On the plains of the Serengeti, a dung beetle rolls his perfectly sculpted ball of dung away from competitors.
Na ravnicama Serengetija, balegar kotrlja svoju perfektno oblikovanu kuglicu izmeta što dalje od protivnika.
In this Canadian river, a beaver rushes to reinforce her dam as it threatens to burst.
U ovoj kanadskoj reci, dabar užurbano popravlja svoju branu kojoj preti raspadanje.
As the snowball thunders down the mountainside, gaining momentum, the arctic foxes run for cover—
Dok se grudva snega kotrlja niz planinu, dobijajući snagu, arktičke lisice traže zaklon -
I can't stand these nature programs. Always the same story, and not a rational actor in sight. What else is on?
Ne podnosim ove dokumentarce o prirodi. Uvek ista priča, bez ijedne racionalne misli na vidiku. Šta se još dešava?
It’s April 1954, and Vietnamese nationalists are on the verge of victory against French forces fighting for control of Vietnam. Their victory could lead to an independent Vietnam under communist leader Ho Chi Minh. The United States President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, is holding a press conference to comment on these developments.
April je 1954, i vijetnamski nacionalisti su na pragu pobede u ratu protiv francuske vojske za kontrolu Vijetnama. Njihova pobeda bi mogla dovesti do osnivanja nezavisnog Vijetnama pod komunističkim vođstvom Ho Ši Mina. Predsednik Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Dvajt D. Ajzenhauer održava konferenciju za novinare da bi prokomentarisao ove događaje.
Well, if you really must.
Pa, ako baš moraš.
Eisenhower claims that by virtue of what he calls the “falling domino principle,” communist control of Vietnam would be the “beginning of a disintegration” that would be certain to cause “incalculable loss.”
Ajzenhauer tvrdi da bi zbog principa koji on naziva ,,domino efekat” komunistička vlast u Vijetnamu bila „početak raspada” koji bi sigurno izazvao „neprocenjiv gubitak”.
The beetles and beavers may be beyond my reach, but surely here's someone I can reason with.
Balegari i dabrovi su možda van mog domašaja, ali ovde sigurno postoji neko koga mogu urazumiti.
Now, Mr. President, let’s take a deep breath, shall we? It’s a big leap—or, one might say, a long slide— from communist governance of Vietnam to the global spread of authoritarian communist regimes. It’s as if we were to say you were clothed, now you’re in your underwear, so soon everyone in the world will be completely naked.
Sada, gospodine predsedniče, hajde da udahnemo duboko, može? Veliki je to skok - ili bi možda mogli reći duga nizbrdica - od ostvarivanja komunističke vlasti u Vijetnamu do globalnog proširenja autoritativnog komunističkog režima. To bi bilo kao kao kada bismo rekli da ste vi bili obučeni, a sada ste u donjem vešu, i zbog toga će uskoro svi ljudi na svetu biti potpuno goli.
Don’t worry, I may have that power, but I promise not to use it. Now, as I was saying, this kind of argument, where one step, let’s call it A, kicks off a string of events that inevitably culminates in an extreme scenario, let’s call it Z, is known as a slippery slope. Many such arguments focus on catastrophe, but the slope to an extreme positive outcome can be just as slippery. The trouble with this kind of argument is that, in presenting Z is the inevitable outcome of A, it almost always overstates the likelihood that Z will happen if A happens. Why? Allow me to trouble you with some math.
Ne brinite, iako mogu to da ostvarim, obećavam da neću. Da se vratimo na temu, ovaj argument gde jedan korak, nazvaćemo ga A, započne lančanu reakciju koja na kraju neizbežno prouzrokuje ekstremnu posledicu, nazvaćemo je Z, poznat je pod nazivom klizava nizbrdica. Mnogi ovakvi argumenti se zavšavaju katastrofalno, ali nizbrdica do ekstremno pozitivnog ishoda može biti podjednako klizava. Problem sa ovim tipom argumenta je da, ako prikažemo Z kao neizbežnu posledicu A, gotovo uvek preuveličavamo verovatnoću da će se Z desiti, ako se A desi. Zašto? Dozvolite mi da vas malo smorim matematikom.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that, taken individually, each step between A and Z is independent from the others and very likely— 99%. So the probability that A causes B, that B causes C, that C causes D, and so on, is each 99%. Even so, each additional step adds an opportunity to alter the outcome, and A is only 78% likely to lead to Z— far from an inevitability. If there’s a 95% likelihood of each step, the chance that A leads to Z plummets to about 28%. If there’s a 90% likelihood at each step— still very likely by most standards— the chance that A leads to Z is only 7%. And if 24 of the 25 steps between A and Z are 99% likely, and one is 50% likely, the chance that A leads to Z goes down from 78% to 39%.
Hajde da pretpostavimo, u ime argumenta, da su svi individualni koraci između A i Z međusobno nezavisani i vrlo verovatni - 99%. Dakle, verovatnoća da A uzrokuje B, B uzrokuje C, C uzrokuje D i tako dalje, pojedinačno iznosi 99%. Uprkos tome, svaki dodatni korak povećava verovatnoću da se krajnji ishod izmeni, a u našem primeru, A dovodi do Z u svega 78% slučajeva - što nije toliko neizbežno. Ako je verovatnoća za svaki korak 95%, šansa da Z nastaje zbog A pada na oko 28%. Ako je verovatnoća za svaki korak 90%, što je i dalje veoma visok procenat - šansa da A dovodi do Z je svega 7%. A ako su 24 od 25 koraka između A i Z 99% verovatni, a jedan 50%, onda šansa da će A uzrokovati Z pada sa 78% na 39%.
Back to your situation. I won’t deny you have reason to be concerned. You’re warily watching as powerful authoritarian communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China try to spread their form of governance. But let’s take a look at the chain of events you suggest: You say that the countries surrounding Vietnam would all soon fall under communist rule; that this would result in a loss of essential trade with these countries for others; that with no non-communist nations left to trade with, Japan would be pressured towards communism and that this, in turn, would threaten Australia and New Zealand. Your ultimate fear, if I may presume, is that this will in turn threaten the United States. Is this a possibility? Sure. Where I take issue is with your comparison to dominos. These complex real-world events are not, in fact, like dominoes, where when the first one falls, it becomes a certainty that the last will fall. For any one of these events, a number of possible outcomes could result, each affecting the other events in different ways. The possibilities are not a chain, they’re a web.
Da se vratimo na tvoju situaciju. Neću poricati da imaš razlog da budeš zabrinut. Ti oprezno posmatraš kako moćni autorativni kominustički režimi u Sovjetskom Savezu i Kini pokušavaju da prošire svoj oblik vladavine. Međutim, hajde da sagledamo niz događaja koji te brinu: ti smatraš da će sve zemlje koje okružuju Vijetnam uskoro pasti pod komunističku vlast; to bi dovelo do prekida trgovine sa ovim državama u korist drugih; da neće ostati nijedna nekoministička zemlja za trgovinu, Japan bi bio pod pritiskom da prihvati komunizam, a to bi, zauzvrat, dovelo u opasnost Australiju i Novi Zeland. Ono što tebe zapravo najviše zabrinjava je kako će sve ovo ugroziti SAD. Da li je moguće da to toga dođe? Naravno. Ono što meni smeta je tvoje poređenje sa dominama. Ovi stvarni komplikovani događaji ne nalikuju, zapravo, dominama, kod kojih čim prva padne, sigurno je da će i poslednja pasti. Za bilo koji od ovih događaja postoji gomila drugih mogućih ishoda, gde svaki na jedinstven način utiče na druge događaje. Ove mogućnosti nisu lanac, one su mreža.
It’s 1975, and after 20 years of conflict, and several million lives lost, North Vietnamese forces have taken control of the capital of South Vietnam. The war is over, and all of Vietnam is under communist control. Communist regimes have come to power in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, where the regime will be responsible for the deaths of an estimated quarter of all Cambodians.
Godina je 1975, i posle 20 godina rata i nekoliko miliona izgubljenih života trupe Severnog Vijetnama su zaposele glavni grad Južnog Vijetnama. Rat je gotov, a ceo Vijetnam je pod kontrolom komunista. Komunistički režim se takođe proširio i na okolne zemlje, Laos i Kambodžu, gde će biti odgovoran za smrt oko četvrtine svih Kambodžana.
Wait, there's more.
Sačekaj, ima još.
That first step you were trying to avoid happened, but the end result you predicted did not. As for the steps between, a few happened; many did not. Decades afterward, your fellow humans are still debating why events unfolded the way they did.
Prvi korak koji si pokušao da izbegneš se desio, ali krajnji rezultat koji si predvideo nije. Što se tiče koraka između, neki su se dogodili, a mnogi nisu. Decenijama kasnije, ljudi i dalje raspravljaju oko toga zašto su se stvari desile onako kako jesu.
And this is the trouble with slippery slope arguments. They focus exclusively on extreme outcomes, assigning those outcomes a degree of certainty or inevitability that rarely corresponds to reality. They divert attention from other, more likely possibilities, foreclosing discussions that might be more productive. And that’s when they’re made in good faith. Slippery slope arguments can also be intentionally structured to take advantage of people’s fears— whatever your position on an issue, it’s easy to come up with an extreme outcome that suits your aims. Best to avoid them entirely, eh?
I ovo predstavlja problem klizavih nizbrdica. One se samo fokusiraju na ekstremne ishode, koje smatraju sigurnim ili neizbežnim, a to je retko slučaj u realnosti. One skreću pažnju sa drugih, mnogo verovatnijih ishoda, i prekidaju diskusiju koja bi mogla ispasti produktivna. A to je tako kada se konstruišu sa dobrim namerama. Argumenti tipa klizavih nizbrdica se takođe mogu namerno formulisati tako da iskorišćavaju ljudske strahove - bez obzira na tvoj stav u odnosu na problem, veoma je lako doći do ekstremnog ishoda koji ti odgovara. Najbolje bi bilo da ih u potpunosti zaobiđemo, zar ne?