Dakle, ovdje je: Možete vidjeti, niska sam, ja sam Francuskinja. Imam prilično jak francuski naglasak, i to će biti prilično jasno za koji moment.
So here it is. You can check: I am short, I'm French, I have a pretty strong French accent, so that's going to be clear in a moment.
Možda otrežnjujuća pomisao i nešto o čemu vi svi znate. I pretpostavljam, mnogi od vas su dali nešto ljudima Haitija ove godine. Ima i nešto drugo u što ja vjerujem, u pozadini vašeg uma, vi također znate da, svakodnevno, 25,000 djece umre zbog potpuno zaustavljivih uzroka. To je zemljotres u Haitiju svakih osam dana. I pretpostavljam da su mnogi od vas dali nešto za taj problem također, ali nekako se to ne dešava sa istim intenzitetom.
Maybe a sobering thought and something you all know about. And I suspect many of you gave something to the people of Haiti this year. And there is something else I believe in the back of your mind you also know. That is, every day, 25,000 children die of entirely preventable causes. That's a Haiti earthquake every eight days. And I suspect many of you probably gave something towards that problem as well, but somehow it doesn't happen with the same intensity.
Pa, zašto je to slučaj? Dakle, evo jedan misaoni eksperiment za vas. Zamislite da imate par miliona dolara koje ste skupili. Možda ste političar u nekoj zemlji u razvoju, i imate budžet da potrošite; želite da ga potrošite na siromašne Kako da to uradite? Da li vjerujete ljudima koji kažu da sve treba uraditi je potrošiti pare, da mi znamo kako iskorjeniti siromaštvo samo trebamo raditi vise? Ili vjerujete ljudima koji kažu da finansijiska pomoć neće pomoći, nasuprot možda će pogoršati stanje, možda će pogoršati korupciju, zavisnost, itd.? Ili se možda okrenemo prošlosti. Na kraju krajeva, mi smo potrošili milijarde dolara na finansijisku pomoć. Možda pogledamo u prošlost i vidimo da li je postignuto išta dobro.
So why is that? Well, here is a thought experiment for you. Imagine you have a few million dollars that you've raised -- maybe you're a politician in a developing country and you have a budget to spend. You want to spend it on the poor: How do you go about it? Do you believe the people who tell you that all we need to do is to spend money? That we know how to eradicate poverty, we just need to do more? Or do you believe the people who tell you that aid is not going to help, on the contrary it might hurt, it might exacerbate corruption, dependence, etc.? Or maybe you turn to the past. After all, we have spent billions of dollars on aid. Maybe you look at the past and see. Has it done any good?
Ali, nažalost, ne znamo. I najgore od svega, nikada nećemo znati. A razlog je - uzmimo Afriku kao primjer - Afrikanci su dobili mnogo finansijiske pomoći. To su plavi stupci na grafikonu I BDP u Africi nije mnogo napredovao. Ok, uredu. Kako da znamo šta bi se desilo bez finansijiske pomoći? Možda bi bilo mnogo gore. Ili bi možda bili bolje. Mi ne znamo. Mi nemamo kontračinjenične podatke. U svijetu postoji samo jedna Afrika.
And, sadly, we don't know. And worst of all, we will never know. And the reason is that -- take Africa for example. Africans have already got a lot of aid. These are the blue bars. And the GDP in Africa is not making much progress. Okay, fine. How do you know what would have happened without the aid? Maybe it would have been much worse, or maybe it would have been better. We have no idea. We don't know what the counterfactual is. There's only one Africa.
Dakle, šta da radimo? Da damo finansijisku pomoć i da se molimo da se nešto dobro desi? Ili da se fokusiramo na naš svakodnevni život i dozvolimo da se zemljotres svakih osam dana i dalje dešava? Stvar je u tome, da ako ne znamo da li radimo ikakvo dobro, mi nismo ništa bolji od doktora Srednjeg Vijeka, i njihovih pijavica. Ponekad pacijent ozdravi, ponekad taj pacijent umre. Zbog pijavica? Zbog nečega drugoga? Mi ne znamo.
So what do you do? To give the aid, and hope and pray that something comes out of it? Or do you focus on your everyday life and let the earthquake every eight days continue to happen? The thing is, if we don't know whether we are doing any good, we are not any better than the Medieval doctors and their leeches. Sometimes the patient gets better, sometimes the patient dies. Is it the leeches? Is it something else? We don't know.
Dakle, evo par drugih pitanja. To su manja pitanja, ali nisu baš tako mala pitanja. Imunizacija, to je najjeftiniji način da se spasi život djeteta. I svijet je potrošio dosta novaca na to. GAVI i Gejts fondacije obje zalažu mnogo novca za imunizaciju. Čak i zemlje u razvoju same ulažu dosta truda. I opet, svake godine, najmanje 25 miliona djece ne dobija potrebnu imunizaciju. Ovo je šta mi zovemo "problem posljednje milje." Tehnologija je tu. Infrakstruktura je tu. I opet, ništa ne uspijeva. Dakle imamo milion. Kako koristiti taj milion da riješimo problem posljednje milje?
So here are some other questions. They're smaller questions, but they are not that small. Immunization, that's the cheapest way to save a child's life. And the world has spent a lot of money on it: The GAVI and the Gates Foundations are each pledging a lot of money towards it, and developing countries themselves have been doing a lot of effort. And yet, every year at least 25 million children do not get the immunization they should get. So this is what you call a "last mile problem." The technology is there, the infrastructure is there, and yet it doesn't happen. So you have your million. How do you use your million to solve this last mile problem?
I evo još jedno pitanje: Malarija. Malarije ubija skoro 900,000 ljudi svake godine, uglavnom ljudi u sub-saharskoj Africi, većina mlađih od pet godina. U stvari to je vodeći razlog smrtnosti za mlađe od pet godina. Mi već znamo kako ubiti malariju, ali neki ljudi dođu i kažu. "Imaš milione. Šta mislite o mrežama za krevete?" Mreže za krevet su vrlo jeftine. Za 10 dolara, možemo proizvesti i poslati insekticidom tretirane mreže za krevete, i možemo nekome objasniti kako da ih koriste. I, ne samo da one štite ljude koji spavaju pod njima, nego imaju i odlične koristi protiv daljne zaraze. Ako pola zajednice spava pod mrežama, druga polovina ima koristi od toga jer se spriječava daljnje širenje bolesti. I opet, samo četvrtina djece pod rizikom spava pod mrežom. Društva bi trebala biti voljna da se potrude i da sponzorišu mreže, da ih daju besplatno, ili, u tu svrhu, platiti ljudima da ih koriste zbog zaustavljanja daljnjeg širenja bolesti. "Ne tako brzo," kažu drugi ljudi. "Ako damo mreže besplatno, ljudi ih neće cijeniti. Neće ih koristiti, ili ih bar neće koristiti kao mreže za krevet, možda za ribarenje." Dakle, šta da radimo? Da damo mreže besplatno, da maksimiziramo pokrivenost? Ili da tražimo da ljudi plate kako bismo bili sigurni da ljudi razumiju vrijednost tih mreža? Kako da znamo?
And here's another question: Malaria. Malaria kills almost 900,000 people every year, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, most of them under five. In fact, that is the leading cause of under-five mortality. We already know how to kill malaria, but some people come to you and say, "You have your millions. How about bed nets?" Bed nets are very cheap. For 10 dollars, you can manufacture and ship an insecticide treated bed net and you can teach someone to use them. And, not only do they protect the people who sleep under them, but they have these great contagion benefits. If half of a community sleeps under a net, the other half also benefits because the contagion of the disease spread. And yet, only a quarter of kids at risk sleep under a net. Societies should be willing to go out and subsidize the net, give them for free, or, for that matter, pay people to use them because of those contagion benefits. "Not so fast," say other people. "If you give the nets for free, people are not going to value them. They're not going to use them, or at least they're not going to use them as bed nets, maybe as fishing nets." So, what do you do? Do you give the nets for free to maximize coverage, or do you make people pay in order to make sure that they really value them? How do you know?
I treće pitanje: obrazovanje. Možda je to riješenje. Možda bi trebali poslati djecu u školu. Kako da to uradimo? Da li da uposlimo profesore? Da izgradimo nove škole? Da li da osiguramo ručak u školi? Kako da znamo?
And a third question: Education. Maybe that's the solution, maybe we should send kids to school. But how do you do that? Do you hire teachers? Do you build more schools? Do you provide school lunch? How do you know?
Dakle, ovako stvari stoje. Ja ne mogu odgovoriti na veliko pitanje, da li je finansijiska pomoć uspješna ili ne, ali ova tri pitanja, ja mogu odgovoriti. Ovo nije Srednji vijek više. Ovo je 21. vijek. I u 20. vijeku, randomizirani, kontrolirani pokušaji su revolucionirali medicinu dozvolivši nam da razlikujemo lijekove koji su uspješni i lijekove koji nisu. I možemo uraditi istu stvar randomizirani, kontrolirani pokušaj za društvenu politiku. Možemo i za društvenu inovaciju koristiti iste rigorozne, naučne testove koje koristimo za lijekove. I na taj način, možemo izbaciti nagađanje iz političkih odlučivanja ako znamo šta radi, i šta ne radi, te zašto. I dati ću vam par primjera za ta tri pitanja.
So here is the thing. I cannot answer the big question, whether aid did any good or not. But these three questions, I can answer them. It's not the Middle Ages anymore, it's the 21st century. And in the 20th century, randomized, controlled trials have revolutionized medicine by allowing us to distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that don't work. And you can do the same randomized, controlled trial for social policy. You can put social innovation to the same rigorous, scientific tests that we use for drugs. And in this way, you can take the guesswork out of policy-making by knowing what works, what doesn't work and why. And I'll give you some examples with those three questions.
Dakle ja krenem sa imunizacijom. Ovo je Udaipur distrikt, Rajasthan, prekrasno. Kada sam ja krenula tamo raditi, oko jedan posto djece je bilo u potpunosti imunizirano. To je loše, ali takva mjesta postoje. Znaci, to nije zbog toga što vakcine nisu tu. Vakcine su tu, i besplatne su. I nije zato što roditelji ne mare za svojom djecom. Isto dijete koje nije imunizirano protiv ospica, ako dobije ospice, roditelji će platiti hiljade rupija da mu pomognu. Tako da dobijemo ove prazne seoske polu centre i prepune bolnice. Šta je problem u svemu? Pa, dio problema je, vjerovatno, da ljudi ne razumiju sve to u potpunosti. Na kraju krajeva, u ovoj zemlji također, mnoge vrste mitova i zabluda postoje oko imuniziranja. Tako da ako je to slučaj, to je problematično jer je nagovaranje vrlo teško. Ali možda postoji drugi problem također. To je prelazak sa namjere na djelovanje. Zamislite da ste vi majka u Udaipur distriktu, Rajasthanu. Morate hodati par kilometara da biste imunizirali svoju djecu. I možda kada dođete tamo, šta nađete je ovo. Centar za imunizaciju je zatvoren, morate doći ponovo. I vi ste zauzeti, imate mnogo drugih stvari za uraditi, Uvijek ćete polušati da odgodite i odgodite, i na kraju će biti prekasno. Dakle, ako je to problem, to je mnogo lakše jer, A, možemo proces pojednostaviti, i, B, možda možemo dati ljudima razlog da djeluju danas, radije nego sutra.
So I start with immunization. Here's Udaipur District, Rajasthan. Beautiful. Well, when I started working there, about one percent of children were fully immunized. That's bad, but there are places like that. Now, it's not because the vaccines are not there -- they are there and they are free -- and it's not because parents do not care about their kids. The same child that is not immunized against measles, if they do get measles, parents will spend thousands of rupees to help them. So you get these empty village subcenters and crowded hospitals. So what is the problem? Well, part of the problem, surely, is people do not fully understand. After all, in this country as well, all sorts of myths and misconceptions go around immunization. So if that's the case, that's difficult, because persuasion is really difficult. But maybe there is another problem as well. It's going from intention to action. Imagine you are a mother in Udaipur District, Rajasthan. You have to walk a few kilometers to get your kids immunized. And maybe when you get there, what you find is this: The subcenter is closed. Ao you have to come back, and you are so busy and you have so many other things to do, you will always tend to postpone and postpone, and eventually it gets too late. Well, if that's the problem, then that's much easier. Because A, we can make it easy, and B, we can maybe give people a reason to act today, rather than wait till tomorrow.
Ovo su neke jednostavne ideje, ali nismo znali. Pokušajmo ih onda. Znaći, šta smo uradili su randomizirani kontrolirani pokušaji u 134 sela u Udaipur distriktima. Plave tačke su nasumično odabrane. Pojednostavili smo proces. Objasniti ću to za koji moment. U crvenim tačkama, pojednostavili smo proces i dali ljudima razlog da djeluju sada. Bijele tačke su usporedbe, ništa se nije mijenjalo. Znaći pojednostavili smo to organizirajući mjesećni kamp gdje ljudi mogu dovesti djecu na imunizaciju. A onda smo to pojednostavili i dali im razlog da djeluju sada dodajući kilogram leća za svaku imunizaciju. Znamo da je kilogram leća malen. Nikada neće nikoga nagovoriti da uradi nešto što ne želi ra uradi. U drugu ruku, ako je tvoj problem isključivo odgađanje, onda ti možda da razlog da djeluješ danas radije nego kasnije.
So these are simple ideas, but we didn't know. So let's try them. So what we did is we did a randomized, controlled trial in 134 villages in Udaipur Districts. So the blue dots are selected randomly. We made it easy -- I'll tell you how in a moment. In the red dots, we made it easy and gave people a reason to act now. The white dots are comparisons, nothing changed. So we make it easy by organizing this monthly camp where people can get their kids immunized. And then you make it easy and give a reason to act now by adding a kilo of lentils for each immunization. Now, a kilo of lentils is tiny. It's never going to convince anybody to do something that they don't want to do. On the other hand, if your problem is you tend to postpone, then it might give you a reason to act today rather than later.
Šta smo otkrili? Dakle, prije, sve je bilo isto. To je ljepota randomizacije. Kasnije, kamp, samo postojanje kampa, povećalo je imunizaciju sa šest posto na 17 posto. To je puna imunizacija. To nije loše. To je dobar napredak. Dodajući leća i stižemp do 38 posto. Dakle ovdje imate vaš odgovor. Pojednostavite proces, i dajte kilogram leća, i umnožit ćete imunizaciju šest puta. Sada, možda ćete reći. "Da, ali to nije održivo. Ne možemo konstantno davati leća ljudima." Pa, to je pogrešna računica jer je jeftinije davati leća nego ne davati ih. Jer morate platiti medicinsku sestru ionako, trošak po imunizaciji na kraju ispada niži ako damo inicijative nego ako ih ne damo.
So what do we find? Well, beforehand, everything is the same. That's the beauty of randomization. Afterwards, the camp -- just having the camp -- increases immunization from six percent to 17 percent. That's full immunization. That's not bad, that's a good improvement. Add the lentils and you reach to 38 percent. So here you've got your answer. Make it easy and give a kilo of lentils, you multiply immunization rate by six. Now, you might say, "Well, but it's not sustainable. We cannot keep giving lentils to people." Well, it turns out it's wrong economics, because it is cheaper to give lentils than not to give them. Since you have to pay for the nurse anyway, the cost per immunization ends up being cheaper if you give incentives than if you don't.
A šta je sa mrežama za krevete? Da ih damo besplatno, ili da pitamo ljude da plate za njih? Dakle odgovor ovisi od odgovora na tri jednostavna pitanja. Prvo je: Ako ljudi moraju platiti za mrežu, da li će je kupiti? Drugo pitanje je: Ako im damo mreže besplatno, da li će ih koristiti? I treće pitanje je: Da li besplatne mreže obeshrabruju kupovinu u budućnosti? Treće pitanje je vrlo bitno jer, ako pomislimo da će se ljudi naviknuti na izdatke, možda uspijemo uništiti market za distribuciju mreža za krevet. Ovo je debata koja je proizvela mnogo emocija i ljutih retorika. Više je ideološka nego praktičma. ali ispadne da je jednostavno pitanje. Možemo znati odgovor na to pitanje. Možemo samo pokušati eksperiment. I mnoge eksperimente, i svi će imati iste rezultate, tako da ću ja govoriti samo o jednom.
How about bed nets? Should you give them for free, or should you ask people to pay for them? So the answer hinges on the answer to three simple questions. One is: If people must pay for a bed net, are they going to purchase them? The second one is: If I give bed nets for free, are people going to use them? And the third one is: Do free bed nets discourage future purchase? The third one is important because if we think people get used to handouts, it might destroy markets to distribute free bed nets. Now this is a debate that has generated a lot of emotion and angry rhetoric. It's more ideological than practical, but it turns out it's an easy question. We can know the answer to this question. We can just run an experiment. And many experiments have been run, and they all have the same results, so I'm just going to talk to you about one.
I taj je bio u Keniji, otišli su okolo i podijelili ljudima bonove, bonove za popust. Tako da ljudi sa svojim bonovima mogu dobiti mrežu za krevet u lokalnim farmacijama. I neki ljudi dobiju 100 % sniženje, a neki drugi 20 % sniženja, i neki drugi ljudi dobiju 50 % sniženja, itd. I sada možemo vidjeti šta se će se desiti. Dakle, šta se dešava sa kupovinom? Ono što možemo zapaziti je da kada ljudi moraju platiti za mreže, stopa pokrivenosti uveliko opadne. Dakle i sa djelimičnim popustom -- tri dolara nije puna cijena proizvodnje jedne mreže za krevet. I sada imamo samo 20 posto ljudi sa tim mrežama za krevete, gubimo zdravstveni imunitet, to nije dobro. Druga stvar je, šta se dešava sa korištenjem tih mreža? Pa, dobre vijesti su da ljudi ako imaju te mreže, će ih koristiti be obzira na to kako su ih dobili. Ako su ih dobili besplatno, koriste ih. Ako su platili za njih, koriste ih. Šta se dešava u dugoročnom planu? U budučnosti, ljudi koji su dobili mreže besplatno, godinu poslije, su dobili ponudu da kupe mrežu za krevet za dva dolara. I ljudi koji su dobili jednu besplatno su ustvari kupili drugu mrežu sa većom vjerovatnoćom nego ljudi koji nisu dobili prvu besplatno. Dakle ljudi se ne naviknu na besplatne izdatke, nego na te mreže. Možda im moramo dati malo više kredibilnosti.
And this one that was in Kenya, they went around and distributed to people vouchers, discount vouchers. So people with their voucher could get the bed net in the local pharmacy. And some people get 100 percent discount, and some people get 20 percent discounts, and some people get 50 percent discount, etc. And now we can see what happens. So, how about the purchasing? Well, what you can see is that when people have to pay for their bed nets, the coverage rate really falls down a lot. So even with partial subsidy, three dollars is still not the full cost of a bed net, and now you only have 20 percent of the people with the bed nets, you lose the health immunity, that's not great. Second thing is, how about the use? Well, the good news is, people, if they have the bed nets, will use the bed nets regardless of how they got it. If they get it for free, they use it. If they have to pay for it, they use it. How about the long term? In the long term, people who got the free bed nets, one year later, were offered the option to purchase a bed net at two dollars. And people who got the free one were actually more likely to purchase the second one than people who didn't get a free one. So people do not get used to handouts; they get used to nets. Maybe we need to give them a little bit more credit.
To je primjer mreža za krevet. A vi ćete pomisliti, "To je super. Sada znamo kako imunizirati, znamo kako davati mreže za krevete." Ali ono što političarima treba je niz mogućnosti. Oni moraju znati: Od svih stvari koje mogu uraditi, šta je najbolji način da postignem svoje ciljeve? Pa zamislite da je vaš cilj da podstaknete djecu da idu u školu. Postoje mnoge opcije koje možete uraditi. Možete platiti za uniforme, uklonuti potrebne naknade, izgraditi komunalne toalete, možete izgraditi higjenske uloške za djevojke, itd.. itd. Šta je najbolja opcija? Pa, na nekom nivou, mi vjerujemo da bi svaka od ovih trebala biti uspješna. Pa, da li je to dovoljno, da mi intuitivno mislimo da bi opcije trebale raditi, da ih pokušamo? U biznisu, to definitivno nije način na koji bismo prišli ovom problemu.
So, that's for bed nets. So you will think, "That's great. You know how to immunize kids, you know how to give bed nets." But what politicians need is a range of options. They need to know: Out of all the things I could do, what is the best way to achieve my goals? So suppose your goal is to get kids into school. There are so many things you could do. You could pay for uniforms, you could eliminate fees, you could build latrines, you could give girls sanitary pads, etc., etc. So what's the best? Well, at some level, we think all of these things should work. So, is that sufficient? If we think they should work intuitively, should we go for them? Well, in business, that's certainly not the way we would go about it.
Razmotrimo na primjer prevoz sredstava. Prije nego su kanali izumljeni u Britaniji prije industrijiske revolucije, sredstva su prenošena konjskim zapregama. Onda su kanali izgrađeni, I sa tim istim jahačem i tim istim konjem, možemo prevoziti deset puta više tereta. Dakle, da li su trebali nastaviti da prevoze teret na tim konjskim zapregama, na terenu, koji bi na kraju stigli tu? Pa, ako je to slučaj, onda ne bi bilo industrijiske revolucije. Zašto onda ne uradimo isto sa društvenom politikom? Sa tehnologijom, mi provodimo toliko vremena eksperimentirajući, ugađanjem, pronalazeći apsolutno najjeftinije načine da nešto uradimo, dakle, zašto ne radimo istu stvar sa socijalnom politikom?
Consider for example transporting goods. Before the canals were invented in Britain before the Industrial Revolution, goods used to go on horse carts. And then canals were built, and with the same horseman and the same horse, you could carry ten times as much cargo. So should they have continued to carry the goods on the horse carts, on the ground, that they would eventually get there? Well, if that had been the case, there would have been no Industrial Revolution. So why shouldn't we do the same with social policy? In technology, we spend so much time experimenting, fine-tuning, getting the absolute cheapest way to do something, so why aren't we doing that with social policy?
Pa, sa eksperimentima, šta možemo uraditi je da odgovorimo na jednostavno pitanje. Zamislite da imamo 100 dolara da potrošimo na različite intervencije. Koliko daljnjih godina obrazovanja možemo ostvariti sa stotinu dolara? Sada ću da vam pokažem šta dobijamo sa različitim obrazovnim intervencijama. Dakle prvi su takozvani uobičajeni slučajevi, uposliti nastavnike, jela u školi, školske uniforme, školarine. I to nije loše. Za stotinu dolara dobijemo između jedne i tri dodatne godine obrazovanja. Stvari koje ne rade tako dobro su potplaćivanje roditelja, jer mnogo učenika već ide u školu tako da na kraju potrošimo dosta novca. A ovo su najiznenađujući rezultati. Recite ljudima šta su predonsti obrazovanja. To je vrlo jeftino. Tako da za svakih stotinu dolara potrošenih na to, dobijemo 40 dodatnih godina obrazovanja. I u mjestima gdje imamo crve, crijevne crve, izliječite djeci te crve. I za svakih stotinu dolara, dobijemo 30 dodatnih godina obrazovanja. Dakle ovo nije vaša intuicija. To nisu stvari koje bi ljudi uradili, i opet, to su programi koji su uspješni. Nama su potrebne takve informacije. Treba nam što više toga. I onda trebamo da vodimo politiku.
Well, with experiments, what you can do is answer a simple question. Suppose you have 100 dollars to spend on various interventions. How many extra years of education do you get for your hundred dollars? Now I'm going to show you what we get with various education interventions. So the first ones are if you want the usual suspects, hire teachers, school meals, school uniforms, scholarships. And that's not bad. For your hundred dollars, you get between one and three extra years of education. Things that don't work so well is bribing parents, just because so many kids are already going to school that you end up spending a lot of money. And here are the most surprising results. Tell people the benefits of education, that's very cheap to do. So for every hundred dollars you spend doing that, you get 40 extra years of education. And, in places where there are worms, intestinal worms, cure the kids of their worms. And for every hundred dollars, you get almost 30 extra years of education. So this is not your intuition, this is not what people would have gone for, and yet, these are the programs that work. We need that kind of information, we need more of it, and then we need to guide policy.
Sada, počela sam od velikog problema, i nisam ga mogla odgovoriti. I podjielila sam ga u manja pitanja, a imam odgovore na manja pitanja. I to su dobri, naučni, snažni odgovori.
So now, I started from the big problem, and I couldn't answer it. And I cut it into smaller questions, and I have the answer to these smaller questions. And they are good, scientific, robust answers.
Vratimo se sada u Haiti na momenat. U Haitiju, oko 200 000 ljudi je umrlo. Ustvari, nešto više od posljednjeg mjerenja. I odgovor svijeta je bio odličan. Dvije milijarde dolara su obećane samo zadnji mjesec. To je oko 10 000 dolara po smrti. To ne zvuči tako puno ako pomislite o tome. Ali ako smo spremni potrošiti 10 000 dolara za svako dijete ispod 5 godina koje umre, to bi bilo 90 milijardi godišnje samo za taj problem. Ali to se ne dešava. Zašto? Ja mislim da dio problema je da, u Haitiju, iako je problem ogroman, nekako ga razumijemo, lokaliziran je. Ako damo novac Doktorima Bez Granica, damo novac Partnerima u Zdravlju, i oni ce ga potrošiti da šalju doktore, drvo, slati će stvari tamo i nazad. Problem sa siromaštvom nije takav. Kao prvo, uglavnom je nevidljiv. Drugo, prevelik je. I treće, ne znamo kako da ga riješimo efikasno. Ne postoji srebreni metak. Ne možemo poslati helikoptere da spasimo siromaštvo. I to je vrlo uznemirijuće.
So let's go back to Haiti for a moment. In Haiti, about 200,000 people died -- actually, a bit more by the latest estimate. And the response of the world was great: Two billion dollars got pledged just last month, so that's about 10,000 dollars per death. That doesn't sound like that much when you think about it. But if we were willing to spend 10,000 dollars for every child under five who dies, that would be 90 billion per year just for that problem. And yet it doesn't happen. So, why is that? Well, I think what part of the problem is that, in Haiti, although the problem is huge, somehow we understand it, it's localized. You give your money to Doctors Without Borders, you give your money to Partners In Health, and they'll send in the doctors, and they'll send in the lumber, and they'll helicopter things out and in. And the problem of poverty is not like that. So, first, it's mostly invisible; second, it's huge; and third, we don't know whether we are doing the right thing. There's no silver bullet. You cannot helicopter people out of poverty. And that's very frustrating.
Ali pogledajmo šta smo upravo uradili danas. Dala sam vam tri jednostavna odgovora na tri pitanja. Dajte leća da imuniziramo ljude, dajte besplatne mreže za krevete, i izliječite crve djeci. Sa imunizacijom ili mrežama, možemo spasiti život za 300 dolara. Sa liječenjem crva, možemo dobiti dodatne godine obrazovanja. Dakle ne možemo izliječiti sirmoaštvo još uvijek, ali možemo krenuti. I možda je to mali početak sa stvarima za koje znamo da su efikasne.
But look what we just did today. I gave you three simple answers to three questions: Give lentils to immunize people, provide free bed nets, deworm children. With immunization or bed nets, you can save a life for 300 dollars per life saved. With deworming, you can get an extra year of education for three dollars. So we cannot eradicate poverty just yet, but we can get started. And maybe we can get started small with things that we know are effective.
Ovo je primjer kako ovo može biti efikasno. Liječenje crva. Crvi imaju mali problem da se nađu na početnim vijestima. Nisu lijepi, i ne ubijaju nikoga. Ali ipak, kada je mladi globalni vođa u Davosu pokazao statistike koje ste vidjeli, počeli su "Deworm the World". I hvala "Deworm the World", i trudu mnogih zemalja i fondacija, 20 miliona školskog uzrasta dijece je izliječeno u 2009. Dokazi su uspješni. Može pokrenuti akciju.
Here's an example of how this can be powerful. Deworming. Worms have a little bit of a problem grabbing the headlines. They are not beautiful and don't kill anybody. And yet, when the young global leader in Davos showed the numbers I gave you, they started Deworm the World. And thanks to Deworm the World, and the effort of many country governments and foundations, 20 million school-aged children got dewormed in 2009. So this evidence is powerful. It can prompt action.
Pa počnimo sada. Sada, neće biti lahko. To je spor proces. Moramo eksperimentisati, i nekada se ideologije moraju skovati na osnovi praktičnosti. I nekada nešto što radi negdje, ne radi svuda. Dakle, spor proces, ali ne postoji drugi način. Ova eknomija koju predlažem, je kao medicina 20. vijeka. Spor, detaljan proces otkrića. Ne postoje medicinska čuda, ali moderna medicina spašava milione života svake godine, i mi možemo uraditi istu stvar.
So we should get started now. It's not going to be easy. It's a very slow process. You have to keep experimenting, and sometimes ideology has to be trumped by practicality. And sometimes what works somewhere doesn't work elsewhere. So it's a slow process, but there is no other way. These economics I'm proposing, it's like 20th century medicine. It's a slow, deliberative process of discovery. There is no miracle cure, but modern medicine is saving millions of lives every year, and we can do the same thing.
I sada, možda se možemo vratiti velikom pitanju koje smo postavili na početku. Ne mogu vam reći da li je finansijiska pomoć potrošena u prošlosti napravila promjene, ali se možemo vratiti ovdje za 30 godina i reći, "Šta smo uradili, je ustvari napravilo promjenu ka boljem." Vjerujem da možemo, i nadam se da hoćemo.
And now, maybe, we can go back to the bigger question that I started with at the beginning. I cannot tell you whether the aid we have spent in the past has made a difference, but can we come back here in 30 years and say, "What we have done, it really prompted a change for the better." I believe we can and I hope we will.
Hvala vam.
Thank you.
(Aplauz)
(Applause)