Amongst all the troubling deficits we struggle with today -- we think of financial and economic primarily -- the ones that concern me most is the deficit of political dialogue -- our ability to address modern conflicts as they are, to go to the source of what they're all about and to understand the key players and to deal with them. We who are diplomats, we are trained to deal with conflicts between states and issues between states. And I can tell you, our agenda is full. There is trade, there is disarmament, there is cross-border relations.
Midis gjithe problemeve me deficite ne luftojme me te sotmen-- ne kryesisht mendojme per financa dhe ekonomi-- per te cilat shqetsohemi me shume eshte deficiti i dialogu politike-- aftesia jone per te adresuar konflikte moderne ashtu sic ato jane, për të shkuar tek burimi dhe per te kuptuar lojtaret kyç dhe te merremi me ta. Ne te cilet jemi diplomat, ne jemi trajnuar te mirremi me konfliktet ndermjet shteteve dhe ceshtjeve ndermjet shteteve. Dhe une mund t'u them se agjenda jone eshte e mbushur. Eshte tregti, eshte çarmatim, eshte mardhenie e kalimit te kufirit.
But the picture is changing, and we are seeing that there are new key players coming onto the scene. We loosely call them "groups." They may represent social, religious, political, economic, military realities. And we struggle with how to deal with them. The rules of engagement: how to talk, when to talk, and how to deal with them.
Por gjendja eshte duke ndryshuar, dhe ne jemi duke pare se jane lojtar te ri kryesor duke ardhur ne skene. Ne lirshem i thrrasim ata"grupe." Ata mund te perfaqesojne realitete shoqerore, religjioze, poltike, ekonomike, ushtarake. Dhe ne luftojme se si te merremi me ata. Rregullat e angazhimit: si te flasim, kur te flasim, dhe si te mirremi me ta.
Let me show you a slide here which illustrates the character of conflicts since 1946 until today. You see the green is a traditional interstate conflict, the ones we used to read about. The red is modern conflict, conflicts within states. These are quite different, and they are outside the grasp of modern diplomacy. And the core of these key actors are groups who represent different interests inside countries. And the way they deal with their conflicts rapidly spreads to other countries. So in a way, it is everybody's business.
Me lerni t'ju tregoj nje sllajd ketu i cili ilustron karakteret e konflikteve qe nga 1946 deri me sot. Ju e shihni te gjelberten eshte nje konflikt tradicional ndershtetror, ato te cilat ne i lexonim. E kuqja edhte konflikt modern, konfliktet ndermjet shteteve. Keto jane tersisht ndryshe, dhe ato jane jashte zoterimit te diplomacise moderne. Dhe thelbi i ketyre aktoreve kryesor jane grupet te cilet perfaqsojne interese te ndryshme mbrenda shteteve. Dhe menyra si ata mirren me konfliktete e tyre shpejt shperndahet ne shtete tjera. Pra ne njefare menyre, eshte puna e te gjitheve.
Another acknowledgment we've seen during these years, recent years, is that very few of these domestic interstate, intrastate conflicts can be solved militarily. They may have to be dealt with with military means, but they cannot be solved by military means. They need political solutions. And we, therefore, have a problem, because they escape traditional diplomacy. And we have among states a reluctance in dealing with them. Plus, during the last decade, we've been in the mode where dealing with groups was conceptually and politically dangerous. After 9/11, either you were with us or against us. It was black or white. And groups are very often immediately label terrorists. And who would talk to terrorists? The West, as I would see it, comes out of that decade weakened, because we didn't understand the group. So we've spent more time on focusing on why we should not talk to others than finding out how we talk to others.
Tjeter njohuri qe e kemi pare gjate ketyre viteve, viteve te fundit, eshte se shume pak te ketyre konflikteve ndershteterore mund te zgjidhen nga ana ushtarake. Ato do të duhen të trajtohen me mjete ushtarake, por ato nuk mund te zgjidhen me mjete ushtarake. Ato kane nevoje per zgjidhje politike. Dhe ne, per kete, kemi nje problem, sepse ata larguan diplomacine tradicionale. Dhe ne kemi ndermjet shteteve nje ngurrim per te bere marreveshje me ata. Plus, gjate dekades se fundit, keni qene ne forme ku marreveshjet me grupet ishin konceptualisht dhe politikisht te rrezikshme. Pas 9/11, ju ose ishte me ne ose kunder nesh. Ishte zi ose bardhe. Dhe grupet shume shpesh etiketohen si terrorist. Dhe kush dp te fliste me terrorista? Perendimi, sic une do ta shikoja, vjen nga e ajo dekade dobësuar, sepse ne nuk e kemi kuptuar grupin. Pra ne kaluam me shume kohe duke u fokusuar pse ne nuk duhet te flasim me te tjeret sesa te zbulojme si ne flasim me te tjeret.
Now I'm not naive. You cannot talk to everybody all the time. And there are times you should walk. And sometimes military intervention is necessary. I happen to believe that Libya was necessary and that military intervention in Afghanistan was also necessary. And my country relies on its security through military alliance, that's clear. But still we have a large deficit in dealing with and understanding modern conflict.
Tani une nuk jam naiv. Ju nuk mund te flisni me te gjithe gjithe kohen. Dhe ka momente qe ju duhet te ecni. Dhe ndonjehere intervenimi ushtarak eshte i nevojshem. Une besoj se Libia ishte e nevojshme dhe se intervenimi ushtarak ne Afganistan gjithashtu ishte i nevojshem. Dhe vendi im mbeshtetet ne kete siguri nepermes aleances ushtarake, kjo eshte e qarte. Por ne akoma kemi nje deficit te madh qe kane ite bejne ne te kuptuarit e konfliktit modern.
Let us turn to Afghanistan. 10 years after that military intervention, that country is far from secure. The situation, to be honest, is very serious. Now again, the military is necessary, but the military is no problem-solver. When I first came to Afghanistan in 2005 as a foreign minister, I met the commander of ISAF, the international troops. And he told me that, "This can be won militarily, minister. We just have to persevere." Now four COM ISAF's later, we hear a different message: "This cannot be won militarily. We need military presence, but we need to move to politics. We can only solve this through a political solution. And it is not us who will solve it; Afghans have to solve it." But then they need a different political process than the one they were given in 2001, 2002. They need an inclusive process where the real fabric of this very complicated society can deal with their issues.
Le te kthehemi tek Afganistani. 10 vite pas atij intervenimi ushtarak, ai vend eshte larg nga siguria. Situata per te qene i sinqerte, eshte shume serioze. Tani perseri, ushtria eshte e nevojshme, por ushtria nuk eshte zgjidhje e prolemit. Kur erdha per te paren here ne Afganistan ne 2005 si minister i jashtem, Une takova komandantin e ISAF, trupat internacional, Dhe ai me tha qe, "Kjo mund te fitohet ushtarakisht, minister. Ne vetem duhet te kembngulim." Tani kater COM ISAF ne degjojme nje mesazh te ndryshem: "Kjo nuk mund te fitohet ushtarakisht. Ne kemi nevoje per presence ushtarake, por ne kemi nevoje te levizim ne politike. Ne vetem mund ta zgjidhim kete nepermjet zgjidhjes politike. Dhe nuk jemi ne te cilet do ta zgjidhin kete; Afganet duhet ta zgjidhin ate." Por pastaj ata kane nevoje per nje proces tjter pollitike sesa ato qe atyre i'u ishind dhene ne 2001, 2002. Ata kane nevoje per nje proces gjitheperfshires ku struktura e vertete e kesaj shoqerie te komplikuar mund te mirret me ceshtjet e tyre.
Everybody seems to agree with that. It was very controversial to say three, four, five years ago. Now everybody agrees. But now, as we prepare to talk, we understand how little we know. Because we didn't talk. We didn't grasp what was going on. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, is talking to everyone, and it is doing so because it is neutral. And that's one reason why that organization probably is the best informed key player to understand modern conflict -- because they talk.
Te gjithe duket qe po pajtohen me ate. Ishte shume e diskutueshene per te thene trem kater, pese vite me pare. Tani te gjithe pajtohen. Por tani, pasi ne pergaditemi te flasim, ne kuptojme sa pak dime. Sepse ne nuk kemi folur. Ne nuk e kuptuam cka ishte duke ndodhur. Komisioni Nderkombtar i Kryqit te Kuc, ICRC, eshte duke folur me te gjithe, dhe eshte duke bere keshtu sepse eshte neutral. Dhe kjo eshte nje arsye pse ajo organizate ndoshta eshte lojtari me i informuar per te kuptuar konfliktin modern-- sepse ata flasin.
My point is that you don't have to be neutral to talk. And you don't have to agree when you sit down with the other side. And you can always walk. But if you don't talk, you can't engage the other side. And the other side which you're going to engage is the one with whom you profoundly disagree. Prime Minister Rabin said when he engaged the Oslo process, "You don't make peace with your friends, you make peace with your enemies." It's hard, but it is necessary.
Qellimi im eshte se ju nuk duhet te jeni neutral per te folur. Dhe ju nuk duhet te pajtoheni kur ju te uleni me anen tjeter. Dhe ju gjithmone mund te ecni. Por nese nuk flisni, ju nuk mund te angazhoni pjesen tjeter. Dhe pjesa tjeter ne te cilen ju do te angazhoheni eshte ajo me te cilen ju thellesisht nuk pajtoheni. Kryeministri Rabin tha kur ai u angazhua ne procesin e Oslos, "Ju nuk beni paqe me shoket tuaj, ju beni paqe me armiqet tuaj." Eshte e veshtirem por eshte e nevojshme.
Let me go one step further. This is Tahrir Square. There's a revolution going on. The Arab Spring is heading into fall and is moving into winter. It will last for a long, long time. And who knows what it will be called in the end. That's not the point. The point is that we are probably seeing, for the first time in the history of the Arab world, a revolution bottom-up -- people's revolution. Social groups are taking to the streets. And we find out in the West that we know very little about what's happening. Because we never talk to the people in these countries. Most governments followed the dictate of the authoritarian leaders to stay away from these different groups, because they were terrorists. So now that they are emerging in the street and we salute the democratic revolution, we find out how little we know.
Me lerni te shkoj nje hap me tutje. Ky eshte Sheshi Tahrir. Nje revulucion eshte duke ndodhur. Pranvera Arabe eshte duke shkuar be vejshte dhe eshte duke u zhvendosur ne dimer. Do te zgjas per nje kohe shume, shume te gjate. Dhe kush e di se si do ye quhet ne fund. Ky nuk eshte qellimi. Qellimi eshte se ne ndoshta jemi duke e pare, per te paren here ne historine e botes Arabe, nje revulucion nga poshte- lart-- revulucioni i njerezve. Grupet shoqerore jane duke u marr ne rruge. Dhe ne e zbuluam ne Perendim se ne dime shume pak rreth asaj se cka eshte duke ndoshur. Sepse ne kurre nuk flasim me njerez ne keto vende. Shumica e qeverive ndoqen urdherat e liderve autoritar per te qendruar larg nga keto grupe te ndryshme, sepse ata ishin terrorist. Pra, tani ata jane duke u shfaqur neper rruge dhe ne e pershendesim revulucionin demokratik, ne e gjetem sa pak ne dime.
Right now, the discussion goes, "Should we talk to the Muslim Brotherhood? Should we talk to Hamas? If we talk to them, we may legitimize them." I think that is wrong. If you talk in the right way, you make it very clear that talking is not agreeing. And how can we tell the Muslim Brotherhood, as we should, that they must respect minority rights, if we don't accept majority rights? Because they may turn out to be a majority. How can we escape [having] a double-standard, if we at the same time preach democracy and at the same time don't want to deal with the groups that are representative? How will we ever be interlocutors? Now my diplomats are instructed to talk to all these groups. But talking can be done in different ways. We make a distinction between talking from a diplomatic level and talking at the political level. Now talking can be accompanied with aid or not with aid. Talking can be accompanied with inclusion or not inclusion.
Per momentin, diskutimi vazhdon, " A duhet te flasim me Vllazerin Muslimane? A duhet te flasim me Hamas? Nese ne flasim per ta, ne mund t'i legjitimojme ata." Une mendoj se kjo eshte gabim Nese flisni ne menyren e duhur, ju e beni shume te qarte se te folurit nuk eshte pajtushmeri. Dhe si mund ti tregojme Vllezerve Musliman, sic duhet, se ata duhet te respektojne te drejtat e minoriteteve, nese ne nuk i pranojme te drejtat e shumices? Pershkak se ata mund te jene shumice. Si mund te ikim duke pasur nje standard te dyfishte, nese ne ne kohen e njejte predikojme per demokraci dhe ne te njejten kohe nuk duam te bejme marreveshje me grupet te cilet jane perfaqesues? Si do te jemi bashkebisedues? Tani diplomatet e mi jane te mesuar te flasin me gjithe keta grupe. Por te folurit mund te behet ne menyra te ndryshme. Ne bejme nje dallim ndermjet te folurit nga nje nivel diplomatik dhe te folurit nga nje nivel poltik. Tani te folurit mund te shoqerohet me ndihme ose pa ndihme. Te folurit mund te shoqerohet me perfshirje dhe jo perfshirje.
There's a big array of the ways of dealing with this. So if we refuse to talk to these new groups that are going to be dominating the news in years to come, we will further radicalization, I believe. We will make the road from violent activities into politics harder to travel. And if we cannot demonstrate to these groups that if you move towards democracy, if you move towards taking part in civilized and normal standards among states, there are some rewards on the other side. The paradox here is that the last decade probably was a lost decade for making progress on this.
Eshte nje liste e madhe me menyrat se di duhet te mirreni me kete. Keshtu nese ne refuzojme te flasim me keto grupe te reja qe do te dominojne ne lajme ne vitet qe po vine, ne do te dergojme me tej radikalizmin, une besoj. Ne do të bëjmë rrugën nga aktivitetet e dhunshme në politikë me veshtire per te udhetuar. Dhe nese ne nuk mund te ja demonstrojme ketyre grupeve se nese ju levzini ne drejtim te demokracise nese ju levizni drejt marrjes pjese ne standardet e civilizuara dhe moderne ndermjet shteteve, jane disa shperblime ne anen tjeter. Paradoksi ketu eshte se dekada e fundit ndoshta ishte dekada e humbur per te bere perparim ne kete.
And the paradox is that the decade before the last decade was so promising -- and for one reason primarily. And the reason is what happened in South Africa: Nelson Mandela. When Mandela came out of prison after 27 years of captivity, if he had told his people, "It's time to take up the arms, it's time to fight," he would have been followed. And I think the international community would have said, "Fair enough. It's their right to fight." Now as you know, Mandela didn't do that. In his memoirs, "Long Road to Freedom," he wrote that he survived during those years of captivity because he always decided to look upon his oppressor as also being a human being, also being a human being. So he engaged a political process of dialogue, not as a strategy of the weak, but as a strategy of the strong. And he engaged talking profoundly by settling some of the most tricky issues through a truth and reconciliation process where people came and talked. Now South African friends will know that was very painful.
Dhe paradoksi eshte se dekada para dekades se fusnit ishte shume premtuese-- dhe per nje arsye kryesore. Dhe arsyeja eshte cka ndodhi ne Afriken Jugore: Nelson Mandela. Kur Mandela doli nga burgu pas 27 viteve te roberise, nese ai i'u kishte treguar njerezve te tij, " Eshte koha t'i kapim armet, eshte koha te luftojme," ai do e ndiqej. Dhe une mendoj se komuniteti nderkombtar do te thoshte,"Koxha e drejte. Eshte e drejta e tyre per te luftuar." Tani sic ju e dini, Mandela nuk e ka bere ate. Ne kujtimet e tij, "Long Road To Freedom." ai shkroi se ai mbijetoj pergjate ketyre viteve te roberise sepse ai gjithmone vendosi te shikonte ne tiranin e tij gjithashtu duke qene nje qenie humane, gjithashtu duke qene nje qenie njerezore. Pra ai angazhoj nje proces poltike te dialogut, jo si strategji e dobesise, por si strategji e fortesise. Dhe ai anganzhoj te folurit thellesisht duke i vendosur disa nga ceshtjet më me hile permes te vertetes dhe procesit te pajtimit ku njerezit erdhen dhe folen. Tani shoket e Afikes Jugore do te dine se ajo ishte shume e dhimbshme.
So what can we learn from all of this? Dialogue is not easy -- not between individuals, not between groups, not between governments -- but it is very necessary. If we're going to deal with political conflict-solving of conflicts, if we're going to understand these new groups which are coming from bottom-up, supported by technology, which is available to all, we diplomats cannot be sitting back in the banquets believing that we are doing interstate relations. We have to connect with these profound changes.
Pra cka mund te dime nga e gjithe kjo? Dialogu nuk eshte i lehte-- jo ndermjet individeve, jo ndermjet grupeve, jo ndermjet qeverive-- por eshte shume e nevojshme. Nëse ne do të merren me konfliktin poltike zgjidhjen e konflikteve, nese do te kuptojne keto grupe te reja te cilet jane dyje ardhur nga poshte- lart, mbeshtetur nga teknologjia, e cila eshte gatshme per te gjithe, ne diplomatet nuk mun te ulemi ne kankete duke besuar se ne jemi duke bere mardhenie ndershtetrore. Ne duhet te lidhemi me keto ndryshime te thella.
And what is dialogue really about? When I enter into dialogue, I really hope that the other side would pick up my points of view, that I would impress upon them my opinions and my values. I cannot do that unless I send the signals that I will be open to listen to the other side's signals. We need a lot more training on how to do that and a lot more practice on how that can take problem-solving forward. We know from our personal experiences that it's easy sometimes just to walk, and sometimes you may need to fight. And I wouldn't say that is the wrong thing in all circumstances. Sometimes you have to. But that strategy seldom takes you very far. The alternative is a strategy of engagement and principled dialogue. And I believe we need to strengthen this approach in modern diplomacy, not only between states, but also within states.
Dhe per cka me te vertete eshte dialogu ? Kur une hy ne dialog, Une me te vertete shpresoj se ana tjeter do ti kap pikat e mendimit tim, qe do te le pershtyje ne ta opinionet e mia dhe aftesit e mija. Une nuk mund ta beje ate perderisa une i dergoj sinjalet se une do te jem i hapur te degjoj sinjalet e anes tjeter. Ne kemi nevoje per me shume trajnime se si ta bejme ate dhe shume me shume praktike se si kjo mund ta shty perpara zgjidhjen e problemit. Ne e dime nga eksperincat tona personale se eshte e lehet ndonjehere vetem te ecim, dhe ndonjehere juve ju duhet te luftoni. Dhe unë nuk do të thoja se është gjë e gabuar në të gjitha rrethanat. Nganjehere ju duhet te. Por ajo strategji rrale ju dergon shume larg. Alternativa eshte nje strategji e bashkpunimit dhe dialogur parimor. Dhe une besoj se ne duhet ta forcojme kete arritje ne diplomacine moderne, jo vetem ndermjet shteteve, por gjithashtu mbrenda shteteve.
We are seeing some new signs. We could never have done the convention against anti-personnel landmines and the convention that is banning cluster munitions unless we had done diplomacy differently, by engaging with civil society. All of a sudden, NGOs were not only standing in the streets, crying their slogans, but they were taking [them] into the negotiations, partly because they represented the victims of these weapons. And they brought their knowledge. And there was an interaction between diplomacy and the power coming bottom-up. This is perhaps a first element of a change. In the future, I believe, we should draw examples from these different illustrations, not to have diplomacy which is disconnected from people and civil society.
Ne jemi duke i pare disa shenja te reja. Ne kurre nuk do ti kishim bere Konventa kunder minave tokesore anti-personel dhe konventë që ndalon municionetthërrmuese vec nese ne kemi bere diplomaci ndryshe, duke u angazhuar me shoqerine civile. Krejt papritmas, NGO jo vetem qe ishin duke qendruar ne rruge, me parrulat e tyre, por ata ishin duke i marre ata ne negociata, pjeserisht sepse ata perfaqsonin viktimat e ketyre armeve, Dhe ata sollen njohrine e tyre. Dhe ishte nje bashkeveprim ndermjet diplomacise dhe fuqise se ardhshme poshte- lart. Ky ndoshta eshte elementi i pare i ndryshimit. N ete ardhmen, une besoj ne duhet te nxjerrim shembuj nga keto ilustrime te ndryshme, jo te kemi diplomaci e cila eshte e shkeputur nga njerezit dhe shoqeria civile.
And we have to go also beyond traditional diplomacy to the survival issue of our times, climate change. How are we going to solve climate change through negotiations, unless we are able to make civil society and people, not part of the problem, but part of the solution? It is going to demand an inclusive process of diplomacy very different from the one we are practicing today as we are heading to new rounds of difficult climate negotiations, but when we move toward something which has to be much more along a broad mobilization. It's crucial to understand, I believe, because of technology and because of globalization, societies from bottom-up.
Dhe ne gjithashtu duhet te shkojme pertej diplomacise tradicionale tek ceshtjet mbijetuese te koherave tona, ndryshimi i mjedisit. Si do te zgjidhim ndryshimin e mjedisit nepermjet negociatave, perderisa ne jemi ne gjendje te bejme shoqeri civile dhe njerez, jo pjese e problemit, por pjese e zgjidhjes? Kjo do të kërkojë një proces gjithëpërfshirës të diplomacisë shume ndryshe prej asaj qe ne jemi duke e praktikuar sot si ne jemi të nisej për raunde të reja të negociatave të vështira klimatike, por kur ne levzim drejt dicka e cila duhet te jete shume me shume përgjatë një mobilizim të gjerë. Eshte thelbesore te kuptojme, une besoj pershkak te teknologjise dhe pershkak te globalizimit, shoqerite nga poshte-lart.
We as diplomats need to know the social capital of communities. What is it that makes people trust each other, not only between states, but also within states? What is the legitimacy of diplomacy, of the the solution we devise as diplomats if they cannot be reflected and understood by also these broader forces of societies that we now very loosely call groups?
Ne si diplomat kemi nevoje te dime per kapitalin shoqeror te komuniteteve. Cka eshte ajo qe i ben njerezit te besojne ne njerin tjetrin, jo vetem ndermjet shteteve, por gjithashtu mbrenda shteteve? Cila eshte ligjshmeria e diplomacise, e zgjidhjes qe ne si diplomat sajojme nese ata nuk mund te reflektojne dhe kuptojne nga keto forca me te gjera te shoqerive qe ne tani shume lirshem i qujame grupe?
The good thing is that we are not powerless. We have never had as many means of communication, means of being connected, means of reaching out, means of including. The diplomatic toolbox is actually full of different tools we can use to strengthen our communication. But the problem is that we are coming out of a decade where we had a fear of touching it. Now, I hope, in the coming years, that we are able to demonstrate through some concrete examples that fear is receding and that we can take courage from that alliance with civil society in different countries to support their problem-solving, among the Afghans, inside the Palestinian population, between the peoples of Palestine and Israel.
Gjeja e mire eshte se ne nuk jemi te pafuqishem. Ne kurr nuk kemi qene si shume menyra te komunikimit, menyra te te qenurit i kyqur, menyra per te arritur menyra te perfshirjes. Kutia diplomatike faktikisht eshte e mbushur me vegla te ndryshme qe ne mund ti perdorimin per te forcuar komunikimin tone. Por porblemi eshte se ne jem duke ardhur nje nje dekade ku ne kishim frike per te prekur ate. Tani, une shpresoj, ne vitet ne vijme, ne te jemi ne gjendje te demonstrojme nepermjet disa shembujve konkret qe frika eshte duke y larguar dhe qe ne mund marrim huxim nga ajo aleance me shoqeri civile ne vende te ndryshme te mbeshtesim zgjidhjen e problemit te tyre ndermjet Afganeve, mbrenda popullit Palestinez, ndermjet njerezve te Palestines dhe Izraelit.
And as we try to understand this broad movement across the Arab world, we are not powerless. We need to improve the necessary skills, and we need the courage to use them. In my country, I have seen how the council of Islamist groups and Christian groups came together, not as a government initiative, but they came together on their own initiative to establish contact and dialogue in times where things were pretty low-key tension. And when tension increased, they already had that dialogue, and that was a strength to deal with different issues.
Dhe pasi ne perpiqemi te kuptojme kete levzije te gjere pertej bptes Arabe, ne nuk jemi te pafuqishem. Ne kemi nevoje te permirsojme aftesite e nevojshme, dhe ne kemi nevoje per guximin per t'i perdorur ato. Ne vendim tim, Une kam pare si keshilli i grupeve Islame dhe grupet Krishtere u bashkuan, jo si nje iniciative e qeverise, por ata u bashkuan ne iniciativene tyre per te zhvilluar kontaktin dhe dialogun ne kohera kur gjerat ishin jo shume tensionuese. Dhe kur tensioni u ngrit, ata tanime e kishim ate dialog, dhe kjo ishte një forcë për t'u marrë me çështje të ndryshme.
Our modern Western societies are more complex than before, in this time of migration. How are we going to settle and build a bigger "We" to deal with our issues if we don't improve our skills of communication? So there are many reasons, and for all of these reasons, this is time and this is why we must talk.
Shoqerite tona Perendimore e moderne jane me te nderlikuara se me pare, ne kete kohe te migrimit. Si do ta vendosim dhe ndertojme nje "Ne" te madhe te mirremi me ceshtjet tona nese nuk i permiresojme aftesite tona te komunikimit? Pra jane shume arsye, dhe per te gjitha keto arsye, kjo eshte koha dhe kjo eshte pse ne duhet te flasim.
Thank you for your attention.
Faleminderit per vemendjen tuaj.
(Applause)
(Duartokitje)