So here it is. You can check: I am short, I'm French, I have a pretty strong French accent, so that's going to be clear in a moment.
Dakle, možete videti, niska sam, Francuskinja sam, imam prilično jak francusk akcenat što će biti jasno za koji trenutak.
Maybe a sobering thought and something you all know about. And I suspect many of you gave something to the people of Haiti this year. And there is something else I believe in the back of your mind you also know. That is, every day, 25,000 children die of entirely preventable causes. That's a Haiti earthquake every eight days. And I suspect many of you probably gave something towards that problem as well, but somehow it doesn't happen with the same intensity.
Možda otrežnjujuća misao i nešto za šta svi znate. Pretpostavljam da su mnogi od vas dali nešto ljudima Haitija ove godine. I postoji još nešto za šta sam uverena da, u svojoj podsvesti takođe znate, a to je da svakodnevno 25 000 dece umre usled uzroka koje je moguće sprečiti. To je kao zemljotres na Haitiju na svakih 8 dana. Pretpostavljam da je mnogo vas dalo nešto i za ovaj problem, takođe, ali to se nekako ne dešava sa istim intenzitetom.
So why is that? Well, here is a thought experiment for you. Imagine you have a few million dollars that you've raised -- maybe you're a politician in a developing country and you have a budget to spend. You want to spend it on the poor: How do you go about it? Do you believe the people who tell you that all we need to do is to spend money? That we know how to eradicate poverty, we just need to do more? Or do you believe the people who tell you that aid is not going to help, on the contrary it might hurt, it might exacerbate corruption, dependence, etc.? Or maybe you turn to the past. After all, we have spent billions of dollars on aid. Maybe you look at the past and see. Has it done any good?
Zašto je to tako? Pa, evo jednog misaonog eksperimenta za vas. Zamislite da ste prikupili nekoliko miliona dolara. Možda ste političar u nekoj zemlji u razvoju, i imate budžet koji želite da potrošite na siromašne. Kako ćete to izvesti? Da li verujete ljudima koji vam kažu da sve što treba da uradimo je da trošimo novac, da znamo kako da iskorenimo siromaštvo, samo treba da se potrudimo? Ili verujete ljudima koji vam kažu da pomoć ne može da pomogne, naprotiv, može da šteti, da pogorša korupciju, zavisnost, itd? Ili možda se okrećete prošlosti. Ipak smo potrošili milijarde dolara na pomoć. Možda gledate u prošlost i vidite da li je donela nešto dobro.
And, sadly, we don't know. And worst of all, we will never know. And the reason is that -- take Africa for example. Africans have already got a lot of aid. These are the blue bars. And the GDP in Africa is not making much progress. Okay, fine. How do you know what would have happened without the aid? Maybe it would have been much worse, or maybe it would have been better. We have no idea. We don't know what the counterfactual is. There's only one Africa.
I nažalost, to ne znamo. Što je najgore, nikada nećemo ni znati. A razlog tome - uzmite za primer Afriku - Afrikanci su dobili mnogo pomoći. To su plavi stupci. A bruto domaća prozvodnja u Africi ne napreduje. Okej, dobro. Kako znate šta bi se dogodilo bez pomoći? Možda bi bilo mnogo gore. Ili bi možda bilo bolje. Nemamo pojma. Ne znamo kako bi drugačije bilo. Postoji samo jedna Afrika.
So what do you do? To give the aid, and hope and pray that something comes out of it? Or do you focus on your everyday life and let the earthquake every eight days continue to happen? The thing is, if we don't know whether we are doing any good, we are not any better than the Medieval doctors and their leeches. Sometimes the patient gets better, sometimes the patient dies. Is it the leeches? Is it something else? We don't know.
Dakle, šta radite? Dajete pomoć i nadate se i molite da će nešto proizaći iz toga? Ili se fokusirate na svakodnevni život i dozvoljavate da se zemljotres svakih 8 dana nastavlja? Stvar je u tome da, ako ne znamo da li činimo dobro, nismo ništa bolji od srednjevekovnih doktora sa pijavicama. Nekada pacijentu bude bolje, nekada pacijent umre. Da li je to zbog pijavica? Ili nečeg drugog? Ne znamo.
So here are some other questions. They're smaller questions, but they are not that small. Immunization, that's the cheapest way to save a child's life. And the world has spent a lot of money on it: The GAVI and the Gates Foundations are each pledging a lot of money towards it, and developing countries themselves have been doing a lot of effort. And yet, every year at least 25 million children do not get the immunization they should get. So this is what you call a "last mile problem." The technology is there, the infrastructure is there, and yet it doesn't happen. So you have your million. How do you use your million to solve this last mile problem?
Evo nekih drugih pitanja. Ona su manja, ali nisu previše mala. Imunizacija je najjevtiniji način da spasite dečiji život. Svet troši mnogo novca na to. GAVI (Globalna Alijansa za Vakcine i Imunizaciju) i Gates fondacija daju mnogo novca za ovo. I zemlje u razvoju takođe ulažu mnogo napora. A ipak, svake godine, najmanje 25 miliona dece ne dobije imunizaciju koju bi trebalo. To je ono što zovete "problemom poslednje milje". Postoji tehnologija. Postoji infrastruktura. Ali ipak, to se ne dešava. Znači imate svoj milion. Kako ćete iskoristiti svoj milion da rešite ovaj "problem poslednje milje"?
And here's another question: Malaria. Malaria kills almost 900,000 people every year, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of them under five. In fact, that is the leading cause of under-five mortality. We already know how to kill malaria, but some people come to you and say, "You have your millions. How about bed nets?" Bed nets are very cheap. For 10 dollars, you can manufacture and ship an insecticide treated bed net and you can teach someone to use them. And, not only do they protect the people who sleep under them, but they have these great contagion benefits. If half of a community sleeps under a net, the other half also benefits because the contagion of the disease spread. And yet, only a quarter of kids at risk sleep under a net. Societies should be willing to go out and subsidize the net, give them for free, or, for that matter, pay people to use them because of those contagion benefits. "Not so fast," say other people. "If you give the nets for free, people are not going to value them. They're not going to use them, or at least they're not going to use them as bed nets, maybe as fishing nets." So, what do you do? Do you give the nets for free to maximize coverage, or do you make people pay in order to make sure that they really value them? How do you know?
Evo još jednog pitanja: malarija. Malarija ubija skoro 900 000 ljudi svake godine, većinu u pod-saharskoj Africi, od kojih je najviše mlađe od 5 godina. Ustvari, to je vodeći uzrok smrtnosti dece ispod 5 godina. Već znamo kako da izlečimo malariju, ali neki ljude vam prilaze i kažu, "Imate milione. Šta mislite o baldahinima?" Baldahini su veoma jevtini. Za 10 dolara možete proizvesti i isporučiti baldahin sa insekticidom, i možete naučiti nekoga da ga koristi. I ne samo da oni štite ljude koji pod njima spavaju, nego koriste i kao zaštita od zaraza. Ako polovina zajednice spava pod mrežom, druga polovina takođe ima koristi zbog širenja zaraznih bolesti. Ali i pored toga, tek četvrtina ugrožene dece spava pod mrežama. Društva bi trebalo da žele da sponzorišu mreže, da ih dele besplatno, ili još bolje, da plate ljudima da ih koriste jer štite od zaraze. "Ne tako brzo", kažu drugi ljudi. "Ako podelite mreže ljudi ih neće ceniti. Neće ih koristiti, ili ih neće koristiti na krevetima, nego kao mreže za pecanje." Dakle, šta ćete uraditi? Podeliti mreže i povećati pokrivenost? Ili ćete naterati ljude da ih plate kako biste ih naveli da ih stvarno cene? Kako da znate?
And a third question: Education. Maybe that's the solution, maybe we should send kids to school. But how do you do that? Do you hire teachers? Do you build more schools? Do you provide school lunch? How do you know?
I treće pitanje: obrazovanje. Možda je to rešenje. Možda bi trebalo da šaljemo decu u škole. Ali kako ćete uraditi to? Zaposliti nastavnike? Izgraditi više škola? Da li obezbediti ručak u školi? Kako da znate?
So here is the thing. I cannot answer the big question, whether aid did any good or not. But these three questions, I can answer them. It's not the Middle Ages anymore, it's the 21st century. And in the 20th century, randomized, controlled trials have revolutionized medicine by allowing us to distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that don't work. And you can do the same randomized, controlled trial for social policy. You can put social innovation to the same rigorous, scientific tests that we use for drugs. And in this way, you can take the guesswork out of policy-making by knowing what works, what doesn't work and why. And I'll give you some examples with those three questions.
Evo u čemu je stvar. Ja ne mogu da odgovorim na veliko pitanje, da li je pomoć koristila ili ne, ali na ova tri pitanja mogu da odgovorim. Nije više Srednji vek. Sada je 21. vek. A u 20. veku su nasumična, kontrolisana testiranja preokrenula medicinu, omogućavajući nam da utvrdimo koji lekovi deluju a koji ne. Možete sprovoditi ista, nasumična, kontrolisana testiranja socijalne politike. Možete da podvrgnete socijalne inovacije istim strogim, naučnim testovima koje koristimo za lekove. Na ovaj način otklanjate nagađanje iz donošenja zakona, tako što znate šta funkcioniše a šta ne i zašto. Daću vam neke primere za ta tri pitanja.
So I start with immunization. Here's Udaipur District, Rajasthan. Beautiful. Well, when I started working there, about one percent of children were fully immunized. That's bad, but there are places like that. Now, it's not because the vaccines are not there -- they are there and they are free -- and it's not because parents do not care about their kids. The same child that is not immunized against measles, if they do get measles, parents will spend thousands of rupees to help them. So you get these empty village subcenters and crowded hospitals. So what is the problem? Well, part of the problem, surely, is people do not fully understand. After all, in this country as well, all sorts of myths and misconceptions go around immunization. So if that's the case, that's difficult, because persuasion is really difficult. But maybe there is another problem as well. It's going from intention to action. Imagine you are a mother in Udaipur District, Rajasthan. You have to walk a few kilometers to get your kids immunized. And maybe when you get there, what you find is this: The subcenter is closed. Ao you have to come back, and you are so busy and you have so many other things to do, you will always tend to postpone and postpone, and eventually it gets too late. Well, if that's the problem, then that's much easier. Because A, we can make it easy, and B, we can maybe give people a reason to act today, rather than wait till tomorrow.
Počeću sa imunizacijom. Ovo je okrug Udaipur u Radžastanu, prelepo. Kada sam počela tamo da radim, otprilike 1% dece je bilo vakcinisano. To je loše, ali takva mesta postoje. To nije zbog toga što vakcina nema. Ima ih i besplatne su. I nije zbog toga što roditeljima nije stalo do svoje dece. Ako dete nije vakcinisano protiv boginja, a dobije ih, roditelji će potrošiti hiljade rupija da mu pomognu. Tako dobijate prazne seoske centre i pune bolnice. U čemu je problem? Pa, deo problema je u tome što ljudi ne razumeju u potpunosti. Čak i u ovoj zemlji postoje svakavi mitovi i pogrešnja uverenja o imunizaciji. Ako je to slučaj, onda je veoma teško jer je ubeđivanje veoma teško. Ali možda postoji još jedan problem. Problem između namere i realizacije. Zamislite da ste majka u okrugu Udaipur u Radžastanu. Morate da prepešačite nekoliko kilometara da biste vakcinisali decu. I možda kada stignete tamo, zatekete ovo. Centar je zatvoren i morate da se vratite. Vi ste vrlo zauzeti, imate toliko drugih stvari da uradite, uvek ćete odlagati i odlagati dok na kraju ne bude kasno. Pa, ako je to problem, onda je mnogo lakše jer, A - možemo olakšati i B - možda možemo ljudima dati razlog da reaguju danas, pre nego da čekaju sutra.
So these are simple ideas, but we didn't know. So let's try them. So what we did is we did a randomized, controlled trial in 134 villages in Udaipur Districts. So the blue dots are selected randomly. We made it easy -- I'll tell you how in a moment. In the red dots, we made it easy and gave people a reason to act now. The white dots are comparisons, nothing changed. So we make it easy by organizing this monthly camp where people can get their kids immunized. And then you make it easy and give a reason to act now by adding a kilo of lentils for each immunization. Now, a kilo of lentils is tiny. It's never going to convince anybody to do something that they don't want to do. On the other hand, if your problem is you tend to postpone, then it might give you a reason to act today rather than later.
Ovo su dakle jednostavne ideje, ali mi nismo znali. Isprobajmo ih. Sproveli smo nasumična, kontrolisanja testiranja u 134 sela u okrugu Udaipur. Plave tačke su nasumično izabrane. Učinili smo da bude lako. Objasniću vam za trenutak. U crvenim tačkama smo olakšali i dali ljudima razlog da odmah reaguju. Bele tačke su za poređenje, ništa se nije menjalo. Olakšali smo tako što smo organizovali mesečni kamp gde ljudi mogu da vakcinišu svoju decu. I onda olakšate i date razlog da se reaguje odmah dajući kilogram sočiva za svaku vakcinaciju. E sad, kilogram sočiva je malo. Nikada neće ubediti nekoga da uradi nešto što ne želi da uradi. S druge strane, ako je vaš problem u tome što odlažete, onda vam može dati razlog da reagujete danas a ne kasnije.
So what do we find? Well, beforehand, everything is the same. That's the beauty of randomization. Afterwards, the camp -- just having the camp -- increases immunization from six percent to 17 percent. That's full immunization. That's not bad, that's a good improvement. Add the lentils and you reach to 38 percent. So here you've got your answer. Make it easy and give a kilo of lentils, you multiply immunization rate by six. Now, you might say, "Well, but it's not sustainable. We cannot keep giving lentils to people." Well, it turns out it's wrong economics, because it is cheaper to give lentils than not to give them. Since you have to pay for the nurse anyway, the cost per immunization ends up being cheaper if you give incentives than if you don't.
I šta vidimo? Pa, pre svega sve je isto. U tome je lepota nasumičnosti. Posle, u kampu, samo u kampu, vakcinacija je povećana sa 6 na 17%. To je potpuna imunizacija. Nije loše. To je dobro poboljšanje. Dodajte sočivo i dolazite do 38%. Eto vam odgovor. Olakšajte i dodajte kilogram sočiva i imunizacija se povećava 6 puta. Sada, možete reći, "Pa to nije održivo. Ne možemo stalno davati ljudimo sočivo." Pa, ispostavlja se da je to pogrešna računica jer jevtinije je davati ljudima sočivo nego ne davati. Pošto svakako morate da platite sestru, trošak jedne vakcinacije je manji ako im date motivaciju nego ako to ne učinite.
How about bed nets? Should you give them for free, or should you ask people to pay for them? So the answer hinges on the answer to three simple questions. One is: If people must pay for a bed net, are they going to purchase them? The second one is: If I give bed nets for free, are people going to use them? And the third one is: Do free bed nets discourage future purchase? The third one is important because if we think people get used to handouts, it might destroy markets to distribute free bed nets. Now this is a debate that has generated a lot of emotion and angry rhetoric. It's more ideological than practical, but it turns out it's an easy question. We can know the answer to this question. We can just run an experiment. And many experiments have been run, and they all have the same results, so I'm just going to talk to you about one.
Šta je sa baldahinima? Da li da ih poklonite ili da tražite od ljudi da plate? Odgovor se nadovezuje na odgovor na tri jednostavna pitanja. Jedno je: ako ljudi moraju da plate za baldahin, da li će ga kupiti? Drugo: ako damo baldahine besplatno da li će ih ljudi koristiti? I treće: Da li poklanjanje baldahina sprečava njihovu kupovinu u budućnosti? Ovo treće je važno jer ako mislimo da se ljudi naviknu na besplatne stvari to može uništiti tržište, ako delimo baldahine. Ovo je debata koja je izazvala mnogo emotivnih i ljutih reči. Više je ideološka nego praktična, ali odgovara na jedno lako pitanje. Možemo znati odgovor na ovo pitanje. Možemo samo sprovesti eksperiment. I mnogo eksperimenata je sprovedeno i svi oni imaju isti rezultat, sada ću vam pričati o jednom.
And this one that was in Kenya, they went around and distributed to people vouchers, discount vouchers. So people with their voucher could get the bed net in the local pharmacy. And some people get 100 percent discount, and some people get 20 percent discounts, and some people get 50 percent discount, etc. And now we can see what happens. So, how about the purchasing? Well, what you can see is that when people have to pay for their bed nets, the coverage rate really falls down a lot. So even with partial subsidy, three dollars is still not the full cost of a bed net, and now you only have 20 percent of the people with the bed nets, you lose the health immunity, that's not great. Second thing is, how about the use? Well, the good news is, people, if they have the bed nets, will use the bed nets regardless of how they got it. If they get it for free, they use it. If they have to pay for it, they use it. How about the long term? In the long term, people who got the free bed nets, one year later, were offered the option to purchase a bed net at two dollars. And people who got the free one were actually more likely to purchase the second one than people who didn't get a free one. So people do not get used to handouts; they get used to nets. Maybe we need to give them a little bit more credit.
Ovo je bilo u Keniji, ljudima su podeljeni vaučeri za popust. Ljudi su sa vaučerima mogli da kupe baldahin u lokalnoj apoteci. Neki ljudi dobiju 100% popusta, neki 20% popusta, neki dobiju 50% popusta itd. I sad vidimo šta se dešava. Dakle, šta je sa kupovinom? Pa, možete videti da kada ljudi treba da plate za baldahine, pokrivenost opada u velikoj meri. Čak i sa delimičnom subvencijom - 3 dolara i dalje nije puna cena baldahina. Sada imate samo 20% ljudi sa baldahinima, gubite [nejasno], to nije dobro. Druga stvar, šta je sa omladinom? Pa, dobra stvar je da će ako imaju baldahine, ljudi da ih koriste, bez obzira kako su do njih došli. Ako su ih dobili na poklon, koristiće ih. Ako moraju da plate, koristiće ih. A dugoročno? Dugoročno, ljudima koji su dobili besplatne mreže, godinu dana kasnije, ponuđena je opcija da kupe mrežu za 2 dolara. I oni koji su dobili jednu na poklon češće su kupovali drugu od ljudi koji nisu dobili jednu na poklon. Znači, ljudi se ne navikavaju na deljenje; navikavaju se na mreže. Možda bi trebalo da im ukažemo više poverenja.
So, that's for bed nets. So you will think, "That's great. You know how to immunize kids, you know how to give bed nets." But what politicians need is a range of options. They need to know: Out of all the things I could do, what is the best way to achieve my goals? So suppose your goal is to get kids into school. There are so many things you could do. You could pay for uniforms, you could eliminate fees, you could build latrines, you could give girls sanitary pads, etc., etc. So what's the best? Well, at some level, we think all of these things should work. So, is that sufficient? If we think they should work intuitively, should we go for them? Well, in business, that's certainly not the way we would go about it.
To je što se mreža tiče. Pomislićete, "To je super. Znate kako da vakcinišete, kako da date baldahine." Ali političarima su potrebne različite opcije. Oni moraju da znaju: od svih stvari koje mogu da uradim, koji je najbolji način da ostvarim ciljeve? Pretpostavimo da vam je cilj da upišete decu u škole. Postoji toliko stvari koje možete učiniti. Možete da platite za uniforme, možete da ukinete školarine, da izgradite toalete, možete devojčicama da date uloške, itd. Šta je najbolje? Pa, donekle mislimo da bi sve ove stvari trebalo da uspeju. Da li je to dovoljno, ako mislimo da će to uspeti, intuitivno, da li treba da probamo? Pa, u poslovanju to sigurno nije način na koji bismo postupili.
Consider for example transporting goods. Before the canals were invented in Britain before the Industrial Revolution, goods used to go on horse carts. And then canals were built, and with the same horseman and the same horse, you could carry ten times as much cargo. So should they have continued to carry the goods on the horse carts, on the ground, that they would eventually get there? Well, if that had been the case, there would have been no Industrial Revolution. So why shouldn't we do the same with social policy? In technology, we spend so much time experimenting, fine-tuning, getting the absolute cheapest way to do something, so why aren't we doing that with social policy?
Razmislite na primer o transportu robe. Pre nego što su kanali izmišljeni u Britaniji, pre industrijske revolucije, roba se prevozila na konjskim zapregama. Onda su kanali izgrađeni, i sa istim konjem i konjanikom mogli ste da prevezete deset puta više tereta. Da li je trebalo da nastave da prenose robu na konjskim zapregama, putem, koje će nekada stići na cilj? Pa, da je bilo tako, ne bi došlo do industrijske revolucije. Dakle, zašto ne bismo učinili isto sa socijalnom politikom? U tehnologiji provodimo toliko vremena eksperimentišući, podešavajući, nalazeći najjevtiniji način da nešto uradimo, pa zašto ne radimo to i sa socijalnom politikom?
Well, with experiments, what you can do is answer a simple question. Suppose you have 100 dollars to spend on various interventions. How many extra years of education do you get for your hundred dollars? Now I'm going to show you what we get with various education interventions. So the first ones are if you want the usual suspects, hire teachers, school meals, school uniforms, scholarships. And that's not bad. For your hundred dollars, you get between one and three extra years of education. Things that don't work so well is bribing parents, just because so many kids are already going to school that you end up spending a lot of money. And here are the most surprising results. Tell people the benefits of education, that's very cheap to do. So for every hundred dollars you spend doing that, you get 40 extra years of education. And, in places where there are worms, intestinal worms, cure the kids of their worms. And for every hundred dollars, you get almost 30 extra years of education. So this is not your intuition, this is not what people would have gone for, and yet, these are the programs that work. We need that kind of information, we need more of it, and then we need to guide policy.
Pa, kod eksperimenata, ono što možete da uradite je da odgovorite na jednostavno pitanje. Pretpostavimo da imate 100 dolara da potrošite na različite intervencije. Koliko dodatnih godina obrazovanja dobijate za sto dolara? Sada ću vam pokazati šta dobijamo različitim intervencijama u obrazovanju. Prve se odnose na uobičajene stvari, unajmite nastavnike, školske obroke, uniforme, stipendije. To nije loše. Za vaših sto dolara, dobijate između jedne i tri dodatne godine obrazovanja. Stvari koje ne bi funkcionisale su podmićivanje roditelja, jer toliko mnogo dece već ide u školu, završili biste trošeći puno para. I evo rezultata koji najviše iznenađuju. Objasnite ljudima dobiti obrazovanja. To se može veoma jevtino uraditi. Na svakih sto dolara koje potrošite na to, dobijate dodatnih 40 godina obrazovanja. I u mestima gde ima glista, crevnih glista, izlečite decu od njih. I za svakih sto dolara, dobijate skoro 30 dodatnih godina obrazovanja. Znači to [nejasno] vaša intuicija. Ljudi ne bi ovo izabrali, a ipak, ovo su programi koji uspevaju. Potrebne su nam takve informacije. Potrebno nam ih je više. I onda je potrebno da usmeravamo politiku.
So now, I started from the big problem, and I couldn't answer it. And I cut it into smaller questions, and I have the answer to these smaller questions. And they are good, scientific, robust answers.
Znači, počela sam od velikog problema i nisam mogla da ga rešim. Podelila sam ga na manja pitanja i imam odgovore na ta manja pitanja. To su dobri, naučni, robusni odgovori.
So let's go back to Haiti for a moment. In Haiti, about 200,000 people died -- actually, a bit more by the latest estimate. And the response of the world was great: Two billion dollars got pledged just last month, so that's about 10,000 dollars per death. That doesn't sound like that much when you think about it. But if we were willing to spend 10,000 dollars for every child under five who dies, that would be 90 billion per year just for that problem. And yet it doesn't happen. So, why is that? Well, I think what part of the problem is that, in Haiti, although the problem is huge, somehow we understand it, it's localized. You give your money to Doctors Without Borders, you give your money to Partners In Health, and they'll send in the doctors, and they'll send in the lumber, and they'll helicopter things out and in. And the problem of poverty is not like that. So, first, it's mostly invisible; second, it's huge; and third, we don't know whether we are doing the right thing. There's no silver bullet. You cannot helicopter people out of poverty. And that's very frustrating.
Vratimo se na Haiti za trenutak. Tamo je skoro 200 000 ljudi umrlo. Zapravo, po poslednjoj proceni, nešto više. Odgovor sveta je bio odličan. Dve milijarde dolara je skupljeno samo prošlog meseca. To je oko 10 000 dolara po smrti. Ne zvuči tako mnogo kad razmišljate o tome. Ali ako bismo bili voljni da potrošimo 10 000 dolara na svako dete mlađe od 5 godina koje umre, to bi bilo 90 milijardi godišnje, samo za taj problem. Ali to se ipak ne dešava. Zašto je to tako? Ja mislim da je deo problema u tome što na Haitiju, iako je problem ogroman, nekako ga razumemo, lokalizovan je. Date novac Doktorima bez granica, date novac Partnerima u zdravlju, i oni će poslati doktore, poslaće stare stvari, poslaće helikopter da donosi i odnosi stvari. A problem siromaštva nije takav. Prvo, uglavnom je nevidljiv. Drugo, ogroman je. I treće, ne znamo da li činimo ispravnu stvar. Ne postoji jedno najbolje rešenje. Ne možete helikopterom izneti ljude iz siromaštva. A to je veoma frustrirajuće.
But look what we just did today. I gave you three simple answers to three questions: Give lentils to immunize people, provide free bed nets, deworm children. With immunization or bed nets, you can save a life for 300 dollars per life saved. With deworming, you can get an extra year of education for three dollars. So we cannot eradicate poverty just yet, but we can get started. And maybe we can get started small with things that we know are effective.
Ali pogledajte šta smo upravo danas učinili. Dala sam vam tri jednostavna odgovora na tri pitanja. Dajte sočivo za imunizaciju ljudi, obezbedite besplatne baldahine, izlečite decu. Vakcinisanjem ili baldahinima možete spasiti jedan život za 300 dolara po spašenom životu. Sa lečenjem od glista, dobijate dodatnu godinu obrazovanja za tri dolara. Ne možemo još uvek iskoreniti siromaštvo, ali možemo početi. Možda možemo početi s malim stvarima za koje znamo da su učinkovite.
Here's an example of how this can be powerful. Deworming. Worms have a little bit of a problem grabbing the headlines. They are not beautiful and don't kill anybody. And yet, when the young global leader in Davos showed the numbers I gave you, they started Deworm the World. And thanks to Deworm the World, and the effort of many country governments and foundations, 20 million school-aged children got dewormed in 2009. So this evidence is powerful. It can prompt action.
Evo primera koliko ovo može biti moćno. Lečenje od glista. Gliste imaju problem sa dospevanjem u naslove. Nisu lepe i ne ubijaju nikoga. Ali ipak, kada je mladi vođa u Davosu pokazao brojeve koje sam vam dala, započeo je "Deworm the World" ("Oslobodimo svet od glista"). I zahvaljujući tome, i naporu mnogih vlada i fondacija, 20 miliona dece školskog uzrasta je izlečeno u 2009. Ovaj dokaz je moćan. Može da ubrza akciju.
So we should get started now. It's not going to be easy. It's a very slow process. You have to keep experimenting, and sometimes ideology has to be trumped by practicality. And sometimes what works somewhere doesn't work elsewhere. So it's a slow process, but there is no other way. These economics I'm proposing, it's like 20th century medicine. It's a slow, deliberative process of discovery. There is no miracle cure, but modern medicine is saving millions of lives every year, and we can do the same thing.
Trebalo bi da počnemo odmah. To neće biti lako. To je veoma spor proces. Morate stalno da eksperimentišete, i ponekad ideologiju mora da pobedi praktičnost. A ponekada nešto što uspeva na jednom mestu, ne uspeva na drugom. Dakle to je spor proces, ali ne postoji drugi način. Ova računica koju predlažem je kao medicina dvadesetog veka. To je spor, promišljen proces otkrivanja. Ne postoji čudotvorni lek, ali moderna medicina spašava milione života svake godine, a mi možemo da učinimo isto.
And now, maybe, we can go back to the bigger question that I started with at the beginning. I cannot tell you whether the aid we have spent in the past has made a difference, but can we come back here in 30 years and say, "What we have done, it really prompted a change for the better." I believe we can and I hope we will.
I sada se možda možemo vratiti većem pitanju s kojim sam počela. Ne mogu da vam kažem da li je pomoć koju smo dali u prošlosti značila nešto, ali možemo li se vratiti ovde za 30 godina i reći, "Ono što smo ovde uradili je stvarno ubrzalo promenu na bolje." Verujem da možemo i nadam se da hoćemo.
Thank you.
Hvala.
(Applause)
(aplauz)