Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now -- (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (Laughter) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about competency?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system -- election, election, election -- that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural difference. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.
Dobro jutro. Sem Eric Li in rodil sem se tukaj. Pravzaprav ne. Rojen sem bil tu, v Šanghaju na vrhuncu Kulturne revolucije. Babica mi je pripovedovala, da je moj prvi jok spremljal zvok streljanja. Med odraščanjem sem slišal zgodbo, ki je pojasnjevala vse, kar sem moral vedeti o človeštvu. Zgodba je šla tako. Vse človeške družbe se razvijajo in napredujejo linearno. Začne se s primitivno družbo, sledi ji suženjstvo, fevdalizem, kapitalizem, socializem in kje končamo? Pri komunizmu! Prej ali slej naj bi vsaka človeška družba, ne glede na kulturo, jezik, ali narodnost dosegla to zadnjo stopnjo političnega in družbenega razvoja. Ljudstva vsega sveta bodo združena v raju na Zemlji in živela srečno do konca svojih dni. Preden pa to dosežemo, smo ujeti v boj med dobrim in zlim, med dobrim socializmom in zlim kapitalizmom, dobro pa bo prevladalo nad slabim. To je seveda bila meta-pripoved, povzeta po teorijah Karla Marxa. Kitajci so jo vzeli za svojo. To zgodbo smo poslušali dan za dnem. Postala je del nas in verjeli smo vanjo. Zgodba je postala uspešnica. Približno tretjina svetovnega prebivalstva je živela to meta-pripoved. Nato se je svet čez noč spremenil. Sam sem, razočaran nad porazom religije moje mladosti, šel v Ameriko in postal hipi na Berkeleyju. (Smeh) Ko sem postajal starejši, se je zgodilo še nekaj. Kot da ena velika zgodba ne bi bila dovolj, sem slišal še eno. Bila je prav tako velika. Tudi ta je trdila, da razvoj vseh družb linearno napreduje proti enotnemu cilju. Zgodba je šla tako: Vse družbe, ne glede na njihovo kulturo, bodisi krščansko, muslimansko ali konfucijansko, se razvijejo iz tradicionalnih družb s skupinami kot osnovnimi enotami v sodobne družbe, v katerih so izolirani posamezniki samostojne enote, ti pa so v osnovi razumska bitja in vsi želijo le eno, volilni glas. Ker so ljudje razumni, bodo volilni glas uporabili za sestavo dobre vlade in vsi bodo živeli srečno do konca svojih dni. Še en raj na Zemlji. Prej ali slej naj bi volilna demokracija postala edini politični sistem za vse države in vse ljudi, vključno s prostim trgom, s katerim bodo vsi bogati. A preden to dosežemo, smo ujeti v boj med dobrim in zlim. (Smeh) Dobro je na strani demokracij, in njihovo poslanstvo je širjenje le-te, tudi z uporabo sile, v zlih deželah, kjer nimajo volitev. George H. W. Bush: Nov svetovni red ... G. W. Bush: ... konec tiranije na svetu ... Barack Obama: ... enoten standard za vse, ki bodo na oblasti. Eric X. Li: Torej ... (Smeh) (Aplavz) Tudi ta zgodba je postala uspešnica. Po podatkih organizacije Hiša svobode je število demokratičnih družb naraslo s 45 leta 1970 na 115 leta 2010. Zadnjih 20 let zahodne elite neutrudno po svetu prodajajo to reklamo. Številne politične stranke se borijo za oblast in vsak njihov volivec je edina pot do odrešitve dolgo zatiranega sveta v razvoju. Tisti, ki sprejmejo ta način, bodo zagotovo uspeli. Drugi bodo pogubljeni. A te zgodbe Kitajci niso vzeli za svojo. Osel gre samo enkrat ... (Smeh) Ostalo je zgodovina. V le 30 letih se je Kitajska iz ene najrevnejših poljedelskih držav na svetu razvila v drugo največje gospodarstvo. 650 milijonov ljudi se je dvignilo iz revščine. 80 odstotkov svetovnega reševanja revščine se je v tistem obdobju zgodilo na Kitajskem. Ali drugače, nove in stare demokratične družbe skupaj so predstavljale le drobec tega, kar je ena enostrankarska država dosegla brez volitev. Odraščal sem ob teh bonih za hrano. V določenem obdobju je bilo meso odmerjeno na le nekaj sto gramov na osebo na mesec. Seveda sem pojedel vse, kar je babica dobila. Vprašal sem se, kaj je tu narobe? V mojem rojstnem kraju moje podjetje skokoma raste, nova podjetja se odpirajo vsak dan. Srednji razred se širi s hitrostjo in v obsegu, ki nima primere v človeški zgodovini. A glede na veliko zgodbo se nič od tega ne bi smelo dogajati. Storil sem edino, kar sem lahko. Preučeval sem jo. Da, Kitajska je enostrankarska država, ki jo vodi Kitajska komunistična partija, vélika Partija, nimajo pa volitev. Tri predpostavke o takem sistemu so znane v sodobnih vodilnih političnih teorijah. Tak sistem je operativno tog, politično zaprt in moralno sporen. Vse te predpostavke so napačne. Pravilna so njihova nasprotja. Prilagodljivost, vladavina najzaslužnejših in legitimnost so glavne tri značilnosti kitajskega enostrankarskega sistema. Večina politologov bo trdila, da je enostrankarski sistem v svojem bistvu nezmožen samonadzora. Ne more trajati dolgo, ker je neprilagodljiv. Poglejmo dejstva. V 64 letih vodenja največje države na svetu je nabor partijskih programov širši kot pri katerikoli državi v zadnjem času, od korenite kolektivizacije posestev do Velikega skoka naprej, od privatizacije kmetijskih zemljišč do Kulturne revolucije, od Deng Xiaopingove reforme trga do ogromnega političnega skoka njegovega naslednika Jiang Zemina, ko je članstvo v Partiji omogočil zasebnim podjetnikom, kar je bilo nepredstavljivo med Maovo politiko. Partija se je torej razvijala na dramatične načine. Institucionalno so se uzakonili novi predpisi, ki so popravljali prejšnje napake. Tak primer je omejitev trajanja funkcij. Politični vodje so si običajno dosmrtno lastili svoje položaje ter tako kopičili oblast in ohranjali njihove predpise v veljavi. Mao je bil oče sodobne Kitajske, a njegova predolga oblast je vodila v usodne napake. Partija je zato uzakonila omejitev funkcij z obvezno upokojitvijo med 68. in 70. letom. Pogosto slišimo: "Politične reforme so daleč za gospodarskimi," ter: "Kitajska krvavo potrebuje politično reformo." A ta trditev je retorična past, skrita za političnimi težnjami. Nekateri so se namreč a priori odločili, kakšne spremembe želijo videti, in le take spremembe bi lahko bile politične reforme. Dejstvo je, da se politične reforme nikoli niso ustavile. Če situacijo primerjamo s tisto izpred 30, 20 ali celo 10 let, je vsak vidik Kitajske družbe in vladanja državi, od krajevnih uradnikov do najvišjega nivoja, danes popolnoma drugačen. Take spremembe preprosto niso mogoče brez najbolj korenitih političnih reform. Drznil si bom trditi, da je Partija vodilni svetovni strokovnjak za politične reforme. Druga predpostavka je, da se v enostrankarski državi oblast kopiči le v rokah maloštevilnih, čemur sledita slabo vodenje in korupcija. Korupcija je res velika težava, a najprej poglejmo širše. To se vam bo morda zdelo kontradiktorno. Partija je politična ustanova, ki dosledno vodi po principu vladanja najzaslužnejših. Najvišje kitajsko vladajoče telo, Politbiro, ima 25 članov. V njegovi zadnji sestavi le pet članov prihaja iz privilegiranih ozadij, so potomci vplivnih očetov moderne Kitajske. Ostalih 20, s predsednikom in ministrskim predsednikom prihaja iz popolnoma običajnih okolij. V širšem centralnem komiteju z več kot 300 člani je odstotek tistih, ki so bili rojeni v oblast in bogastvo, še manjši. Velika večina starejših kitajskih vodij si je z delom prislužila pot do vrha. Primerjajte to z vladajočimi elitami v razvitih državah in tistih v razvoju. Odkrili boste, da je Partija v vrhu sistemov z mobilnostjo napredovanja. Vprašanje je, kako je to mogoče v sistemu, ki mu vlada ena stranka? Prišli smo do močne politične inštitucije, ki je Zahodnjakom malo poznana - Organizacijski oddelek Partije. Ta organ deluje kot ogromen kadrovski motor, ki bi ga želelo marsikatero od najuspešnejših podjetij. Upravlja in nadzira vrtečo se piramido, sestavljeno iz treh delov: civilna služba, podjetja v državni lasti in družbene organizacije, kot je univerza ali lokalni programi. To so ločene, a povezane poklicne poti za kitajske uradnike. Diplomante zaposlijo na vstopnih mestih v vseh treh delih, začnejo pa na dnu, imenovanem "keyuan" [uslužbenec] Od tam lahko napredujejo preko štirih vse višjih položajev: fuke (namestnik pododdelčnega vodje), ke (pododdelčni vodja), fuchu (namestnik vodje oddelka ) in chu (oddelčni vodja). To niso gibi iz filma "Karate Kid", prav? Gre za resno zadevo. Nabor položajev je širok, od vodenja vaške zdravstvene oskrbe prek tujih naložb v mestnem predelu do vodenja podjetja. Enkrat letno oddelek pregleda njihovo delo. Opravijo intervjuje z njihovimi nadrejenimi, kolegi in podrejenimi. Opazujejo njihovo vedenje. Izvedejo raziskave javnega mnenja. Najboljše povišajo. Med njihovo kariero se ti kadri gibljejo znotraj in med vsemi tremi deli. Čez čas se najboljši prebijejo mimo vseh štirih stopenj do nazivov fuju (namestnik vodje urada) in ju (vodja urada). Takrat postanejo višji uradniki. Na tem mestu je njihova tipična naloga vodenje področja z večmilijonskim prebivalstvom ali podjetja s stotinami milijonov dolarjev prihodkov. Da si lažje predstavljate konkurenčnost sistema, leta 2012 je bilo 900.000 položajev fuke in ke, 600.000 položajev fuchu in chu, ter samo 40.000 položajev fuju in ju. Po položajih ju se najboljši prebijejo prek naslednjih nekaj nivojev in naposled dosežejo Centralni komite. Ta pot traja dve do tri desetletja. Ali je pokroviteljstvo pomembno? Seveda je. A glavno vodilo so zasluge. Organizacijski oddelek pravzaprav vodi posodobljeno različico kitajskega stoletja starega mentorskega sistema. Novi kitajski predsednik, Xi Jinping, je sin bivšega vodje, kar je zelo nenavadno in je prvi te vrste, ki je dosegel vrh. Tudi zanj je pot do tja trajala 30 let. Začel je kot vaški vodja in ko je bil sprejet v Politbiro, je vodil področja s skupnim prebivalstvom 150 milijonov in skupnim BDP-jem 1,5 bilijona dolarjev. Prosim, ne razumite me narobe. Nikogar ne želim blatiti, navajam le dejstva. George W. Bush, se ga spominjate? To ni blatenje. (Smeh) Preden je Bush postal guverner Teksasa, ali preden se je Barack Obama potegoval za predsedstvo, ne bi mogla biti niti vodji majhnega okrožja v kitajskem sistemu. Winston Churchill je dejal, da je demokracija grozen sistem z izjemo vseh ostalih. Očitno ni slišal za Organizacijski oddelek. Zahodnjaki predvidevajo, da so večstrankarske volitve z vsesplošno volilno pravico edini vir do politične legitimnosti. Nekoč so me vprašali: "Partija ni bila izvoljena na volitvah, od kje torej izhaja njena legitimnost?" Odgovoril sem: "Kaj pa sposobnost?" Vsi poznamo dejstva. Ko je leta 1949 Partija prevzela oblast, je bila Kitajska v državljanski vojni, razkosana od tujih napadov, povprečna življenjska doba je bila takrat 41 let. Danes je Kitajska drugo največje svetovno gospodarstvo, industrijska gonilna sila, njeno prebivalstvo pa živi v rastoči blaginji. Raziskave Pew Research so merile mnenja kitajske javnosti in tu so številke zadnjih let. Zadovoljstvo z usmerjenostjo države: 85 odstotkov. Tisti, ki živijo bolje kot pred petimi leti: 70 odstotkov. Delež tistih, ki pričakujejo boljšo prihodnost: debelih 82 odstotkov. Financial Times je anketiral mnenja mladine po celem svetu in tu so najnovejše številke, objavljene šele prejšnji teden. 93 odstotkov kitajske Generacije Y je optimističnih glede prihodnosti njihove države. Če to ni legitimnost, ne vem, kaj je. Nasprotno pa se večina izvoljenih demokracij po svetu sooča s klavrnimi izkupički. Vam mi ni treba posebej razlagati, kako disfunkcionalne so, od Washingtona do Evropskih prestolnic. Z le redkimi izjemami ogromno število držav v razvoju, ki so prevzele demokratične režime, še vedno trpi revščino in državljanske spore. Vlade so izvoljene, v nekaj mesecih jim podpora pade pod 50 odstotkov, obstanejo in slabšajo položaj do naslednjih volitev. Demokracija postaja neprestan krog volitev in kesanja. Bojim se, da v tem trenutku demokracija, ne kitajski enostrankarski sistem, resno izgublja legitimnost. Ne želim ustvariti napačnega vtisa, da je Kitajska v najlepšem redu in na poti k nekakšni supervelesili. Spopada se namreč z gromozanskimi izzivi. Družbeni in gospodarski problemi, ki spremljajo tako sunkovite spremembe, so osupljivi. En od njih je onesnaženje. Varnost živil. Prebivalstvo. Na političnem prizorišču je najhujši problem korupcija. Zaradi svoje razširjenosti spodkopava sistem in njegovo moralno legitimnost. A večina analitikov to bolezen diagnosticira napačno. Trdijo, da je korupcija posledica enostrankarskega sistema in za njeno rešitev je treba pomesti s celotnim sistemom. A bolj podroben pogled bo razkril nasprotno. Organizacija Transparency International uvršča Kitajsko med 70. in 80. mesto v zadnjih letih na lestvici 170 držav in vsako leto je višje. Indija, največja demokracija na svetu, je na 94. mestu in pada. Med okoli sto držav, ki se uvrščajo za Kitajsko, je več kot polovica izvoljenih demokracij. Če so torej volitve čudežno zdravilo za korupcijo, zakaj še vedno obstaja v teh državah? Ukvarjam se s tveganimi naložbami. Sklepam stave. Ne bi bilo prav, da končam ta govor, ne da postavim svoje trditve na kocko in napovem nekaj izidov. Tu so. V naslednjih 10 letih bo Kitajska prehitela ZDA in postala največje gospodarstvo na svetu. Prihodek na prebivalca bo blizu vrha vseh držav v razvoju. Korupcija bo zajezena, a ne odstranjena, in Kitajska se bo pomaknila 10 do 20 mest navzgor, nad 60. mesto na lestvici Transparency International. Gospodarske reforme se bodo pospešile, politične reforme se bodo nadaljevale in enopartijski sistem se bo trdno obdržal. Priča smo mraku neke dobe. Meta-pripoved z univerzalnimi trditvami nas je razočarala v 20. stoletju in razočaranje traja tudi v 21. stoletju. Meta-pripoved je rak, ki razjeda demokracijo od znotraj. Nekaj želim pojasniti. Nisem tu, da bi obtoževal demokracijo. Prav nasprotno, menim, da je demokracija prispevala k vzponu Zahoda in gradnji sodobnega sveta. Univerzalna teza, ki jo Zahodne elite tvorijo o njihovih političnih sistemih, in njihov napuh so vzrok trenutnih bolezni Zahoda. Če bi le malo manj časa namenili vsiljevanju njihovih načinov drugim in ga več namenili domačim političnim reformam, bi se morda njihovim demokracijam bolje pisalo. Kitajski politični model ne bo nikoli izpodrinil demokracije in volitev, saj si nasprotno od nje ne domišlja, da je univerzalen. Ne more se ga izvoziti. A ravno to je njegovo bistvo. Pomen primera Kitajske ni v tem, da predstavlja alternativo, ampak v tem, da pokaže obstoj alternative. Povzemimo to obdobje meta-pripovedi. Tako komunizem kot demokracija sta lahko hvalevredna ideala, a obdobje njunih dogmatskih univerzalizmov je mimo. Nehajmo pripovedovati ljudem in otrokom, da obstaja le en način, kako nas voditi, in enotna prihodnost, proti kateri se morajo razviti vse družbe. To ni prav. To je neodgovorno. In kar je najhuje, dolgočasno je. Naj univerzalnost da prostor pluralnosti. Morda nas čaka bolj zanimiva doba. Smo dovolj pogumni, da jo sprejmemo? Hvala lepa. (Aplavz) Hvala. Hvala lepa. Bruno Giussani: Eric, ostanite na odru še nekaj minut, za vas imam še nekaj vprašanj. Marsikdo tu in na sploh v Zahodnih državah bi se strinjal z vašimi trditvami in analizami, da demokratični sistemi postajajo disfunkcionalni, a marsikdo bi hkrati tudi težko sprejel misel, da obstaja neizvoljena avtoriteta, ki brez nadzora ali posveta odloča o nacionalnih interesih. Kateri je vzvod kitajskega modela, s katerim lahko ljudje izrazijo nestrinjanje z določenim nacionalnim interesom? Eric X Li: Politolog Frank Fukuyama je kitajski sistem označil za "odziven avtoritarizem". To ni čisto točno, a mislim, da je blizu. Poznam največjo agencijo za raziskave javnega mnenja na Kitajskem. Veste, kdo je njihova največja stranka? Kitajska vlada. Ne le centralna vlada, pač pa tudi mestna in provincialna vlada ter celo najožja četrtna okrožja. Raziskave izvajajo neprestano. Ste zadovoljni z odvozom odpadkov? Ste zadovoljni s splošno usmeritvijo države? Na Kitajskem obstaja torej drugačen vzvod za odzivnost na zahteve in mnenja ljudi. Moje bistvo je, da bi se morali odlepiti od prepričanja, da obstaja zgolj en politični sistem - volitve, volitve, volitve - ki je odziven na mnenja ljudstva. Nisem več prepričan, da volitve še vedno ustvarjajo odzivne vlade po svetu. (Aplavz) B. G.: Očitno se mnogi strinjajo. Ena od značilnosti demokratičnega sistema je prostor, znotraj katerega se lahko civilna družba izraža. Videli smo številke, ki predstavljajo podporo vladi in organom na Kitajskem. Omenili pa ste tudi druge elemente, velike izzive, na katere opozarjajo podatki v nasprotni smeri: na desettisoče nemirov in protestov, okoljski protesti itd. Videti je, da Kitajski model nima prostora izven Partije, znotraj katerega bi se lahko civilna družba izražala. Eric X Li: Na Kitajskem je živahna civilna družba, ki se izraža glede okolja in ostalega. A je drugačna, ne bi je prepoznali. Po zahodnih definicijah naj bi bila t. i. civilna družba ločena ali celo nasprotujoča političnemu sistemu, kar pa je tuje Kitajski kulturi. Tisoče let že obstaja civilna družba, ki pa je usklajena in povezana ter del političnega reda, kar mislim, da je velika kulturna razlika. BG. Eric, hvala da ste to delili na TED-u. Eric X Li. Hvala lepa.