On March 10, 2011, I was in Cambridge at the MIT Media Lab meeting with faculty, students and staff, and we were trying to figure out whether I should be the next director.
10. marta 2011. godine, bio sam u MIT laboratoriji u Kembridžu na sastanku sa fakultetom, studentima i osobljem, pokušavali smo da se dogovorimo
That night, at midnight, a magnitude 9 earthquake hit off of the Pacific coast of Japan. My wife and family were in Japan, and as the news started to come in, I was panicking. I was looking at the news streams and listening to the press conferences of the government officials and the Tokyo Power Company, and hearing about this explosion at the nuclear reactors and this cloud of fallout that was headed towards our house which was only about 200 kilometers away. And the people on TV weren't telling us anything that we wanted to hear. I wanted to know what was going on with the reactor, what was going on with the radiation, whether my family was in danger.
da li bih ja trebao biti sledeći direktor. Te noći, u ponoć, zemljotres jačine 9 stepeni po Rihteru pogodio je obalu Japana. Moja žena i porodica su bili u Japanu, i kako su novosti pristizale, ja sam paničio. Gledao sam novosti i slušao konferencije za štampu vladinih službenika i elektrane Tokija, slušao sam o eksploziji na nuklearnim reaktorima i tom oblaku prašine koji se kretao ka našoj kući koja je bila udaljena samo 200 kilometara. I ljudi na TV-u nam nisu govorili o stvarima koje smo hteli da čujemo. Hteo sam da znam šta je sa reaktorima, šta sa radijacijom,
So I did what instinctively felt like the right thing, which was to go onto the Internet and try to figure out if I could take matters into my own hands. On the Net, I found there were a lot of other people like me trying to figure out what was going on, and together we sort of loosely formed a group and we called it Safecast, and we decided we were going to try to measure the radiation and get the data out to everybody else, because it was clear that the government wasn't going to be doing this for us.
da li je moja porodica ugrožena. Uradio sam ono što se instinktivno činilo ispravnim, to jeste, otišao sam na internet i pokušao sam da shvatim mogu li da preuzmem stvari u svoje ruke. Na internetu sam pronašao brojne ljude koji takođe pokušavaju da saznaju šta se dešava i zajedno smo osnovali neformalnu grupu i nazvali je "Safecast" i odlučili smo da pokušamo da izmerimo radijaciju i da iznesemo podatke svima ostalima, pošto je bilo očigledno da vlada
Three years later, we have 16 million data points, we have designed our own Geiger counters that you can download the designs and plug it into the network. We have an app that shows you most of the radiation in Japan and other parts of the world. We are arguably one of the most successful citizen science projects in the world, and we have created the largest open dataset of radiation measurements.
to neće uraditi za nas. Tri godine kasnije, imamo 16 miliona stavki podataka, dizajnirali smo sopstvene Gajgerove brojače čije nacrte možete preuzeti s interneta i priključiti ih na mrežu. Imamo aplikaciju koja vam pokazuje većinu radijacije u Japanu i u drugim delovima sveta. Mi smo verovatno među najuspešnijim građanskim naučnim projekatima na svetu, i stvorili smo
And the interesting thing here is how did — (Applause) — Thank you. How did a bunch of amateurs who really didn't know what we were doing somehow come together and do what NGOs and the government were completely incapable of doing? And I would suggest that this has something to do with the Internet. It's not a fluke. It wasn't luck, and it wasn't because it was us. It helped that it was an event that pulled everybody together, but it was a new way of doing things that was enabled by the Internet and a lot of the other things that were going on, and I want to talk a little bit about what those new principles are.
najveću otvorenu bazu podataka merenja radijacije. I zanimljiva stvar ovde jeste kako - (Aplauz) - Hvala. Kako se gomila amatera, koja u stvari nije znala šta radi, nekako ujedinila i uradila ono što nevladine organizacije i vlada nisu bili u stanju da urade? I ja bih rekao da ovo ima nekakve veze sa internetom. To nije slučajnost. Nije se desilo zbog sreće, niti zato što smo to bili mi. Pomogao je događaj koji nas je ujedinio, to je bio novi način da se nešto uradi kojeg je omogućio internet i druge stvari koje su se desile, i želim da pričam malo o tome šta su ti novi principi.
So remember before the Internet? (Laughter) I call this B.I. Okay? So, in B.I., life was simple. Things were Euclidian, Newtonian, somewhat predictable. People actually tried to predict the future, even the economists. And then the Internet happened, and the world became extremely complex, extremely low-cost, extremely fast, and those Newtonian laws that we so dearly cherished turned out to be just local ordinances, and what we found was that in this completely unpredictable world that most of the people who were surviving were working with sort of a different set of principles, and I want to talk a little bit about that.
Dakle, sećate li se vremena Pre Interneta? (Smeh) Ja to zovem P.I. U redu? P.I., život je bio jednostavan. Stvari su bile euklidovske, njutnovske, nekako predvidive. Ljudi su zapravo pokušavali da predvide budućnost, čak i ekonomisti. I onda se desio internet, i svet je postao veoma komplikovan, veoma jeftin, jako brz, i ti Njutnovi zakoni koje smo toliko cenili su se ispostavili kao obična lokalna pravila, i shvatili smo da u ovom sasvim nepredvidivom svetu u kom većina ljudi koja preživljava zapravo funkcioniše pomoću različitih principa, i o tome želim malo da pričam.
Before the Internet, if you remember, when we tried to create services, what you would do is you'd create the hardware layer and the network layer and the software and it would cost millions of dollars to do anything that was substantial. So when it costs millions of dollars to do something substantial, what you would do is you'd get an MBA who would write a plan and get the money from V.C.s or big companies, and then you'd hire the designers and the engineers, and they'd build the thing. This is the Before Internet, B.I., innovation model. What happened after the Internet was the cost of innovation went down so much because the cost of collaboration, the cost of distribution, the cost of communication, and Moore's Law made it so that the cost of trying a new thing became nearly zero, and so you would have Google, Facebook, Yahoo, students that didn't have permission — permissionless innovation — didn't have permission, didn't have PowerPoints, they just built the thing, then they raised the money, and then they sort of figured out a business plan and maybe later on they hired some MBAs. So the Internet caused innovation, at least in software and services, to go from an MBA-driven innovation model to a designer-engineer-driven innovation model, and it pushed innovation to the edges, to the dorm rooms, to the startups, away from the large institutions, the stodgy old institutions that had the power and the money and the authority. And we all know this. We all know this happened on the Internet. It turns out it's happening in other things, too. Let me give you some examples.
Pre interneta, ako se sećate, kada biste pokušali da stvorite servise, stvorili biste hardverski sloj i mrežni sloj i softver i koštalo bi milione dolara da uradite bilo šta što je značajno. Potrebni su milioni da uradite nešto značajno, da zaposlite magistra poslovnog upravljanja koji bi napisao plan i nabavio novac od ulagača ili velikih kompanija, onda biste zaposlili dizajnere i inženjere da naprave stvar. Ovo je inovativni model "Pre Interneta", P.I. Nakon interneta se desilo to da je cena inovacije toliko opala pošto su cena kolaboracije, cena distribucije, cena komunikacije i Murov zakon učinili da cena isprobavanja nečeg novog postane gotovo nula, tako da su Gugl, Fejsbuk, Jahu, studenti bez dozvola - inovacija bez dozvole - nisu imali dozvolu ni prezentacije, samo su napravili stvar, onda su sakupili novac, i onda su nekako stvorili poslovni program, možda posle zaposle magistre poslovnog upravljanja. Tako da je internet prouzrokovao inovaciju, bar za softver i usluge da se pređe sa modela vođenog magistrom poslovnog upravljanja na inovacijski model vođen dizajnerom i inžinjerom, i to je poguralo inovaciju do ivica, studentskih domova, malih kompanija, daleko od velikh institucija, dosadnih starih institucija koje su imale moć i novac i autoritet. I svi ovo znamo. Znamo da se ovo desilo na internetu. Izgleda da se dešava i u drugim stvarima.
So at the Media Lab, we don't just do hardware. We do all kinds of things. We do biology, we do hardware, and Nicholas Negroponte famously said, "Demo or die," as opposed to "Publish or perish," which was the traditional academic way of thinking. And he often said, the demo only has to work once, because the primary mode of us impacting the world was through large companies being inspired by us and creating products like the Kindle or Lego Mindstorms. But today, with the ability to deploy things into the real world at such low cost, I'm changing the motto now, and this is the official public statement. I'm officially saying, "Deploy or die." You have to get the stuff into the real world for it to really count, and sometimes it will be large companies, and Nicholas can talk about satellites. (Applause) Thank you. But we should be getting out there ourselves and not depending on large institutions to do it for us.
Da vam pokažem neke primere. U medijskoj laboratoriji ne izrađujemo samo hardver. Bavimo se svačim. Bavimo se biologijom, hardverom, Nikolas Negroponte je rekao: "Demonstriraj ili umri!", suprotno krilatici "Objavi ili iščezni". koja je bila tradicionalni način razmišljanja. I često je govorio, demonstracija mora da uspe samo jednom, zato što je prvobitni način da mi utičemo na svet bio pomoću velikih kompanija koje smo mi inspirisali i stvaranjem proizvoda kao što su Kindl ili Lego Mindstorm. Ali danas, pomoću iznošenja u stvarnost po vrlo niskim cenama, ja sada menjam moto, i ovo je zvanična javna izjava, Zvanično govorim: "Iznesi ili umri". Morate izneti proizvode u stvarni svet da bi se to računalo, i ponekad će to biti velike kompanije, i Nikolas može da priča o satelitima, (Aplauz) Hvala. Ali moramo izaći tamo sami a ne računati na velike institucije da to urade za nas.
So last year, we sent a bunch of students to Shenzhen, and they sat on the factory floors with the innovators in Shenzhen, and it was amazing. What was happening there was you would have these manufacturing devices, and they weren't making prototypes or PowerPoints. They were fiddling with the manufacturing equipment and innovating right on the manufacturing equipment. The factory was in the designer, and the designer was literally in the factory. And so what you would do is, you'd go down to the stalls and you would see these cell phones. So instead of starting little websites like the kids in Palo Alto do, the kids in Shenzhen make new cell phones. They make new cell phones like kids in Palo Alto make websites, and so there's a rainforest of innovation going on in the cell phone. What they do is, they make a cell phone, go down to the stall, they sell some, they look at the other kids' stuff, go up, make a couple thousand more, go down. Doesn't this sound like a software thing? It sounds like agile software development, A/B testing and iteration, and what we thought you could only do with software kids in Shenzhen are doing this in hardware. My next fellow, I hope, is going to be one of these innovators from Shenzhen.
Tako da smo prošle godine poslali studente u Šenžen, i sedeli su na podu fabrike sa inovatorima u Šenženu i to je bilo zapanjujuće. Šta se dešavalo tamo jeste to da ste imali sprave za proizvodnju, oni nisu pravili prototipove ili prezentacije. Igrali su se sa opremom za proizvodnju i inovirali upravo na opremi za proizvodnju. Industrija je bila u dizajneru, i dizajner je bukvalno bio u industriji. Vi biste uradili sledeće, sišli biste do tezgi i videli biste ove mobilne telefone. Tako da umesto započinjanja malih veb stranica kao što rade klinci u Palo Altu, klinci u Šenženu prave nove telefone. Prave nove telefone kao što klinci u Palo Altu prave veb stranice, tako da postoji džungla inovacije koja se odvija u telefonima. Oni naprave telefon, siđu do tezgi, prodaju nekoliko, pogledaju proizvode drugih klinaca, vrate se gore, naprave još nekoliko hiljada i ponovo siđu. Zar ovo ne zvuči kao softverska stvar? Poput agilnog razvoja softvera, A/B testiranje i ponavljanje, i ono za šta smo mislili da može da se radi samo sa softverom, klinci u Šenženu rade sa hardverom. Moj budući kolega, valjda, biće jedan od ovih
And so what you see is that is pushing innovation to the edges. We talk about 3D printers and stuff like that, and that's great, but this is Limor. She is one of our favorite graduates, and she is standing in front of a Samsung Techwin Pick and Place Machine. This thing can put 23,000 components per hour onto an electronics board. This is a factory in a box. So what used to take a factory full of workers working by hand in this little box in New York, she's able to have effectively — She doesn't actually have to go to Shenzhen to do this manufacturing. She can buy this box and she can manufacture it. So manufacturing, the cost of innovation, the cost of prototyping, distribution, manufacturing, hardware, is getting so low that innovation is being pushed to the edges and students and startups are being able to build it. This is a recent thing, but this will happen and this will change just like it did with software.
inovatora u Šenženu. Tako da ono što vidite, to gura inovaciju do ivica. Mi pričamo o 3D štampačima i sličnom i to je odlično, ali ovo je Limor. Ona je jedna od mojih omiljenih diplomaca i ovde stoji ispred Samsungovog Tekvin uređaja sa sistemom "Podigni i smesti". Ova stvar može za sat da stavi 23.000 kompnenata na električnu tablu. Ovo je industrija u kutiji. Za ono za šta je nekada bila potrebna industrija puna radnika koji rade ručno u ovoj maloj kutiji u Njujorku, ona ima efikasno - Ne mora zapravo da ode u Šenžen da bi proizvodila. Ona može kupiti ovu kutiju i proizvesti je. Tako da proizvodnja, cena inovacije, cena prototipa, distribucije, proizvodnje, hardvera postaje tako niska da se inovacija gura na ivice i studenti i startap firme mogu da to sagrade. Ovo je nova stvar, ali ovo će se desiti i ovo će se promeniti kao što se to desilo sa softverom.
Sorona is a DuPont process that uses a genetically engineered microbe to turn corn sugar into polyester. It's 30 percent more efficient than the fossil fuel method, and it's much better for the environment. Genetic engineering and bioengineering are creating a whole bunch of great new opportunities for chemistry, for computation, for memory. We will probably be doing a lot, obviously doing health things, but we will probably be growing chairs and buildings soon. The problem is, Sorona costs about 400 million dollars and took seven years to build. It kind of reminds you of the old mainframe days. The thing is, the cost of innovation in bioengineering is also going down. This is desktop gene sequencer. It used to cost millions and millions of dollars to sequence genes. Now you can do it on a desktop like this, and kids can do this in dorm rooms. This is Gen9 gene assembler, and so right now when you try to print a gene, what you do is somebody in a factory with pipettes puts the thing together by hand, you have one error per 100 base pairs, and it takes a long time and costs a lot of money. This new device assembles genes on a chip, and instead of one error per 100 base pairs, it's one error per 10,000 base pairs. In this lab, we will have the world's capacity of gene printing within a year, 200 million base pairs a year. This is kind of like when we went from transistor radios wrapped by hand to the Pentium. This is going to become the Pentium of bioengineering, pushing bioengineering into the hands of dorm rooms and startup companies.
Sorona je Diponov proces koji koristi genetički inženjerisane mikrobe da pretvori kukuruzov šećer u poliester. 30 posto je efikasnija od metode sa fosilnim gorivima, i mnogo je bolja za okolinu. Genetski inženjering i bioinžinjering stvaraju novu gomilu odličnih prilika za hemiju, za računanje, za memoriju. Radićemo mnogo stvari u vezi sa zdravljem, ali verovatno ćemo uskoro uzgajati stolice i zgrade. Problem je u tome što Sorona košta oko 400 miliona dolara i potrebno je 7 godina za izradu. Malo podseća na stare dane mejnfrejm računara. Stvar je u tome da cena inovacije u bioinžinjeringu takođe opada. Ovo je stona sprava za sekvenciranje gena. Nekada je sekvenciranje gena koštalo milione dolara. Sada to možete sa ovakvom spravom, klinci ovo mogu raditi u studentskim domovima. Ovo je sastavljač gena Gen9, i sada kada pokušate da odštampate gen, neko u fabrici sa pipetama sastavlja stvar ručno, dobijete jednu grešku na 100 osnovnih parova, i traje dugo i košta mnogo novca. Ova nova sprava sklapa gene na čip, i umesto jedne greške na 100 osnovnih parova, ima jednu grešku na 10.000 osnovnih parova. U ovoj laboratoriji, imaćemo svetski kapacitet štampanja gena u roku od godinu dana, 200 miliona osnovnih parova godišnje. Ovo je kao kad smo prelazili sa tranzistorskih radija sklopljenih ručno na Pentijum. Ovo će postati Pentijum bioinženjeringa, gurajući bioinžinjering u ruke studentskih domova i startap kompanija.
So it's happening in software and in hardware and bioengineering, and so this is a fundamental new way of thinking about innovation. It's a bottom-up innovation, it's democratic, it's chaotic, it's hard to control. It's not bad, but it's very different, and I think that the traditional rules that we have for institutions don't work anymore, and most of us here operate with a different set of principles. One of my favorite principles is the power of pull, which is the idea of pulling resources from the network as you need them rather than stocking them in the center and controlling everything.
Dakle dešava se u softveru i u hardveru i bioinženjeringu, i ovo je osnovni novi način razmišljanja o inovaciji. Ovo je razvoj inovacije odozdo naviše, demokratski je, haotičan je, teško ga je kontrolisati. Nije loš, ali je veoma drugačiji, i mislim da tradicionalna pravila koja imamo za institucije više ne funkcionišu, i većina nas ovde se rukovodi drugačijim principima. Jedan od mojih omiljinh principa je moć vučenja, što je ideja izvlačenja resursa iz mreže kako vam trebaju umesto da ih gomilate u centru i kontrolišete sve.
So in the case of the Safecast story, I didn't know anything when the earthquake happened, but I was able to find Sean who was the hackerspace community organizer, and Peter, the analog hardware hacker who made our first Geiger counter, and Dan, who built the Three Mile Island monitoring system after the Three Mile Island meltdown. And these people I wouldn't have been able to find beforehand and probably were better that I found them just in time from the network.
Tako da u slučaju priče o "Safecast"-u nisam znao ništa kad se desio zemljotres, ali sam uspeo da pronađem Šona, organizatora društvenog prostora hakera, i Pitera, analognog hardver hakera, kreatora našeg prvog Gajgerovog brojača, i Dena, tvorca "Ostrva od tri milje", sistema za nadgledanje nakon što se Ostrvo od tri milje istopilo. I ove ljude ne bih mogao naći pre svega ovoga i verovatno je bolje što sam ih našao tačno na vreme na mreži.
I'm a three-time college dropout, so learning over education is very near and dear to my heart, but to me, education is what people do to you and learning is what you do to yourself.
Ja sam tri puta odustajao od fakulteta, tako da mi je sistem učenja umesto obrazovanja blizak i drag, ali za mene, obrazovanje je ono što ti učine ljudi a učenje je ono što uradiš sam sebi.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)
And it feels like, and I'm biased, it feels like they're trying to make you memorize the whole encyclopedia before they let you go out and play, and to me, I've got Wikipedia on my cell phone, and it feels like they assume you're going to be on top of some mountain all by yourself with a number 2 pencil trying to figure out what to do when in fact you're always going to be connected, you're always going to have friends, and you can pull Wikipedia up whenever you need it, and what you need to learn is how to learn. In the case of Safecast, a bunch of amateurs when we started three years ago, I would argue that we probably as a group know more than any other organization about how to collect data and publish data and do citizen science.
I čini se kao - tu sam pristrasan - čini se kao da te teraju da zapamtiš celu enciklopediju pre nego što te puste da izađeš i igraš se, i za mene, ja imam Vikipediju na telefonu, i čini se kao da oni pretpostavljaju da ćeš biti na vrhu neke planine sasvim sam sa običnom olovkom i smišljati šta da radiš kad ćeš zapravo uvek biti povezan, uvek ćeš imati prijatelje, i možeš izvući Vikipediju kad god, i zapravo treba da naučiš kako da učiš. U slušaju "Safecast", gomila amatera - kada smo započeli pre tri godine - rekao bih da mi verovatno kao grupa znamo više nego ijedna druga organizacija o tome kako sakupiti i objaviti podatke i baviti se građanskom naukom.
Compass over maps. So this one, the idea is that the cost of writing a plan or mapping something is getting so expensive and it's not very accurate or useful. So in the Safecast story, we knew we needed to collect data, we knew we wanted to publish the data, and instead of trying to come up with the exact plan, we first said, oh, let's get Geiger counters. Oh, they've run out. Let's build them. There aren't enough sensors. Okay, then we can make a mobile Geiger counter. We can drive around. We can get volunteers. We don't have enough money. Let's Kickstarter it. We could not have planned this whole thing, but by having a very strong compass, we eventually got to where we were going, and to me it's very similar to agile software development, but this idea of compasses is very important.
Kompas, a ne mape. Ideja je ta da cena izgradnje plana ili mapiranja nečega postaje tako skupa i nije tako precizna niti korisna. Tako da smo u priči "Safecast" znali da moramo da sakupimo podatke, da želimo da ih objavimo, i umesto da smislimo precizan plan, prvo smo rekli, nabavimo Gajgerove brojače. Oh, nestalo ih je. Napravimo ih. Nema dovoljno senzora. Ok, onda možemo da stvorimo pokretni Gajgerov brojač. Možemo da se vozamo okolo. Možemo naći volontere. Nemamo dovoljno novca. Skupimo ga na Kikstarteru. Nismo mogli sve to da isplaniramo, ali imajući jak kompas, na kraju smo stigli gde smo krenuli i meni je to slično agilnom razvoju softvera, ali ova ideja o kompasima je veoma bitna.
So I think the good news is that even though the world is extremely complex, what you need to do is very simple. I think it's about stopping this notion that you need to plan everything, you need to stock everything, and you need to be so prepared, and focus on being connected, always learning, fully aware, and super present.
Tako da mislim da je dobra vest ta da iako je svet veoma komplikovan, ono što treba da radite je veoma jednostavno. Mislim da treba da zaustavite ovu zamisao da radite sve po planu, treba da prikupite sve, i treba da budete spremni, već da se fokusirate na to da budete povezani, uvek da učite, sasvim svesni, i super prisutni.
So I don't like the word "futurist." I think we should be now-ists, like we are right now.
tako da ne volim reč "futurista". Mislim da treba da budemo "sadašnjisti", kao što smo upravo sada.
Thank you.
Hvala vam.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)