Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under that meta-narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. (Laughter) Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. (Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order... (Video) George W. Bush:... ending tyranny in our world... (Video) Barack Obama:... a single standard for all who would hold power. Eric X. Li: Now -- (Laughter) (Applause) This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it. Fool me once... (Laughter) The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother's portions. So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule. So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the source of legitimacy?" I said, "How about competency?" We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can't fix it? Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you. (Applause) Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks. Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong? EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China, okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not just from the central government, the city government, the provincial government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking that there's only one political system -- election, election, election -- that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce responsive government anymore in the world. (Applause) BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction: tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc. So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the Party for civil society to express itself. EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a big cultural difference. BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you.
Bos días. O meu nome é Eric Li, e nacín aquí. Mais non, non nacín aí. Aquí é onde nacín. Xangai, no cumio da Revolución Cultural. A miña avoa conta que escoitou o son de disparos xunto cos meus primeiros choros. Cando fun medrando, contáronme unha historia que explicaba todo o que precisaba coñecer sobre a humanidade. Esta é a historia. Todas as sociedades humanas desenvólvense nunha progresión lineal comezando pola sociedade primitiva, logo, a sociedade de escravos, feudalismo, capitalismo, socialismo e finalmente, adiviñen con cal rematamos. Comunismo! Máis tarde ou máis cedo, toda a humanidade independentemente da cultura, lingua, nacionalidade, chegará a esta etapa final do desenvolvemento político e social. Toda a xente do mundo enteiro se unirá neste paraíso na Terra e vivirá feliz para sempre. Pero antes de chegar alí, estamos comprometidos nunha loita entre o ben e o mal, as bondades do socialismo contra as maldades do capitalismo, e o ben sempre triunfará. Isto, por suposto, era un metarrelato destilado das teorías de Karl Marx. E os chineses comprárono. Ensináronnos esa gran historia día si, día non. Formaba parte de nós, e criamos nela. A historia era un best-séller. Preto dun terzo da poboación mundial vivía baixo este metarrelato. Entón, o mundo cambiou da noite para a mañá. Canto a min, desilusionado polo fracaso da relixión da miña mocidade, vin para América e convertinme nun hippy de Berkeley. (Risos) A medida que ía crecendo, sucedeu algo. Coma se cunha gran historia non fose dabondo, contáronme outra máis. Esta era igual de grande. Tamén afirma que todas as sociedades humanas desenvolvéronse nunha progresión lineal cara a un final singular. Esta historia é como segue: Todas as sociedades, independentemente da cultura, xa pode ser cristiá, musulmá, confucianista, teñen que progresar dende as sociedades tradicionais nas cales os grupos son as unidades básicas ata as sociedades modernas nas cales os individuos atomizados son as unidades soberanas, e todos estes individuos son, por definición, racionais, e todos queren unha cousa: o voto. Porque todos son racionais, unha vez que teñan o voto, producirán un bo goberno e vivirán felices para sempre. O paraíso na Terra, unha vez máis. Máis tarde ou máis cedo, a democracia electoral será o único sistema político para todos os países e persoas, cun mercado libre que os enriquecerá a todos. Mais antes de chegar alí, estamos inmersos nunha loita entre o ben e o mal. (Risos) O ben perténcelles ás democracias e están a cargo da misión de expandilo ao redor do mundo, ás veces pola forza, contra as maldades daqueles que non realizan eleccións. George H.W. Bush: Unha nova orde mundial... George W. Bush: ...rematando coa tiranía no mundo... Barack Obama: ...un só estándar para todos os que teñan o poder. Eric X. Li: Agora -- (Risos) (Aplausos) Esta historia tamén se converteu nun best-séller. De acordo coa Freedom House, o número de democracias pasou de 45 no ano 1970 a 115 no ano 2010. Nos últimos 20 anos, as elites occidentais incansablemente foron ao redor do mundo vendendo a súa proposta. Múltiples partidos loitando polo poder político e todas as persoas votándoos, ese é o único camiño á salvación para o sufrido mundo en desenvolvemento. Aqueles que mercaron a proposta están destinados ao éxito. Os que non, están condenados ao fracaso. Pero desta vez, os chineses non o mercaron. Se me enganas unha vez... (Risos) O resto é historia. En só 30 anos, China pasou de ser un dos países agrícolas máis pobres do mundo a converterse na segunda economía mundial. 650 millóns de persoas saíron da pobreza. O oitenta por cento do alivio mundial da pobreza durante ese período ocorreu en China. Noutras palabras, todas as democracias novas e vellas xuntas fixeron unha mera fracción do que fixo un só estado de partido único, sen votar. Vedes, eu crecín con estas cousas: cupóns de comida. A carne racionouse a uns poucos centos de gramos por persoa ao mes durante un tempo. Non fai falta dicir, eu comía todas as porcións da miña avoa. Así que me preguntei: cal é o problema aquí? Aquí estou na miña vila natal, o meu negocio crecendo rapidamente. Os empresarios están a crear empresas todos os días. A clase media expándese a unha velocidade e escala sen precedentes na historia humana. E aínda así, segundo a historia oficial, nada disto debía suceder. Así que fun e fixen o único que podía facer. Estudeino. Si, China é un estado de partido único gobernado polo Partido Comunista da China, o Partido, e non celebran eleccións. Fixéronse tres suposicións acordes coas teorías políticas dominantes do noso tempo. Un sistema así é operativamente ríxido, politicamente cerrado, e moralmente ilexítimo. Ben, estas suposicións son erróneas. As opostas son verdade. Adaptabilidade, meritocracia e lexitimidade son as tres características definitorias do sistema de partido único de China. A maioría de politólogos dirá que o sistema de partido único é inherentemente incapaz de autocorrixirse. Non durará moito porque non pode adaptarse. Mais aquí están os datos. En 64 anos de goberno do país máis grande do mundo, o conxunto de políticas do Partido foi máis amplo que calquera outro país da historia recente, dende a radical colectivización de terras ata o Gran Salto Adiante, e logo a privatización das terras de cultivo, logo a Revolución Cultural, logo a reforma de mercado de Deng Xiaoping, logo o seu sucesor Jiang Zemin deu un paso político xigante coa apertura de afiliación ao Partido para os empresarios, algo inimaxinable durante o goberno de Mao. Así, o Partido autocorríxese nos momentos máis extremos. Institucionalmente, as novas normas son adoptadas para corrixir disfuncións anteriores. Por exemplo, límites de mandato. Os líderes políticos retiñan os postos de por vida, para así acumular o poder e perpetuar as súas normas. Mao foi o fundador da China moderna, aínda así, o seu prolongado mandato levou a erros desastrosos. Así que o Partido impuxo límites de mandato cunha xubilación obrigatoria aos 68 ou 70 anos. Unha cousa que escoitamos a miúdo é: "As reformas políticas quedaron por tras das reformas económicas," e "China precisa con urxencia unha reforma política." Mais esta declaración é unha trampa retórica agachada detrás dun nesgo político. Mirade, algúns xa decidiron a priori que tipo de cambios querían ver, e só eses cambios poden chamarse reformas políticas. A verdade é que as reformas políticas nunca se detiveron. Comparado con hai 30 anos, 20 ou incluso 10, todos os aspectos da sociedade chinesa, como se gobernou o país, dende o nivel máis local ata o centro do poder, son hoxe irrecoñecibles. Todos estes cambios son simplemente imposibles sen as reformas políticas máis básicas. Arriscaríame a suxerir que o Partido é o principal experto do mundo en reforma política. A segunda suposición é que nun partido único, o poder concéntrase nas mans duns cantos, o que produce malos gobernos e corrupción. En efecto, a corrupción é un gran problema, pero miremos antes o contexto xeral. Isto pode resultarvos contraditorio. O Partido resulta ser unha das institucións políticas máis meritocráticas do mundo actual. O máximo órgano de decisión de China, o Politburó, ten 25 membros. E no máis recente, só cinco deles proviñan dun ambiente de privilexio, os chamados príncipes vermellos. Os outros 20, incluído o presidente e o primeiro ministro, viñan de ambientes totalmente comúns. No Comité central de 300 ou máis, a porcentaxe de persoas que naceron nun ambiente de poder e riqueza foi aínda menor. A inmensa maioría dos principais líderes chineses traballaron e loitaron por chegar ao cume. Comparade isto coas elites dirixentes en países desenvolvidos ou en desenvolvemento, Creo que atoparedes o Partido nos primeiros postos en mobilidade social ascendente. A pregunta entón é: como puido ser isto posible nun sistema gobernado por un só partido? Agora imos a unha institución política poderosa descoñecida para occidentais: o Departamento de Organización do Partido. O Departamento funciona coma unha enorme máquina de recursos humanos que sería a envexa incluso dalgunhas das empresas máis prósperas. Dirixe unha pirámide xiratoria integrada por tres compoñentes: servizo civil, empresas estatais, e organizacións sociais coma a universidade ou os programas comunitarios. Forman carreiras separadas e aínda así integradas para funcionarios chineses. Recrutan graduados universitarios en posicións básicas nas 3 vías, e comezan dende a base, chamada "keyuan" [obreiro]. Logo poderán ascender a través de 4 rangos ascendentes: fuke, ke, fuchu e chu. Estes non son movementos de <i>Karate Kid</i>. Son asuntos serios. A variedade de cargos é ampla, dende a xestión da saúde nunha vila, ao investimento estranxeiro nun barrio urbano ou a dirección dunha empresa. Unha vez ao ano, o departamento avalía o traballo. Entrevistan os superiores, compañeiros e subordinados. Aproban as condutas persoais. Levan a cabo enquisas de opinión pública. E logo, ascenden os gañadores. Durante as súas carreiras, estes cadros poden moverse entre as 3 vías. Co tempo, os mellores pasarán dos catro niveis básicos ata os niveis fuju e ju. Alí, entrarán na alta burocracia. Neste punto, unha tarefa típica sería dirixir un distrito cunha poboación de millóns de persoas ou unha compañía cuns ingresos de centos de millóns de dólares. Só para amosarvos o competitivo que é o sistema, en 2012, había 900 000 niveis fuke e ke, 600 000 niveis fuchu e chu, e soamente 40 000 niveis fuju e ju. Despois dos niveis ju, só algúns dos mellores ascenden uns cantos niveis máis, e finalmente chegan ao Comité Central. O proceso dura dúas ou tres décadas. Intervén o apadriñamento? Si, por suposto. Pero os méritos son a clave fundamental. En esencia, o Departamento de Organización manexa unha versión modernizada do centenario sistema chinés de mentores. O novo presidente da China, Xi Jinping, é o fillo dun ex-dirixente, algo moi pouco frecuente, o primeiro do seu tipo que chega ao máis alto. Incluso a el lle levou 30 anos. Comezou como administrador dunha vila, e cando entrou no Politburó, xa gobernara zonas cunha poboación total de 150 millóns de persoas. e cun PIB combinado de 1,5 billóns de dólares americanos. Por favor, non me interpretedes mal, de acordo? Isto non é un desprezo a ninguén. É só a declaración dun feito. George W. Bush, acordádesvos del? Isto non é un desprezo. (Risos) Antes de converterse en gobernador de Texas, ou Barack Obama antes de presentarse para presidente, non poderían ser nin dirixentes dun pequeno condado no sistema chinés. Winston Churchill dixo que a democracia é un sistema terrible sacando o resto. Aparentemente non coñecía o Departamento da Organización. Os occidentais sempre asumen que as eleccións multipartidistas con sufraxio universal son a única fonte de lexitimidade política. Unha vez preguntáronme: "O Partido nunca foi elixido nas urnas. Onde está a súa lexitimidade?" Respondín: "E que hai da competencia?" Todos coñecemos os feitos. En 1949, cando o Partido tomou o poder, China estaba sumida en guerras civís, dividida por agresións foráneas, daquela, a esperanza de vida era de 41 anos. Hoxe, é a segunda potencia mundial, unha potencia industrial, e a súa xente vive nunha prosperidade que medra. Pew Research fixo enquisas sobre as actitudes públicas chinesas, e estas son as cifras dos últimos anos. Satisfacción coa dirección que leva o país: 85 %. Os que pensan que están mellor que hai 5 anos: 70 %. Os que imaxinan que o futuro vai mellorar: un xigantesco 82 %. O <i>Financial Times</i> pregunta polas actitudes globais da xuventude, e estas cifras, moi recentes, publicáronse a semana pasada. O 93 % da xeración Y chinesa é optimista sobre o futuro do seu país. Entón, se isto non é lexitimidade, non sei que é. Pola contra, a maioría das democracias electorais ao redor do mundo están a sufrir un pésimo desempeño. Non preciso explicarlle a esta audiencia como de disfuncional é isto, dende Washington ata as capitais europeas. Cunhas cantas excepcións, un gran número de países en desenvolvemento que adoptaron réximes electorais aínda sofren pobreza e conflitos civís. Escóllense os gobernos, e logo caen por baixo do 50 % de aprobación aos poucos meses e permanecen alí e empeoran ata as próximas eleccións. A democracia estase a converter nun ciclo perpetuo de elixir e arrepentirse. A este ritmo, temo que é a democracia, non o sistema chinés de partido único, o que está en risco de perder a lexitimidade. Ben, non quero crear unha impresión falsa de que todo vai ben en China, en camiño de ser algo parecido a unha superpotencia. O país enfróntase a enormes retos. Os problemas socioeconómicos que veñen con cambios enormes coma este son alucinantes. A polución é un. Seguridade alimentaria. Problemas de poboación. Na fronte política, o peor dos problemas é a corrupción. A corrupción está moi estendida e debilita o sistema e a súa lexitimidade moral. Pero moitos analistas erran diagnosticando a enfermidade. Din que a corrupción é o resultado do sistema unipartidista, e por iso, para curalo, hai que eliminar o sistema ao completo. Pero unha ollada máis coidadosa, diravos outra cousa. Transparencia Internacional clasifica China entre os postos 70 e 80 nos últimos anos nun total de 170 países, e continúa a subir. India, a democracia máis grande do mundo, está no 94 e caendo. Dos cento e pico países que están por baixo de China, máis da metade son democracias electorais. Así que se as eleccións son a panacea da corrupción, como é que estes países non poden arranxala? Son un capitalista de risco, fago apostas. Non sería xusto rematar esta charla sen arriscarme e facer unhas cantas predicións. Así que aquí están. Nos próximos 10 anos, China superará os Estados Unidos e converterase na maior economía do mundo. A renda per cápita, rozará o máximo de todos os países en desenvolvemento. Frearase a corrupción, pero non se eliminará, e China subirá de 10 a 20 postos por riba do 60 na clasificación de Transparencia Internacional A reforma económica acelerarase, a reforma política continuará e o sistema unipartidista manterase firme. Vivimos no ocaso dunha era. Os metarrelatos que fan afirmacións universais falláronnos no século XX e seguen a fallarnos no século XXI. Os metarrelatos son o cancro que está a matar a democracia dende dentro. Quero aclarar unha cousa. Non estou aquí para criticar a democracia. Ao contrario, penso que a democracia contribuíu ao ascenso de Occidente e á creación do mundo moderno. É a reivindicación universal que moitas elites occidentais están a facer sobre o seu sistema político, a arrogancia, o que está no corazón dos males actuais de Occidente. Se perdesen menos tempo tratando de impoñerlles o seu sistema a outros, e un pouco máis nas súas propias reformas políticas, farían algo mellor pola democracia. O modelo político chinés nunca suplantará a democracia electoral, porque ao contrario desta, non pretende ser universal. Non pode ser exportado. Pero este é precisamente o tema. A importancia do exemplo chinés non está en proporcionar unha alternativa, senón en demostrar que existen alternativas. Pechemos esta era de metarrelatos. O comunismo e a democracia poden ser os dous ideais loables, pero a era do seu universalismo dogmático terminou. Deixemos de dicirlle á xente e aos nosos fillos que só existe unha forma de gobernarnos e un futuro único cara ao que todas as sociedades deben evolucionar. Iso é incorrecto e irresponsable. E o peor de todo, é aburrido. Deixemos que a universalidade abra paso á pluralidade. Quizais se aproxime unha era máis interesante. Somos valentes abondo como para darlle a benvida? Grazas. (Aplausos) Grazas. Grazas. Grazas. Graciñas. Bruno Giussani: Eric, queda un par de minutos, porque quero facerche unhas preguntas. Penso que aquí, e en xeral nos países occidentais, estarán de acordo coas túas declaracións sobre a análise dos sistemas democráticos que se volven disfuncionais, pero, ao mesmo tempo, moitos atoparán desacougante pensar que hai unha autoridade non elixida que, sen ningunha forma de supervisión ou consulta, decide cal é o interese nacional. Cal é o mecanismo no modelo chinés que lle permite á xente dicir, de feito, que o interese nacional como se definiu é incorrecto? EXL: Frank Fukuyama, o politólogo, chamoulle ao sistema chinés "autoritarismo receptivo." Isto non é exactamente correcto, pero penso que se achega. Coñezo a empresa máis grande de enquisas de opinión pública en China. Sabe quen é o seu mellor cliente? O goberno chinés. Non só dende o goberno central, o municipal, o provincial, ata a maioría dos distritos de barrio. Realizan enquisas todo o tempo. Estades contentos coa recollida de lixo? Estades contentos coa dirección xeral do país? Así que, en China, hai un tipo diferente de mecanismo para ter en conta as demandas e o que pensa a xente. O que eu penso é que deberiamos despegarnos do pensamento de que só hai un sistema político, eleccións, eleccións, eleccións, que pode que responda. Non estou seguro, de feito, as eleccións xa non producen gobernos que respondan. (Aplausos) BG: Seica moitos concordan. Unha das características dun sistema democrático é o espazo para que a sociedade civil se exprese por si mesma. E amosaches cifras do apoio que o goberno e as autoridades teñen en China. Mais logo mencionaches outros elementos como, xa sabes, grandes retos, e hai, claro, unha morea doutros datos que van nunha dirección diferente: decenas de miles de axitacións e protestas e protestas ambientais, etc. E parece que suxires que o modelo chinés non ten un espazo fóra do Partido para que a sociedade civil se exprese. EXL: Hai unha sociedade civil moi vibrante en China, xa sexa polo medio ou o que queiras. Pero é diferente. Non poderías recoñecela. Porque, nas definicións occidentais, a chamada sociedade civil ten que estar separada ou incluso en oposición ao sistema político, pero ese concepto é descoñecido para a sociedade chinesa. Durante miles de anos, tes unha sociedade civil, mais é consistente e coherente e forma parte da orde política, e penso que é unha gran diferenza cultural. BG: Eric, moitas grazas por compartir isto con TED. EXL: Grazas.