Helen Walters: Last week, US President Biden and Xi Jinping, the president of the People's Republic of China, met at the APEC Summit in San Francisco. The meeting was notable for being the first time that Xi had visited the US in six years and the first time the two leaders have met in person in a year.
海伦·沃尔特斯(Helen Walters): 上周,美国总统拜登 和中华人民共和国主席习近平 在旧金山的亚太经合组织峰会上会面。 值得注意的是,这次会议 是习近平六年来首次访问美国, 也是两位领导人一年 来首次面对面会晤。
Now, obviously, what goes on between these two nations matters to everyone. So we found ourselves post-summit with a bunch of follow-up questions, and we've turned to our resident geopolitical expert, Ian Bremmer, to help us understand what to pay attention to and why. Ian, hi.
现在,很明显, 这两个国家之间发生的事情 对每个人都很重要。 我们在峰会后 发现还有很多后续问题, 因此我们求助于常驻地 缘政治专家伊恩·布雷默, 以帮助我们了解需要注意 的事项和原因。 伊恩,你好。
Ian Bremmer: Helen, good to be back with you.
伊恩·布雷默(Ian Bremmer): 海伦,很高兴能回到你身边。
HW: OK, so let's get right to it. These are, alas, not peaceful times. And I think it's safe to say that the meeting between these two leaders felt perhaps even more momentous than it might have done were war not raging everywhere, from the Middle East to Ukraine. So tell us, what happened in San Francisco, and what stood out most to you?
海伦(HW): 好的,让我们开始吧。 唉,现在不是和平时期。 而且我认为可以肯定地说, 这两位领导人之间的会晤, 可能比从中东到乌克兰的战争没有肆虐时 还要重要。 那么,请告诉我们, 旧金山(的会议)发生了什么, 对你来说最突出的是什么?
IB: Well, look, that is the backdrop. That this is a world of unprecedented geopolitical danger and risk. And the efforts are not in trying to make everything better. It's rather to try to stop the existing conflicts from getting much worse. And that is absolutely the macro focus that both President Biden and President Xi bring to the meeting. I mean, there's a lot to discuss around the issues around US-China relations. I'm sure we'll get to that. But, you know, it's interesting that insofar as the Americans and Chinese are actually on opposite sides of the two major global conflicts in the world right now. On Russia-Ukraine, the Chinese are the close friends, without limits, to Vladimir Putin, while the Americans are providing more support than any other country in the world, militarily, to Ukraine. The Chinese have not condemned Hamas for their terrorist attacks. The United States finds Israel its most important and enduring ally in the Middle East. So you would think, Helen, that this would be an area of contention between the United States and China. It's not. Both the Americans and Chinese are deeply concerned that these conflicts are going to get worse. And they don't want that. They want to find ways to contain these conflicts.
伊恩·布雷默(IB): 嗯,你看,这就是背景。 这是一个前所未有的 地缘政治危险和风险的世界。 而且,努力并不是 为了让一切变得更好。 更确切地说,是努力阻止 现有冲突变得更糟。 这绝对是一个 拜登总统和习近平总书记 在会议上都提到过的宏观焦点。 我的意思是,围绕中美关系的问题, 有很多话要讨论。 我敢肯定我们会明白的。 但是,你知道,有趣的是, 美国人和中国人实际上处于对立面 就目前世界上两大全球冲突而言。 在俄罗斯-乌克兰问题上, 中国人无限制地是 弗拉基米尔·普京的亲密朋友, 而美国人向乌克兰提供的军事支持 比世界上任何其他国家都多。 中国人没有谴责哈马斯的恐怖袭击。 美国认为以色列是其在中东 最重要、最持久的盟友。 因此,海伦,你会认为 这将是中美 之间争论的领域。 不是。 美国人和中国人都对冲突的恶化 深感担忧。 而且他们不想要那样。 他们想找到 遏制这些冲突的方法。
And I think it's a very important point, because we hear a lot about, you know, Americans looking for adversaries around the world and lumping in China with countries like Russia, Iran, North Korea. And those other countries are rogue states. They're pariahs. They're countries that benefit from chaos. They want to take advantage of vacuums geopolitically. Where the Americans and Chinese actually geopolitically have a lot more in common, in addition to the fact that they have a lot of interdependence, they also both benefit from a global backdrop that is stable. They want relatively free and open trade of goods. They want a global economy that's working. They don't want political instability everywhere or social instability everywhere. And so even though the United States and China have different preferred end-states for Russia-Ukraine and for Israel-Gaza, in the near-term, you've got two leaders that are meeting and saying, how do we stop this from getting worse? And that ended up being a significant piece of the conversation, the four-hour, three-session conversations that Presidents Biden and Xi were having.
我认为这是非常重要的一点, 因为我们听到很多关于 美国人在 世界各地寻找对手 并将中国 与俄罗斯、伊朗、 朝鲜等国家混为一谈的消息。 而那些其他国家 都是流氓国家。 他们是贱民。 它们是从混乱中获益的国家。 他们想在地缘政治上的真空。 实际上,美国人和中国人在 地缘政治上有更多共同点, 除了高度相互依存的事实之外, 它们还受益于稳定的全球背景。 他们想要相对自由 和开放的商品贸易。 他们想要一个行之有效的全球经济。 他们不希望到处都是政治不稳定, 也不希望到处都是社会不稳定。 因此,尽管美国和中国 对俄罗斯-乌克兰事件 和以色列-加沙事件 有不同的首选最终状态, 但在短期内, 有两位领导人 会面并说, 我们如何阻止情况恶化? 这最终成为了这场 拜登总统和习近平主席之间 长达四小时、三轮对话的 重要组成部分。
In some ways, maybe the most important takeaway that the two most powerful countries in the world are not looking at the Middle East and Russia-Ukraine through a lens of cold war, but instead are looking at it through the lens of, "Oh my God, this is really a problem. And are there anything that we can do, individually or collectively or with our friends and allies in the regions, that might help to stop this from getting much, much worse?"
在某些方面,也许 最重要的结论 是世界上最强大的两个国家 在看待中东和俄罗斯-乌克兰问题时, 不是从冷战的角度, 而是从 “天啊,这确实是个问题。 而且,我们可以 单独或集体地做些什么, 或者与我们在该 地区的朋友和盟友一起做什么, 以防止情况变得更糟?”
HW: Can you say any more about what that actually looks like? What might those alignments be?
HW:你能再说 一下那到底是什么样子吗? 这些对齐方式可能是什么?
IB: Well, in the case of the Middle East, China has a relationship with Iran that the United States does not have. And both the American cabinet as well as Biden directly have been talking to the Chinese about getting messages to the Iranians to help ensure that they don’t get directly involved in the war and that they limit the support that they have given to proxies in the region that could, for example, not only expand the war, but also lead to challenges in global energy supply. You know, the Americans sent two carrier strike groups to the Eastern Med and the Persian Gulf almost immediately after the October 7 terrorist attacks. China has destroyers in the region, and they were there for military exercises. They’ve kept them there, and they’ve expanded the military presence. Not to fight the Americans but rather to show that the Chinese want to ensure that there is not a fight in the region that would suddenly prevent energy from getting through the Straits of Hormuz, a critical choke point. So, you know, frankly, there's more alignment on this issue.
IB:嗯,就中东而言, 中国与伊朗的关系 是美国所没有的。 而且,美国内阁 和拜登都直接 与中国人说过 向伊朗人传递信息, 以帮助确保他们不会 直接卷入战争, 以及限制他们 对该地区代理人的支持, 例如,该地区不止可能扩大战争, 还可能为全球能源供应带来挑战。 你知道,10 月 7 日 的恐怖袭击之后, 美国立刻向地中海东部和波斯湾 派出了两支航母打击小组。 中国在该地区有驱逐舰, 他们曾在那里 进行军事演习。 他们一直把驱逐舰留在那里, 并扩大了军事存在。 这样做不是为了与美国人作战, 而是为了表明 中国想要确保 该地区不会因为发生战争 而使得能源突然被妨碍 经过霍尔木兹海峡(运输), 霍尔木兹海峡是一个关键的阻塞点。 因此,坦率地说,你知道, 在这个问题上有更多的一致性。
The Chinese also, just earlier today, as you and I are talking, hosting a group of foreign ministers from the Muslim world, including the Palestinian Authority, they're talking about a ceasefire and a two-state solution. Biden wants an extended humanitarian pause, not a ceasefire, but also a two-state solution. There's been a lot of conversation around trying to bring Middle Eastern countries to be more constructive in helping to ensure stability in this conflict. So around the Middle East, there's been a lot, because it's more recent, and because it’s frankly more geopolitically dangerous -- the Russia-Ukraine war has more knock-on economic implications -- but the Middle East conflict is much more geopolitically fraught in the sense that you could have a religious war from, you know, Ecuador to Indonesia. Because you could have, you know, they could have a much greater impact on the US presidential election, for example. That is one that is driving a lot more direct attention and engagement from the American and Chinese leaders together.
就在今天早些时候, 正如你我所说的那样, 中国人还接待了一群 来自穆斯林世界的外交部长 包括巴勒斯坦权力机构在内。 他们正在谈论停火 和两国解决方案。 拜登希望延长 人道主义暂停期, 不是停火, 而是两国解决方案。 已经有很多的讨论 是关于试着让中东地区国家 更具建设性地帮助 确保这场冲突的稳定。 因此,在中东, 有很多,因为这是最近才发生的, 坦率地说,它在地缘 政治上更危险—— 俄乌战争对经济的影响更大—— 但是中东的这场冲突 从地缘政治上看更让人担忧, 从宗教战争的意义上讲,你知道, 从厄瓜多尔到印度尼西亚。 因为你可能知道, 例如,它们可能会对美国总统大选 产生更大影响。 这促使中美领导人一起更加直接地 关注和参与。
HW: So I think it's interesting and heartening that stability might be a watchword at this moment. The US and China, they obviously subscribe to very different political systems. And I think of a quote from the MIT economist Yasheng Huang, who was once quoted saying that the two countries kind of got married without knowing one another's religions. How much did this summit, if anything, do to address the root causes of the tension?
HW:因此,我认为 既有趣又令人振奋的是 稳定性可能成为此时此刻的口号。 美国和中国 显然奉行截然不同的政治制度。 我想到了麻省理工学院 经济学家黄亚生的一句话, 他曾经被引述 说,这两个国家是在 不了解对方宗教的情况下结婚的。 本次峰会为解决紧张局势的根本原因 做了多少(如果有的话)?
IB: You know, it's interesting. I see the analogy of US and China getting married without knowing the families or the religions or any of the other, you know, sort of red lines that one connects with when you make that lifetime bond. But, you know, I've always thought of it as a couple, that the love has left the relationship, but they have children together, and they love the children very much, and they both want to make sure that the children aren't hurt. And so as a consequence, as much as we can talk about, you know, derisking as a term of art, or decoupling, and these countries having very different political and economic systems, and they don’t particularly trust each other, and yet they know they need to work together. So in a sense, they're adults, geopolitically. I mean, when you have the US and China in a room at the highest level, and here I'm not just talking about the presidents, I'm talking about, you know, any of the cabinet meetings that have happened at great level and scope over the past months after really none at all during the couple plus years of pandemic, all of those meetings, they haven't been easy, they've frequently been tense, but they have all been handled as adults, handled as two parents that know the children need to be taken care of long-term. And when I say the children, I'm not disparaging other countries. I'm really talking about the collective interest, the knock-on interests that come from what happens if the US-China relationship suddenly becomes one of cold war or worse, which is absolutely plausible in today's political environment.
IB:你知道,这很有趣。 我看过这个比喻, 说美国和中国在 不了解家庭、宗教 或任何其他方面的情况下结婚, 就像是人们建立终身纽带 时连接的红线。 但是,你知道,我一直认为, 这像是作为一对夫妻, 关系中已经没有爱意, 但是他们有孩子, 他们非常爱孩子, 他们都想确保孩子们不会受到伤害。 因此,我们尽可能地谈论, 作为一个艺术术语, 去风险化 或 脱钩, 这些国家有截然不同的政治和经济体系, 彼此之间并不特别信任, 但他们知道需要 共同努力。 因此,从某种意义上说, 从地缘政治上讲,他们是成年人。 我的意思是, 当美国和中国以最高规格 在同一个房间里, 这里我说的不仅仅是最高领导人, 我说的是, 在过去几个月里的任何高层内阁会议, 你知道,疫情这几年里 实际上没有任何会议。 所有的这些会议,并不轻松, 它们通常是很紧张的氛围, 但它们都被当作成年人来处理, 当作两个父母 知道它们的孩子需要被长期照顾一样。 当我说孩子们时, 我并不是在贬低其他国家。 我说的其实是集体利益, 即中美关系突然陷入冷战或更糟情况 所产生的连锁利益, 这在当今的政治环境中是绝对合理的。
So if that's the backdrop, I think that Biden in particular spent an enormous amount of time over the last six months in preparation for this event, trying to convince the Chinese that the meeting would go well, that the Americans were not planning on dropping any surprises, on undermining or embarrassing their head of state when he showed up on American turf in San Francisco. They were very concerned about that because there's no trust, and because there are plenty of issues of significant tension between the two countries. And I think that they succeeded critically in that. Again, we haven't talked yet about the specific issues, and I know we'll get to them. But the macro backdrop is important. Over the last couple of months, China has been on a charm offensive, with the Australians, inviting the Australian prime minister for a state visit to China just a few weeks ago. That went extremely well with expanded trade and energy agreements on the back of, you know, a relationship where they weren't talking to each other, where they were cutting off business, where they were engaging in massive tariffs and sanctions. That's seen a breakthrough. I've seen some of that in South Korea. I've seen some of that with the Japanese. And over a one-hour meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and Xi Jinping in person at the APEC Summit, first time in over a year that they have met. I've seen that with the Europeans. I've also seen it with a large number of American and European CEOs who have reported individually just how much more access they've gotten, welcoming they've gotten from their trips to Beijing, positive press coverage, movement on issues that have mattered to them, all of which a sense that a better Biden relationship with Xi Jinping, not a breakthrough, not an entente, but simply a commitment that the US wants a more stable baseline relationship and would work towards that, in San Francisco, that gave the Chinese leadership permission to engage in this charm offensive with other countries and with the private sector.
因此,如果是这样的背景, 我认为拜登在过去的六个月里, 尤其花了大量时间 为这次活动做准备, 他试图说服中国人 相信会议会顺利进行, 并且当他们的国家元首 出现在旧金山的美国领上时, 美国人不会让损害两国利益 或者让国家元首感到尴尬 的意外发生。 他们之所以对此非常担忧, 是因为缺乏信任, 也因为有许多严峻的问题 存在两国之间。 而且我认为他们在这方面取得了 至关重要的成功。 再说一遍,我们还没有讨论具体问题, 我知道我们会讨论的, 但是宏观背景很重要。 在过去的几个月中, 中国一直在 对澳大利亚进行魅力攻势, 邀请澳大利亚总理 在几周前对中国进行国事访问。 访问非常顺利, 达成了扩大贸易和能源的相关协议 你知道,这个的背景是两国之间不交谈, 切断了业务, 实行了大规模关税和制裁。 这已经取得了突破。 我在韩国见过一些这样的情况。 我在日本见过一些这样的情况。 在亚太经合组织峰会上, 习近平和岸田首相 进行了一个多小时的会晤, 这是他们一年多以来的首次会晤。 我在欧洲见过一些这样的情况。 我还看到许多美国和 欧洲的首席执行官 都报告了 他们在北京之行中, 获得了更多的访问权限、 更多的欢迎、 更积极的新闻报道、 更多重要问题上的进展, 所有这些都让人感觉 拜登与习近平的良好关系 不是突破,不是协议, 而是简单地承诺 美国希望建立更稳定的基线关系 并将努力实现这一目标, 在旧金山, 这使中国领导人 可以与其他国家和私营部门 一起参与这场魅力攻势。
And why was that so important? Well, first, because it lowers the temperature of the relationship. It makes sudden, unsuspected crises less likely to occur, but also critically, because the Chinese economy is underperforming dramatically. For many reasons, maybe most structurally, because 50 years of China acting as the world's factory, with all of this inexpensive labor, well, you don't need all that inexpensive labor anymore. And by the way, that labor is not so inexpensive anymore. And, you know, China hasn't become an open-governance system. They haven't moved towards rule of law. And the Chinese competitors are a lot stronger, and their demographics are challenging. And they've got lots of nonperforming debt and their real estate sector's in trouble. And zero-COVID went really badly. And then they unwound it but the consumers don't feel like they've got, you know, animal spirits driving them right now. And I can keep going. But the point is that China is severely underperforming in a way that, frankly, we haven't seen structurally since globalization bringing the Chinese in, you know, really got moving in the '70s and '80s. So in other words, Helen, you and I have never seen this structural economic headwinds on so many fronts in China. And the Chinese are much more aware of that than you and I are. So they're very strongly incented, even if they fully intend to take Taiwan over the long-term and they want to be the leading economy in the world and they want to dominate artificial intelligence and all of these things that Americans and others worry about. For the near and foreseeable, medium-term future, they’ve got to just right the boat. They've got to get things stable. They don't want a big fight right now.
那为什么这么重要? 好吧,首先, 因为它降低了关系的温度。 这使得突然发生 意想不到的危机的可能性降低, 但也很关键地是, 因为中国经济表现严重不佳。 原因有很多,也许是结构性原因, 因为中国 50 年来一直是世界工厂, 工厂里都是廉价的劳动力, 现在不再需要所有这些廉价的劳动力了。 顺便说一句,这种劳动力 已经不那么便宜了。 而且,你知道,中国还没有 成为一个开放的治理体系。 他们还没有走向法治。 而且中国竞争对手要强得多, 而且他们的人口结构也充满挑战。 而且他们有大量的不良债务, 他们的房地产行业陷入了困境。 而且“动态清零”进展非常糟糕。 然后他们全面放开, 但消费者不觉得 他们能做到(放开消费), 动物精神驱使着他们。 我还能讲更多。 但关键是,坦率地说, 这是自从全球化在 70 年代和 80 年代真正推动中国人进入以来, 在结构上没有见过的 表现不佳。 换句话说,海伦, 你我从未在中国这么多方面 见过这种结构性经济阻力。 而中国人比你我更 了解这一点。 因此他们被非常强烈地激励着, 尽管他们完全打算长期占领台湾, 他们想成为世界领先的经济体, 他们想主导人工智能领域, 以及美国人和其他人担心的所有事情。 在短期和可预见的中期将来, 他们必须调整局面。 他们必须让情况保持稳定。 他们现在不想打一场激烈的战斗。
And so I think that the Americans, being a little more confident, a little less concerned about, you know, sort of, China taking over everything in the near-term and wanting to stabilize things, really got you a lot more than you would have otherwise expected from this summit meeting over the last several days.
因此,我认为, 美国人稍微自信一些, 美国人的担忧更少点,你知道, 就是中国在近期内接管一切 并想要稳定局势, 实际上会比过去几天的峰会上 你所期望带来的 更多。
HW: So it’s interesting to hear you talk about the economic dysfunction in China. And of course, I think it’s safe to say that America is experiencing pretty significant political dysfunction at the moment. But what often goes unremarked is the fact that President Biden is actually extending, perhaps doubling down, on President Trump’spolicies when it comes to China. So given that next year is an election year, what should we make of that? And do you think that the policies will continue?
HW:因此,听到你 谈论中国的经济失调很有趣。 当然,我认为可以肯定地说, 美国目前正在经历 相当严重的政治功能失调。 但是,经常被忽视的是, 拜登总统实际上是在延长 特朗普总统对中国的政策, 也许是加倍努力。 那么,鉴于明年是选举年, 我们应该如何看待呢? 你认为(对华)政策会继续下去吗?
IB: First of all, that backdrop, that right now, China's in probably the worst economic position structurally that they've been in in 40, 50 years. But their political consolidation around Xi is completely uncontested. And certainly XI Jinping feels very comfortable that he's consolidated a lot of power. The United States, exactly the opposite. The US coming out of the pandemic, by far in the strongest economic position of any advanced industrial economy in terms of growth, in terms of productivity, in terms of leading in technologies and in terms of lower inflation than its peers. But the US political system is more dysfunctional, more divided than at any point in our lifetimes. And for now, that certainly is creating a level of risk aversion on the American side as well.
IB:首先,在这种背景下, 目前中国可能处于 40、50 年来 从结构上看最糟糕的经济形势中, 但他们围绕习近平的政治巩固 是完全没有争议的。 当然,习近平对 自己巩固了大量权力 感到非常自在。 美国,恰恰相反。 摆脱疫情的美国, 迄今为止在所有发达工业经济体中 处于最强的经济地位, 在增长方面, 在生产力方面, 在技术领先方面, 通胀也低于同行。 但是,美国的政治制度 比我们一生中的任何时候都 更加失调,更加分裂。 就目前而言, 这无疑也让美国方面 产生了一定程度 的避险情绪。
So I do think that, you know, at the same time that you hear a lot of people say, "Oh, if things go really badly, maybe they want to lash out." Yeah, not for these two leaders at this point in time. Other leaders, different countries, different positions, maybe. But that's not the way that this is actually playing out. Now 2024 is coming out, and people are certainly starting to talk a lot more about it. It's interesting that, as you point out, the United States on China have policies that are fairly consistent across the board politically. Which is not true for most other issues. If Trump became president, Ukraine policy would be very different. Iran policy would be very different. Europe policy would be very different. China, not so different. There's a lot of consistency between Biden and Trump on China. A lot of people thought Biden was going to remove the Trump tariffs on the Chinese. He did no such thing. In fact, he largely extended some of them. Furthermore, export controls on semiconductors, pretty minimal from the Trump administration, expanded structurally under Biden to the extent that China now really feels like America wants to contain them in the most advanced areas of the 21-century economy. And the US is also leaning into industrial policy, like the CHIPS Act, domestically and with countries like South Korea and the Netherlands. The Chinese clearly would prefer a Trump policy on China there, than they do the Biden administration.
所以我确实这么认为,你知道, 同时你会听到很多人说: “哦,如果事情进展非常糟糕, 也许他们想猛烈抨击。” 是的,但现在不适合这两位领导人。 可能还有其他领导人, 不同的国家,不同的立场。 但实际情况并非如此。 现在 2024 年即将到来, 人们肯定开始更多地谈论它。 有趣的是,正如你指出的那样, 美国对中国的政策始终如一, 包括在政治上。 对于大多数其他问题而言, 情况并非如此。 如果特朗普当选总统, 乌克兰的政策将大不相同。 伊朗的政策将大不相同。 欧洲的政策将大不相同。 中国,没什么不同。 拜登和特朗普在 中国问题上有很多一致性。 很多人认为 拜登会取消 特朗普对中国的关税。 他没有做过这样的事情。 实际上,他在很大程度上 扩展了其中的一些。 此外,在拜登的领导下, 对半导体的出口管制 对半导体的出口管制在结构上有所扩大, 特朗普政府的管制则很小, 以至于中国现在真的觉得美国想要 在21世纪经济最先进的领域牵制他们。 而且,美国还倾向于 在国内或与韩国、荷兰等国家 制定产业政策 比如 CHIPS 法案。 中国人显然更喜欢特朗普的对华政策, 相比拜登政府而言。
And, you know, you can tell this when you talk to Chinese leaders, compared to leaders of other countries around the world, most of whom have pretty strong preferences of whether Biden or Trump is president, of who they want. The Chinese aren't sure. The Chinese are thinking, well, I mean, if Trump comes in, there's greater likelihood that American allies are going to be less aligned because he'll push them transactionally on spending more money on defense or maybe he doesn't care about the Japanese or the South Koreans, and he'll put tariffs or threaten tariffs on anybody, friends or enemies. Biden's less likely to do that. But Trump is also a wild card on negative tail risks directly with the Chinese. You know, he was the guy that was willing to work with North Korea, but also was prepared to hit them harder if things don't go well. Well, how lucky did the Chinese feel? And I think, you know, the answer you get is we really don't know. We don't know who we want there. So there's a lot of uncertainty that the Chinese have about the future of the American political system. And there's a lot of uncertainty that the Americans have about the future of the Chinese economic system. At a time when the interdependence of these two economies and, frankly, of their diplomatic interdependence, is remaining quite high-level. We may not be comfortable with that reality, but that is the abiding reality that we're going to have to deal with going forward.
而且,你知道, 当你与中国领导人交谈时, 与世界其他国家的领导人相比, 他们中的大多数人对于 拜登还是特朗普是他们想要的总统 有着强烈的偏好。 中国人不确定。 中国人在想,好吧, 我的意思是,如果特朗普进来, 有很大的可能性是 美国的盟友就不那么一致, 因为他会在交易中推动 他们花更多的钱在国防上, 或者他并不在意日本人或者韩国人, 他会对任何人,朋友或者敌人, 征收关税或威胁要征收关税。 拜登不太可能这样做。 但特朗普也是一个直接和中国 产生负面尾部风险的未知因素。 你知道,他是 愿意与朝鲜合作的人, 但也是准备在事情进展不顺利时对 他们进行更严厉的打击的人。 那么,中国人觉得有多幸运? 我想,答案是我们真的不知道。 我们不知道我们想要谁在那里。 因此,中国人对美国政治制度的未来 有很多不确定性。 以及美国人对中国经济体系的未来 有很多不确定性。 目前这两个经济体的相互依存度, 以及坦白地说,外交的相互依存度 是相当高的。 我们可能对这种现实不舒服, 但那是一个长久不变的 我们在未来将必须面对的事实。
HW: So you mentioned technology, and I think that we have to talk about artificial intelligence. Now, one of the major breaking stories this weekend was the management implosions and excitement over at OpenAI. And I'm sure we could have a whole conversation about that. But given the implications of AI rolling out at every level of society, where are the Chinese and the US governments on this? And what did they talk about in San Francisco?
HW:所以你提到了技术, 我认为我们必须来聊聊人工智能。 现在,这周最震惊的新闻之一 是 OpenAI 管理层内部动荡。 而且我敢肯定,我们可以 就此进行一个完整的对话。 但是,考虑到人工智能 席卷社会的各个方面所带来的影响, 中国和美国政府 在这个问题的立场是什么呢? 他们在旧金山谈了什么?
IB: Well, in San Francisco, they spoke about starting a track 1.5 working group on artificial intelligence, which means the private sector and the public sector engaging together. Which makes sense from the American perspective, because, you know, the US is a country that really does promote entrepreneurialism and its private sector corporations, so much so that a lot of people think the US is less democratic than it should be, because corporations, private sector, capture the regulatory process through big money lobbying and the rest. The Chinese, of course, if anything, the state captures the private sector. So the fact that they're willing to have not just government-to-government, but government-to-government plus these big companies that are, you know, effectively sovereign when we talk about the digital space, the platforms they have, the algorithms they drive and artificial intelligence that they are rolling out very, very quickly. That's a fairly significant move. And it comes on the back of the Americans and Chinese both sending senior officials to Bletchley Park in the UK, agreeing to a set of principles on safety for frontier AI models, the AI models that are coming in the future. So there is a level of understanding between the US and China that they need to share information, and they need to work together to avoid some of the worst negative potentials from very disruptive AI, while obviously benefiting from extraordinary, you know, sort of, world-changing new productivity, invention and efficiency.
IB:嗯,在旧金山, 他们谈到 要成立一个人工智 能方面的 1.5 轨工作组 这意味着私营部门 和公共部门将共同参与。 从美国的角度来看,这是有道理的, 因为,你知道,美国是一个 非常促进创业 促进私营企业发展的国家, 以至于很多人认为 美国没有应有的民主, 因为企业和私营部门 通过大笔资金游说等方式操控监管过程。 当然,中国人,如果有的话, 就是国家掌控私营部门。 因此,事实上,他们 不仅愿意有政府对政府, 还愿意有政府对政府再加上这些大公司, 你知道, 当我们谈论数字空间时, 大公司拥有平台、驱动算法 以及快速更迭的人工智能技术, 它们实际上是有效主权方。 这是一个相当重要的进展。 在此背景下,美国人和中国人 都向英国的布莱奇利公园 派出高级官员 , 就 未来会出现的前沿 AI 模型 安全性所制定的一系列准则 达成了一致。 因此,美国和中国之间有一定程度的共识 即他们需要共享信息, 他们需要共同努力 来避免一些由极具 颠覆性的人工智能所带来的 负面可能性。 同时显然受益于卓越的、 改变世界的新的生产力、发明和效率。
But there's a really, really big unknown question that underpins the rolling out of AI. Because let's think about what AI does today. It's taking, it's these models, these large language models, that are taking the entire corpus of global data, as we have it on the internet, as we have it in the digital world, and is making predictions, pattern recognition and predictions, on the basis of all of that information instantaneously. And we've never had such powerful tools. Now, when you have all of that data at your fingertips, so you can therefore assess and measure metrics of the world in real time and how human beings interact with it in real-time, that creates really big questions about what political and economic models will be most functional.
但是,有一个非常 非常重要的未知问题 是人工智能推出的基础。 因为让我们想一想 AI 目前做了什么。 正是这些模型, 这些大型语言模型, 正在获取整个全球数据语料库, 正如我们在互联网 和数字世界中拥有的那样, 并正在进行预测, 模式识别和预测, 基于所有即刻产生的信息。 而且我们从未有过如此强大的工具。 现在,当所有这些数据触手可及, 你就可以因此实时评估和衡量的 世界的指标 以及人类如何与之进行实时互动, 这就产生了非常重要的问题 即哪些政治和经济模型最实用。
So, for example, 30 years ago, you know, we thought, well, democracy is definitely the most functional model. And the internet, as it rolls out, is making that more clear, because you've got all these people with their access to the World Wide Web, and that really undermines authoritarian countries that want to control information and it helps democracies. And that's how you got colored revolutions or the Arab Spring. And then you have the data revolution, the surveillance revolution, you say, well, wait a second. You know, governments that have access to all that data can actually create, you know, all sorts of incentives, both carrots and sticks, to motivate patriotic behavior, where in democracies that can create a lot more polarization.
因此,举个例子,30年前, 你知道,我们认为, 好吧,民主绝对是 最实用的模式。 然后互联网推出, 它更清楚地表明了这一点, 因为所有这些人 都可以访问万维网, 这确实削弱了 想要控制信息的专制国家, 并帮助了民主。 这就是“有色人种革命”或 “阿拉伯之春”发生的原因。 然后是数据革命, 监控革命, 好吧,等一下。 你知道,能够获得所有这些数据的政府 实际上可以创造各种激励措施, 包括胡萝卜和大棒, 来激励爱国行为, 而在民主国家,这可能会造成 更多的两极分化。
So now let's take AI and look forward three, five years, when you've got large language models that are tailored to your individual data corpus on your smartphone. So everyone has an individual AI that has all the data on you, and collectively it has all the data on the planet real-time. In that environment, is a planned economy less efficient or more efficient than a free-market economy with different corporations that are competing? We don't know the answer. In that environment, is an authoritarian political system more or less stable than a democratic political system? We actually don't know the answer. I mean, Helen, I know the answer I want it to be. I want it to be a well-regulated free market and a democracy. But I'd be lying to you, right? We don't know the answer to that. And so, I mean, suddenly, the United States and China are entering into a world where a small number of actors in the private sector are investing immense amounts of money and developing unprecedented tools that will determine, more than anything else, the viability and strength of these two fundamentally competing political and economic models. And we don't know which one is going to do better. Which one might even win, or can they both exist, continue to exist at the same time. And so in that environment, you better believe that the Americans and Chinese both want to have, you know, a very significant seat at the head of the table in helping understand what the hell is going on with AI. You need to know that early so you have some time to plan for it, to respond to it, to govern it, to create institutions and structure around it. And I think right now both governments are playing catch-up, but they understand they need to do it hand in glove with the private sector. And my God, I mean, the events at OpenAI are absolutely essential to understanding that future.
因此,现在让我们以人工智能为例,展望 三五年,那时你的智能手机上 会有针对个人数据语料库量身定制 的大型语言模型。 因此,每个人都有 一个个人的人工智能 , 它拥有关于您的所有数据, 并且共同拥有地球上的所有实时数据。 在这种环境下, 计划经济会比 不同企业竞争的自由市场经济 更低效还是高效呢? 我们不知道答案。 在这种环境下, 专制政治制度 比民主政治制度 更稳定还是更不稳定? 我们实际上不知道答案。 我的意思是,海伦, 我知道我想要的答案。 我希望它成为一个监管良好的 自由市场和民主国家。 但我就在对你撒谎,对吧? 我们不知道这个问题的答案。 因此,我的意思是, 突然之间,美国和中国 进入了一个世界, 那里私营部门的少数行动者 正在投入巨额资金 并开发前所未有的工具, 这些资金和工具将首先决定 这两种基础竞争的政治和经济模式 的可行性和优势所在。 而且我们不知道 哪一个会做得更好。 哪一个甚至可能获胜, 或者两者都能存在, 继续同时存在。 因此,在这种环境下, 你最好相信,美国人和中国人都想要 在帮助理解人工智能到底发生了什么方面 占据非常重要的位置。 你需要尽早知道这一点, 这样你才有时间为它做计划、 做出回应、进行治理、 围绕它设立机构和建立架构。 而且我认为 现在两国政府都在追赶, 但他们知道他们需要 与私营部门携手合作。 天哪,我的意思是, OpenAI 的事件 对于理解未来绝对至关重要。
HW: I mean, complexity is the operative word there. I mean, what is the likelihood? I mean, many speakers at TED have called for some form of international regulatory agency or for some kind of oversight. What are the chances that we could actually see that actually happen, and what are the chances that it could have teeth?
HW:我的意思是, 复杂性是那里至关重要的词。 我的意思是,可能性有多大? 我的意思是,TED的许多发言者都 呼吁建立某种形式的国际监管 机构或某种形式的监督。 我们真正看到这种情况 真实发生的可能性有多大, 它发展的可能性有多大?
IB: Well, there are governments all over the world that are treating this issue with urgency. They're making it a priority. And they're doing that in part, not only because they know AI is important, but they also see that AI is critically important to things that they're already prioritizing. So if you look at Russia-Ukraine, the future of that war may well be critically determined by the ability of the Ukrainians to use autonomous lethal weapons powered by AI against Russia. You better understand that if you're the Americans and US allies going forward, both in terms of getting outcomes you want and also potentially destabilizing the region in ways that you're not prepared for. The AI-driven disinformation around the US election in 2024 is an absolute critical concern for US policy makers and, frankly, around disinformation for Israel-Palestine and who wins the information war, which, I mean, the Israelis are militarily doing what they want to, tactically on the ground, but broader information war, at least presently, they're losing. Understanding AI is critical to all of these issues. It's not just a new space. And so I think everyone is taking it very, very seriously. And they're putting a lot of resources into it.
IB:嗯,世界各地的政府 都在紧急处理这个问题。 他们把它当作优先事项。 他们之所以这样做,部分原因 不仅在于他们知道 人工智能很重要, 而且他们还意识到 人工智能对于他们已经 优先考虑的事情至关重要。 因此,如果你看看俄罗斯-乌克兰, 那场战争的未来很可能关键取决于 乌克兰人使用基于人工智能 技术的自动致命武器 去打击俄罗斯的能力。 你最好明白, 如果你是美国人和美国盟友在向前的话, 不管是得到你想要的结果 还是潜在地使该地区动荡, 你都没有准备过。 围绕 2024 年美国大选的 人工智能驱动的虚假情报 对美国政治决策者来说 绝对是个最关心的问题, 坦率地说,围绕着 以色列-巴勒斯坦的虚假情报 以及谁赢得这场信息战, 我的意思是,以色列人在军事上 做着他们想做的事, 战术性地摆在明面上。 但更广泛的信息战, 至少在目前,他们正在输。 了解人工智能 对所有这些问题都至关重要。 这不仅仅是一个新空间。 因此,我认为每个人都在 非常非常认真地对待它。 而且他们在其中投入了大量资源。
There clearly is a level of effort to regulate AI in ways that align with individual government goals and systems that is different from place to place. So, I mean, in China, part of it is we can't allow the average Chinese citizen to have access to a chatbot that could provide, you know, responses on any data. You know, we can't allow -- there's got to be severe penalties in starting to talk about independence of Taiwan or Tiananmen Square or anything like that. And these companies have to be responsible not just for the inputs but also the outputs that are coming from these platforms. Where in the United States, right, you have the companies that are working very closely with the US government to try to figure out, OK, what are the areas that we're going to be comfortable having significant regulation. Like for example, red teaming on how one can break new models as they're developed. Or in having watermarks that help to determine whether something is or is not created by artificial intelligence. Where in Europe, the focus is so much more on privacy and data protections for citizens. So, you know, right now, you would say it looks like they're moving in very, very different directions. But that's in part because we don't yet have anything close to global agreement on what artificial intelligence can do. What are the things that need to be measured, what are the things that we want to promote, and what are the areas that we need to try to contain or constrain or regulate? And I think that there's a United Nations process that I'm involved in, a high-level panel that I think is trying to make immediate strides on that. I mean, the report's going to come out within eight months, which is light speed in terms of the United Nations. But we will see whether all of those efforts will get you to pieces of global governance like you have the beginnings of for climate change, for example. But you had decades to get it together on climate change, and you have months to a few years to do it effectively on AI. I would say that I am hopeful, but I am not yet optimistic.
显然,我们付出了一定程度的努力 来约束人工智能, 使它与不同地方的政府目标和制度 相一致。 因此,我的意思是,在中国, 部分原因是我们不能允许 普通的中国公民访问 可以对任何数据提供响应的聊天机器人。 你知道,我们不能允许 —— 当开始讨论类似台湾独立 或天安门事件时 将会有严重的处罚。 而且,这些公司不仅要对输入负责, 还要对这些平台的产出负责。 在美国,对, 有些公司正在 与美国政府密切合作 , 试图弄清楚, 好吧,在哪些领域 我们可以放心地 进行严格的监管。 例如, 红色团队合作研究如何在开发新模型时 将其打破。 或者使用水印来帮助确定 某物是否由人工智能创造。 在欧洲,重点更多地放在 保护公民的隐私和数据上。 所以,你知道,现在, 你会说他们 看起来在朝着非常 非常不同的方向前进。 但这在一定程度上是因为我们还没有 对人工智能可以做什么 达成近乎全球的共识。 需要衡量的事情有哪些, 我们想要推广的东西是什么, 我们需要努力遏制、 限制或监管的领域有哪些? 而且我认为 有一个我正在参与的联合国进程, 一个高级别小组正在 努力在这方面立即取得进展。 我的意思是,这份报告将在八个月内发布, 对联合国而言这简直太快了。 但是,我们将看看所有这些努力是否 会让你进入全球治理的各个方面, 比如就像气候变化一开始那样。 但是你有几十年的时间来 共同解决气候变化, 而你有几个月到几年的时间 在人工智能上有效地解决这个问题。 我想说我充满希望, 但我还不乐观。
HW: All right, we'll take it. OK, I want to change the topic. I want to talk about infrastructure. So the Belt and Road Initiative is subject to a lot of debate. And just as a quick background reminder for those who don't know, the Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most ambitious physical infrastructure projects that was ever conceived. It was launched by Xi in 2013, and originally it was devised to link East Asia and Europe, has since expanded to the Global South and to Latin America. Do you think that the US is losing out to China in this regard? And what should the US do to counter potential China dominance in the Global South, particularly?
HW:好吧,我们会接受这个答案的。 好的,我想换个话题。 我想谈谈基础设施。 因此,“一带一路” 倡议备受争议。 对于那些不知道的人, 简要提醒一下背景信息, “一带一路” 倡议 是有史以来最雄心勃勃的 基础设施建设项目之一。 它由习近平于 2013 年推出, 最初旨在连接东亚和欧洲, 后来扩展到“全球南方”和拉丁美洲。 你认为美国在这方面输给了中国吗? 特别是,美国应该怎么做才能对抗中国 在全球南方的潜在主导地位呢?
IB: It’s certainly true that the Chinese have far more influence in terms of their commercial and trade relations across the Global South than the Americans do. In part because they invest a lot more and in part because those investments are driven much more by the Chinese government. And that's because that's the nature of the Chinese system. I mean, if Apple decides to invest in India as opposed to China, that decision has virtually nothing to do with the US government, maybe at the margins. But overwhelmingly, that decision is made by Apple for reasons intrinsic to Apple. Where if the Chinese are investing, certainly if it's a state- owned enterprise, it's being coordinated strategically with the Chinese government. And even if it's a private-sector company, there's a lot more alignment with the Chinese. So I'm saying that in part because there's some degree to which this is not a winnable fight by the Americans. The Chinese exert influence around the world through their state capitalist system primarily. Their power is projected more commercially than the United States, which historically has projected power, a lot of soft power through its political institutions and through its cultural institutions, but also, of course, a lot of hard power through its military might. And then, of course, the role of the US dollar as reserve currency, which allows you to weaponize it, get countries to do what they want that way, but not through state-directed trade and investment.
IB:的确,中国人在全球南边 的商业和贸易关系方面 比美国人影响力 大得多。 部分原因是他们的投资要多得多, 而且部分原因是这些投资更多地 是由中国政府推动的。 那是因为这就是中国制度的本质。 我的意思是,如果苹果决定 在印度而不是中国投资, 那个决定几乎与美国政府无关, 可能(对美国政府来说)是很轻微的。 但绝大多数情况下, 那个决定是由苹果出于内部原因作出的。 如果中国人投资, 当然如果是一家国有企业, 那么就是在与中国政府进行战略协调。 而且,即使它是一家私营公司, 与中国人的结盟程度也要高得多。 所以我之所以这样说, 部分原因是从某种程度上 这不是一场美国人可以打赢的战斗。 中国人主要通过 其国家资本制度在世界 范围内施加影响。 他们的国家实力展现比美国更商业性, 美国历来通过 自己的政治机构和文化机构展现软实力 当然, 也通过军事力量展现硬实力。 当然,还有美元作为储备货币, 它允许你将其武器化, 让各国以这种方式做他们想做的事情, 但不是通过国家主导的贸易和投资。
So you could say the Chinese are in the lead there, though I would argue that the size of that lead has been overstated. In part because China is no longer spending anywhere near as much on Belt and Road as they used to. And that's one of the reasons why a lot fewer heads of state showed up a month ago at their Belt and Road summit than did during their summits before the pandemic, because they just don't have the same amount of money that they are willing to throw at these countries, but also because a lot of the investments they made did not perform very well. And as a consequence, you've got a lot of bad debt that now they have to restructure in countries all over the world where they have really, really big exposures, like Pakistan and like Zambia and like Sri Lanka, I mean, countries that 10 years ago, 15 years ago, you were heralding as China's taking over these places. And then it's like, oh my God, what are we dealing with? Venezuela, right? I mean, a lot of the countries that the Chinese are dominating are some of the worst-performing markets out there with debt that is going to be incredibly hard to service, especially in a really challenging interest rate environment. So I'm not so sure that that Belt and Road, you know, sort of, advantage is so critical, especially because a lot of that Belt and Road is in hard infrastructure. And once you build it, everyone can use it. You build a port, you build a railway. I mean, I'd rather the Americans build it than the Chinese because it redounds more to American shareholders, sure. But you'd rather the port be built, than no one build the port. Because that then leads to more economic growth. And if the US is the largest economy in the world, the US benefits disproportionately from more economic growth around the world. That's just kind of a reality. It's what globalization is all about.
因此,你可以说中国 在那里处于领先地位, 但我认为,这种领先优势的规模被夸大 被夸大了。 部分原因是中国在 “一带一路”上的支出 已不再像以前那样多。 这也是 为什么一个月前 出席“一带一路”峰会的国家元首 比疫情前峰会少得多的原因之一, 因为他们 不愿意向这些国家投入 相同的资金, 也因为他们做的许多投资 表现不佳。 因此,有大量坏账产生, 现在他们必须在世界各 地风险敞口非常大的国家 进行重组, 比如巴基斯坦、赞比亚, 还有斯里兰卡, 我的意思是, 那些在10年前、15年前, 你曾预示中国 正在接管的这些地方。 然后就像,天啊, 我们在处理什么? 委内瑞拉,对吧? 我的意思是, 中国占主导地位的许多国家 都是目前表现最差的市场, 其债务将很难偿还, 尤其是在非常艰难的 利率环境中。 因此,我不太确定 “一带一路”的优势在 某种程度上是否如此重要, 尤其是因为 “一带一路” 的许多地方 都来自硬基础设施。 一旦你建造了它, 每个人都可以使用它。 你建造港口,你修建铁路。 我的意思是,我宁愿美国人 建造它,也不愿中国人建造它, 因为它对美国股东的回报肯定更大。 但是你宁愿建造港口, 也不愿没人建造港口。 因为这会 带来更多的经济增长。 而且,如果美国是世界上 最大的经济体, 那么美国将 从全球经济增长中获得不成比例的收益。 这只是现实。 这就是全球化的全部意义。
But I'm not so sure, when you talk about new technologies, now it's a very different place. Now, the Americans are leading the world in AI, and the Chinese are leading the world in transition energy technology: electric vehicles, batteries, supply chain. And we're seeing that play out in the fight between the US and China. So there were some big positives that came between Xi and Biden. You've got a lot of military- to-military direct engagement in a high level that the Chinese had resisted before. And so now the next time you have an American and Chinese aircraft five feet next to each other, near-miss or God forbid, actually have a collision, you'll have hot lines to deconflict that immediately. And that's a good thing. And on Taiwan, there were a lot of conversations. And now the two opposition parties in Taiwan look like they're going to run on a joint ticket. They still have to figure out the final methodology on that. But if that happens, that means the guy that, you know, China thinks of as pro-independence, that would lead to a lot more tensions, probably isn't going to win. That reduces near-term tensions. That's a big issue.
但是我不太确定, 当你谈论新技术时, 现在情况已经完全不同了。 现在,美国人在人工智能方面 处于世界领先水平, 而中国人在能源技术转型 (电动汽车、电池、供应链) 方面处于世界领先地位。 我们在中美之间的斗争中 看到了这一点。 因此,习近平和拜登之间 有一些重大的积极因素。 有许多军事上高能级的直接冲突, 这是中国人以前所抵制的。 因此,现在,下次当有一架美国 的飞机和一架中国的飞机 彼此相隔五英尺, 差点发生 或者上帝保佑 真的发生了碰撞, 两国领导人就会直接 通话来立即消除冲突。 这是一件好事。 在台湾,有很多讨论。 现在,台湾的两个反对党派 看上去要联合竞选。 他们仍然需要找出这方面的最终方法。 但是,如果发生这种情况, 那就意味着,你知道, 中国认为支持独立、 会导致更加紧张局势的那个人 可能不会获胜。 这缓解了短期的紧张局势。 这是个大问题。
But the big area of conflict that has not been addressed and that is still moving towards more confrontation is technology. And here the Americans are continuing with existing export controls, and they plan to expand them. In fact, in the coming months, I think you will see new export controls on cloud computing. And meanwhile, the Chinese are responding with export controls in the critical minerals space. They talked about gallium and germanium, which, you know, are pretty widely available and not so essential for so much of that supply chain. But now they're talking about graphite, which is much more essential for batteries, for EVs and where the Chinese have much more control. And if those move from licenses to direct controls, then you're going to have a very significant fight between the United States containing Chinese growth in AI and the Chinese containing American and allied growth in transition energy. That's the opposite of globalization. It's less efficient. It's more expensive, right? It's industrial policy, it's not free market. And it will create a much more tense structural relationship between the US and China. This is the area that we need to watch the most closely over the coming, say, six months. It's where we could end up getting a much bigger blow up, despite the level of stability that both sides are trying to achieve in the relationship.
但是,尚未解决冲突 且仍在走向更多对抗的领域是技术。 美国人仍在继续执行现有的出口管制, 并计划扩大这些管制。 实际上,在接下来的几个月中, 我认为你会看到新的出口 管制,在云计算方面。 同时,中国人也以出口管制进行回应, 在关键的矿产资源领域。 他们谈到了镓和锗, 你知道,镓和锗非常普遍, 对供应链的大部分来说并不是那么重要。 但是现在他们在谈论石墨, 石墨对电池、电动汽车 以及中国人控制着的 其它相关领域重要得多。 而且,如果这些问题 从许可证转向直接控制, 那么中美将会有一场非常激烈的斗争 美国牵制中国在人工智能方面的增长, 中国牵制美国和盟友 在能源转型方面的增长。 这与全球化恰恰相反。 它的效率较低。 它更昂贵,对吧? 这是产业政策, 不是自由市场。 它将在中美之间 造成更加紧张的结构性关系。 在未来(比如)六个月中, 这是我们最需要密切关注的领域。 尽管双方都在努力 在关系中实现一定程度的稳定, 但我们最终可能会遭受更大的打击。
HW: So the mention of energy is obviously salient. And, you know, the COP conference is coming up in Abu Dhabi in ten days' time. And so I'm wondering, did they talk about climate policy? Were they talking about energy? What happened?
HW:能源问题显然很突出。 而且,你知道, COP会议 10 天后将在阿布扎比举行。 所以我想知道, 他们有没有谈到气候政策? 他们在谈论能源吗? 发生了什么?
IB: It was part of the run-up to the summit where John Kerry, on cabinet and special climate envoy at state for the Biden administration, was meeting with his interlocutor in the Chinese government. They've engaged a lot of late, and there's a replacement there. So Kerry met with the replacement, which is useful, younger, not as well-known globally, but has the portfolio on the Chinese side. And in the run-up to the COP summit in Abu Dhabi, where, you know, the world comes together to talk about commitments on climate, there has been more willingness of the Chinese to say that they will come up with some joint plan to further reduce emissions by 2030 and further invest in transition energy. But, you know, in reality, the US and China are fighting more or competing more than they are cooperating in the climate space. This is one where the Americans looked at China you know, no matter what you think about climate change in the US, no matter how much of a tree hugger you are or aren't, you see the Chinese putting hundreds of billions into new post-carbon technologies and you say, wait a second, I can't let the Chinese dominate the world in that. I want the Americans to do that. So there is, you know, some sort of, you know, virtuous cycle of competition, even if it's not alignment and coordination.
IB:这是峰会筹备过程的一部分, 拜登政府的内阁 兼州气候特使约翰·克里 正在与中国政府的对话者会面。 他们最近约定了很多, 但还有一个继任者 凯利和这个继任者见了面, 继任者很有用、 更年轻,在全球没那么出名, 但他是中国的外交官员。 在阿布扎比的 COP 峰会之前, 全世界聚集在一起讨论气候承诺, 中国人更愿意说 他们将提出一些联合计划, 在 2030 年之前进一步减少排放, 并进一步投资能源转型。 但是,你知道,实际上, 美国和中国在气候领域的斗争 或竞争 比他们在气候领域的合作还要多。 这是美国人看中国人的地方, 你知道,无论你如何 看待美国的气候变化, 无论你是否是环保主义人士, 你看到中国人向新的后碳技术 投入了数千亿美元, 然后你会说,等一下, 我不能让中国人主导这个领域。 我希望美国人做那件事。 因此,你知道, 有某种良性竞争, 即使不是同盟和配合。
Now, the alignment between the US and China on climate is a challenging alignment. It's one where the Chinese are emitting by far the most carbon in the world today. And the Americans have emitted by far the most carbon in the world historically and emit much more per capita today than the Chinese do, though the Chinese per capita actually emit more than Europe, which is quite something, given how comparatively poor the Chinese are. You look at that and you say, well, neither of these economies really wants to spend a lot of money admitting that they're the ones responsible and they have to be the ones paying for loss and damages and transition for the poorer countries that haven't had a chance to industrialize yet, haven't had a chance to industrialize with carbon intensity yet, right? And there are a lot of countries around the world, especially India, but broadly the Global South, that really want a very different outcome.
现在,美国和中国 在气候问题上的协调 是一项具有挑战性的调整。 迄今为止, 中国人现在排放了最多的二氧化碳, 美国人在历史上排放了最多的二氧化碳, 并且美国今天的人均 排放量比中国人多得多, 尽管中国人均碳排放量实际上超过欧洲, 但考虑到 中国人相对贫困, 这确实是一个不错的数字。 你看着就会说,好吧, 这两个经济体都不想花很多钱, (不想)承认他们是责任人, (不想)承认他们必须 为那些还没有机会实现工业化、 还没有机会实现碳强度工业化的贫穷国家 赔偿损失、弥补伤害以及 支付转型的代价,对吧? 世界上有许多国家,尤其是印度, 但更广泛的全球南方国家, 确实想要一个截然不同的结果。
So, you know, China used to be a member of the Global South. And this is one -- we haven't talked about this, but it's kind of a really interesting point to make. China is not a part of the Global South anymore, right? When they're the leading carbon emitter and they're the leading creditor to the world's developing countries and they're increasingly -- and the second, the second-lead technology country in the world in terms of biotech and new energy and digital commerce and, you know, facial recognition, you know, voice recognition, the list goes on and on and on. You know, China is not a developed country, but they’re not in the Global South. And part of the reason, to go back to what we talked about at the beginning here, part of the reason why the Americans and the Chinese are the "adults" in the room is precisely because they both have so much at stake with the existing status quo remaining. The Chinese want to change their level of influence over existing institutions. They want more voting rights in the IMF, for example, but they don't want to break those institutions. They want them to persist. In fact, the Chinese, you know, see that they're the largest contributor in the world to UN peacekeeping operations. That's an organization the Americans created at the end of World War II. But the Chinese are really committed to it. Where the Russians, I mean, you know, basically, they're the ones that are sending, you know, Wagner and their successors in to countries where nobody can participate. To, you know, literally, to ungoverned regions of chaos. So again, it's not that we suddenly say, oh, China is a democracy that we should really like, they're friendly, they're cuddly. No, no, no, not at all. But they are really invested in the present global system. And that is a piece of stability at a time that a lot of the world appears to be coming apart.
所以,你知道, 中国曾经是全球南方的一员。 这是一个 —— 我们还没有讨论过这个问题, 但这是一个非常 有趣的观点。 中国不再是全球 南方的一部分,对吧? 当他们成了主要的碳排放者, 当他们成了世界发展 中国家的主要债权人, 当他们越来越多地作为 世界第二领先的科技国家, 在生物技术、 新能源、电子商务、 面部识别、语音识别方面, 这样的例子不胜枚举。 你知道,中国不是发达国家, 但他们不在全球南方国家范围里。 部分原因是, 回到我们一开始所说的, 美国人和中国人之所以成为 会议室里的 “成年人”,部分原因 正是因为在现有现状依然存在的情况下, 他们都处在成败关头。 中国人想改变他们对现有 机构的影响力水平。 例如,他们希望在国际货币 基金组织获得更多的投票权, 但他们不想破坏这些机构。 他们希望他们坚持下去。 实际上,你知道,中国人看到 他们是世界上 对联合国维和行动的最大贡献者。 这是美国人在第二次世界大战 结束时创建的组织。 但是中国人确实致力于此。 我的意思是,你知道,基本上 俄罗斯人派遣 瓦格纳及其继任者进入那些 而其他人无法插手。 从字面上看,你知道的, 那些地方是无人管理的混乱地区。 因此再说一次, 并不是我们突然说,哦, 中国是一个我们真正 应该喜欢的民主国家。 他们很友善,他们很可爱。 不,不,不,一点也不。 但是他们确实投资 于当前的全球体系。 这是一种稳定, 当世界许多地方 似乎正在分崩离析的时候。
HW: So one final question and then we have to wrap up. And this question came from our community who also sent in questions for you. How did this meeting change your outlook on future relations between the US and China?
HW:所以最后一个问题 然后我们必须结束了。 这个问题来自我们的社区, 他们也向您发送了问题。 这次会议 如何改变了 你对中美未来关系关系的看法?
IB: In the near term, it almost guarantees that US-China relations will be more frequent and will be more constructive. That does not mean that there will be massive breakthroughs, but the willingness of both sides to see that they benefit when they engage with each other substantively at the highest levels across all of the government. I mean, it's not just on, you know, Gina Raimondo in Commerce going over there and saying, "Hey, we want to make sure that Disney and the NBA can still do business." That's happening, it's much broader than that. It's climate, it's defense, it's technology, it's the leaders. And I'll tell you, this wasn't in the talking points, but it is important that Biden and Xi Jinping privately did talk about the fact that they need to spend more time with each other personally. And, you know, that Biden and Xi knew each other quite well, spent a lot of time when they were both vice presidents. And that's something that Biden's pretty proud of. And he talks about it privately in a way that, for example, he never got to know Putin, and he doesn’t like Putin. Xi Jinping, he may not trust him, but he does respect him. They actually do have a person-to-person relationship that matters. And, you know, for two leaders of the most powerful countries in the world that hadn't talked to each other for such a long time, spending four hours together really matters, face-to-face. And I think we're going to see more of that, at least by Zoom, over the coming months. And we should welcome that. Irrespective of what you think of either or both of those leaders, it's a very important thing for them to be talking.
IB:在短期内,这几乎可以 保证中美关系 将更加频繁 和更具建设性。 这并不意味着会取得 重大突破, 而是双方都愿意看到 他们能从在政府最高层面上 进行实质性接触 获利。 我的意思是,你知道, 这不仅仅是商务部 的吉娜·雷蒙多在那边说 “嘿,我们想 确保迪士尼和 NBA 还能做生意。” 这种情况正在发生, 范围远不止于此。 这是气候,是国防, 是技术,是领导者。 我要告诉你, 这不在谈话要点中, 但重要的是, 拜登和习近平确实 私下里谈到了 他们需要花更多时间亲自相处的事实。 而且,你知道, 拜登和习近平非常了解对方, 在他们都是副总统时度过了很多时间。 这是拜登非常自豪的事情。 例如,他私下里谈论这件事的方式是, 他从来不认识普京, 也不喜欢普京。 习近平,他可能不信任他, 但他确实尊重他。 实际上,他们确实有着重要的人 与人之间的关系。 而且,你知道, 对于世界上最强大的国家 的两位领导人来说, 面对面地相处四个小时确实很重要, 他们已经很长时间没有互相交谈了。 而且我认为,在接下来的几个月中, 会看到更多这样的相互交谈, 至少通过视频会议。 我们应该对此表示欢迎。 无论你如何看待 其中一位或两位领导人, 谈话对他们来说 都是一件非常重要的事情。
HW: Ian, always a pleasure, thank you so much for your time.
HW:伊恩(Ian),一直很高兴, 非常感谢你抽出时间。
IB: Thank you. Helen.
IB:谢谢。海伦。