I think all of us have been interested, at one time or another, in the romantic mysteries of all those societies that collapsed, such as the classic Maya in the Yucatan, the Easter Islanders, the Anasazi, Fertile Crescent society, Angor Wat, Great Zimbabwe and so on. And within the last decade or two, archaeologists have shown us that there were environmental problems underlying many of these past collapses. But there were also plenty of places in the world where societies have been developing for thousands of years without any sign of a major collapse, such as Japan, Java, Tonga and Tikopea. So evidently, societies in some areas are more fragile than in other areas. How can we understand what makes some societies more fragile than other societies? The problem is obviously relevant to our situation today, because today as well, there are some societies that have already collapsed, such as Somalia and Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There are also societies today that may be close to collapse, such as Nepal, Indonesia and Columbia.
Uste dut guri guztioi interesatu izan zaizkigula noiz edo noiz gainbehera egin zuten gizarte horien guztien misterio erromantikoak, hala nola maia klasikoenak eta Yucatangoa, Pazko uharteko biztanleenak, Anasazienak, Ekialde Hurbil emankorreko gizartearenak, Angkor Wat-ena, Zimbabwe Handiarena eta abar. Eta azken pare bat hamarkadatan, arkeologoek erakutsi digute ingurumen-arazoak izan zirela iraganeko gainbehera horietako askoren azpian. Baina leku asko zeuden munduan non gizarteak garatu ziren milaka urtean, inolako gainbehera garrantzitsuren zantzurik gabe, hala nola Japonia, Java, Tonga eta Tikopia. Beraz, nabarmenki, zenbait lekutako gizarteak kalteberagoak dira beste leku batzuetakoak baino. Nola jakin dezakegu zerk eragiten duen gizarte batzuk beste batzuk baino kalteberagoak izatea? Arazoa, jakina, esanahi handikoa da gure gaurko egoerari begira, gaur ere badirelako gizarte batzuk dagoeneko gainbehera egin dutenak, hala nola Somalia eta Rwanda eta Jugoslavia ohia. Badira, halaber, gaur egun gizarteak gainbeheratik hurbil egon daitezkeenak, esate baterako Nepal, Indonesia eta Columbia.
What about ourselves? What is there that we can learn from the past that would help us avoid declining or collapsing in the way that so many past societies have? Obviously the answer to this question is not going to be a single factor. If anyone tells you that there is a single-factor explanation for societal collapses, you know right away that they're an idiot. This is a complex subject. But how can we make sense out of the complexities of this subject? In analyzing societal collapses, I've arrived at a five-point framework -- a checklist of things that I go through to try and understand collapses. And I'll illustrate that five-point framework by the extinction of the Greenland Norse society. This is a European society with literate records, so we know a good deal about the people and their motivation. In AD 984 Vikings went out to Greenland, settled Greenland, and around 1450 they died out -- the society collapsed, and every one of them ended up dead.
Eta zer esan geure buruaz? Zer ikas dezakegu iraganetik lagungarri gerta dakigukeena, iraganeko gizarte askok izan duten gainbehera saihesteko? Bistan denez, galdera horren erantzuna ez da faktore bakarraren menpeko izango. Norbaitek esaten badizu faktore bakarrean oinarrituriko azalpen bat dutela gizarteen gainbeherek, badakizu garbi hura ergela dela. Gai konplexua da hori. Baina, nola jabetu gaitezke zentzuz gai horren konplexutasunez? Gizarteen gainbeherak aztertuz. Bost puntuko eredu batera iritsi naiz. Eta azaltzera noa bost puntuok eta saiatzera gainbeherak ulertzen. Eta bost puntuko eredu hori Groenlandiako norvegiar gizartearen suntsipenaren bitartez azalduko dut. Hura europar gizarte bat da, literatur ondarea duena, beraz nahikoa dakigu jende hartaz eta beren motibazioaz. 984. urtean vikingoak Groenlandiara joan ziren, han kokatu ziren eta 1450 inguruan desagertu egin ziren -- gizarteak gainbehera egin zuen, eta haiek guztiak hil egin ziren azkenean.
Why did they all end up dead? Well, in my five-point framework, the first item on the framework is to look for human impacts on the environment: people inadvertently destroying the resource base on which they depend. And in the case of the Viking Norse, the Vikings inadvertently caused soil erosion and deforestation, which was a particular problem for them because they required forests to make charcoal, to make iron. So they ended up an Iron Age European society, virtually unable to make their own iron. A second item on my checklist is climate change. Climate can get warmer or colder or dryer or wetter. In the case of the Vikings -- in Greenland, the climate got colder in the late 1300s, and especially in the 1400s. But a cold climate isn't necessarily fatal, because the Inuit -- the Eskimos inhabiting Greenland at the same time -- did better, rather than worse, with cold climates. So why didn't the Greenland Norse as well?
Zergatik hil ziren guztiak? Hara, nire bost puntuko ereduan, lehenbizikoa gizakiek ingurumenean izandako eragina da: jendeak oharkabean suntsitu egiten ditu irauteko behar dituen oinarrizko baliabideak. Eta, vikingo norvegiarren kasuan, oharkabean lurraren higadura eta oihan-soiltzea eragin zituzten, eta hori arazo berezia zen haientzat, oihanak behar zituztelako egur-ikatza egiteko, burdina lortzeko. Beraz, azkenean Burdin Aroko europar gizarte bat ez zen gai bere burdina lortzeko. Nire zerrendako bigarren elementua klimaren aldaketa da. Klima bihur daiteke beroago edo hotzago edo idorrago edo bustiago. Groenlandiako vikingoen kasuan, klima hotzago bihurtu zen 1300. urteen azkenaldean, eta bereziki 1400. urteetan. Baina klima hotz bat ez da nahitanahiez hilgarria, zeren inuitak -- Groenlandian garai berean bizi ziren eskimalak -- okerrago ez, baizik eta hobeto ibili ziren klima hotzetan. Beraz, zergatik ez zitzaien gauza bera gertatu Groenlandiako norvegiarrei?
The third thing on my checklist is relations with neighboring friendly societies that may prop up a society. And if that friendly support is pulled away, that may make a society more likely to collapse. In the case of the Greenland Norse, they had trade with the mother country -- Norway -- and that trade dwindled: partly because Norway got weaker, partly because of sea ice between Greenland and Norway.
Nire zerrendako hirugarren aztergaia inguruko gizarte bati aitzinatzen lagun diezaieketen gizarte adiskideekiko harremanak dira. Eta adiskidantzazko laguntza hori desagertzen bada, horrek eragin dezake gizarteak errazago gainbehera egitea. Groenlandiako norvegiarren kasuan, harreman komertzialak zituzten jatorrizko herrialdearekin, Norvegiarekin, eta merkataritza hori gutxitu egin zen, partez Norvegia ahuldu zelako, partez Groenlandia eta Norvegia arteko itsasoa jelatu zelako.
The fourth item on my checklist is relations with hostile societies. In the case of Norse Greenland, the hostiles were the Inuit -- the Eskimos sharing Greenland -- with whom the Norse got off to bad relationships. And we know that the Inuit killed the Norse and, probably of greater importance, may have blocked access to the outer fjords, on which the Norse depended for seals at a critical time of the year.
Nire zerrendako laugarren elementua gizarte etsaiekiko harremanak dira. Groenlandiako norvegiarren kasuan, etsaiak inuitak ziren. Norvegiarrekin Groenlandia partekatzen zuten eskimalekiko harremanak gaiztotu egin ziren. Eta badakigu inuitek norvegiarrak hil zituztela, eta, seguru asko garrantzi handikoa izan zena, norvegiarrek urte-sasoi kritiko batean itsasoratzeko ezinbestekoak zituzten fiordoak blokeatu zituztela.
And then finally, the fifth item on my checklist is the political, economic, social and cultural factors in the society that make it more or less likely that the society will perceive and solve its environmental problems. In the case of the Greenland Norse, cultural factors that made it difficult for them to solve their problems were: their commitments to a Christian society investing heavily in cathedrals; their being a competitive-ranked chiefly society; and their scorn for the Inuit, from whom they refused to learn. So that's how the five-part framework is relevant to the collapse and eventual extinction of the Greenland Norse.
Eta azkenik, nire zerrendako azken elementua gizarteak ingurumeneko arazoak atzematea eta konpontzea bideragarriago edo zailago egiten duten faktore ekonomiko, sozial eta politikoek osatzen dute. Groenlandiako norvegiarren kasuan, beren arazoak konpontzea zaildu zuten faktore kulturalak kristau gizartea izateak zekarzkien betebeharrak izan ziren, katedraletan asko inbertituz, lehiakortasunean nagusiki oinarriturik mailakaturiko gizartea izatea eta inuitak mespretxatzea eta haiengandik ez ikasi nahi izatea. Beraz, bost ataleko ereduak balio du Groenlandiako norvegiarren gainbehera eta suntsipena azaltzeko.
What about a society today? For the past five years, I've been taking my wife and kids to Southwestern Montana, where I worked as a teenager on the hay harvest. And Montana, at first sight, seems like the most pristine environment in the United States. But scratch the surface, and Montana suffers from serious problems. Going through the same checklist: human environmental impacts? Yes, acute in Montana. Toxic problems from mine waste have caused damage of billions of dollars. Problems from weeds, weed control, cost Montana nearly 200 million dollars a year. Montana has lost agricultural areas from salinization, problems of forest management, problems of forest fires. Second item on my checklist: climate change. Yes -- the climate in Montana is getting warmer and drier, but Montana agriculture depends especially on irrigation from the snow pack, and as the snow is melting -- for example, as the glaciers in Glacier National Park are disappearing -- that's bad news for Montana irrigation agriculture.
Zer esan egungo gizarte batez? Azken bost urteotan nire emaztearekin eta familiarekin Montanaren hegomendebaldean bizi izan naiz, mutil gaztea nintzela belar biltzen lan egin nuen lekuan. Eta Montanak begiratu batean ematen du Amerikako Estatu Batuetako ingurumenik naturalena duela. Baina azala harrotu, eta Montanak arazo larriak dituela ikusten da. Goazen zerrenda berbera errepasatzera: gizakiok ingurumenean eragiten ditugun inpaktuak. Bai, Montanan larriak dira. Meatzeetako hondakinek eragindako toxizitate-arazoek milaka milioi dolarreko kalteak ekarri dituzte. Belar txarren kontrola Montanari ia 200 milioi dolar kostatzen zaio urtean. Montanan gatzek hondatu dituzten nekazaritza-arloak, oihanen kudeaketako arazoak, oihanetako suteen arazoak. Nire zerrendako bigarren elementua: klima-aldaketa. Bai -- Montanan klima beroago eta idorrago bihurtzen ari da, baina metaturiko elurretatik datorren urez ureztatzea beharrezkoa du Montanako laborantzak, eta elurra urtzea, adibidez, Glaziarren Parke Nazionaleko glaziarrak desagertu ahala, albiste txarra da Montanako ureztatze-laborantzarentzat.
Third thing on my checklist: relations with friendlies that can sustain the society. In Montana today, more than half of the income of Montana is not earned within Montana, but is derived from out of state: transfer payments from social security, investments and so on -- which makes Montana vulnerable to the rest of the United States.
Nire zerrendako hirugarren elementua: gizartea manten dezaketen adiskideekiko harremanak dira. Montanan gaur egun, diru-sarreren erdia baino gehiago ez dator Montanatik bertatik, baizik eta estatuaz kanpotik dator: gizarte-segurantzako transferentziek inbertsioek, etab. Montana AEBren enparauaren pentzudan egotea dakarte.
Fourth: relations with hostiles. Montanans have the same problems as do all Americans, in being sensitive to problems created by hostiles overseas affecting our oil supplies, and terrorist attacks. And finally, last item on my checklist: question of how political, economic, social, cultural attitudes play into this. Montanans have long-held values, which today seem to be getting in the way of their solving their own problems. Long-held devotion to logging and to mines and to agriculture, and to no government regulation; values that worked well in the past, but they don't seem to be working well today.
Laugarrena: etsaiekiko harremanak. Montanatarrek gainerako estatubatuarrek dituzten arazo berberak dituzte, atzerriko etsaiek sortuak, petrolio-hornikuntzan eta eraso terroristetan eragina dutenak. Eta azkenik, nire zerrendako azken elementua: horretan jarrera politiko, ekonomiko, sozial eta kulturalek nola jokatzen duten. Montanatarrek sakonki erroturiko balioak dituzte, beren arazoak konpontzeko bidean oztopoak jartzen dizkietela diruditenak. Oihanetik egurra ateratzearekiko,meatzeekiko eta laborantzarekiko duten atxikimendua, eta gobernuaren erregulaziorik ez izatea. Balio horiek ondo funtzionatzen zuten iraganean, baina ez dirudi gaur egun ondo funtzionatzen dutenik.
So, I'm looking at these issues of collapses for a lot of past societies and for many present societies. Are there any general conclusions that arise? In a way, just like Tolstoy's statement about every unhappy marriage being different, every collapsed or endangered society is different -- they all have different details. But nevertheless, there are certain common threads that emerge from these comparisons of past societies that did or did not collapse and threatened societies today. One interesting common thread has to do with, in many cases, the rapidity of collapse after a society reaches its peak. There are many societies that don't wind down gradually, but they build up -- get richer and more powerful -- and then within a short time, within a few decades after their peak, they collapse. For example, the classic lowland Maya of the Yucatan began to collapse in the early 800s -- literally a few decades after the Maya were building their biggest monuments, and Maya population was greatest.
Beraz, gainbeheren arazo horiek aztertzen ari naiz iraganeko gizarte askotan eta gaur egungo gizarte askotan. Atera al daitezke ondorio orokor batzuk? Nola edo hala, Tolstoik zoritxarreko ezkontza guztiak desberdinak direla zioenean esan zuena esan daiteke kasu honetan ere: gainbehera etorritako edo horretarako arriskuan dauden gizarte guztiek xehetasunak dituztela desberdinak, baina hala ere, badituztela tasun erkide batzuk, agertzen direnak konparatzen direnean gainbehera egin zuten edo ez zuten iraganeko gizarteak gaur egun mehatxaturik dauden gizarteekin. Ezaugarri erkide interesgarri batek zerikusia du, kasu askotan, gainbeheraren lastertasunarekin, gizartea bere puntu gorenera heldu ostean. Gizarte asko dira ez direnak pixkanaka jausten, baizik eta eraikitzen direnak, aberasten eta ahaltsuago bihurtzen direnak, eta denbora laburraren buruan, gailurrera heldu ondoko hamarkada batzuetan, gainbehera egiten dutenak. Adibidez, Yucatango lur behereetako maia gizarte klasikoak 800. urteen hasieran egin zuen gainbehera, literalki maiek beren monumenturik handienak eraikitzen ari zirenetik, eta maien biztanleria handiena zenetik hamarkada batzuetara.
Or again, the collapse of the Soviet Union took place within a couple of decades, maybe within a decade, of the time when the Soviet Union was at its greatest power. An analogue would be the growth of bacteria in a petri dish. These rapid collapses are especially likely where there's a mismatch between available resources and resource consumption, or a mismatch between economic outlays and economic potential. In a petri dish, bacteria grow. Say they double every generation, and five generations before the end the petri dish is 15/16ths empty, and then the next generation's 3/4ths empty, and the next generation half empty. Within one generation after the petri dish still being half empty, it is full. There's no more food and the bacteria have collapsed. So, this is a frequent theme: societies collapse very soon after reaching their peak in power.
Edo, orobat, Sobietar Batasunaren gainbehera Sobietar Batasuna ahaltsuena zenetik pare bat hamarkadatara, agian hamarkada baten buruan gertatu zen. Analogia bat bakterio batek Petriren kaxa batean duen ugalpena izan liteke. Gainbehera laster horiek bereziki irispidean dauden baliabideak baliabideen kontsumoarekin bat ez datozenean gerta litezke, edo inbertsio ekonomikoak potentzial ekonomikoarekin bat ez datozenean. Petriren kaxa batean bakterioa ugaldu egiten da. Demagun belaunaldi bakoitzean bikoiztu egiten dela, eta ahitu baino bost belaunaldi lehenago Petriren kaxaren 15 hamaseiren hutsik daudela eta hurrengo belaunaldian 3 laurden hutsik daudela eta hurrengo belaunaldian erdia hutsik dagoela. Petriren kaxaren erdia hutsik zegoenetik belaunaldi batera guztiz beterik dagoela. Ez dago janari gehiago eta bakterioak gainbehera egiten du. Beraz, sarri gertatzen den gauza da gizarteek gainbehera egitea, ahalmenaren puntu gorenera heldu eta berehala.
What it means to put it mathematically is that, if you're concerned about a society today, you should be looking not at the value of the mathematical function -- the wealth itself -- but you should be looking at the first derivative and the second derivatives of the function. That's one general theme. A second general theme is that there are many, often subtle environmental factors that make some societies more fragile than others. Many of those factors are not well understood. For example, why is it that in the Pacific, of those hundreds of Pacific islands, why did Easter Island end up as the most devastating case of complete deforestation? It turns out that there were about nine different environmental factors -- some, rather subtle ones -- that were working against the Easter Islanders, and they involve fallout of volcanic tephra, latitude, rainfall. Perhaps the most subtle of them is that it turns out that a major input of nutrients which protects island environments in the Pacific is from the fallout of continental dust from central Asia. Easter, of all Pacific islands, has the least input of dust from Asia restoring the fertility of its soils. But that's a factor that we didn't even appreciate until 1999.
Matematika erabiliz esateko, gaur gizarte batek kezkatzen bazaitu, ez zenioke begiratu behar funtzio matematikoaren balioari, ugaritasunari berari, baizik eta funtzioaren lehen deribatuari eta bigarren deribatuari. Hori gai orokorra da. Bigarren gai orokor bat da, badirela ingurumeneko faktore asko, sarri sentikorrak izaten direnak eta gizarte batzuk beste batzuk baino kalteberagoak izatea eragiten dutenak eta ez direnak ondo ezagutzen. Adibidez, zergatik gertatzen da hori Ozeano Bareko ehunka uharteetan, zergatik gertatu zen Pazko uhartean inoizko oihan-soiltzerik suntsikorrena? Gertatzen da han bazirela bederatzi ingurumen-faktore diferente, batzuk nahiko sentikorrak, Pazko uharteko biztanleen aurka jokatzen ari zirenak, besteak beste sumendietako harriak eta laba jaustea, latitudea, euri-prezipitazioak. Agian faktorerik sentikorrena da Ozeano Bareko uharteetako ingurumenak babesten dituen mantenugaien sarrera garrantzitsu bat Asiaren erdialdetik datorren hautsaren prezipitazioa dela. Pazko uharteak jasotzen du, Ozeano Bareko uharteen artean, hautsik gutxiena lurren emankortasuna berreskuratzeko. Baina faktore hori ez genuen ezagutu ere egiten 1999 arte.
So, some societies, for subtle environmental reasons, are more fragile than others. And then finally, another generalization. I'm now teaching a course at UCLA, to UCLA undergraduates, on these collapses of societies. What really bugs my UCLA undergraduate students is, how on earth did these societies not see what they were doing? How could the Easter Islanders have deforested their environment? What did they say when they were cutting down the last palm tree? Didn't they see what they were doing? How could societies not perceive their impacts on the environments and stop in time? And I would expect that, if our human civilization carries on, then maybe in the next century people will be asking, why on earth did these people today in the year 2003 not see the obvious things that they were doing and take corrective action? It seems incredible in the past. In the future, it'll seem incredible what we are doing today. And so I've been trying to develop a hierarchical set of considerations about why societies fail to solve their problems -- why they fail to perceive the problems or, if they perceive them, why they fail to tackle them. Or, if they tackle them, why do they fail to succeed in solving them?
Beraz, gizarte batzuk, ingurumenari loturiko arrazoi batzuengatik, kalteberagoak dira beste batzuk baino. Eta azkenik, beste generalizazio batzuk. Zeren ez bainaiz ari ikastaro bat ematen UCLAn, UCLAko graduatu gabeko ikasleei, gizarteen gainbehera horietaz. UCLAko graduatu gabeko ikasleak benetan gogaitzen dituena da, nolatan ez zuten gizarte horiek ikusi zer ari ziren egiten? Nolatan soildu zituzten beren oihanak Pazko uharteko biztanleek? Zer esan zuten azken palmondoa botatzen ari zirenean? Ez al zuten ikusten zer ari ziren egiten? Nolatan ez ziren konturatu zer inpaktu ari ziren eragiten beren ingurumenetan eta ez ziren garaiz gelditu? Eta espero al nezake gure giza zibilizazioak jarraitzen badu, agian hurrengo mendean, jendeak galdetuko duela zergatik gaurko jendeak 2003an ez zituen ikusi gertatzen ari ziren gauza nabarmenak eta ez zituen erremedioak jarri? Iraganekoak sinetsi ezinezkoa dirudi. Etorkizunean sinetsi ezinezkoa irudituko zaie egun egiten ari garena. Eta horrela saiatzen ari izan naiz kontsiderazio multzo hierarkiko bat garatzen, gizarteek beren arazoak konpontzeko garaian huts egiteko dauden arrazoiez. Zergatik huts egiten dute arazoez jabetzeko garaian, edo haietaz jabetzen badira, zergatik huts egiten dute haiei erantzuterakoan? Edo, haiei erantzuterakoan huts egiten badute, zergatik huts egiten dute arazoa gainditzerakoan?
I'll just mention two generalizations in this area. One blueprint for trouble, making collapse likely, is where there is a conflict of interest between the short-term interest of the decision-making elites and the long-term interest of the society as a whole, especially if the elites are able to insulate themselves from the consequences of their actions. Where what's good in the short run for the elite is bad for the society as a whole, there's a real risk of the elite doing things that would bring the society down in the long run. For example, among the Greenland Norse -- a competitive rank society -- what the chiefs really wanted is more followers and more sheep and more resources to outcompete the neighboring chiefs. And that led the chiefs to do what's called flogging the land: overstocking the land, forcing tenant farmers into dependency. And that made the chiefs powerful in the short run, but led to the society's collapse in the long run.
Bi generalizazio bakarrik aipatuko ditut arlo horretan. Oker jokatzeko oinarrizko arrazoi bat, gainbehera eragin dezakeena, erabakiak hartzen dituzten eliteen epe laburreko interesen eta oro har gizartearen epe luzeko interesen arteko gatazka da, batez ere eliteak gai baldin badira beren buruak beren jokabideen ondorioetatik libratzeko. Epe laburrean elitearentzat ona dena txarra baldin bada gizartearentzat oro har, benetako arriskua dago eliteak gizartea galbidera eramango duten gauzak egiteko. Adibidez, Groenlandiako norvegiarren artean -- lehiakortasunaren araberako gizartea izaki -- agintariek benetan nahi zutena jarraitzaile gehiago eta ardi gehiago eta baliabide gehiago izatea zen, inguruko agintarien gainetik jartzeko. Eta horrek eraman zituen agintariak lurra zigortzera: lurra neurriz kanpo ustiatzera, nekazariak menpekotasunera kondenatuz. Eta horrek ahaltsu bihurtu zituen agintariak epe laburrean, baina gizartea gainbeherara eraman zuen epe luzean.
Those same issues of conflicts of interest are acute in the United States today. Especially because the decision makers in the United States are frequently able to insulate themselves from consequences by living in gated compounds, by drinking bottled water and so on. And within the last couple of years, it's been obvious that the elite in the business world correctly perceive that they can advance their short-term interest by doing things that are good for them but bad for society as a whole, such as draining a few billion dollars out of Enron and other businesses. They are quite correct that these things are good for them in the short term, although bad for society in the long term. So, that's one general conclusion about why societies make bad decisions: conflicts of interest.
Interes-gatazken kontu horietxek larriak dira Amerikako Estatu Batuetan gaur egun. Bereziki AEBko erabakitzaileak sarri gai izaten direlako ondorioetatik libratzeko itxituraz inguraturiko urbanizazioetan biziz, botilako ura edanez, etab. Eta azken pare bat urtean, nabaria izan da negozioen munduko eliteak garbi ikusi duela bere epe laburreko interesak aurrera atera ditzakeela berarentzat onak baina gizartearentzat oro har txarrak diren gauzak eginez, hala nola milaka miloi dolar Enron-etik eta beste negozio batzuetatik drainatuz. Aski garbi dago gauza horiek onak direla haientzat epe laburrean, nahiz eta txarrak izan gizartearentzat epe luzean. Beraz horixe da ondorio orokor bat gizarteek erabaki okerrak hartzeko dauden arrazoiez: interesen arteko gatazkak.
And the other generalization that I want to mention is that it's particularly hard for a society to make quote-unquote good decisions when there is a conflict involving strongly held values that are good in many circumstances but are poor in other circumstances. For example, the Greenland Norse, in this difficult environment, were held together for four-and-a-half centuries by their shared commitment to religion, and by their strong social cohesion. But those two things -- commitment to religion and strong social cohesion -- also made it difficult for them to change at the end and to learn from the Inuit. Or today -- Australia. One of the things that enabled Australia to survive in this remote outpost of European civilization for 250 years has been their British identity. But today, their commitment to a British identity is serving Australians poorly in their need to adapt to their situation in Asia. So it's particularly difficult to change course when the things that get you in trouble are the things that are also the source of your strength.
Eta aipatu nahi dudan beste generalizazio bat da bereziki gogorra dela gizarte batentzat erabaki onak hartzea, zenbait egoeratan egokiak izan arren, beste egoera batzuetan kaskarrak diren ongi erroturiko balioekin gatazka dagoenean. Adibidez, Groenlandiako norvegiarren kasuan, lau mende eta erdian erlijioarekiko betebeharrek eta kohesio sozial sendoak elkarturik mantendu zituzten. Baina gauza biok -- erlijioarekiko betebeharrak eta kohesio sozial sendoak -- aldi berean zaildu egin zien aldatzea eta inuitengandik ikastea. Edo gaur egun, Australia. Australiari, Europako zibilizaziotik urrun kokatu zenean, 250 urtean irautea ahalbidetu zioten gauzetako bat identitate britainiarra izan zen. Baina gaur egun, haiek identitate britaniarrarekiko duten atxikimenduak ez die askorik balio Asian duten egoerara moldatzeko. Horrela, bereziki zaila da aldatzea arazoak sortzen dizkizuten gauzak zure sendotasunaren oinarria ere badirenean.
What's going to be the outcome today? Well, all of us know the dozen sorts of ticking time bombs going on in the modern world, time bombs that have fuses of a few decades to -- all of them, not more than 50 years, and any one of which can do us in; the time bombs of water, of soil, of climate change, invasive species, the photosynthetic ceiling, population problems, toxics, etc., etc. -- listing about 12 of them. And while these time bombs -- none of them has a fuse beyond 50 years, and most of them have fuses of a few decades -- some of them, in some places, have much shorter fuses. At the rate at which we're going now, the Philippines will lose all its accessible loggable forest within five years. And the Solomon Islands are only one year away from losing their loggable forest, which is their major export. And that's going to be spectacular for the economy of the Solomons. People often ask me, Jared, what's the most important thing that we need to do about the world's environmental problems? And my answer is, the most important thing we need to do is to forget about there being any single thing that is the most important thing we need to do. Instead, there are a dozen things, any one of which could do us in. And we've got to get them all right, because if we solve 11, we fail to solve the 12th -- we're in trouble. For example, if we solve our problems of water and soil and population, but don't solve our problems of toxics, then we are in trouble.
Zein izango da ondorioa gaur egun? Hara, guk guztiok ezagutzen ditugu dozenaka erloju-bonba moduko batzuk mundu modernoan, hamarkada gutxi batzuetarako metxak dituztenak --denek ere, ez 50 urte baino gehiagorako, eta horietako edozein leher dakiguke. Uraren, lurraren klima-aldaketaren, espezie inbaditzaileen fotosintesi-sabaiaren, biztanleria-arazoen, produktu toxikoen, eta abarren erloju-bonbak -- horietako 12 zerrenda daitezke. Eta erloju-bonba horietako batzuek -- horietako batek bakarrik ere ez du 50 urte baino gehiagorako metxarik, eta badira metxak hamarkada gutxi batzuetarako -- horietako batzuek zenbait lekutan askoz metxa laburragoak dituzte. Orain daramagun martxan, Filipinek beren oihan ustiagarri guztiak galduko dituzte bost urteren buruan. Eta Solomon uharteetan urtebete bakarrik falta zaie beren oihan ustiagarriak galtzeko, eta hori da beren esportazio nagusia. Eta hori izugarria izango da Solomon uharteetako ekonomiarentzat. Jendeak askotan galdetzen dit, Jared, zein da egin behar dugun gauzarik inportanteena munduko ingurumen-arazoei dagokienez? Eta nire erantzuna hauxe da: egin behar dugun gauzarik inportanteena egin behar dugun gauzarik inportanteena bat bakarra dela ahaztea da. Aitzitik, dozenaka gauza dira, salba gaitzaketenak. Eta haiek guztiak ondo egitea lortu behar dugu, zeren 11 soluzionatzen baditugu, eta hamabigarrena soluzionatzean huts egiten badugu, arazoak izango ditugu. Adibidez, urarekin eta lurrarekin ditugun arazoak konpontzen baditugu, baina ez baditugu konpontzen produktu toxikoekin ditugun arazoak, gaizki ibiliko gara.
The fact is that our present course is a non-sustainable course, which means, by definition, that it cannot be maintained. And the outcome is going to get resolved within a few decades. That means that those of us in this room who are less than 50 or 60 years old will see how these paradoxes are resolved, and those of us who are over the age of 60 may not see the resolution, but our children and grandchildren certainly will. The resolution is going to achieve either of two forms: either we will resolve these non-sustainable time-fuses in pleasant ways of our own choice by taking remedial action, or else these conflicts are going to get settled in unpleasant ways not of our choice -- namely, by war, disease or starvation. But what's for sure is that our non-sustainable course will get resolved in one way or another in a few decades. In other words, since the theme of this session is choices, we have a choice. Does that mean that we should get pessimistic and overwhelmed? I draw the reverse conclusion.
Kontua da gure oraingo martxa ez dela jasangarria, eta horrek esan nahi du definizioz ezin dela mantendu. Eta ondorioak hamarkada batzuk beharko ditu konpontzeko. Horrek esan nahi du gela honetan gaudenon artean 50 edo 60 urte baino gutxiago ditugunok ikusiko dugula paradoxa horiek nola konpontzen diren, eta 60 urtetik gora ditugunok ezin izango dugula soluzioa ikusi, baina gure seme-alabek eta bilobek seguru ikusiko dutela. Soluzioak bi forma hauetakoren bat izango du: edo konpontzen ditugu jasangarriak ez diren metxa horiek geuk aukeratzen ditugun bide atseginak erabiliz edota bestela gatazka horiek gure esku ez dauden modu ez-atseginetan -- bereziki gerren, gaixotasunen edo goseteen bidez aldatuko dira. Baina segurua da gure martxa ez-jasangarria era batera edo bestera soluzionatuko dela hamarkada batzuen buruan. Bestela esateko, saio hau aukerez denez, badugu aukera. Horrek esan nahi al du ezkorrak izan eta etsi egin behar dugula? Nik alderantzizko ondorioa ateratzen dut.
The big problems facing the world today are not at all things beyond our control. Our biggest threat is not an asteroid about to crash into us, something we can do nothing about. Instead, all the major threats facing us today are problems entirely of our own making. And since we made the problems, we can also solve the problems. That then means that it's entirely in our power to deal with these problems. In particular, what can all of us do? For those of you who are interested in these choices, there are lots of things you can do. There's a lot that we don't understand, and that we need to understand. And there's a lot that we already do understand, but aren't doing, and that we need to be doing. Thank you. (Applause)
Munduak gaur egun dituen arazo handiak ez daude inola ere gure kontrolaz haraindi. Dugun mehatxurik handiena ez da gainera etorriko zaigun asteroide bat, ezer egiterik uzten ez digun ezer. Ostera, gaur egun aurrean ditugun mehatxu nagusiak erabat gure esku dauden arazoak dira. Eta arazoak sortzen ditugunez, konpondu ere egin ditzakegu. Horrek esan nahi du erabat gure esku dagoela arazo horiek konpontzea. Zehazki, guk guztiok zer egin dezakegu? Aukera horietan interesaturik zaudetenontzat, gauza asko egin ditzakezue. Ulertzen ez ditugun gauza asko daude ulertu behar ditugunak. Eta gauza asko daude dagoeneko ulertzen ditugunak, baina egiten ez ditugunak, eta egin behar ditugunak. Eskerrik asko. (Txaloak)