Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now -- (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (Laughter) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about competency?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system -- election, election, election -- that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural difference. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.
Dobro jutro. Moje ime je Erik Li i ovde sam se rodio. Ali ne, ja se nisam tu rodio. Ovde sam rođen: Šangaj, na vrhuncu Kulturne revolucije. Moja baka mi je rekla da je čula zvuk pucnja zajedno sa mojim plačem. Dok sam odrastao, pričali su mi priču koja je objasnila sve što je trebalo da znam o čovečanstvu. Ovako je zvučala. Sva ljudska društva se razvijaju linearno, počinjući od primitivnih društava, zatim robovlasničkog društva, feudalizma, kapitalizma, socijalizma i na kraju, pogodite gde završavamo? U komunizmu! Pre ili kasnije, sveukupno čovečanstvo, bez obzira na kulturu, jezik, nacionalnost, stiže do ovog poslednjeg stupnja političkog i društvenog razvoja. Ljudi čitave planete će se ujediniti u ovom raju na Zemlji i živeće zauvek srećno. Ali pre nego što stignemo tamo, učestvujemo u borbi dobra i zla, dobrote socijalizma i zla kapitalizma i dobrota će pobediti. To je, naravno, bila meta-priča izdvojena iz teorija Karla Marksa. I Kinezi su joj poverovali. Pričali su nam tu veliku priču dan za danom. Postala je deo nas i verovali smo u nju. Ta priča je bila bestseler. Oko jedne trećine ukupne populacije sveta je živelo pod uticajem te meta-priče. Onda se svet preko noći promenio. Ja, razočaran neuspelom religijom svoje mladosti, otišao sam u Ameriku i postao Berkli hipik. (Smeh) Dok sam rastao, nešto drugo se desilo. Kao da jedna velika priča nije bila dovoljna, ispričana mi je još jedna. Ova je bila podjednako velika. Ona takođe tvrdi da se sva ljudska društva razvijaju linearno ka jedinstvenom kraju. Ovako je zvučala: sva društva, bez obzira na kulturu, bila to hrišćanska, muslimanska, konfučijanska, moraju se razvijati iz tradicionalnih društava, u kojima su grupe osnovne jedinice, ka modernim društvima, u kojima su pojedinci suverene jedinice i svi ovi pojedinci su, po definiciji, racionalni i žele jednu stvar: glas. Pošto su svi oni racionalni, jednom kada su im dati glasovi, oni stvaraju dobru vladu i žive zauvek srećni. Raj na Zemlji, još jednom. Pre ili kasnije, izborna demokratija će biti jedini politički sistem svih država i svih ljudi, sa otvorenim tržištem koje će ih sve obogatiti. Ali pre nego što stignemo tamo, učestvujemo u borbi između dobra i zla. (Smeh) Dobrota pripada onima koji su demokratije i oni imaju misiju da je šire svetom, ponekad silom, protiv zla, onih koji ne drže izbore. (Video) Džordž H.V. Buš: Novi svetski poredak... (Video) Džordž H.V. Buš: ...koji zaustavlja tiraniju u svetu... (Video) Barak Obama: ...jedinstveni standard za sve koji žele da imaju moć. Erik K. Li: Sad - (Smeh) (Aplauz) I ova priča je postala bestseler. Prema navodima Kuće slobode, broj demokratija je porastao sa 45 1970. godine na 115 u 2010. godini. U poslednjih 20 godina, zapadnjačke elite su neumorno išle planetom propagirajući ovu viziju: mnogobrojne partije se bore za političku moć i glasanje za neku od njih je jedini put ka spasenju sveta u razvoju koji večno pati. Oni koji poveruju u ovu viziju su predodređeni da uspeju. Ostali su osuđeni na propast. Ali ovog puta, Kinezi nisu poverovali u nju. Prevari me jednom... (Smeh) Ostatak je istorija. Za samo 30 godina, Kina je napredovala od jedne od najsiromašnijih poljoprivrednih zemalja na svetu do druge najveće ekonomije sveta. Šestopedeset miliona ljudi je izbavljeno iz siromaštva. 80% ukupne svetske populacije koja je izbavljena iz siromaštva u tom periodu je izbavljeno u Kini. Drugim rečima, sve nove i stare demokratije zajedno su činile mali deo onoga što je jedna, jednopartijska država uradila bez glasanja. Vidite, ja sam odrastao na ovom: kuponima za hranu. Meso je deljeno u porcijama, ljudi su u jednom trenutku dobijali nekoliko stotina grama mesečno. Bespotrebno je reći da sam ja jeo porcije svoje bake. Zapitao sam se, šta nije u redu sa ovim? Evo me ovde, u svom rodnom gradu, moj biznis naveliko raste. Preduzetnici osnivaju kompanije svakog dana. Srednja klasa se širi brzinom i rasponom neviđenim u ljudskoj istoriji. Ali ipak, prema velikoj priči, ništa od ovoga ne bi trebalo da se dešava. Zato sam uradio jedinu stvar koju sam mogao - proučavao sam je. Da, Kina jeste jednopartijska država koju vodi Kineska komunistička partija, Partija i oni ne raspisuju izbore. Napravljene su tri pretpostavke u dominantnim savremenim političkim teorijama. Takav sistem je operativno krut, politički zatvoren i moralno nezakonit. To su pogrešne pretpostavke. Njihova suprotnost je istinita. Prilagodljivost, meritokratija i zakonitost su tri određujuće osobine kineskog jednopartijskog sistema. Većina politikologa će nam reći da jedan jednopartijski sistem nije sam po sebi sposoban za samoispravljanje. Neće dugo opstati jer nije prilagodljiv. Evo sada činjenica. Tokom 64 godine vođenja najveće države na svetu, domet politike Partije je širi od bilo koje druge države u skorijoj istoriji, od radikalne kolektivizacije zemljišta do Velikog skoka napred, zatim privatizacije poljoprivrednog zemljišta, Kulturne Revolucije, reforme tržišta Donga Šaopinga, zatim je naslednik Jiang Zemin napravio ogroman politički iskorak otvorivši članstvo Partije privatnim biznismenima, nešto što je bilo nezamislivo u vreme Maove vladavine. Dakle, Partija se ispravlja na poprilično dramatične načine. Institucionalno, donose se novi zakoni kako bi se ispravile prethodne disfunkcije. Na primer, ograničenje mandata. Političke vođe su zadržavale svoje pozicije ceo život i to su često koristili kako bi nagomilavali moć i produžili svoju vladavinu. Mao je otac savremene Kine, ali je ipak njegova preduga vladavina dovela do katastrofalnih grešaka. Zato je Partija uvela ograničenje mandata sa obaveznim odlaskom u penziju između 68. i 70. godine. Jedna stvar koju često čujemo je: "Političke reforme su zaostale za ekonomskim reformama" i "Kini je preko potrebna politička reforma." Ali ova tvrdnja je retorička zamka, skrivena iza političkih predrasuda. Vidite, neki su a priori odredili kakve promene žele da vide i samo takve promene nazivaju političkom reformom. Istina je, političke reforme nikada nisu prestajale. U poređenju sa pre 30 godina, 20, pa čak i pre 10 godina, svaki vid kineskog društva, kako se državom vlada, od najmanjeg lokalnog nivoa do najvišeg centra, danas je neprepoznatljiv. Takve promene jednostavno nisu moguće bez osnovnih političkih reformi. Sada bih vam rekao da je Partija vodeći svetski ekspert u političkim reformama. Druga pretpostavka je da se u jednopartijskoj državi moć koncentriše u rukama nekolicine i loše upravljanje i korupcija iz toga slede. Uistinu, korupcija je veliki problem, ali hajde da prvo pogledamo širi kontekst. Ovo će vam možda zvučati kontraintuitivno. Partija je jedna od najvećih meritokratija od svih političkih institucija u svetu danas. Najviše vladajuće telo Kine, Politbiro, ima 25 članova. U najskorijem Politbirou, samo pet od njih je poticalo iz privilegovanih položaja takozvani kneščići. Ostalih 20, uključujući i predsednika i premijera, poticalo je iz potpuno običnih položaja. U većem centralnom komitetu koji ima oko 300 članova, procenat onih koji su rođeni kao bogati i moćni je još manji. Velika većina viših kineskih vođa je radila i takmičila se na svom putu ka vrhu. Uporedite to sa vladajućom elitom u razvijenim i državama u razvoju. Mislim da ćete shvatiti da je Partija blizu vrha što se tiče vertikalne pokretljivosti. Onda je pitanje, kako je to moguće u sistemu koji vodi jedna partija? Sada dolazimo do moćne političke institucije, koja je malo poznata zapadnjacima: Organizacioni odsek partije. Ovaj odsek funkcioniše poput ogromnog motora ljudskih resursa kojem bi pozavidele i neke od najuspešnijih korporacija. On rukovodi rotirajućom piramidom koju čine tri dela: civilna služba, državna preduzeća i društvene ogranizacije poput univerziteta ili zajednice. Oni čine odvojene, ali integrisane karijere za kineske službenike. Oni regrutuju diplomce za nezahtevne pozicije u sva tri dela i oni počinju sa dna, koje se zove kejuan [službenik]. Zatim ih unapređuju kroz četiri rastuća elitna čina: fuke [zamenik rukovodioca odeljka], ke [rukovodilac odeljka], fuku [zamenik rukovodioca odseka] i ku [rukovodilac odseka]. Ovo nisu pokreti iz filma "Karate Kid". Ovo je ozbiljno. Raspon položaja je širok, od rukovođenja bolnicom u selu do stranih investicija u gradskoj oblasti i menadžera u kompaniji. Jednom godišnje, Odsek ocenjuje njihov učinak. Razgovaraju sa njihovim nadređenima, njihovim vršnjacima, njihovim podređenima. Ocenjuju njihovo lično ponašanje. Vrše ankete javnog mnjenja. I onda unaprede pobednike. Tokom njihovih karijera, ovi kadrovi mogu da se kreću kroz sva tri dela. Vremenom, dobri napreduju preko četiri početna nivoa na fuđu [zamenik šefa biroa] i đu [šef biroa] nivoe. Tada zalaze u visoko činovništvo. Do tog trenutka, tipičan zadatak bi bio upravljanje oblašću sa populacijom u milionima ili kompanijom sa hiljadama miliona dolara u prihodima. Samo da bih vam pokazao koliko je konkurentan sistem, u 2012. godini, bilo je 900 000 fuke i ke nivoa, 600 000 fuku i ku nivoa i samo 40 000 fuđu i đu nivoa. Posle đu nivoa, najbolji napreduju još nekoliko činova i u svoje vreme stignu do Centralnog komiteta. Taj proces traje dve do tri decenije. Da li pokroviteljstvo igra neku ulogu? Da, naravno. Ali zasluge ostaju osnovni pokretač. U suštini, Organizacioni odsek vodi modernu verziju kineskog vekovima starog sistema podučavanja. Novi predsednik Kine, Ći Jinping, je sin bivšeg vođe, što je veoma neobično, prvi njegove vrste koji je uspeo da zauzme vrhovni posao. Čak i njegova karijera je trajala 30 godina. Počeo je kao rukovodilac sela i dok je ušao u Politbiro, rukovodio je oblastima ukupne populacije od 150 miliona ljudi i ukupnim BDP-om od 1,5 biliona dolara. Nemojte sada da me pogrešno razumete, OK? Ovo ne treba nikog da uvredi. To je samo činjenica. Džordž V. Buš, sećate se njega? Ovo nije uvreda. (Smeh) Pre nego što je postao guverner Teksasa, ili Barak Obama, pre nego što je postao predsednik, ne bi mogao da postane ni rukovodilac malog okruga u kineskom sistemu. Vinston Čerčil je jednom rekao da je demokratija užasan sistem osim svih ostalih. Očigledno nije čuo za Organizacioni odsek. Sad, Zapadnjaci uvek pretpostave da su višepartijski izbori sa univerzalnim pravom glasa jedini izvor političke legitimnosti. Jednom su me pitali: "Partija nije izglasana na izborima. Gde je izvor njene legitimnosti?" Rekao sam: "Možda njena sposobnost?" Svi znamo činjenice. 1949. godine, kada je Partija preuzela vlast, Kina je bila ukaljana građanskim ratovima, raskomadana stranim agresijama, prosečni stanovnik je u to vreme živeo 41 godinu. Danas, Kina je druga najveća svetska ekonomija, industrijski pokretač i njeni stanovnici žive u sve većem blagostanju. "Pew Research" ispituje javno mnjenje Kine i evo brojki iz poslednjih nekoliko godina. Zadovoljstvo zbog smera u kom se kreće država: 85 procenata. Oni koji misle da žive bolje nego pre pet godina: 70 procenata. Oni koji očekuju da će budućnost biti bolja: ogromnih 82 procenta. "Financial Times" ispituje stavove mladih širom sveta i ovo su brojke, potpuno nove, objavljene prošle nedelje. Devedeset tri procenta generacije Y u Kini je optimistično u pogledu budućnosti svoje države. Ako ovo nije legitimitet, onda ne znam šta je. U poređenju, većina izbornih demokratija širom sveta pati od sumornih učinaka. Ne moram da objašnjavam ovoj publici koliko je disfunkcionalna, od Vašingtona do glavnih gradova Evrope. Uz nekoliko izuzetaka, ogroman broj država u razvoju koje su prihvatile izborne režime još uvek muči siromaštvo i demonstracije. Vlade se izaberu i onda padnu ispod 50 procenata podrške za nekoliko meseci i ostanu tako i pogoršaju se do sledećih izbora. Demokratija postaje trajni ciklus izglasavanja i kajanja. Ovim tempom, plašim se da je demokratija, ne jednopartijski sistem Kine, ta koja je u opasnosti od gubljenja legitimiteta. Ne želim da stvorim pogrešan utisak kako je u Kini sve sjajno i bajno na putu ka nekoj vrsti supermoći. Država se suočava sa ogromnim izazovima. Socijalni i ekonomski problemi koji se javljaju sa bolnim promenama poput ovih su zapanjujući. Zagađenje je jedan. Bezbednost hrane. Problemi sa brojem populacije. Na političkom frontu, najgori problem je korupcija. Korupcija se proširila i podriva sistem i njegov moralni legitimitet. Ali većina analitičara postavlja pogrešnu dijagnozu ovoj bolesti. Oni smatraju da je korupcija rezultat jednopartijskog sistema i da, kako bismo je izlečili, treba da odbacimo ceo sistem. Ali pažljiviji pogled bi nam pokazao nešto drugo. "Transparency International" rangira Kinu između 70. i 80. mesta u poslednjih nekoliko godina, od 170 država i napreduje. Indija, najveća demokratija na svetu, 94. i nazaduje. Od sto ili više država koje su rangirane ispod Kine, više od polovine čine izborne demokratije. Ako su izbori lek za korupciju, kako to da ove države ne mogu da je izleče? Ja sam preduzetnik. Ja pravim opklade. Ne bi bilo fer da završim ovaj govor, a da prethodno ne postavim nekoliko prognoza. Pa, evo ih. U sledećih 10 godina, Kina će nadmašiti SAD i postaće najveća ekonomija sveta. Prihod po glavi stanovnika će biti pri vrhu svih država u razvoju. Korupcija će biti umanjena, ali ne eliminisana i Kina će napredovati 10 do 20 mesta, iznad 60 po T.I. sistemu rangiranja. Ekonomske reforme će se ubrzati, političke reforme će se nastaviti i jednopartijski sistem će ostati stabilan. Živimo u sumraku jedne ere. Meta-priče koje prave univerzalne tvrdnje podbacile su u 20. veku i podbacuju u 21. veku. Meta-priča je rak koji ubija demokratiju iznutra. Sada želim nešto da razjasnim. Nisam ovde kako bih podigao optužnicu protiv demokratije. Naprotiv, mislim da je demokratija doprinela usponu Zapada i stvaranju savremenog sveta. Univerzalne tvrdnje koje mnoge zapadnjačke elite postavljaju o svom političkom sistemu, oholost, to je u samom središtu trenutne bolesti Zapada. Kada bi proveli samo malo manje vremena pokušavajući da nametnu svoj način drugima i malo više posvetili političkim reformama kod kuće, možda bi pružili bolju šansu njihovoj demokratiji. Politički model Kine nikada neće potisnuti izbornu demokratiju jer, za razliku od nje, ne pretvara se da je univerzalan. Ne može se izvoziti. Ali to je i poenta. Značaj primera Kine nije to da on pruža alternativu, već to što on pokazuje da alternative postoje. Hajde da završimo ovu eru meta-priča. Komunizam i demokratija su možda ideali za pohvalu, ali era njihovog dogmatičnog univerzalizma je završena. Hajde da prestanemo da govorimo ljudima i našoj deci da postoji samo jedan način da rukovodimo sobom i jedinstvena budućnost ka kojoj sva društva moraju da evoluiraju. To je pogrešno. To je neodgovorno. I najgore od svega, dosadno je. Neka univerzalnost napravi mesta za pluralitet. Možda nas čeka zanimljivije doba. Jesmo li dovoljno hrabri da ga dočekamo? Hvala vam. (Aplauz) Hvala vam. Hvala vam. Hvala. Bruno Đuzani: Eriče, ostani sa mnom na par minuta, želim da ti postavim par pitanja. Mislim da bi se većina ljudi ovde, a i u zapadnim državama uopšte, složila sa tvojom izjavom o analizi da demokratski sistemi postaju disfunkcionalni, ali istovremeno, dosta ljudi bi uznemirila pomisao da postoji neizabrani autoritet koji, bez ikakve forme nadzora ili konsultacije, odlučuje koji su to nacionalni interesi. Koji su to mehanizmi u modelu Kine koji dozvoljavaju ljudima da kažu da je nacionalni interes, kako si ga ti nazvao, pogrešan? EKL: Znaš, Frenk Fukujama, politikolog, kineski sistem je nazvao "odgovorna autoritarnost". To nije potpuno tačno, ali je približno. Ja znam najveću kompaniju za ispitivanje javnog mnjenja u Kini, OK? Znate ko je njihov najveći klijent? Kineska vlada. Ne samo centralna vlada, već i gradska vlada, pokrajinska vlada, sve do oblasti lokalnih komšiluka. Oni sprovode ankete sve vreme. Jeste li zadovoljni odnošenjem smeća? Jeste li zadovoljni opštim smerom kojim se kreće država? Dakle, u Kini postoje različite vrste mehanizama koji reaguju na zahteve i mišljenje ljudi. Moja poenta je, mislim da bi trebalo da se oslobodimo misli da postoji samo jedan politički sistem - izbori, izbori, izbori - na koji vlada reaguje. U stvari, nisam siguran da izbori još uvek stvaraju odgovorne vlade u svetu. (Aplauz) BĐ: Izgleda da se mnogi slažu. Jedna od osobina demokratskog sistema je mogućnost za izražavanje građanskog društva. Ti si pokazao brojke o podršci koju imaju vlada i službena lica u Kini. A onda si samo pomenuo druge elemente, poput velikih izazova i, naravno, ima dosta drugih podataka koji govore drugačije: desetine hiljada nemira i protesta i protesta za životnu sredinu, itd. Dakle, izgleda da ti želiš da pokažeš da u modelu Kine ne postoji mogućnost za izražavanje građanskog društva izvan Partije. EKL: U Kini postoji promenljivo građansko društvo, bilo da je reč o životnoj sredini ili nečem drugom. Ali ono je drugačije. Ne biste ga prepoznali. Zato što, po zapadnjačkim definicijama, takozvano građansko društvo mora da bude odvojeno ili čak u opoziciji političkog sistema, ali taj koncept je nepoznat kineskoj kulturi. Hiljadama godina, postojalo je građansko društvo, ali ono je dosledno i povezano i deo političkog sistema i mislim da je to velika kulturološka razlika. BĐ: Eriče, hvala ti što si podelio to sa TEDom. EKL: Hvala vam.