Good afternoon. If you have followed diplomatic news in the past weeks, you may have heard of a kind of crisis between China and the U.S. regarding cyberattacks against the American company Google. Many things have been said about this. Some people have called a cyberwar what may actually be just a spy operation -- and obviously, a quite mishandled one. However, this episode reveals the growing anxiety in the Western world regarding these emerging cyber weapons.
Dobar dan. Ako ste pratili diplomatske vesti prethodnih nedelja, možda ste čuli za neku vrstu krize koja je izbila između Kine i SAD u vezi sa sajber napadima na američku kompaniju Google. O ovome se mnogo pričalo. Pojedinici su nazvali sajber ratom ono što bi u stvari mogla da bude samo špijunska operacija - i to, kao što je očigledno, vrlo nesupešna. Pa ipak, ovaj događaj otkriva rastuću uznemirenost u Zapadnom svetu u vezi sa sajber oružjem
It so happens that these weapons are dangerous. They're of a new nature: they could lead the world into a digital conflict that could turn into an armed struggle. These virtual weapons can also destroy the physical world. In 1982, in the middle of the Cold War in Soviet Siberia, a pipeline exploded with a burst of 3 kilotons, the equivalent of a fourth of the Hiroshima bomb. Now we know today -- this was revealed by Thomas Reed, Ronald Reagan's former U.S. Air Force Secretary -- this explosion was actually the result of a CIA sabotage operation, in which they had managed to infiltrate the IT management systems of that pipeline.
Ovo oružje je zaista opasno. I drugačije je: i moglo bi da odvede svet u digitalni sukob koji bi mogao da preraste u oružanu borbu. Ovo virtuelno oružje može da uništi i fizički svet. Usred Hladnog rata, 1982. godine u sovjetskom Sibiru, eksplodirao je cevovod jačinom od 3 kilotone što je jednako četvrtini eksplozije u Hirošimi. Danas znamo -- otkrio je Tomas Rid bivši američki vojni sekretar Ronalda Regana -- da je ova eksplozija u stvari bila rezultat operacije i sabotaže koju je sprovela CIA koja je uspela da infiltrira IT menadžment sisteme tog cevovoda.
More recently, the U.S. government revealed that in September 2008, more than 3 million people in the state of Espirito Santo in Brazil were plunged into darkness, victims of a blackmail operation from cyber pirates. Even more worrying for the Americans, in December 2008 the holiest of holies, the IT systems of CENTCOM, the central command managing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, may have been infiltrated by hackers who used these: plain but infected USB keys. And with these keys, they may have been able to get inside CENTCOM's systems, to see and hear everything, and maybe even infect some of them. As a result, the Americans take the threat very seriously. I'll quote General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who says in a report to Congress that cyberattacks could be as powerful as weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the Americans have decided to spend over 30 billion dollars in the next five years to build up their cyberwar capabilities.
U skorije vreme, američka vlada je otkrila da je u septembru 2008. godine, više od 3 miliona ljudi u državi Espirito Santo u Brazilu ostalo u mraku kao žrtve ucenjivačke operacije sajber pirata. Jos više zabrinjavajuće za Amerikance, na Božić decembra 2008. godine, IT sisteme CENTCOM-a, centralne komande koja upravlja ratovima u Iraku i Afganistanu, su infiltirirali hakeri koji su upotrebili: najobičnije ali inficirane USB memorije. I tako su pomoću njih, bili u mogućnosti da uđu unutar CENTCOM sistema, da vide i čuju sve, i možda i inficiraju neke od njih. To je rezultiralo time da Amerikanci shvate ovo kao veoma ozbiljnu pretnju. Citiraću generala Džejmsa Kartrajta, potpredsednika Združenog generalštaba koji u izveštaju za Kongres kaže da bi sajber napadi mogli da budu jednako moćni kao i oružje za masovno uništenje. Osim toga, Amerikanci su odlučili da potroše više od 30 milijardi dolara u sledećih pet godina da izgrade svoje kapacitete za sajber rat.
And across the world today, we see a sort of cyber arms race, with cyberwar units built up by countries like North Korea or even Iran. Yet, what you'll never hear from spokespeople from the Pentagon or the French Department of Defence is that the question isn't really who's the enemy, but actually the very nature of cyber weapons. And to understand why, we must look at how, through the ages, military technologies have maintained or destroyed world peace. For example, if we'd had TEDxParis 350 years ago, we would have talked about the military innovation of the day -- the massive Vauban-style fortifications -- and we could have predicted a period of stability in the world or in Europe. which was indeed the case in Europe between 1650 and 1750.
I danas, širom sveta, vidimo neku vrstu trke u sajber naoružanju, sa postrojenjima za sajber rat koja se grade u zemljama kao sto su Severna Koreja ili čak Iran. Pa ipak, ono sto nećete nikad čuti od predstavnika iz Pentagona ili francuskog Ministarstva za Odbranu jeste da pitanje nije zapravo ko je neprijatelj, nego sama priroda sajber oružja. I da bismo razumeli zašto, mi moramo da pogledamo kako su, kroz vekove, vojne tehnologije održavale ili uništavale svetski mir. Na primer, da smo imali TEDxParis pre 350 godina, mi bismo pričali o vojnoj inovaciji, masivnom utvrđenju u stilu Vauban i predvideli bismo period stabilnosti u svetu ili u Evropi, što je zaista i bio slučaj u Evropi od 1650. do 1750.
Similarly, if we'd had this talk 30 or 40 years ago, we would have seen how the rise of nuclear weapons, and the threat of mutually assured destruction they imply, prevents a direct fight between the two superpowers. However, if we'd had this talk 60 years ago, we would have seen how the emergence of new aircraft and tank technologies, which give the advantage to the attacker, make the Blitzkrieg doctrine very credible and thus create the possibility of war in Europe. So military technologies can influence the course of the world, can make or break world peace -- and there lies the issue with cyber weapons.
Isto tako, da smo imali ovaj govor pre 30 ili 40 godina, videli bismo kako porast nuklearnog oružja, i opasnost od sigurnog uzajamnog uništenja koje ono implicira, sprečava direktnu borbu između dve super sile. Pa ipak, da smo imali ovaj govor pre 60 godina, videli bismo kako pojava novih tehnologija u izradi aviona i tenkova, koje daju prednost napadaču, čini Blickrigovu doktrinu veoma verodostojnom i tako stvara mogućnost rata u Evropi. Dakle vojne tehnologije mogu da utiču na svetski tok mogu da stvore ili unište svetski mir -- i tu leži problematika sajber oružja.
The first issue: Imagine a potential enemy announcing they're building a cyberwar unit, but only for their country's defense. Okay, but what distinguishes it from an offensive unit? It gets even more complicated when the doctrines of use become ambiguous. Just 3 years ago, both the U.S. and France were saying they were investing militarily in cyberspace, strictly to defend their IT systems. But today both countries say the best defense is to attack. And so, they're joining China, whose doctrine of use for 15 years has been both defensive and offensive.
Prvi problem: Zamislite potencijalnog neprijatelja kako izjavljuje da gradi postrojenje za sajber rat ali samo zbog odbrane svoje zemlje. U redu, ali šta je to što ga razlikuje od postrojenja za napad? Postaje još komplikovanije kada doktrine upotrebe postaju dvosmislene. Pre tri godine i SAD i Francuska su izjavile da vrše vojne investicije u sajber prostoru, strogo da bi odbranile svoje IT sisteme. Ali danas obe zemlje kažu da je napad najbolja odbrana. I tako se one pridružuju Kini, čiji je princip delovanja već 15 godina bio i odbrambeni i napadački.
The second issue: Your country could be under cyberattack with entire regions plunged into total darkness, and you may not even know who's attacking you. Cyber weapons have this peculiar feature: they can be used without leaving traces. This gives a tremendous advantage to the attacker, because the defender doesn't know who to fight back against. And if the defender retaliates against the wrong adversary, they risk making one more enemy and ending up diplomatically isolated. This issue isn't just theoretical.
Drugi problem: Vaša zemlja bi mogla biti pod sajber napadom sa celim regijama u totalnom mraku a vi ne biste čak ni znali ko vas napada. Sajber oružje ima to čudno svojstvo: ono može biti upotrebljeno a da ne ostavi nikakav trag. To daje neverovatnu prednost napadaču, zato što onaj koji se brani ne zna protiv koga se bori. A ako se onaj koji se brani osveti pogrešnom protivniku, rizikuje da stvori još jednog neprijatelja i da padne u diplomatsku izolaciju. Ovaj problem nije samo teorijski.
In May 2007, Estonia was the victim of cyberattacks, that damaged its communication and banking systems. Estonia accused Russia. But NATO, though it defends Estonia, reacted very prudently. Why? Because NATO couldn't be 100% sure that the Kremlin was indeed behind these attacks. So to sum up, on the one hand, when a possible enemy announces they're building a cyberwar unit, you don't know whether it's for attack or defense. On the other hand, we know that these weapons give an advantage to attacking.
U maju 2007.godine, Estonija je bila žrtva sajber napada, koji su oštetili njenu komunikaciju i bankarske sisteme. Estonija je optužila Rusiju. Ali je NATO, iako brani Estoniju, reagovao vrlo promišljeno. Zašto? Zato što NATO nije mogao da bude 100% siguran da je Kremlj zaista iza ovih napada. Dakle da rezimiramo, sa jedne strane, kada mogući neprijatelj najavi da gradi postrojenje za sajber rat, vi ne znate da li je to za napad ili za odbranu. Sa druge strane, mi znamo da ovo oružje daje prednost napadaču.
In a major article published in 1978, Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University in New York described a model to understand how conflicts could arise. In this context, when you don't know if the potential enemy is preparing for defense or attack, and if the weapons give an advantage to attacking, then this environment is most likely to spark a conflict. This is the environment that's being created by cyber weapons today, and historically it was the environment in Europe at the onset of World War I. So cyber weapons are dangerous by nature, but in addition, they're emerging in a much more unstable environment.
U važnom članku objavljenom 1978., profesor Robert Džervis sa Kolumbijskog univerziteta u Njujorku opisao je model koji može da pomogne pri razumevanju načina nastajanja konflikta. U ovom kontekstu, kada vi ne znate da li se potencijalni neprijatelj sprema za odbranu ili napad i da li oružje daje prednost napadaču, tada će se u ovom okruženju najverovatnije razviti konflikt. Ovakvo okruženje stvara sajber oružje danas, a istorijski gledano to je bilo okruženje u Evropi na početku Prvog svetskog rata. Dakle sajber oružje je opasno po prirodi, ali se dodatno pojavljuje u mnogo nestabilnijem okruženju.
If you remember the Cold War, it was a very hard game, but a stable one played only by two players, which allowed for some coordination between the two superpowers. Today we're moving to a multipolar world in which coordination is much more complicated, as we have seen at Copenhagen. And this coordination may become even trickier with the introduction of cyber weapons. Why? Because no nation knows for sure whether its neighbor is about to attack. So nations may live under the threat of what Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling called the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack," as I don't know if my neighbor is about to attack me or not -- I may never know -- so I might take the upper hand and attack first.
Ako se sećate Hladnog rata, to je bila jako teška igra, ali stabilna, koju je igralo samo dva igrača, koja su dozvoljavala neku koordinaciju između dve super moći. Danas živimo u multipolarnom svetu u kojem je koordinacija mnogo komplikovanija, kao što smo to videli u Kopenhagenu. I ova koordinacija može da postane još zahtevnija sa uvođenjem sajber oružja. Zašto? Zato što nijedna nacija ne zna za sigurno da li će je njen komšija napasti. Tako da države mogu da žive pod pretnjom onoga što je dobitnik Nobelove nagrade Tomas Šeling nazvao "recipročnim strahom od iznenadnog napada" jer ja ne znam da li će me moj komšija napasti ili ne -- možda nikada necu saznati -- zato ću ga možda preduhitriti i napasti prvi.
Just last week, in a New York Times article dated January 26, 2010, it was revealed for the first time that officials at the National Security Agency were considering the possibility of preemptive attacks in cases where the U.S. was about to be cyberattacked. And these preemptive attacks might not just remain in cyberspace. In May 2009, General Kevin Chilton, commander of the U.S. nuclear forces, stated that in the event of cyberattacks against the U.S., all options would be on the table.
Prošle nedelje, u članku u Njujork Tajmsu od 26. januara 2010. godine. po prvi put je otkriveno da su zvaničnici NASA-e razmatrali mogućnosti preventivnih napada u slučajevima kada bi SAD-u pretili sajber napadi. I ovi preventivni napadi možda ne bi ostali samo u sajber prostoru. U maju 2009. godine, general Kevin Čilton, zapovednik američkih nuklearnih snaga, izjavio je da bi u slučaju sajber napada protiv SAD-a sve opcije bile u igri.
Cyber weapons do not replace conventional or nuclear weapons -- they just add a new layer to the existing system of terror. But in doing so, they also add their own risk of triggering a conflict -- as we've just seen, a very important risk -- and a risk we may have to confront with a collective security solution which includes all of us: European allies, NATO members, our American friends and allies, our other Western allies, and maybe, by forcing their hand a little, our Russian and Chinese partners.
Sajber oružje ne zamenjuje konvencionalno ili nuklearno oružje ono samo dodaje novi sloj već postojećem sistemu terora. Ali se pritom dodaje i rizik od pokretanja konflikta -- kao što smo upravo videli, veoma važan rizik, i rizik sa kojim ćemo morati da se suočimo sa zajedničkim rešenjem o bezbednosti koje uključuje sve nas: evropske saveznike, članove NATO-a, američke prijatelje i saveznike, druge zapadne saveznike i možda , uz malo prisile naše ruske i kineske partnere.
The information technologies Joël de Rosnay was talking about, which were historically born from military research, are today on the verge of developing an offensive capability of destruction, which could tomorrow, if we're not careful, completely destroy world peace.
Informativne tehnologije o kojima priča Joël de Rosnay, koje su rođene tokom istorije iz vojnih istraživanja danas su na ivici toga da razviju napadačke kapacitete destrukcije koji bi sutra, ako nismo pažljivi, mogli da u potpunosti unište svetski mir.
Thank you.
Hvala.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)