Jeg er bange for, at jeg er en af de talere som du håber, at du ikke vil møde på TED For det første har jeg ikke nogen mobil. Bare for at være på den sikre side. Derudover er en politisk teoretiker, som ønsker at tale om demokratiets krise, formentlig ikke det mest interessante du kan komme i tanke om. Som om det ikke var nok, er jeg ikke her for at give jer svar. Jeg er snarere kommet for tilføje endnu flere ubesvarede spørgsmål. En af de ting som jeg ønsker at sætte spørgsmålstegn ved, er den meget moderne og populære ide, at transparens og åbenhed kan genoprette troen på demokratiske institutioner.
I'm afraid I'm one of those speakers you hope you're not going to meet at TED. First, I don't have a mobile, so I'm on the safe side. Secondly, a political theorist who's going to talk about the crisis of democracy is probably not the most exciting topic you can think about. And plus, I'm not going to give you any answers. I'm much more trying to add to some of the questions we're talking about. And one of the things that I want to question is this very popular hope these days that transparency and openness can restore the trust in democratic institutions.
Der er endnu en grund at være mistænkelig i forhold til mine intentioner. I, publikum i the Church of TED, er en del af et vældigt optimistisk fællesskab. (Latter) Jeres mest generelle karaktertræk er at I tror på kompleksitet, men ikke på flertydighed. Som I er blevet fortalt, så er jeg fra Bulgarien. I følge undersøgelser er bulgarer de mest pessimistiske mennesker i verden. (Latter) The Economist skrev for nylig en artikel der dækkede en ny undersøgelse a lykke. Titlen var "De lykkelige, de ulykkelige og bulgarerne".
There is one more reason for you to be suspicious about me. You people, the Church of TED, are a very optimistic community. (Laughter) Basically you believe in complexity, but not in ambiguity. As you have been told, I'm Bulgarian. And according to the surveys, we are marked the most pessimistic people in the world. (Laughter) The Economist magazine recently wrote an article covering one of the recent studies on happiness, and the title was "The Happy, the Unhappy and the Bulgarians."
(Latter)
(Laughter)
Eftersom I nu ved hvad I kan forvente, så lad os komme i gang. Vi starter på en regnvejrsfuld valgdag i et lille land. Det kunne være mit land, men det kunne også være dit. Det regnede indtil kl. 4 om eftermiddagen. Som en konsekvens heraf var der ingen, der begav sig ned til stemmeurnen. Men så stoppede regnen, og befolkning gik ned for at stemme. Da stemmerne var blevet talt, stod det klart, at tre fjerdedele stemmerne var blanke. Regeringen og oppositionen var ude af stand til at handle. De vidste hvordan de skulle forholde sig til protester. De vidste hvem der skulle arresteres og hvem der skulle forhandles med. Men hvordan forholder man sig til en befolkning, der stemmer blankt? Derfor besluttede regeringen sig for afholde endnu et valg. Ved dette valg stemte et endnu større antal, 83 procent for at være præcis, blankt. Befolkningen gik simpelthen til stemmeurnen for at fortælle politikerne, at de ikke havde nogen at stemme på.
So now when you know what to expect, let's give you the story. And this is a rainy election day in a small country -- that can be my country, but could be also your country. And because of the rain until four o'clock in the afternoon, nobody went to the polling stations. But then the rain stopped, people went to vote. And when the votes had been counted, three-fourths of the people have voted with a blank ballot. The government and the opposition, they have been simply paralyzed. Because you know what to do about the protests. You know who to arrest, who to negotiate with. But what to do about people who are voting with a blank ballot? So the government decided to have the elections once again. And this time even a greater number, 83 percent of the people, voted with blank ballots. Basically they went to the ballot boxes to tell that they have nobody to vote for.
Det er begyndelsen Jose Saramagos fantastiske roman "Seeing". Men i mine øjne er det glimrende eksempel på en del af det problem vi har med demokrati i Europa nu til dags. På den end side er der ingen der stiller spørgsmålstegn ved, at demokrati er den bedste styreform. Demokrati er det eneste spil man kan spille. Problemet er bare, at mange mennesker begynder at tro, at det ikke er et spil, der er værd at spille.
This is the opening of a beautiful novel by Jose Saramago called "Seeing." But in my view it very well captures part of the problem that we have with democracy in Europe these days. On one level nobody's questioning that democracy is the best form of government. Democracy is the only game in town. The problem is that many people start to believe that it is not a game worth playing.
I løbet af de senest 30 år har politologer observeret, at der er et konstant fald i valgprocenter og at den del af befolkninger, der stemmer mindst er også den del af befolkningen, der ville have det største udbytte ved at stemme. Her henviser jeg til arbejdsløse og samfundets bund. Det er et kæmpe problem. I forbindelse med den nuværende økonomiske krise står det klart, at troen på på politik og på demokratiske institutioner er blevet nedbrudt. I følge den seneste under udført af EU-kommisionen mener 89 procent af borgerne i EU at der en stigning forskellen mellem politikernes holdninger og borgernes holdninger. Kun 18 procent af italienerne og 15 procent grækerne tror at deres stemme gør en forskel. Kort sagt tror folk at de kan udskifte regeringer, men de har tabt troen på, at de kan ændre den førte politik.
For the last 30 years, political scientists have observed that there is a constant decline in electoral turnout, and the people who are least interested to vote are the people whom you expect are going to gain most out of voting. I mean the unemployed, the under-privileged. And this is a major issue. Because especially now with the economic crisis, you can see that the trust in politics, that the trust in democratic institutions, was really destroyed. According to the latest survey being done by the European Commission, 89 percent of the citizens of Europe believe that there is a growing gap between the opinion of the policy-makers and the opinion of the public. Only 18 percent of Italians and 15 percent of Greeks believe that their vote matters. Basically people start to understand that they can change governments, but they cannot change policies.
Spørgsmålet jeg ønsker at stille er følgende: Hvordan er det sket, at samtidig med at vi lever i samfund med mere frihed, flere rettigheder, større bevægelsesfrihed og lettere adgang til informationer at troen på demokratiske institutioner er brudt sammen? Sagt med andre ord, så ønsker jeg at spørge: Hvad har vi gjort rigtigt og hvad har vi gjort forkert i de seneste 50 år med demokrati? Jeg vil starte med hvad vi har gjort rigtigt.
And the question which I want to ask is the following: How did it happen that we are living in societies which are much freer than ever before -- we have more rights, we can travel easier, we have access to more information -- at the same time that trust in our democratic institutions basically has collapsed? So basically I want to ask: What went right and what went wrong in these 50 years when we talk about democracy? And I'll start with what went right.
For det første var der selvfølgelig de 5 revolutioner som i mine øjne har ændret den måde vi lever på og forbedret vores demokrati radikalt. Den første revolution var den kulturelle og sociale revolution som i 1968 of 1970'erne satte individet i centrum af politik. Det var menneskerettighedsbevægelsen. Denne bevægelse medførte paradigmeskift, en kultur a holdningsforskelle, en kultur af non-konformisme af hidtil uset karakter. Jeg tror at sådanne ændringer er konsekvenser af ændringerne i 68. Også selvom mange af os ikke engang var født. Derefter kom markedsrevolutionen i 1980'erne. Til trods for at mange på venstrefløjen forsøger at hade den, så er sandheden at markedsrevolutionen grundlagde ideen: "Staten ved ikke bedre". Således fostrede den samfund med flere muligheder og valg. Derpå kom 1989. Kommunismens endeligt og enden på den kolde krig. Det var starten på den globale verden. Dernæst kom internettet. Det er ikke nødvendigt at overbevise dette publikum om, at internettet gav individet mere magt. Internettet har ændret den måde vi kommunikerer på og den måde vi betragter politik. Selve ideen om politisk fællesskab har ændret sig markant. Jeg vil dog nævne endnu en revolution. Dette er revolutionen inden for hjerneforskning, som i den grad har ændret vores forståelse af beslutningsprocesser.
And the first thing that went right was, of course, these five revolutions which, in my view, very much changed the way we're living and deepened our democratic experience. And the first was the cultural and social revolution of 1968 and 1970s, which put the individual at the center of politics. It was the human rights moment. Basically this was also a major outbreak, a culture of dissent, a culture of basically non-conformism, which was not known before. So I do believe that even things like that are very much the children of '68 -- nevertheless that most of us had been even not born then. But after that you have the market revolution of the 1980s. And nevertheless that many people on the left try to hate it, the truth is that it was very much the market revolution that sent the message: "The government does not know better." And you have more choice-driven societies. And of course, you have 1989 -- the end of Communism, the end of the Cold War. And it was the birth of the global world. And you have the Internet. And this is not the audience to which I'm going to preach to what extent the Internet empowered people. It has changed the way we are communicating and basically we are viewing politics. The very idea of political community totally has changed. And I'm going to name one more revolution, and this is the revolution in brain sciences, which totally changed the way we understand how people are making decisions.
Det var altså hvad der gik godt. Men hvis vi skal betragte hvad der gik mindre godt, så ender vi hos de samme fem revolutioner. Først har har vi 1960'ernes og 1970'ernes sociale og kulturelle revolution, der på sin vis ødelagde ideen om et fælles formål. Alle disse kollektive navneord som vi er blevet lært: nation, klasse, familie. Vi begynder at synes om skilsmisser, hvis vi overhovedet bliver gift. Alle disse kollektive enheder var under angreb. Det meget svært at engagere folk i politik hvis de er af den overbevisning, at det eneste der betyder noget er hvor de står personligt.
So this is what went right. But if we're going to see what went wrong, we're going to end up with the same five revolutions. Because first you have the 1960s and 1970s, cultural and social revolution, which in a certain way destroyed the idea of a collective purpose. The very idea, all these collective nouns that we have been taught about -- nation, class, family. We start to like divorcing, if we're married at all. All this was very much under attack. And it is so difficult to engage people in politics when they believe that what really matters is where they personally stand.
Så kom markedsrevolutionen i 80'erne med den store forøgelse i ulighed. Kan i huske at indtil 1970'erne var udbredelsen af demokrati forbundet med et fald i ulighed. Desto mere demokratiske vores samfund er blevet, desto mere lige er de blevet. Nu har vi den modsatte tendens. Udbredelsen af demokrati er i høj grad forbundet med stigninger i ulighed. Dette finder jeg dybt problematisk når drejer sig om hvad vi gør rigtigt og forkert i forhold til demokrati nu til dags.
And you have the market revolution of the 1980s and the huge increase of inequality in societies. Remember, until the 1970s, the spread of democracy has always been accompanied by the decline of inequality. The more democratic our societies have been, the more equal they have been becoming. Now we have the reverse tendency. The spread of democracy now is very much accompanied by the increase in inequality. And I find this very much disturbing when we're talking about what's going on right and wrong with democracy these days.
Hvis vi så bevæger os videre til 1989. Her har vi noget som vi antager, at ingen vil kritisere, men mange vil sige: "Hør nu her, det var enden på den kolde krig der ødelagde den sociale kontrakt mellem eliten og folket i Vesteuropa. Da Sovjetunionen fortsat eksisterede havde de rige og magtfulde behov for folket fordi de frygtede dem. Nu er eliter mere eller mindre sat fri. De er meget mobile. Du kan ikke beskatte dem. De frygter ikke folket. Som en konsekvens heraf har vi fået denne meget mærkværdige situation hvor eliten kom uden for demokratiets kontrol. Det er derfor ikke et tilfælde at folket ikke har en interesse i at stemme længere.
And if you go to 1989 -- something that basically you don't expect that anybody's going to criticize -- but many are going to tell you, "Listen, it was the end of the Cold War that tore the social contract between the elites and the people in Western Europe." When the Soviet Union was still there, the rich and the powerful, they needed the people, because they feared them. Now the elites basically have been liberated. They're very mobile. You cannot tax them. And basically they don't fear the people. So as a result of it, you have this very strange situation in which the elites basically got out of the control of the voters. So this is not by accident that the voters are not interested to vote anymore.
Og når det kommer til internettet, ja, det er sandt at internettet har bragt os tættere sammen, men vi ved samtidig at internet har skabt ekkodale og politiske ghettoer, hvor vi for resten af vores liv kan blive sammen med det politiske fællesskab som hører til. Det bliver sværere og sværere at forstå de mennesker som ikke er som os selv. Jeg ved, at mange mennesker her har snakket ivrigt om den digitale verden og muligheden for samarbejde, men har I set hvad den digitale verden har gjort ved moderne amerikansk politik? Dette er også til dels på grund af internetrevolutionen. Dette er bagsiden af medaljen.
And when we talk about the Internet, yes, it's true, the Internet connected all of us, but we also know that the Internet created these echo chambers and political ghettos in which for all your life you can stay with the political community you belong to. And it's becoming more and more difficult to understand the people who are not like you. I know that many people here have been splendidly speaking about the digital world and the possibility for cooperation, but [have you] seen what the digital world has done to American politics these days? This is also partly a result of the Internet revolution. This is the other side of the things that we like.
Og i forhold til hjerneforskning, så har politiske konsulenter lært af hjerneforskere at man ikke skal snakke om ideer og at man ikke skal tale om politiske programmer. Hvad der virkelig betyder noget er at manipulere med folkets følelser. Derudover er den stærke tendens til, at når vi snakker om revolutioner nu til dags, så er revolutionerne ikke nævnt ved navne, der associeres med ideologier og ideer. Før i tiden havde revolutioner ideologiske navne. De kunne være kommunistiske eller liberale. De kunne være fascistiske eller islamiske. Nu bliver revolutionerne navngivet efter det medium som er mest brugt. Vi har Facebook-revolutioner og Twitter-revolutioner. Indholdet har ingen betydning. Problemet er medierne.
And when you go to the brain sciences, what political consultants learned from the brain scientists is don't talk to me about ideas anymore, don't talk to me about policy programs. What really matters is basically to manipulate the emotions of the people. And you have this very strongly to the extent that, even if you see when we talk about revolutions these days, these revolutions are not named anymore around ideologies or ideas. Before, revolutions used to have ideological names. They could be communist, they could be liberal, they could be fascist or Islamic. Now the revolutions are called under the medium which is most used. You have Facebook revolutions, Twitter revolutions. The content doesn't matter anymore, the problem is the media.
jeg siger dette fordi en af mine hovedpointer er, at hvad der gik galt var også hvad der gik godt. Og når vi nu kigger på hvordan vi kan ændre situationen, når vi kigger hvordan vi kan forbedre demokratiet, bør vi have disse dobbelttydigheder i baghovedet. De ting som vi elsker aller højest er formentlig også de ting som kan skade os mest. Nu til dags er det meget populært at tro, at denne bevægelse mod gennemsigtighed, denne kombination mellem aktivt medborgerskab, nye teknologier, og meget mere transparens-venlig lovgivning kan genoprette troen på politik. Vi tror at når vi har nye teknologier, og folk er klar til at bruge dem, så vil det gøre det meget sværere for regeringer at lyve, og meget sværere for dem at stjæle og måske endda gøre det svære for dem at dræbe. Det er muligvis sandt. Men jeg mener at vi må gøre det klar, at vi sætter transparens i centrum af politik. Præcis der hvor budskabet er at transparens er åndssvagt.
I'm saying this because one of my major points is what went right is also what went wrong. And when we're now trying to see how we can change the situation, when basically we're trying to see what can be done about democracy, we should keep this ambiguity in mind. Because probably some of the things that we love most are going to be also the things that can hurt us most. These days it's very popular to believe that this push for transparency, this kind of a combination between active citizens, new technologies and much more transparency-friendly legislation can restore trust in politics. You believe that when you have these new technologies and people who are ready to use this, it can make it much more difficult for the governments to lie, it's going to be more difficult for them to steal and probably even going to be more difficult for them to kill. This is probably true. But I do believe that we should be also very clear that now when we put the transparency at the center of politics where the message is, "It's transparency, stupid."
Transparens handler ikke om at genoprette troen på institutioner. Transparens er politisk styring af mistro. Vi antager at vores samfund vil blive baseret på mistro. Og i øvrigt så var mistro altid vigtigt for demokrati. Det er der for at vi har en opdeling af magten. Det derfor at vi har en masse kreativ mistro mellem repræsentanterne og dem de repræsenterer. Men når politik kun er styring af mistro, så er jeg ovenud lykkelig for at "1984" er blevet beskrevet nu hvor vi vil opleve "1984" i på hovedet. Det handler ikke om at Big Brother holder øje med dig, men snarere om at vi er Big Brother der overvåger politikerne.
Transparency is not about restoring trust in institutions. Transparency is politics' management of mistrust. We are assuming that our societies are going to be based on mistrust. And by the way, mistrust was always very important for democracy. This is why you have checks and balances. This is why basically you have all this creative mistrust between the representatives and those whom they represent. But when politics is only management of mistrust, then -- I'm very glad that "1984" has been mentioned -- now we're going to have "1984" in reverse. It's not going to be the Big Brother watching you, it's going to be we being the Big Brother watching the political class.
Men er dette ideen om et frit samfund? Kan i for eksempel forestille jer, at ordentlige, civile, talentfulde mennesker vil være politikere hvis de oprigtigt tror at politik handler om at styre mistro? Er I ikke bange for alle disse teknologier, der vil spore ethvert udsagn en politiker giver? Er I ikke bange for at dette vil sende et stærkt signal til politikerne om konsistens, uanset om det er forkert eller ej, fordi konsistens ender med at være vigtigere end sund fornuft? Og til de amerikanere der er til stede idag, er I ikke bange for at jeres præsidenter vil regere baseret på hvad de sagde i primærvalgene?
But is this the idea of a free society? For example, can you imagine that decent, civic, talented people are going to run for office if they really do believe that politics is also about managing mistrust? Are you not afraid with all these technologies that are going to track down any statement the politicians are going to make on certain issues, are you not afraid that this is going to be a very strong signal to politicians to repeat their positions, even the very wrong positions, because consistency is going to be more important than common sense? And the Americans who are in the room, are you not afraid that your presidents are going to govern on the basis of what they said in the primary elections?
Jeg synes at dette er yderst vigtigt fordi demokrati handler om at vi ændrer vores holdninger baseret på rationelle argumenter og diskussioner. Og vi kan miste den meget noble der handler om at holde folk ansvarlige for at vise folk at vi ikke vil tolerere politisk opportunisme. For mig er dette ekstremt vigtigt. Jeg mener, at når vi diskuterer politik i dag, så giver det mening at kigge på dette scenarie.
I find this extremely important, because democracy is about people changing their views based on rational arguments and discussions. And we can lose this with the very noble idea to keep people accountable for showing the people that we're not going to tolerate politicians the opportunism in politics. So for me this is extremely important. And I do believe that when we're discussing politics these days, probably it makes sense to look also at this type of a story.
Men husk også, at enhver afsløring er også en sløring. Uanset hvor transparente vores regeringer vil være, så vil de være selektivt transparente. I et lille land, det kunne for eksempel være mit land, men det kunne også være dit land, tog de en beslutning, det er en rigtig historie, om at alle regeringsbeslutninger og diskussioner i ministerhøringer skule offentliggøres på internettet 24 timer efter diskussionen fandt sted. Folket synes godt virkelig godt om det. Jeg fik muligheden for at snakke med premierministeren om grundlaget for denne beslutning. Han sagde: "Hør nu her, det er den bedste måde at få alle mine ministre til at tie stille. For det vil være meget svært for at skifte mening velvidende at 24 timer efter vil deres udsagn være offentlige, hvilket vil medføre en politisk krise."
But also don't forget, any unveiling is also veiling. [Regardless of] how transparent our governments want to be, they're going to be selectively transparent. In a small country that could be my country, but could be also your country, they took a decision -- it is a real case story -- that all of the governmental decisions, discussions of the council of ministers, were going to be published on the Internet 24 hours after the council discussions took place. And the public was extremely all for it. So I had the opportunity to talk to the prime minister, why he made this decision. He said, "Listen, this is the best way to keep the mouths of my ministers closed. Because it's going to be very difficult for them to dissent knowing that 24 hours after this is going to be on the public space, and this is in a certain way going to be a political crisis."
Så når vi snakker om transparens, og når vi snakker om åbenhed, mener jeg virkelig at vi skal huske hvad der gik godt og hvad der gik skidt. Dette er Goethe, som hverken er bulgarer eller politolog, der for nogle hundrede år siden sagde: "Der er en stor skygge hvor der der er meget lys".
So when we talk about transparency, when we talk about openness, I really do believe that what we should keep in mind is that what went right is what went wrong. And this is Goethe, who is neither Bulgarian nor a political scientist, some centuries ago he said, "There is a big shadow where there is much light."
Mange tak.
Thank you very much.
(Bifald)
(Applause)