Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now -- (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (Laughter) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about competency?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system -- election, election, election -- that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural difference. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.
大家早 我是李世默 (艾瑞克) 這是我的出生地 但當時不是長那樣 而是這個樣子 當時文化大革命 正在上海如火如荼地展開 我祖母說她聽見了 我出生的啼聲及砲火之聲 當我長大時,聽到了一種說法 解釋了一切對人類應有的了解 它是這樣說的 所有人類社會都以線性的方式進展 由原始社會開始,接著依序是奴隸社會 封建社會、資本主義及社會主義型社會 猜猜最後我們會進入哪種型態的社會呢? 共產主義社會! 或早或晚,所有人類文明 無論文化、語言、國籍 最終都會達到此階段的 政治及社會發展形式 世界上各個民族將一統並達到 天上人間的境界 從此過著幸福快樂的日子 但在那之前,我們面臨著 善與惡之間的掙扎 善的社會主義與惡的資本主義對抗 善的一方終將獲勝 毫無疑問地,這後設敘述就是 馬克斯主義延伸而來的故事 為中國人廣為相信 中國時常以這套美好的故事來教導我們 成為我們生活的一環 也因此深信不疑 這是最流行的說法 解釋世界上三分之一的人口 生活於這種後設敘述之中 接著,世界在一夕之間改變了 對我而言,這是過去信仰的幻滅 我到美國成為柏克萊的嬉皮族 (笑聲) 我成年之後,另外一件事發生了 彷彿一種版本的說法還不夠 我又聽到另一種說法 聽起來也同樣偉大 它也說所有人類社會 以線性方式發展到單一的終點 它說 無論是哪種文化,所有社會 不管是基督教、伊斯蘭教、儒教 都來自於傳統的社會 各族群為組成現代社會的基本單位 社會中的個人 為統領單位 所有人皆為理性的個體 都希望能夠擁有 選票 因為所有人都是理性的,只要擁有選票 就能選出好的政府 並有美好結局 同樣達到地上的樂園 或早或晚,民選的民主政體 將成為所有國家及民族的政體 擁有均富的自由市場 但到達之前,勢必面臨著 善惡之爭 (笑聲) 善為民主的一方 身負全人類的重大使命 必要時以武力 抵抗非民選的獨裁國家 (影片) 老布希:一個新的世界秩序... (影片) 小布希:...終結世界上的獨裁統治 (影片) 歐巴馬:...為所有執政者 所共有的一套標準 這時 (笑聲) (掌聲) 這也成為最流行的說法 根據自由之家 (譯註:推廣民主自由的非政府組織) 民主國家的數量由 1970 年的 45 國 成長到 2010 年的 115 國 在過去 20 年間,西方菁英不辭辛勞 走訪世界各地宣傳以下理念: 多黨爭取政治權力 以及民選機制 才是唯一能夠拯救 長期受苦的發展中國家的途徑 擁有這種信念的人終將成功 沒有的則必然失敗 但這一次,中國人不再相信 上一次當... (譯註:上一次當為對方狡詐,上第二次當為自己笨) (笑聲) (譯註:上一次當為對方狡詐,上第二次當為自己笨) 之後所發生的事,大家都已知道了 中國在短短 30 年間 由世界上最窮的農業國之一 成為了第二大經濟體 6.5 億的人口 已脫離貧窮 當時世界上 80% 脫離貧窮的人口皆在中國 當時世界上 80% 脫離貧窮的人口皆在中國 換言之 新舊各民主國家的總和也不及 這一黨專制國家的表現 我從小仰賴的生活用品:糧票 有段時期肉類地配給 為每人每月數百克 當然,我把奶奶的配給額吃光了 於是我問自己,這種機制有什麼問題 在我家鄉裡 我的事業不斷蒸蒸日上 每天都有企業家創立公司 中產階級不斷壯大且成長迅速 為人類史上前所未見 但根據之前的說法 這些現象皆不應發生 於是我唯一能做的就是進行研究 確實,中國是一黨專制的國家 執政黨為中國共產黨,簡稱共產黨 也沒有民主投票 現代主要的政治理論 有三個假設 舉例來說,這種系統執行上較為僵化 政治封閉且不合乎道德原則 但假設都是錯的 實際情形恰恰相反 適應性強,唯才是用,合乎正當性 才是中國一黨治國 的主要特色 多數的政治學家認為 一黨的統治方式 無法自我修正 故因無法適應而不能長存 事實上 過去世界最大國的 64 年統治時期 共產黨的政策涵蓋範圍 較近期以來任何國家為廣 先是激進式的土地共有制 大躍進 接著是農地私有化 再來是文化大革命 鄧小平的市場改革 接續了江澤民激烈的、大幅的政治舉措 從私有企業中招募黨員 這與毛澤東時期截然不同 一黨制度仍經歷莫大的自我修正 以制度而言,採取新的政策 以修正過去不佳的功能 譬如任期制度 原本統治者能終生適任 因此能累積政治實力 以無限統治 毛澤東為中國現代之父 但他的常任導致嚴重後果 因此共產黨規定任期 必須在 68 至 70 歲間退任 我們常聽人說: 「政治改革遠較經濟改革慢」 以及「中國亟需政治改革」 但這只是個文字遊戲 隱含著政治偏見 有些人決定了他們所樂見的 改變的先後順序 認為只有這些改變才可稱為政治改革 其實,政治改革從未停息 相較於 30 年前、20 年前,甚至 10 年前 中國社會的各種面向 國家的治理方式 從最底層的地方機關 到最高級的中央機構 早已不復以往 如果沒有最根本的政治改革 上述這些改變是不可能發生的 我想大膽地說,中國共產黨 是世上政治改革的龍頭 第二個假設為,一黨專制國家 權力集中於少數人身上 於是便有了差勁的統治及腐敗的問題 的確,腐敗為一大問題 但我們先從更巨觀的角度來討論 這可能不同於多數人的想像 中國共產黨卻是世界上 最能唯才是用的政治團體之一 中國最高統治機關「政治局」有 25 位成員 近一任中,僅有 5 位 來自於特權階級,也就是所謂的太子黨 其它包含國家主席及總理的 20 位 皆來自於普通階級 中央委員會有 300 位以上的成員 出身於上層階級者的 比例甚至更低 中國多數的高級政府官員 努力爭取頂尖的位置 與其他已開發及開發中國家菁英相較 與其他已開發及開發中國家菁英相較 共產黨的社會流動性名列前茅 共產黨的社會流動性名列前茅 問題是一黨專政的政治系統是如何做到的? 問題是一黨專政的政治系統是如何做到的? 我們現在有一強而有力的政治制度 在西方鮮為人知 為中國共產黨中央組織部 功能就像是大型的人力資源引擎 功能就像是大型的人力資源引擎 羨煞各大成功的企業 運作方式有如一旋轉的金字塔 由三部分組成: 公務員、國有企業 以及社會組織,如大學 或社區計畫 三種型態皆是成為官員的途徑 三種型態皆是成為官員的途徑 招集大學畢業生為初級人員 三種途徑皆從基層開始 稱為「科員」 可以依序升等至 以下四種官位 副科長、科長、副處長以及處長 這可不是辦家家酒的遊戲 而是正經之事 每個職位主掌之事很廣 舉凡村內健康照護 城市的外國投資 以及公司經理 組織部每年會記錄他們的表現 與主管、同僚及下屬會談,以評估個人表現 與主管、同僚及下屬會談,以評估個人表現 並且舉辦大眾意見調查 將勝選者升等 這些幹部的職位 可以於這三種官途內向上攀升 一段時間後,表現佳者可從四個基層 升至正副局長的階層 晉升高級官員之列 一般任務則會成為 管理數百萬人的城市 或是收益上億的公司 接著我想讓各位知道競爭多激烈 2012 年時共有 90 萬名正副科長 60 萬名正副處長 卻只有 4 萬名正副局長 繼局長階層後 表現最佳者可再晉升數層 最終進到中央委員會 過程需要 20 到 30 年 捐贈對官途有用嗎? 當然 但最根本的還是績效 就本質而言,組織部的運作 好比現代版的中國師徒制度 好比現代版的中國師徒制度 中國新任主席習近平 非常特別,是前任領導的兒子 也是領導人之子成為元首的首例 即使身分特殊,他也花費了 30 年 首先是村長 當他進入政治局時 所管轄區的人口達 1.5億 之多 所管轄區的人口達 1.5億 之多 占有 1.5 兆美元的國內生產毛額 請各位別誤會我接下來要說的話 我沒有要詆毀任何人,而是陳述事實 小布希,還記得他嗎? 不是詆毀喔 (笑聲) 在成為德州州長前 或說歐巴馬競選總統前 沒有資格成為中國系統中的小縣長 沒有資格成為中國系統中的小縣長 邱吉爾曾如此描述民主 民主是一個很糟糕的體制 但比其他可能的政體為佳 看來他沒聽過中央組織部吧 西方人常認為 多黨普選制 為政治正當性的唯一來源 有人問我「既然共產黨非民選」 「正當性何來?」 我回答「知人善任的原則呢?」 答案不證自明 1949年,共產黨掌權 中國面臨內憂外患 當時人均壽命為 41 歲 今日卻成為世界第二大的經濟體 及工業重鎮,人民也更為富足 及工業重鎮,人民也更為富足 皮尤研究中心 (翻註:美國獨立民調中心) 調查了中國人民的看法及感受 以下為近年來的調查數據 對國家方向的滿意度:85% 認為中國較五年前改善 70% 認為未來會更好 高達 82% 英國《金融時報》調查了全球青年的想法 以下為上週剛出爐的統計數字 93% 的中國 Y 世代年輕人 對國家未來感到樂觀 如果這還不算具正當性 我真不知道什麼叫做正當了 相較之下,全球多數的民主國家 表現則更為低落 我想不需要向各位多加解釋 問題有多嚴重,遍布華府及歐洲各首都 有一些例外 即使許多發展中國家採取了民選制度 仍遭受貧窮及內亂的問題 新上任的民選政府失敗慘重 數月內民眾支持度即降到 50% 以下 卻持續治國直至下次選舉 民主成了選舉及後悔交替的 無限迴圈 如此看來 恐怕面臨正當性危機的是民主制 而非中國的一黨制 希望大家不要誤會 以為中國正穩扎穩打地 邁向超級強權 中國也遇到莫大的挑戰 各種社經問題 伴隨著難以想像的困境 像汙染、食品安全、人口問題等 就政治而言,最大的問題為貪汙腐敗 貪腐的狀況普遍存在,降低制度的效能 及道德正當性 但許多分析家誤判情勢 認為貪污為一黨政治的結果 因此若要解決問題 則必須革除整個體制 但仔細觀察便會發現事實並非如此 中國透明度的國際排名 近期來在 170 個國家中為第 70 到 80 名 且持續向上 印度為世界上最大的民主國家 排名 94 且仍不斷下滑 排在中國之後的百餘個國家 超過半數為民選的民主國家 所以說如果民主為貪腐的萬靈丹 為何這些國家無法解決貪腐問題呢? 我是風險資本家,我要下賭注 為公平起見,這場演講結束前 我也要親自參與並做出預測 如以下 10 年之內,中國將超越美國 成為世界上最大的經濟體 人均收入 將於發展中國家名列前茅 貪腐將減緩,但未完全革除 中國排名將進步 10 到 20 名 進入國際透明度排行 60 名以內 經改將加速,政改也持續進行 一黨政治將屹立不搖 這時代已邁入黃昏 後設敘述的普世性假設 在 20 世紀已失效 在 21 世紀也不會成功 後設敘述是個致命毒瘤 從民主國家體內中擴散 我想先澄清 我不是要在此抨擊民主制 我其實認為民主貢獻良多 使西方得以崛起,也塑造了現代社會 反而,是許多西方國家的菁英 對其政治系統的 普世性宣揚與傲慢 才是西方近期各種積弊的成因 如果他們能少花點精力 以同樣的價值要求他國並進 多用點精力進行內部政治改革 或許民主制能有更好的表現 中國的政治型態無法替代 也不像民選的民主制 假裝適用全世界 它無法被複製輸出 這就是重點所在 中國例子的重要之處 不在於提供他國備案 而是顯現出有其他可能 讓我們來結束後設敘事的時代 共產主義及民主主義 也許皆為值得讚許的理想 但教條式的普遍主義時代已經結束 我們別再告訴人們與後代 治理的方式只有一種 或是所有社會終將進到同樣的階段 或是所有社會終將進到同樣的階段 那是錯誤且不負責的說法 更糟的是,還很無趣 讓世界接受多樣性 或許我們將進入更有趣的時代 我們有勇氣接受嗎? 謝謝大家 (鼓掌) 謝謝 布魯諾‧吉薩尼:請留步 我有些問題想請教 相信在場及世界上多數西方人 同意你所分析的 民主制失調的問題 但同時,有也不少人認為 懷疑非民選制度 缺乏監督及諮詢機制 為國家謀福祉 究竟是什麼樣的中國模式機制 可以讓人民確切地指出 你所定義的「國家利益」是有誤的? 李:政治學家弗蘭克·福山 將中國體制稱為「反應式威權主義」 或許不夠精準,但大致方向正確 中國最大規模的 民調公司 你知道最大客戶是誰呢? 中國政府 不僅是中央政府 地方、省級政府 以及各區的村鎮機構 皆不斷進行意見調查 你對收垃圾方式滿意嗎? 你對國家方針大致滿意嗎? 因此中國有不一樣的機制 能回應人民的需求及想法 我的意思是,我們應該不應一味認為 政治系統只有一種: 選舉、選舉、還是選舉 才是唯一有效的方式 我其實不確定,在這個世界上 選舉是否還能產生負責的政府 (鼓掌) 布魯諾:許多人同意 民主制度的一大特色 在於公民自由表達的權利 你也讓我們看過了 中國政府支持率 但也提到其他事項 如巨大的挑戰 及其他方向的數據: 上萬件的騷動及抗議事件 環保抗爭等等 因此,你似乎認為中國模式 在共產黨外並沒有 公民社會的自我表達空間 李:中國有活躍的公民社會 無論是有關環境或其他 但它不一樣,你可能無法輕易辨識 因為西方定義中的公民社會 必須活躍於政治制度之外 或者甚至反對體制 但這種概念對中國文化很陌生 數千年來公民社會皆存在 但自始至終與政治秩序共存 實為其一部分 我想這就是一大文化差異 布魯諾:謝謝你在 TED 的分享 李:謝謝