On the plains of the Serengeti, a dung beetle rolls his perfectly sculpted ball of dung away from competitors.
在賽倫蓋提的平原上, 一隻蜣螂正在滾動 牠塑造的完美糞球, 遠離競爭者。
In this Canadian river, a beaver rushes to reinforce her dam as it threatens to burst.
在加拿大的這條河裡, 一隻海狸正趕去強化牠的水壩, 因為水壩即將被沖壞。
As the snowball thunders down the mountainside, gaining momentum, the arctic foxes run for cover—
當雪球一邊發出巨響一邊滾下山坡, 衝力越來越大時, 北極狐跑去找掩護——
I can't stand these nature programs. Always the same story, and not a rational actor in sight. What else is on?
我實在受不了這些大自然節目。 故事一成不變, 看不到可以講道理的對象。 有什麼其他節目?
It’s April 1954, and Vietnamese nationalists are on the verge of victory against French forces fighting for control of Vietnam. Their victory could lead to an independent Vietnam under communist leader Ho Chi Minh. The United States President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, is holding a press conference to comment on these developments.
現在是 1954 年 4 月, 越南的民族主義者正為了 爭奪越南的掌控權對抗法國軍隊, 他們即將獲得勝利, 若他們獲勝, 越南就會在共產黨領導人 胡志明的帶領下獨立。 美國總統艾森豪 召開記者會,說明這些發展。
Well, if you really must.
那,你就說吧。
Eisenhower claims that by virtue of what he calls the “falling domino principle,”
艾森豪聲稱,因為他所謂的
communist control of Vietnam would be the “beginning of a disintegration” that would be certain to cause “incalculable loss.”
「多米諾骨牌原則」, 越南被共產主義控制就會是 「崩解的開端」, 肯定會造成「無法計算的損失」。
The beetles and beavers may be beyond my reach, but surely here's someone I can reason with.
我可能管不了蜣螂和海狸, 但我肯定可以跟這個人講道理。
Now, Mr. President, let’s take a deep breath, shall we?
總統先生,
It’s a big leap—or, one might say, a long slide— from communist governance of Vietnam to the global spread of authoritarian communist regimes. It’s as if we were to say you were clothed, now you’re in your underwear, so soon everyone in the world will be completely naked.
先深呼吸一下,好嗎? 你這說法一下跳得太遠了—— 或應該說是滑得太遠了。 從共產黨治理越南 跳到獨裁共產黨政權散播全球。 這就好像是在說:你本來有穿衣服, 現在你只穿內褲, 所以很快地, 全世界的人都會全裸。
Don’t worry, I may have that power, but I promise not to use it. Now, as I was saying, this kind of argument, where one step, let’s call it A, kicks off a string of events that inevitably culminates in an extreme scenario, let’s call it Z, is known as a slippery slope. Many such arguments focus on catastrophe, but the slope to an extreme positive outcome can be just as slippery. The trouble with this kind of argument is that, in presenting Z is the inevitable outcome of A, it almost always overstates the likelihood that Z will happen if A happens. Why? Allow me to trouble you with some math.
別擔心,也許我有能力讓你們全裸, 但我保證不會這麼做。 回到剛才說的,這種論點斷定了 一個步驟,姑且稱為 A, 帶出一連串的事件, 最後無可避免地 結束在一個極端的情境, 姑且稱之為 Z, 這種論點被稱為「滑坡謬誤」。 許多這類的論點 都把焦點放在大災難上, 但導向極端正向結果的斜坡 也可能一樣滑。 這類論點的問題在於, 它幾乎都會過度誇大 A 發生之後 Z 發生的機率, 好像 A 必然會導致 Z。 為什麼? 容我用些數學來煩你。
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that, taken individually, each step between A and Z is independent from the others and very likely— 99%. So the probability that A causes B, that B causes C, that C causes D, and so on, is each 99%. Even so, each additional step adds an opportunity to alter the outcome, and A is only 78% likely to lead to Z— far from an inevitability. If there’s a 95% likelihood of each step, the chance that A leads to Z plummets to about 28%. If there’s a 90% likelihood at each step— still very likely by most standards— the chance that A leads to Z is only 7%. And if 24 of the 25 steps between A and Z are 99% likely, and one is 50% likely, the chance that A leads to Z goes down from 78% to 39%.
為了方便說理,咱們就假設, A 和 Z 之間的每一個單獨的步驟 都是獨立的, 且都很可能發生—— 都是 99% 的機率。 所以,A 造成 B,B 造成 C, C 造成 D 等等, 機率分別都是 99%。 就算如此, 每前進一個步驟, 就會多一個改變結果的機會, 因此 A 會導致 Z 的可能性 只有 78%—— 離「必然」遠得很。 如果每個步驟發生的機率為 95%, A 會導致 Z 的機率 就暴跌到約 28%。 如果每個步驟發生的機率為 90% ——就大部分標準來說, 90% 仍然算「很可能」—— A 導致 Z 的機率 就只有 7%。 如果 A 到 Z 之間的 25 個步驟 有 24 個的發生機率為 99%, 剩下那一個的機率為 50%, 那麼 A 會導致 Z 的機率會再下降, 從 78% 變成 39%。
Back to your situation. I won’t deny you have reason to be concerned. You’re warily watching as powerful authoritarian communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China try to spread their form of governance. But let’s take a look at the chain of events you suggest: You say that the countries surrounding Vietnam would all soon fall under communist rule; that this would result in a loss of essential trade with these countries for others; that with no non-communist nations left to trade with, Japan would be pressured towards communism and that this, in turn, would threaten Australia and New Zealand. Your ultimate fear, if I may presume, is that this will in turn threaten the United States. Is this a possibility? Sure. Where I take issue is with your comparison to dominos. These complex real-world events are not, in fact, like dominoes, where when the first one falls, it becomes a certainty that the last will fall. For any one of these events, a number of possible outcomes could result, each affecting the other events in different ways. The possibilities are not a chain, they’re a web.
回到你的情況。 我不否認你的擔心其來有自。 你時時留意著 強大的蘇聯和中國共產主義政權 試圖散播他們的統治形態。 但,咱們來看看 你提到的一連串事件: 你說,越南周圍的國家 很快都會被共產主義統治; 這就會導致其他國家 失去和這些國家的重要貿易; 接下來因為沒有 非共產主義國家與之貿易, 日本會被迫走向共產主義, 那接著就會威脅到澳洲 和紐西蘭。 容我做個假設,你的終極恐懼, 就是接下來美國也會受到威脅。 有這種可能性嗎? 當然有。 我的異議是針對你用骨牌作的比喻。 其實這些真實世界的事件很複雜, 並不像骨牌—— 當第一塊骨牌倒下, 就可以肯定最後一塊也會倒下。 至於你說的這些事件, 每個都有數種可能的結果, 每個結果都會對其他事件 有不同的影響。 這些機率不是一個接著一個地串連, 而是一張網。
It’s 1975, and after 20 years of conflict, and several million lives lost, North Vietnamese forces have taken control of the capital of South Vietnam. The war is over, and all of Vietnam is under communist control. Communist regimes have come to power in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, where the regime will be responsible for the deaths of an estimated quarter of all Cambodians.
現在是 1975 年, 經過了 20 年的衝突 以及失去了數百萬條生命之後, 北越軍隊控制了南越的首都。 戰爭結束了, 整個越南都在共產黨的掌控之下。 鄰近的寮國和柬埔寨 也都受到共產政權統治, 估計共產政權造成了 四分之一柬埔寨人口的死亡。
Wait, there's more.
等等,後面還有。
That first step you were trying to avoid happened, but the end result you predicted did not. As for the steps between, a few happened; many did not. Decades afterward, your fellow humans are still debating why events unfolded the way they did.
你試圖避免的第一個 步驟還是發生了, 但你預測的最終結果並沒有發生。 至於中間的那些步驟, 有幾個發生了,許多沒有發生。 數十年之後,你的人類同胞還在辯論
And this is the trouble with slippery slope arguments. They focus exclusively on extreme outcomes, assigning those outcomes a degree of certainty or inevitability that rarely corresponds to reality. They divert attention from other, more likely possibilities, foreclosing discussions that might be more productive. And that’s when they’re made in good faith. Slippery slope arguments can also be intentionally structured to take advantage of people’s fears— whatever your position on an issue, it’s easy to come up with an extreme outcome that suits your aims. Best to avoid them entirely, eh?
事件為什麼是這樣發展的。 這就是「滑坡謬誤」論點的問題: 把焦點只放在最極端的結果上, 認定那些極端結果一定會發生 或無可避免, 但卻很少符合現實狀況。 他們把注意力從其他 更可能的結果轉移開來, 阻擋可能更有成效的討論。 且這還是意圖良善的情況呢。 滑坡謬誤的論述 也可能是蓄意設計的, 為的是利用人民的恐懼—— 不論你對某議題的立場為何, 都很容易找出一個 符合你目標的極端結果。 最好完全避開這種論述,對吧?