On March 10, 2011, I was in Cambridge at the MIT Media Lab meeting with faculty, students and staff, and we were trying to figure out whether I should be the next director.
10. Marta 2011, Bio sam na Kembridžu u MIT-ovoj istraživačkoj laboratoriji gdje je bio održan sastanak sa fakultetom, studentima i osobljem, i pokušavali smo da odlučimo da li ja treba da budem sljedeći direktor.
That night, at midnight, a magnitude 9 earthquake hit off of the Pacific coast of Japan. My wife and family were in Japan, and as the news started to come in, I was panicking. I was looking at the news streams and listening to the press conferences of the government officials and the Tokyo Power Company, and hearing about this explosion at the nuclear reactors and this cloud of fallout that was headed towards our house which was only about 200 kilometers away. And the people on TV weren't telling us anything that we wanted to hear. I wanted to know what was going on with the reactor, what was going on with the radiation, whether my family was in danger.
Te noći, u ponoć, zemljotres jačine 9 Rihtera je pogodio Japan na obali Pacifika. Moja žena i porodica su bili u Japanu, i kako su vijesti počele da pristižu, hvatala me je panika. Gledao sam prenose vijesti i slušao pres-konferencije vladinih službenih lica i Tokio Power kompanije, i slušao o toj eksploziji u nuklearnim reaktorima i tom oblaku radioaktivnih čestica koji se uputio ka našoj kući koja je bila udaljena svega oko 200 kilometara. A ljudi sa televizije nam nijesu govorili ništa što smo željeli da čujemo. Htio sam da znam šta se događalo sa reaktorom, šta se događalo sa radijacijom, da li je moja porodica bila u opasnosti.
So I did what instinctively felt like the right thing, which was to go onto the Internet and try to figure out if I could take matters into my own hands. On the Net, I found there were a lot of other people like me trying to figure out what was going on, and together we sort of loosely formed a group and we called it Safecast, and we decided we were going to try to measure the radiation and get the data out to everybody else, because it was clear that the government wasn't going to be doing this for us.
Tako sam uradio ono što je instinktivno djelovalo kao ispravna stvar, a to je bilo da uđem na internet i pokušam da saznam da li mogu da uzmem stvari u svoje ruke. Na netu je bilo mnogo drugih ljudi koji su, poput mene, pokušavali da saznaju šta se dešavalo, i zajedno smo poprilično slobodno formirali grupu i nazvali je Safecast, i odlučili smo da ćemo da pokušamo da izmjerimo jačinu radijacije i da proslijedimo podatke svima jer je bilo jasno da vlada nije htjela da to uradi za nas.
Three years later, we have 16 million data points, we have designed our own Geiger counters that you can download the designs and plug it into the network. We have an app that shows you most of the radiation in Japan and other parts of the world. We are arguably one of the most successful citizen science projects in the world, and we have created the largest open dataset of radiation measurements.
Tri godine kasnije, imamo 16 miliona statističkih pojedinosti, napravili smo vlastite Gajgerove brojače čiji dizajn možete da skinete i priključite ga na mrežu. Imamo program koji prikazuje većinu radijacije u Japanu i drugim djelovima svijeta. Mi smo vjerovatno jedan od najuspješnijih projekata građanske nauke u svijetu, i stvorili smo najveću otvorenu datoteku o mjerenju radijacije.
And the interesting thing here is how did — (Applause) — Thank you. How did a bunch of amateurs who really didn't know what we were doing somehow come together and do what NGOs and the government were completely incapable of doing? And I would suggest that this has something to do with the Internet. It's not a fluke. It wasn't luck, and it wasn't because it was us. It helped that it was an event that pulled everybody together, but it was a new way of doing things that was enabled by the Internet and a lot of the other things that were going on, and I want to talk a little bit about what those new principles are.
I zanimljiva stvar ovdje je to kako se - (Aplauz) - Hvala. Kako se grupa amatera koja zaista nije znala šta radimo nekako sastala i uradila ono što nevladine organizacije i vlada uopšte nijesu bile sposobne da urade? Rekao bih da je ovo nekako povezano sa internetom. Nije u pitanju slučajnost. To nije bila sreća, i nije se desilo zato što smo to bili mi. Pomoglo je što je to bio događaj koji nas je privlačio jedne drugima, ali to je bio jedan novi način rađenja stvari omogućen od strane interneta i mnoštva drugih stvari koje su se odvijale, i želio bih da malo pričam o tim novim principima.
So remember before the Internet? (Laughter) I call this B.I. Okay? So, in B.I., life was simple. Things were Euclidian, Newtonian, somewhat predictable. People actually tried to predict the future, even the economists. And then the Internet happened, and the world became extremely complex, extremely low-cost, extremely fast, and those Newtonian laws that we so dearly cherished turned out to be just local ordinances, and what we found was that in this completely unpredictable world that most of the people who were surviving were working with sort of a different set of principles, and I want to talk a little bit about that.
Dakle, sjećate li se prije interneta? (Smijeh) Ja ga zovem P.I. U redu? Dakle, u P.I., život je bio jednostavan. Stvari su bile Euklidove, Njutnove, prilično predvidljive. Ljudi su zapravo pokušavali da predvide budućnost, čak i ekonomisti. I onda se internet desio i svijet je postao izuzetno složen, izuzetno jeftin, izuzetno brz, a oni Njutnovi zakoni koje smo tako drago njegovali su se pretvorili u obične lokalne statute, i ono što smo mi otkrili je da u ovom potpuno nepredvidljivom svijetu većina ljudi koji su preživljavali su radili sa na neki način drugačijim skupom principa, i želio bih da malo pričam o tome.
Before the Internet, if you remember, when we tried to create services, what you would do is you'd create the hardware layer and the network layer and the software and it would cost millions of dollars to do anything that was substantial. So when it costs millions of dollars to do something substantial, what you would do is you'd get an MBA who would write a plan and get the money from V.C.s or big companies, and then you'd hire the designers and the engineers, and they'd build the thing. This is the Before Internet, B.I., innovation model. What happened after the Internet was the cost of innovation went down so much because the cost of collaboration, the cost of distribution, the cost of communication, and Moore's Law made it so that the cost of trying a new thing became nearly zero, and so you would have Google, Facebook, Yahoo, students that didn't have permission — permissionless innovation — didn't have permission, didn't have PowerPoints, they just built the thing, then they raised the money, and then they sort of figured out a business plan and maybe later on they hired some MBAs. So the Internet caused innovation, at least in software and services, to go from an MBA-driven innovation model to a designer-engineer-driven innovation model, and it pushed innovation to the edges, to the dorm rooms, to the startups, away from the large institutions, the stodgy old institutions that had the power and the money and the authority. And we all know this. We all know this happened on the Internet. It turns out it's happening in other things, too. Let me give you some examples.
Prije interneta, ako se sjećate, kada bismo pokušali da napravimo servise radili smo tako što bismo napravili podlogu za hardver i podlogu za mrežu i softver i koštalo bi nas na milione dolara da uradimo bilo šta od značaja. Prema tome, kada bi koštalo na milione dolara da uradimo nešto značajno, nabavili bismo magistra poslovne administracije koji bi napravio plan i obezbijedio novac sa rizičnog kapitala ili od velikih kompanija, a zatim bismo unajmili dizajnere i inženjere koji bi sagradili stvar. Ovo je prije interneta, P.I. inovativni model. Nakon interneta je došlo do tolikog pada cijena inovacija jer su troškovi saradnje, troškovi distribucije, troškovi komunikacije i Murov zakon učinili da je cijena oprobavanja nove stvari postala približna nuli, i tako bismo imali Google-ove, Facebook-ove, Yahoo-ove studente koji nijesu imali odobrenje - inovativnost za koju nije potrebno odobrenje - nijesu imali odobrenje, PowerPoint prezentacije, oni bi samo sagradili stvar, zatim bi podizali novac, a potom bi otprilke osmislili poslovni plan nakon čega bi možda unajmili magistre poslovne administracije. Tako je internet prouzrokovao inovativnost, makar u polju softvera i servisa, prelaska sa inovativnog modela vođenim magistrom poslovne administracije na inovativni model vođen dizajnerima i inženjerima, i pogurao je inovaciju do krajnjih granica, do soba u domovima, do tek začetih kompanija, daleko od velikih ustanova, dosadnih starih ustanova koje su imale moć, novac i autoritet. I mi svi to znamo. Svi znamo da se to desilo na internetu. On je takođe prisutan i u drugim stvarima. Daću vam nekolika primjera.
So at the Media Lab, we don't just do hardware. We do all kinds of things. We do biology, we do hardware, and Nicholas Negroponte famously said, "Demo or die," as opposed to "Publish or perish," which was the traditional academic way of thinking. And he often said, the demo only has to work once, because the primary mode of us impacting the world was through large companies being inspired by us and creating products like the Kindle or Lego Mindstorms. But today, with the ability to deploy things into the real world at such low cost, I'm changing the motto now, and this is the official public statement. I'm officially saying, "Deploy or die." You have to get the stuff into the real world for it to really count, and sometimes it will be large companies, and Nicholas can talk about satellites. (Applause) Thank you. But we should be getting out there ourselves and not depending on large institutions to do it for us.
U istraživačkoj laboratoriji mi se ne bavimo samo hardverom. Bavimo se svakakvim stvarima. Bavimo se biologijom, hardverom; čuvene su riječi Nikolasa Negropontea: "Demo verzija ili umri," naspram "objavi ili nestani," što je bio tradicionalni akademski način razmišljanja. On bi često govorio, demo verzija treba da radi smo jednom, zato što je prvobitni režim našeg uticaja na svijet sproveden preko velikih kompanija koje smo mi inspirisali i koje su pravile proizvode poput Kindle ili Lego Mindstorms. Ali danas, sa mogućnošću da razvijamo nove stvari i dajemo ih stvarnom svijetu po tako niskim cijenama, sada mijenjam moto, i ovo je zvanični javni iskaz. Zvanično govorim, "Razvijaj ili umri." Moramo da dovedemo stvar u stvarni svijet kako bi od nje bilo prave koristi, i nekad će to biti velike kompanije, a Nikolas će moći da priča o satelitima. (Aplauz) Hvala. Ali mi lično moramo da se ispoljavamo, bez oslanjanja na jake ustanove da rade umjesto nas.
So last year, we sent a bunch of students to Shenzhen, and they sat on the factory floors with the innovators in Shenzhen, and it was amazing. What was happening there was you would have these manufacturing devices, and they weren't making prototypes or PowerPoints. They were fiddling with the manufacturing equipment and innovating right on the manufacturing equipment. The factory was in the designer, and the designer was literally in the factory. And so what you would do is, you'd go down to the stalls and you would see these cell phones. So instead of starting little websites like the kids in Palo Alto do, the kids in Shenzhen make new cell phones. They make new cell phones like kids in Palo Alto make websites, and so there's a rainforest of innovation going on in the cell phone. What they do is, they make a cell phone, go down to the stall, they sell some, they look at the other kids' stuff, go up, make a couple thousand more, go down. Doesn't this sound like a software thing? It sounds like agile software development, A/B testing and iteration, and what we thought you could only do with software kids in Shenzhen are doing this in hardware. My next fellow, I hope, is going to be one of these innovators from Shenzhen.
Prošle godine, poslali smo grupu studenata u Šenžen, koji su sjeli na podove fabrike sa inovatorima u Šenženu, i bilo je nevjerovatno. Dešavalo se to da smo imali prerađene uređaje, a oni nisu pravili prototipe ni PowerPoint-e. Oni su prčkali po proizvedenoj opremi i unosili inovacije direktno na tu proizvedenu opremu. Tajna fabrike je bila u dizajneru a dizajner je bio bukvalno u fabrici. Ono što bi uslijedilo je to da bismo sišli do kioska gdje bismo vidjeli ove mobilne telefone. Umjesto pokretanja malih veb-sajtova kao što to rade djeca u Palo Alto-u, djeca u Šenženu prave nove mobilne telefone. Oni prave nove mobilne telefone kao što djeca u Palo Alto-u prave veb-sajtove, i tako nastaju prostranstva inovativnosti kod mobilnih telefona. To rade tako što uzmu mobilni telefon, siđu do kioska, prodaju određeni broj, pogledaju stvari druge djece, odu gore, naprave još par hiljada i vrate se dolje. Zar to ne zvuči kao stvar softvera? Zvuči kao brz razvoj softvera, A/B testiranje i ponavljanje, i šta smo mi mislili da se može raditi samo sa softverom djeca u Šenženu rade sa hardverom. Moj sljedeći saradnik će, nadam se, biti jedan od ovih inovatora iz Šenžena.
And so what you see is that is pushing innovation to the edges. We talk about 3D printers and stuff like that, and that's great, but this is Limor. She is one of our favorite graduates, and she is standing in front of a Samsung Techwin Pick and Place Machine. This thing can put 23,000 components per hour onto an electronics board. This is a factory in a box. So what used to take a factory full of workers working by hand in this little box in New York, she's able to have effectively — She doesn't actually have to go to Shenzhen to do this manufacturing. She can buy this box and she can manufacture it. So manufacturing, the cost of innovation, the cost of prototyping, distribution, manufacturing, hardware, is getting so low that innovation is being pushed to the edges and students and startups are being able to build it. This is a recent thing, but this will happen and this will change just like it did with software.
I to što vidite je guranje inovacije do njenih granica. Pričamo o 3D štampačima i sličnim stvarima, i to je odlično, ali ovo je Limor. Ona je jedna od naših omiljenih apsolvenata, i ona stoji pred Samsung Techwin Pick and Place mašinom. Ova stvar može da ubaci 23,000 komponenti na sat na jednu elektronsku karticu. Ovo je fabrika u kutiji. Ono za šta je bila potrebna fabrika puna radnika koji bi radili ručno u ovoj maloj kutiji u Njujorku, ona će biti sposobna da ima efikasno - Ona zapravo ne treba da ide u Šenžen da proizvodi. Ona može da kupi tu kutiju i može da je proizvede. Dakle, proizvodnja, cijena inovacije, cijena pravljenja prototipa, distribucije, proizvodnje, hardvera, postaje tako niska da je inovacija pogurana do svojih granica i studenti i tek začete kompanije su u stanju da ih naprave. Ovo je novina, ali ovo će se dešavati i ovo će se promijeniti kao što se desilo sa softverom.
Sorona is a DuPont process that uses a genetically engineered microbe to turn corn sugar into polyester. It's 30 percent more efficient than the fossil fuel method, and it's much better for the environment. Genetic engineering and bioengineering are creating a whole bunch of great new opportunities for chemistry, for computation, for memory. We will probably be doing a lot, obviously doing health things, but we will probably be growing chairs and buildings soon. The problem is, Sorona costs about 400 million dollars and took seven years to build. It kind of reminds you of the old mainframe days. The thing is, the cost of innovation in bioengineering is also going down. This is desktop gene sequencer. It used to cost millions and millions of dollars to sequence genes. Now you can do it on a desktop like this, and kids can do this in dorm rooms. This is Gen9 gene assembler, and so right now when you try to print a gene, what you do is somebody in a factory with pipettes puts the thing together by hand, you have one error per 100 base pairs, and it takes a long time and costs a lot of money. This new device assembles genes on a chip, and instead of one error per 100 base pairs, it's one error per 10,000 base pairs. In this lab, we will have the world's capacity of gene printing within a year, 200 million base pairs a year. This is kind of like when we went from transistor radios wrapped by hand to the Pentium. This is going to become the Pentium of bioengineering, pushing bioengineering into the hands of dorm rooms and startup companies.
Sorona je proces DuPont-a koji koristi genetički konstruisane mikrobe da pretvori kukuruzni zaslađivač u poliester. Ovaj metod je 30% efikasniji od metoda fosilnog goriva, i mnogo je zdraviji za okolinu. Genetički inženjering i bioinženjering prave pregršt sjajnih mogućnosti za hemiju, za računanje, za memoriju. Mi ćemo vjerovatno raditi dosta, očigledno stvari koje se tiču zdravlja, ali ćemo vjerovatno gajiti stolice i zgrade ubrzo. Problem je u tome što Sorona košta oko 400 miliona dolara i bilo je potrebno sedam godina da se sagradi. To donekle podsjeća na doba starih računara. Stvar je u tome da je cijena inovacije u bioinženjeringu takođe u padu. Ovo je radna površina za vezanje gena. Nekada je koštalo na milione i milione dolara za vezivanje gena. Sada to možemo ovako da radimo na radnoj površini, i djeca mogu ovo da rade u sobama domova. Ovo je Gen9 asembler gena, i sada, kada želite da odštampate gen, neko iz fabrike sa pipetama ručno sklopi stvar, dešava se jedna greška na 100 baznih parova, i to oduzima mnogo vremena i košta mnogo novca. Ovaj novi uređaj skuplja gene na čip i umjesto jedne greške na 100 baznih parova, to je sada jedna greška na 10,000 baznih parova. U ovoj laboratoriji, imaćemo svjetski kapacitet gena odštampanih u roku od godinu dana, 200 miliona prostih parova godišnje. Ovo je poput nekadašnjeg prelaska sa ručno upakovanih radio tranzistora na Pentium. Ovo će da postane Pentium bioinženjeringa, gurajući bioinženjering u ruke ljudi u sobama domova i tek začetim kompanijama.
So it's happening in software and in hardware and bioengineering, and so this is a fundamental new way of thinking about innovation. It's a bottom-up innovation, it's democratic, it's chaotic, it's hard to control. It's not bad, but it's very different, and I think that the traditional rules that we have for institutions don't work anymore, and most of us here operate with a different set of principles. One of my favorite principles is the power of pull, which is the idea of pulling resources from the network as you need them rather than stocking them in the center and controlling everything.
To se dešava u softveru i hardveru i bioinženjeringu, tako da je ovo jedan fundamentalan novi način razmišljanja o inovaciji. Ovo je jedna inovacija koja počinje od nule, demokratska je, haotična, teška za kontrolisanje. Nije loša, ali je poprilično drugačija, i smatram da tradicionalna pravila koja imamo za institucije više ne važe, i većina nas ovdje funkcioniše na osnovu drugačijeg skupa principa. Jedan od mojih omiljenih principa je sila povlačenja, koji predstavlja ideju povlačenja resursa sa mreže kada su nam potrebni umjesto što ih gomilamo u centar i kontrolišemo sve.
So in the case of the Safecast story, I didn't know anything when the earthquake happened, but I was able to find Sean who was the hackerspace community organizer, and Peter, the analog hardware hacker who made our first Geiger counter, and Dan, who built the Three Mile Island monitoring system after the Three Mile Island meltdown. And these people I wouldn't have been able to find beforehand and probably were better that I found them just in time from the network.
Što se tiče priče Safecast-a, nisam znao ništa kada je nastao zemljotres, ali sam uspio da nađem Šona koji je bio organizator hackerspace zajednice, i Pitera, analognog hakera hardvera koji je napravio naš prvi Gajgerov brojač, i Dena, koji je napravio upravljački sistem Three Mile ostrva nakon pregorijevanja njegovih nuklearnih reaktora. Ne bih bio u mogućnosti da nađem ove ljude ranije i možda je bilo i bolje
I'm a three-time college dropout, so learning over education is very near and dear to my heart, but to me, education is what people do to you and learning is what you do to yourself.
što sam ih našao u pravom trenutku na mreži. Ja sam student koji je tri puta napuštao koledž, tako da je učenje tokom školovanja meni veoma drago i blisko srcu, ali po meni je školovanje ono što tebi rade ljudi,
(Applause)
a učenje ono što sam sebi radiš.
And it feels like, and I'm biased, it feels like they're trying to make you memorize the whole encyclopedia before they let you go out and play, and to me, I've got Wikipedia on my cell phone, and it feels like they assume you're going to be on top of some mountain all by yourself with a number 2 pencil trying to figure out what to do when in fact you're always going to be connected, you're always going to have friends, and you can pull Wikipedia up whenever you need it, and what you need to learn is how to learn. In the case of Safecast, a bunch of amateurs when we started three years ago, I would argue that we probably as a group know more than any other organization about how to collect data and publish data and do citizen science.
(Aplauz) Djeluje kao, biću pristrasan, djeluje kao da pokušavaju da te natjeraju da zapamtiš cijelu enciklopediju prije nego što te pušte van da se igraš, i, po mom mišljenju, imam Vikipediju na mobilnom telefonu, djeluje kao da pretpostavljaju da ćeš biti na vrhu neke planine, sam sa sobom, koristeći prvu stvar koja ti padne na pamet ne bi li shvatio šta da radiš kad ćeš zapravo uvijek biti povezan, uvijek ćeš imati prijatelje, i možeš da pribjegneš Vikipediji kad god ti zatreba, a ono što treba da naučiš jeste kako da učiš. Što se tiče Safecast-a, grupa amatera koju smo osnovali prije tri godine, usudio bih se reći da mi, kao grupa, znamo više od bilo koje druge organizacije o tome kako da sakupljamo podatke i objavljujemo ih
Compass over maps. So this one, the idea is that the cost of writing a plan or mapping something is getting so expensive and it's not very accurate or useful. So in the Safecast story, we knew we needed to collect data, we knew we wanted to publish the data, and instead of trying to come up with the exact plan, we first said, oh, let's get Geiger counters. Oh, they've run out. Let's build them. There aren't enough sensors. Okay, then we can make a mobile Geiger counter. We can drive around. We can get volunteers. We don't have enough money. Let's Kickstarter it. We could not have planned this whole thing, but by having a very strong compass, we eventually got to where we were going, and to me it's very similar to agile software development, but this idea of compasses is very important.
i kako da se bavimo građanskom naukom. Usmjeravanje ispred planiranja. Ovo predstavlja ideju da je cijena pravljenja plana ili pravljenja mape za nešto toliko skupa a nije toliko precizna niti korisna. Što se tiče Safecast-a, znali smo da smo morali da sakupljamo podatke, znali smo da želimo da objavimo te podatke, i umjesto da pokušamo da smislimo tačan plan, prvenstveno smo rekli: o, hajde da napravimo Gajgerove brojače. O, ponesalo ih je. Hajde da ih napravimo. Nema dovoljno senzora. U redu. Onda možemo da napravimo pokretni Gajgerov brojač. Možemo da se vozimo unaokolo. Možemo da prikupljamo volontere. Nemamo dovoljno novca. Hajde da pokrenemo veb-sajt za podizanje novca. Ne bismo mogli da isplaniramo cijelu stvar da nijesmo imali veoma snažno usmjerenje. Najzad smo došli gdje smo se bili uputili,
So I think the good news is that even though the world is extremely complex,
i, po mom mišljenju, ovo je veoma slično brzom razvoju softvera, ali ova ideja o usmjeravanju je jako bitna.
what you need to do is very simple. I think it's about stopping this notion that you need to plan everything, you need to stock everything, and you need to be so prepared, and focus on being connected, always learning, fully aware, and super present.
Mislim da su dobre vijesti da, iako je svijet izuzetno složen, ono što treba da radiš je jako prosto. Ja smatram da je u pitanju zaustavljanje tog vjerovanja da moras sve da osmisliš, moraš sve da posložiš, i moraš da budeš veoma spreman i da se koncentrišeš na to da budeš povezan, uvijek da učiš, potpuno svjestan,
So I don't like the word "futurist." I think we should be now-ists, like we are right now.
i uvijek prisutan. Ne volim riječ "futurista." Mislim da bi mi trebalo da budemo sadašnjisti,
Thank you.
kao što smo upravo sada.
(Applause)
Hvala.