I'm going to talk to you about power in this 21st century. And basically, what I'd like to tell you is that power is changing, and there are two types of changes I want to discuss. One is power transition, which is change of power amongst states. And there the simple version of the message is it's moving from West to East. The other is power diffusion, the way power is moving from all states West or East to non-state actors. Those two things are the huge shifts of power in our century. And I want to tell you about them each separately and then how they interact and why, in the end, there may be some good news.
我想和你們談談 這21世紀裡的權力。 而基本上我想告訴你們的, 就是權力正在改變。 有兩種改變 是我想要探討的。 一是權力的轉移, 也就是國際中不同國家擁有的權力的改變。 這種改變簡單說起來 就是權力正由西方移向東方。 另一個則是權力的擴散 也就是權力移動的方式 從所有國家,西方或東方 到非國家或非政府個體。 這兩種現象 就是這世紀裡重要的 權力轉移。 而我想和你們分別聊聊這兩種現象 以及它們如何的互動 和為什麽,在最後,可能還是有好消息。
When we talk about power transition, we often talk about the rise of Asia. It really should be called the recovery or return of Asia. If we looked at the world in 1800, you'd find that more than half of the world's people lived in Asia and they made more than half the world's product. Now fast forward to 1900: half the world's people -- more than half -- still live in Asia, but they're now making only a fifth of the world's product. What happened? The Industrial Revolution, which meant that all of a sudden, Europe and America became the dominant center of the world. What we're going to see in the 21st century is Asia gradually returning to being more than half of the world's population and more than half of the world's product. That's important and it's an important shift. But let me tell you a little bit about the other shift that I'm talking about, which is power diffusion.
在討論權力的轉移的時候, 我們常常講到亞洲的崛起。 但它真的應該要被稱為 亞洲的回復,或重返國際舞臺。 如果我們來看 1800年的世界, 你會發覺世界上過半的人口 住在亞洲, 這過半的人口也生產世界上超過一半的產品。 現在快轉到1900年, 世界上一半的人口--超過一半的人仍然住在亞洲, 但他們只有生產了 世界上五分之一的產品。 有什麼事件發生了嗎? 工業革命。 這表示一夕之間 歐洲和美洲 成為了世界上的統治中心。 我們在二十一世紀會看到的 是亞洲逐步地再擁有 世界過半的人口 和生產超過世界一半的產品。 那是重要的一點,也是很重要的轉變。 但讓我來告訴你們一些 我一開始談到的另一個轉變, 權力的擴散。
To understand power diffusion put this in your mind: computing and communications costs have fallen a thousandfold between 1970 and the beginning of this century. Now that's a big abstract number. But to make it more real, if the price of an automobile had fallen as rapidly as the price of computing power, you could buy a car today for five dollars. Now when the price of any technology declines that dramatically, the barriers to entry go down. Anybody can play in the game. So in 1970, if you wanted to communicate from Oxford to Johannesburg to New Delhi to Brasilia and anywhere simultaneously, you could do it. The technology was there. But to be able to do it, you had to be very rich -- a government, a multinational corporation, maybe the Catholic Church -- but you had to be pretty wealthy. Now, anybody has that capacity, which previously was restricted by price just to a few actors. If they have the price of entry into an Internet cafe -- the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour -- and if you have Skype, it's free. So capabilities that were once restricted are now available to everyone. And what that means
要了解權力的擴散, 你們必須先設想: 計算和通信的費用 跟1970年比起來 二十一世紀初的價格 降低了整整一千倍。 這聽起來像是個大而抽象的數字, 但要讓這聽起來比較真實一點, 我們來假想如果汽車的價格 也是跌了一千倍, 就像電腦計算能力的價格一樣, 你今天可以去買一輛車, 而那只會花上你五塊美金。 當任何科技的價格 如此戲劇性的降低, 入門的門檻也會跟著降低, 任何人都可以參與競爭。 在1970年, 如果你想要啟動 從牛津到約翰尼斯堡 到新德里 到巴西利亞 和任何地方的同步通訊, 你是做得到的, 科技是有的。 但要真的去做, 你必須要非常的富有-- 像是政府、多國企業、 或許天主教廷等才有可能 總之你必須要非常有錢。 但現在,任何人都做得到, 之前因為價格的限制 使得能參與的個體極少, 現在任何人付得起使用網咖的費用-- 我上次看得時候一小時大概才一英鎊吧-- 而且如果你有用Skype的話還免費。 所以在以前 僅限於少數人特權 現在已經到了普及大眾的程度。 而這表示的
is not that the age of the State is over. The State still matters. But the stage is crowded. The State's not alone. There are many, many actors. Some of that's good: Oxfam, a great non-governmental actor. Some of it's bad: Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor. But think of what it does to how we think in traditional terms and concepts. We think in terms of war and interstate war. And you can think back to 1941 when the government of Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. It's worth noticing that a non-state actor attacking the United States in 2001 killed more Americans than the government of Japan did in 1941. You might think of that as the privatization of war. So we're seeing a great change in terms of diffusion of power.
並不是美國的時代已經結束了。 美國仍然很重要。 但是國際舞台上變得更擁擠, 美國並不孤單。還有很多很多的參與者。 有些是好的: 像,樂施會, 這是一個很棒的非政府組織。 有些是不好的: 蓋達組織,另一個非政府組織。 但想想這些 對我們傳統的觀念做了哪些改變。 我們用戰爭 或國與國之間的戰爭的角度來思考。 而你們可以回想一下,在1941年 日本政府 攻擊了美國珍珠港。 值得一提的是 一個非政府的組織 在2001年對美國的攻擊 比1941年日本政府 殺的美國人還要多。 你可以想成 這是戰爭的私有化。 所以我們正看到了很大的改變 發生在權力擴散這方面。
Now the problem is that we're not thinking about it in very innovative ways. So let me step back and ask: what's power? Power is simple the ability to affect others to get the outcomes you want, and you can do it in three ways. You can do it with threats of coercion, "sticks," you can do it with payments, "carrots," or you can do it by getting others to want what you want. And that ability to get others to want what you want, to get the outcomes you want without coercion or payment, is what I call soft power. And that soft power has been much neglected and much misunderstood, and yet it's tremendously important. Indeed, if you can learn to use more soft power, you can save a lot on carrots and sticks. Traditionally, the way people thought about power was primarily in terms of military power. For example, the great Oxford historian who taught here at this university, A.J.P. Taylor, defined a great power as a country able to prevail in war. But we need a new narrative if we're to understand power in the 21st century. It's not just prevailing at war, though war still persists. It's not whose army wins; it's also whose story wins. And we have to think much more in terms of narratives and whose narrative is going to be effective.
現在問題是 我們並沒有用很創新的想法來考量這個現象。 讓我們來重新檢視, 來問問: 權力是什麼? 權力,最簡單來說就是 “影響別人 去得到你想要的結果的能力。” 而這可以用三種方式達成: 你可以使用威脅, 強勢的逼迫--棍子; 你也可以使用金錢-- 紅蘿蔔; 或你可以讓別人 去想要你所想要的結果。 而用這種使別人想要你所想要的能力 來達到你想要的結果, 沒有威脅或金錢利誘 我稱之為軟實力。 而軟實力常常被忽略 甚至誤解。 但其實它扮演了極度重要的角色。 沒錯,如果你能學習 去使用更多的軟實力, 你可以省下很多的 紅蘿蔔和棍子。 傳統來說,大多數人想到權力的時候, 主要都是以武力的角度來想。 舉個例子:偉大的牛津史學家 A.J.P.泰勒曾在這間大學教書。 他定義一個強權 為一個在戰爭裡能夠得勝的國家。 但我們需要一個新的闡述方法 來幫助我們了解二十一世紀裡的權力。 這不只是在戰爭中得勝, 雖然戰爭持續在發生, 這不是誰的軍隊可以贏, 而也是誰的故事可以贏。 而我們必須要多多以故事的角度來想, 看看誰的故事會是最有效的。
Now let me go back to the question of power transition between states and what's happening there. the narratives that we use now tend to be the rise and fall of the great powers. And the current narrative is all about the rise of China and the decline of the United States. Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis, many people said this was the beginning of the end of American power. The tectonic plates of world politics were shifting. And president Medvedev of Russia, for example, pronounced in 2008 this was the beginning of the end of United States power. But in fact, this metaphor of decline is often very misleading. If you look at history, in recent history, you'll see the cycles of belief in American decline come and go every 10 or 15 years or so. In 1958, after the Soviets put up Sputnik, it was "That's the end of America." In 1973, with the oil embargo and the closing of the gold window, that was the end of America. In the 1980s, as America went through a transition in the Reagan period, between the rust belt economy of the midwest to the Silicon Valley economy of California, that was the end of America. But in fact, what we've seen is none of those were true. Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic in the early 2000s, thinking America could do anything, which led us into some disastrous foreign policy adventures, and now we're back to decline again.
現在讓我回到 有關於 權力轉移於 不同國家之間的問題 和現在的情況究竟是如何。 我們現在所使用的闡述方法, 常常是強權的 崛起和殞落。 而當前我們看到的全部都是 中國的崛起 和美國的衰退。 沒錯,2008年的財務危機, 很多人說這是 美國強權結束的開始。 世界政治的 結構板塊正在轉移。 而舉個例子來說:俄羅斯的總統梅德維傑夫 在2008年對外宣稱 這是美國強權 結束的開始。 但事實上, 這種所謂衰退的象徵 是非常誤導人的。 如果你看看歷史,最近的歷史, 你會看到每隔十到十五年, 就會出現對於 美國衰退的看法。 在1958年, 蘇聯把史普尼克1號送上太空之後, 很多人說「那是美國的末日。」 在1973年的石油禁運 以及美元和黃金互相轉換的結束, 很多人也說那是美國的末日。 在1980年代, 當美國經歷了雷根總統任內的經濟轉換-- 從美國中西部的銹帶經濟 到加州的矽谷經濟-- 很多人也說那是美國的末日。 但事實上,我們所看到的 是沒有任何一個關於美國末日的說法是事實。 沒錯,人們在2000年代早期 是過度樂觀的, 他們相信美國什麼都做得到, 進而導致一些災難性的 外交政策, 現在我們又回到了美國正在衰退這個論點。
The moral of this story is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline tell us a lot more about psychology than they do about reality. If we try to focus on the reality, then what we need to focus on is what's really happening in terms of China and the United States. Goldman Sachs has projected that China, the Chinese economy, will surpass that of the U.S. by 2027. So we've got, what, 17 more years to go or so before China's bigger. Now someday, with a billion point three people getting richer, they are going to be bigger than the United States. But be very careful about these projections such as the Goldman Sachs projection as though that gives you an accurate picture of power transition in this century. Let me mention three reasons why it's too simple. First of all, it's a linear projection. You know, everything says, here's the growth rate of China, here's the growth rate of the U.S., here it goes -- straight line. History is not linear. There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way. The second thing is that the Chinese economy passes the U.S. economy in, let's say, 2030, which it may it, that will be a measure of total economic size, but not of per capita income -- won't tell you about the composition of the economy. China still has large areas of underdevelopment and per capita income is a better measure of the sophistication of the economy. And that the Chinese won't catch up or pass the Americans until somewhere in the latter part, after 2050, of this century.
這個故事的寓意指出 所有這些有關崛起衰退再崛起的看法, 告訴我們很多關於心理層面的想法, 而不真正是對現實的描述。 如果我們試著專注於現實, 那我們真的要關心的 是在中國和美國之間 真的在發生的事情。 高盛集團預測 中國和中國的經濟 會在2027年 超越美國。 所以我們還有, 大約十七多年 才會等到中國比美國壯大。 有一天, 當十三億人同時的富有起來 他們會比美國還要強大。 但我們應該謹慎來看, 像是由高盛集團所提出的這些預測。 這些並不能告訴你們 這個世紀裡權力會如何真正的轉移。 讓我提出三個為什麼這些預測太簡易的原因: 第一,這些預測都是直線形的預測。 你們知道,所有的資料顯示 這是中國的成長率,而那是美國的成長率 所以我們來就用這些成長率來做線形的預測。 歷史不是直線形的, 歷史的長路上中間常常會有凸塊甚至有意外發生。 第二點, 當中國的經濟 在,我們假設2030年好了,超越美國的經濟, 這有可能會發生, 那會是一個整個經濟體的測量, 但不是人均收入的測量-- 也就是那並不會顯示整個經濟體的結構。 中國仍然有大部分的區域 處於尚未開發的狀態, 而人均收入是一個比較好的測量方式, 尤其對於中國如此複雜的經濟體。 而中國人在人均收入 在這個世紀後期,2050年以後 都不會追上或超越美國人的人均收入。
The other point that's worth noticing is how one-dimensional this projection is. You know, it looks at economic power measured by GDP. Doesn't tell you much about military power, doesn't tell you very much about soft power. It's all very one-dimensional. And also, when we think about the rise of Asia, or return of Asia as I called it a little bit earlier, it's worth remembering Asia's not one thing. If you're sitting in Japan, or in New Delhi, or in Hanoi, your view of the rise of China is a little different than if you're sitting in Beijing. Indeed, one of the advantages that the Americans will have in terms of power in Asia is all those countries want an American insurance policy against the rise of China. It's as though Mexico and Canada were hostile neighbors to the United States, which they're not. So these simple projections of the Goldman Sachs type are not telling us what we need to know about power transition.
第三點值得注意的 是這些預測 都是只考慮單方面的。 你們知道,當測量經濟實力的時候 採用的是國內生產總值, 這沒辦法告訴你多少關於軍事實力, 沒辦法告訴你多少關於軟實力, 這完全是一維化的。 同時,當我們想到亞洲崛起, 或我早些對這個現象的稱呼 亞洲重返國際舞臺的時候, 我們應該要記得亞洲不是一個個體. 如果你坐在日本、 新德里、 或是河內, 那你對中國崛起的看法 將會和你坐在北京的看法有些不同。 沒錯,美國 在亞洲的權力分配裡 將會有的優勢之一, 是很多亞洲國家 會想要有美國作靠山 來抗衡中國的崛起。 這就像是如果墨西哥和加拿大 是美國危險的鄰居-- 他們當然不是。 所以這些例如高盛 所做的簡單的預測, 並沒有告訴我們對於 權力轉移所需要知道的東西。
But you might ask, well so what in any case? Why does it matter? Who cares? Is this just a game that diplomats and academics play? The answer is it matters quite a lot. Because, if you believe in decline and you get the answers wrong on this, the facts, not the myths, you may have policies which are very dangerous. Let me give you an example from history. The Peloponnesian War was the great conflict in which the Greek city state system tore itself apart two and a half millennia ago. What caused it? Thucydides, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War, said it was the rise in the power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. Notice both halves of that explanation.
但你可能會問,好吧,但是如果中國真的崛起了那又怎樣? 這很重要嗎?為什麼我們應該去關心這件事? 這是不是一場 外交官和學術家們在玩的遊戲? 答案是,這的確很重要。 因為,如果你相信衰退, 而你對於衰退的疑問的回答是不正確的 事實,甚至不是神話, 你可能會採取一些很危險的政策。 讓我從歷史來給你們舉個例子, 伯羅奔尼撒戰爭 是那場 希臘式城邦系統 被自己摧毀的大衝突, 這發生在大約兩千五百年前。 什麼導致它的發生? 修昔底德,紀錄伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的偉大史學家, 說是雅典為首的同盟的實力盛興 進而對斯巴達帶來恐懼而導致的。 注意這兩半的解釋,
Many people argue that the 21st century is going to repeat the 20th century, in which World War One, the great conflagration in which the European state system tore itself apart and destroyed its centrality in the world, that that was caused by the rise in the power of Germany and the fear it created in Britain. So there are people who are telling us this is going to be reproduced today, that what we're going to see is the same thing now in this century. No, I think that's wrong. It's bad history. For one thing, Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial strength by 1900. And as I said earlier, China has not passed the United States. But also, if you have this belief and it creates a sense of fear, it leads to overreaction. And the greatest danger we have of managing this power transition of the shift toward the East is fear. To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt from a different context, the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself. We don't have to fear the rise of China or the return of Asia. And if we have policies in which we take it in that larger historical perspective, we're going to be able to manage this process.
很多人會說 二十一世紀 將會重覆二十世紀: 像第一次世界大戰是 歐洲各國政治系統 摧毀自己 和摧毀歐洲在世界中心 的導火綫。 而原因是由於 德國實力的崛起 和它在英國造成的恐懼導致的。 所以現在我們就聽到 類似的歷史將會重演, 而我們將會看到 同樣的事情發生在這個世紀。 不,我認為這是錯的。 這是拙劣的歷史。 我們必須知道,德國 在1900年就已經在工業實力上超越了英國, 而我早些已經提到了, 中國還沒有超越美國。 但是,如果你相信中國已經超越美國, 而那產生了一種恐懼感, 這就會導致過度反應。 而我們當前 在管理這個權力朝東方轉移 最大的危險就是恐懼。 我來改述富蘭克林‧羅斯福 在另一個場合所講的, 我們最大的恐懼,就是恐懼本身。 我們不需要害怕中國的崛起, 或是亞洲重返國際舞臺, 而如果我們有 把歷史放入考量 的政策, 我們將可以 有效度過這個過程。
Let me say a word now about the distribution of power and how it relates to power diffusion and then pull these two types together. If you ask how is power distributed in the world today, it's distributed much like a three-dimensional chess game. Top board: military power among states. The United States is the only superpower, and it's likely to remain that way for two or three decades. China's not going to replace the U.S. on this military board. Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game: economic power among states. Power is multi-polar. There are balancers -- the U.S., Europe, China, Japan can balance each other. The bottom board of this three-dimensional, the board of transnational relations, things that cross borders outside the control of governments, things like climate change, drug trade, financial flows, pandemics, all these things that cross borders outside the control of governments, there nobody's in charge. It makes no sense to call this unipolar or multi-polar. Power is chaotically distributed. And the only way you can solve these problems -- and this is where many greatest challenges are coming in this century -- is through cooperation, through working together, which means that soft power becomes more important, that ability to organize networks to deal with these kinds of problems and to be able to get cooperation.
現在讓我來談談 權力的分配 以及它和權力的擴散的關係, 然後在把這兩者連結在一起。 如果你問說今天全球的權力是如何分配的? 答案是 那就像一場立體3D的三層西洋棋賽: 最上一個棋盤: 不同國家的軍事實力。 美國是唯一的強權, 而這很有可能在 未來二三十年保持如此, 中國在這個層面不會取代美國。 中間的棋盤: 不同國家的經濟實力, 實力是多極化的, 這有很多的平衡者: 美國、歐洲、 中國、日本 會平衡彼此。 最下層的棋盤: 國家之間的關係, 外於政府控制而跨國界的東西, 像是氣候變遷、毒品交易、 財務流、 全球流行病等, 所有這些跨越國界 而外於政府控制的東西, 沒有人是真正的領頭。 要稱之為單極化 或多極化並不正確。 權力很混亂的分散, 而唯一能解決這些問題的方法 而這也是很多這世紀 最大的挑戰 就是合作, 同心協力的來解決。 這也表示軟實力越來越重要。 軟實力能夠組織、 解決這些問題 和組織合作的連結。
Another way of putting it is that as we think of power in the 21st century, we want to get away from the idea that power's always zero sum -- my gain is your loss and vice versa. Power can also be positive sum, where your gain can be my gain. If China develops greater energy security and greater capacity to deal with its problems of carbon emissions, that's good for us as well as good for China as well as good for everybody else. So empowering China to deal with its own problems of carbon is good for everybody, and it's not a zero sum, I win, you lose. It's one in which we can all gain. So as we think about power in this century, we want to get away from this view that it's all I win, you lose. Now I don't mean to be Pollyannaish about this. Wars persist. Power persists. Military power is important. Keeping balances is important. All this still persists. Hard power is there, and it will remain. But unless you learn how to mix hard power with soft power into strategies that I call smart power, you're not going to deal with the new kinds of problems that we're facing.
另一種描述這的方式, 就是當我們思考二十一世紀裡的權力, 我們必須摒棄 權力是零和遊戲這個觀念-- 我的增是你的減。 權力的總和可以是正數, 也就是你的增加也可以是我的增加。 如果中國開發了更多的能源保證 和更多的能力 來處理它境內的碳排放的問題, 那對我們有益、 對中國有益、 也對所有其他人有益。 所以激勵中國 來處理它的碳排放問題 對所有人都有益, 而這不會是權力加總起來是零, 而是所有人都從中獲益。 所以當我們想到 這個世紀裡的權力, 我們必須遠離 我嬴你輸這種看法。 我無意做一個盲目而樂觀的人, 戰爭仍然在發生,權力仍然重要, 軍事實力很重要, 保持平衡很重要, 這些所有的仍然持續著, 硬實力還是存在, 而且還會繼續存留。 但除非你學著將 硬實力和軟實力 混合成所謂我稱呼的巧實力, 你將無法處理我們正在面對 的新的問題。
So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this is how do we work together to produce global public goods, things from which all of us can benefit? How do we define our national interests so that it's not just zero sum, but positive sum. In that sense, if we define our interests, for example, for the United States the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century, keeping an open trading system, keeping a monetary stability, keeping freedom of the seas -- those were good for Britain, they were good for others as well. And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that. How do we produce global public goods, which are good for us, but good for everyone at the same time? And that's going to be the good news dimension of what we need to think about as we think of power in the 21st century.
所以我們現在最需要思考的關鍵問題, 就是我們如何可以同心協力合作 來產生對於全球都有好處 使得每個人都可以獲益? 我們如何定義我們的國家利益, 使得權力的總和不會是零, 而是大於零。 如果我們能使用這種思維來定義國家利益, 舉個例子:對美國來說 英國在十九世紀定義國家利益的方法, 是保持開放的貿易系統、 保持貨幣穩定、保持航海的自由-- 這些對英國有益, 也對其他國家有益。 而在二十一世紀裡,你必須要做出類似的舉動。 我們如何產生全球公共財, 那不只對我們有益 也在同時讓所有人獲益, 而那就是屬於我們在思考 二十一世紀裡的權力 的好消息的方面
There are ways to define our interests in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power, we can organize with others in networks to produce, not only public goods, but ways that will enhance our soft power. So if one looks at the statements that have been made about this, I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton described the foreign policy of the Obama administration, she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration was going to be smart power, as she put it, "using all the tools in our foreign policy tool box." And if we're going to deal with these two great power shifts that I've described, the power shift represented by transition among states, the power shift represented by diffusion of power away from all states, we're going to have to develop a new narrative of power in which we combine hard and soft power into strategies of smart power. And that's the good news I have. We can do that.
在定義國家利益的時候, 除了使用硬實力來保護自己, 我們還能組織我們和其他人 來生產,不只有公共財 還有能夠提升我們軟實力的方法。 所以如果有人來檢驗 官方對於此的發言, 希拉蕊‧柯林頓在描述 歐巴馬政府的外交政策 的發言給我很深刻的印象: 她說歐巴馬政府的外交政策 將會以巧實力為中心, 她說:「使用我們外交政策 工具箱裡所有的工具。」 而如果我們要面對 我所提到的重大權力轉移: 由轉移在不同國家之間所代表的, 和由擴散遠離於政府 所代表的權力轉移, 我們將會有一個對於權力的新的闡述方法。 結合硬和軟實力 來創造聰明實力的策略, 這就是我的好消息。我們真的做得到。
Thank you very much.
非常謝謝你們
(Applause)
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