Good afternoon. If you have followed diplomatic news in the past weeks, you may have heard of a kind of crisis between China and the U.S. regarding cyberattacks against the American company Google. Many things have been said about this. Some people have called a cyberwar what may actually be just a spy operation -- and obviously, a quite mishandled one. However, this episode reveals the growing anxiety in the Western world regarding these emerging cyber weapons.
Dobar dan. Ako ste pratili diplomatske vijesti zadnjih tjedana, možda ste čuli za jednu vrstu krize između Kine i SAD-a koja se odnosi na virtualne napade na američku tvrtku Google. Mnogo je stvari rečeno o ovome. Neki su nazvali virtualnim ratom ono što zapravo može biti samo špijunska operacija -- i to očito, krivo vođena. Međutim, ovaj slučaj pokazuje rastuću anksioznost u Zapadnom svijetu glede nastajućeg virtualnog oružja.
It so happens that these weapons are dangerous. They're of a new nature: they could lead the world into a digital conflict that could turn into an armed struggle. These virtual weapons can also destroy the physical world. In 1982, in the middle of the Cold War in Soviet Siberia, a pipeline exploded with a burst of 3 kilotons, the equivalent of a fourth of the Hiroshima bomb. Now we know today -- this was revealed by Thomas Reed, Ronald Reagan's former U.S. Air Force Secretary -- this explosion was actually the result of a CIA sabotage operation, in which they had managed to infiltrate the IT management systems of that pipeline.
Čini se da je ovo oružje opasno. Nove je prirode i moglo bi odvesti svijet u virtualni sukob koji bi mogao prerasti u oružanu borbu. Ovo virtualno oružje također može uništiti i fizički svijet. 1982. godine usred hladnog rata u Sovjetskom Sibiru cijev je eksplodirala praskom od tri kilotona, što je jednako četvrtini praska bombe bačene na Hiroshimu. Danas znamo -- to je otkrio Thomas Reed, bivši tajnik zračnih snaga SAD-a Ronalda Reagana -- da je ta eksplozija zapravo rezultat CIA-ine sabotažne operacije, u kojoj su se uspijeli ubaciti u sustav upravljanja tog cijevovoda.
More recently, the U.S. government revealed that in September 2008, more than 3 million people in the state of Espirito Santo in Brazil were plunged into darkness, victims of a blackmail operation from cyber pirates. Even more worrying for the Americans, in December 2008 the holiest of holies, the IT systems of CENTCOM, the central command managing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, may have been infiltrated by hackers who used these: plain but infected USB keys. And with these keys, they may have been able to get inside CENTCOM's systems, to see and hear everything, and maybe even infect some of them. As a result, the Americans take the threat very seriously. I'll quote General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who says in a report to Congress that cyberattacks could be as powerful as weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the Americans have decided to spend over 30 billion dollars in the next five years to build up their cyberwar capabilities.
Nedavno je vlada SAD-a otkrila da je u rujnu 2008., više od tri milijuna ljudi u državi Espirito Santo u Brazilu progutao mrak kao žrtve ucjene virtualnih pirata. Ono što još više zabrinjava Amerikance jest da je u prosincu 2008., najsvetiji od svetih, sustav upravljanja CENTCOM-om, središnji voditelj naredba za rat u Iraku i Afganistanu je možda bio infiltriran hakerima koji su koristili sljedeće: obični, ali zaraženi USB. I s tim USB-om su možda uspjeli ući u CENTCOM-ove sisteme, vidjeti i čuti sve, i možda i zaraziti poneki. Kao rezultat, Amerikanci shvaćaju ovu prijetnju jako ozibljno. Citirat ću generala Jamesa Cartwrighta, potpredsjenika združenog stožera američke vojske, koji u izvješću Kongresu kaže da bi virtualni napadi mogli biti moćni koliko i oružje za masovno uništenje. Štoviše, Amerikanci su odlučili potrošiti preko 30 milijardi dolara u sljedećih pet godina da izgrade svoje kapacitete za virtualni rat.
And across the world today, we see a sort of cyber arms race, with cyberwar units built up by countries like North Korea or even Iran. Yet, what you'll never hear from spokespeople from the Pentagon or the French Department of Defence is that the question isn't really who's the enemy, but actually the very nature of cyber weapons. And to understand why, we must look at how, through the ages, military technologies have maintained or destroyed world peace. For example, if we'd had TEDxParis 350 years ago, we would have talked about the military innovation of the day -- the massive Vauban-style fortifications -- and we could have predicted a period of stability in the world or in Europe. which was indeed the case in Europe between 1650 and 1750.
I diljem svijeta danas, vidimo neku vrstu utrke u virtualnom naoružanju, s postrojenjima za virtualni rat izgrađenima u zemljama kao što su Sjeverna Koreja ili čak Iran. Ipak, ono što nikada nećete čuti od glasnogovornika Pentagona ili francuskog Ministarstva obrane, jest da pitanje nije tko je neprijatelj, nego priroda virtualnog oružja. Da bi razumijeli zašto, moramo pogledati kako su tijekom vremena vojne tehnologije održavale ili uništavale svjetski mir. Na primjer, da smo imali TEDxParis prije 350 godina, pričali bismo o tadašnjim novostima u oružju -- masivne utvrde u Vauban stilu -- i mogli bismo predvidjeti razdoblje stabilnosti u svijetu ili u Europi, što je stvarno i bilo u Europi između 1650-te i 1750-te.
Similarly, if we'd had this talk 30 or 40 years ago, we would have seen how the rise of nuclear weapons, and the threat of mutually assured destruction they imply, prevents a direct fight between the two superpowers. However, if we'd had this talk 60 years ago, we would have seen how the emergence of new aircraft and tank technologies, which give the advantage to the attacker, make the Blitzkrieg doctrine very credible and thus create the possibility of war in Europe. So military technologies can influence the course of the world, can make or break world peace -- and there lies the issue with cyber weapons.
Slično, da smo imali ovaj razgovor prije 30 ili 40 godina, mogli bismo vidjeti kako uspon nuklearnog oružja i opasnost od uzajamno sigurnog uništenja koje to oružje podrazumijeva, spriječava izravan sukob između dvije supersile. Međutim, da smo imali ovaj govor prije 60 godina, mogli bismo vidjeli kako pojava novih zrakoplova i tenkovskih tehnologija koje daju prednost napadaču čine Blitzkrieg doktrinu vrlo uvjerljivom i tako tvore mogućnost rata u Europi. Dakle vojne tehnologije mogu utjecati na smjer svijeta, mogu stvoriti ili razbiti svijetski mir -- i tu leži problem virtualnog oružja.
The first issue: Imagine a potential enemy announcing they're building a cyberwar unit, but only for their country's defense. Okay, but what distinguishes it from an offensive unit? It gets even more complicated when the doctrines of use become ambiguous. Just 3 years ago, both the U.S. and France were saying they were investing militarily in cyberspace, strictly to defend their IT systems. But today both countries say the best defense is to attack. And so, they're joining China, whose doctrine of use for 15 years has been both defensive and offensive.
Prvi problem: Zamislite potencijalnog neprijatelja koji najavljuje da gradi postrojenje za virtualni rat, ali samo za obranu svoje zemlje. Dobro, ali što ju razlikuje od postrojenja za napad? Postaje još kompliciranije kada princip korištenja postane nejasan. Prije samo tri godine SAD i Francuska su govorile da ulažu naoružanje u virtualni prostor, izričito da bi obranili svoje sustave upravljanja -- IT sisteme. Ali danas obje države govore da je napad najbolja obrana. I tako se pridružuju Kini, čiji je princip djelovanja tijekom 15 godina bio i defenzivan i ofenzivan.
The second issue: Your country could be under cyberattack with entire regions plunged into total darkness, and you may not even know who's attacking you. Cyber weapons have this peculiar feature: they can be used without leaving traces. This gives a tremendous advantage to the attacker, because the defender doesn't know who to fight back against. And if the defender retaliates against the wrong adversary, they risk making one more enemy and ending up diplomatically isolated. This issue isn't just theoretical.
Drugi problem: Vaša zemlja bi mogla biti pod virtualnim napadom i s cijelim regijama nestati u tami, i možete ni ne znati tko vas napada. Virtualno oružje ima ovu svojstvenu osobitost: može biti upotrijebljeno bez ostavljanja tragova. Ovo daje ogromnu prednost napadaču jer branitelj ne zna protiv koga se bori. I ako se branitelj osveti pogrešnom napadaču, riskira da si stvori još jednog neprijatelja i ostane diplomatski izoliran. Ovaj primjer nije samo teoretski.
In May 2007, Estonia was the victim of cyberattacks, that damaged its communication and banking systems. Estonia accused Russia. But NATO, though it defends Estonia, reacted very prudently. Why? Because NATO couldn't be 100% sure that the Kremlin was indeed behind these attacks. So to sum up, on the one hand, when a possible enemy announces they're building a cyberwar unit, you don't know whether it's for attack or defense. On the other hand, we know that these weapons give an advantage to attacking.
U svibnju 2007., Estonija je bila žrtva virtualnog napada koji je oštetio njene komunikacije i bankarske sisteme. Estonija je optužila Rusiju. Ali NATO, iako brani Estoniju, je reagirao jako promišljeno. Zašto? Zato što NATO nije mogao biti 100% siguran da je Kremlin stvarno stajao iza tih napada. Dakle da skratimo -- u jednu ruku, kada mogući neprijatelj objavi da gradi postrojenje za virtualni rat, ne znate je li to za napad ili obranu. U drugu ruku, znamo da ovo oružje daje prednost pri napadu.
In a major article published in 1978, Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University in New York described a model to understand how conflicts could arise. In this context, when you don't know if the potential enemy is preparing for defense or attack, and if the weapons give an advantage to attacking, then this environment is most likely to spark a conflict. This is the environment that's being created by cyber weapons today, and historically it was the environment in Europe at the onset of World War I. So cyber weapons are dangerous by nature, but in addition, they're emerging in a much more unstable environment.
U velikom članku objavljenom 1978., profesor Robert Jervis sa sveučilišta Kolumbija u New Yorku opisao je model da bi shvatio kako bi sukob mogao nastati. U ovom kontekstu, kada ne znate priprema li se potencijalni neprijatelj za obranu ili napad i ako oružje daje prednost pri napadu, onda je ovo okruženje vrlo podložno za pojavu sukoba. To je okruženje koje danas nastaje zbog virtualnog oružja i povijesno takvo je okruženje bilo i u Europi na početku Prvog svjetkog rata. Dakle virtualno oružje je po prirodi opasno, ali u dodatku, pojavljuje se u puno nestabilnijem okruženju.
If you remember the Cold War, it was a very hard game, but a stable one played only by two players, which allowed for some coordination between the two superpowers. Today we're moving to a multipolar world in which coordination is much more complicated, as we have seen at Copenhagen. And this coordination may become even trickier with the introduction of cyber weapons. Why? Because no nation knows for sure whether its neighbor is about to attack. So nations may live under the threat of what Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling called the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack," as I don't know if my neighbor is about to attack me or not -- I may never know -- so I might take the upper hand and attack first.
Ako se sjećate Hladnog rata, bila je to vrlo teška igra, ali stabilna i igrana samo od strane dva igrača, što je donekle dopustilo koordinaciju između dvije supersile. Danas se selimo u multipolaran svijet u kojem je koordinacija puno kompliciranija, kao što smo vidjeli u Kopenhagenu. I ova koorodinacija može postati još kompliciranija uvodom virtualnog oružja. Zašto? Zato što nijedna nacija nije posve sigurna hoće li je susjed napasti. Države mogu živjeti pod prijetnjom od, kako je to dobitnik Nobelove nagrade, Thomas Schelling nazvao, „obostran strah od iznenadnog napada“: jer ne znam sprema li se moj susjed napasti me ili ne -- možda nikada neću znati -- pa mogu prvi povući potez i prvi napasti.
Just last week, in a New York Times article dated January 26, 2010, it was revealed for the first time that officials at the National Security Agency were considering the possibility of preemptive attacks in cases where the U.S. was about to be cyberattacked. And these preemptive attacks might not just remain in cyberspace. In May 2009, General Kevin Chilton, commander of the U.S. nuclear forces, stated that in the event of cyberattacks against the U.S., all options would be on the table.
Prošli tjedan, u članku u New York Timesu objavljenom 26. siječnja 2010. po prvi put je otkriveno da su službenici u Nacionalnoj agenciji za sigurnost razmatrali mogućnost preventivnih napada u slučaju da će SAD biti virtualno napadnut. I ti preventivni napadi možda ne ostanu samo u virtualnom prostoru. U svibnju 2009., general Kevin Chilton, zapovjednik američkih nuklearnih snaga naveo je da će u slučaju virtualnog napada protiv SAD-a, sve opcije biti otvorene.
Cyber weapons do not replace conventional or nuclear weapons -- they just add a new layer to the existing system of terror. But in doing so, they also add their own risk of triggering a conflict -- as we've just seen, a very important risk -- and a risk we may have to confront with a collective security solution which includes all of us: European allies, NATO members, our American friends and allies, our other Western allies, and maybe, by forcing their hand a little, our Russian and Chinese partners.
Virtualno oružje ne zamjenjuje konvencionalno ili nuklearno oružje -- samo dodaje novi sloj postojećem sustavu terora. Ali pri tome također dodaje vlastiti rizik poticanja sukoba -- kao što smo upravo vidjeli, vrlo važan rizik -- i rizik s kojim ćemo se morati suočiti s kolektivnim sigurnosnim rješenjem koje uključuje sve nas: europske saveznike, članove NATO-a, američke prijatelje i saveznike, druge zapadne saveznike i možda, primorajući ih malo, naše ruske i kineske partnere.
The information technologies Joël de Rosnay was talking about, which were historically born from military research, are today on the verge of developing an offensive capability of destruction, which could tomorrow, if we're not careful, completely destroy world peace.
Informacijske tehnologije o kojima je Joël De Rosnay pričao, koje su povijesno stvorene iz vojnih istraživanja danas su na granici razvitka napadačkih kapaciteta uništenja, koji bi sutra mogli, ako ne budemo pazili, potpuno uništiti svjetski mir.
Thank you.
Hvala Vam.
(Applause)
( Pljesak)