What I'd like to do is talk to you a little bit about fear and the cost of fear and the age of fear from which we are now emerging. I would like you to feel comfortable with my doing that by letting you know that I know something about fear and anxiety. I'm a Jewish guy from New Jersey.
今天我想跟大家谈谈恐惧 以及恐惧的代价 还有我们(美国)从中兴起的 那个恐怖的年代。 在我演讲的过程中, 我并不想让大家感觉不适 因此我想告诉大家,关于恐惧和焦虑 我是有发言权的。 因为我是一个来自新泽西州的犹太人。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
I could worry before I could walk.
我在会走路之前就已经学会了担忧。
(Laughter)
(笑声)
Please, applaud that.
请给点掌声吧。
(Applause)
(掌声)
Thank you.
谢谢大家。
But I also grew up in a time where there was something to fear. We were brought out in the hall when I was a little kid and taught how to put our coats over our heads to protect us from global thermonuclear war. Now even my seven-year-old brain knew that wasn't going to work. But I also knew that global thermonuclear war was something to be concerned with.
我成长于一个充满恐怖的时代。 在我小的时候,我曾被带到一个大厅 有人教我如何将外套套在头上 以保护我们躲过全球核战争的打击。 当然,尽管我当时只有七岁, 也知道那并没什么用。 但我也知道 全球核战争并不是无稽之谈。
And yet, despite the fact that we lived for 50 years with the threat of such a war, the response of our government and of our society was to do wonderful things. We created the space program in response to that. We built our highway system in response to that. We created the Internet in response to that. So sometimes fear can produce a constructive response. But sometimes it can produce an un-constructive response.
尽管在核战阴云下,我们生活了 长达50年, 但我们的政府和社会为了应对核战威胁 却做了不少好事。 我们发展了太空技术。 修建了高速公路。 发明了互联网。 因此,恐惧有时候能激发正能量。 但有时候也会带来负面影响。
On September 11, 2001, 19 guys took over four airplanes and flew them into a couple of buildings. They exacted a horrible toll. It is not for us to minimize what that toll was. But the response that we had was clearly disproportionate -- disproportionate to the point of verging on the unhinged. We rearranged the national security apparatus of the United States and of many governments to address a threat that, at the time that those attacks took place, was quite limited. In fact, according to our intelligence services, on September 11, 2001, there were 100 members of core Al-Qaeda. There were just a few thousand terrorists. They posed an existential threat to no one.
2001年9月11日, 19个人劫持了4架飞机 撞击了几幢大楼。 他们付出了可怕的代价。 我们并不是要把这代价降到最低。 但我们做出的回应显然是过激了—— 过激到近乎疯狂的地步。 我们重组了美国的国家安全机构, 其他许多政府也同样做了, 目的是针对恐怖袭击发生时, 可能存在的威胁 而实际上这种威胁很有限。 事实上,根据情报部门的数据, 在2001年9月11日, “基地组织”的核心成员有100人。 恐怖分子也才数千人。 他们对任何人的威胁, 远未到生死存亡 的程度。
But we rearranged our entire national security apparatus in the most sweeping way since the end of the Second World War. We launched two wars. We spent trillions of dollars. We suspended our values. We violated international law. We embraced torture. We embraced the idea that if these 19 guys could do this, anybody could do it. And therefore, for the first time in history, we were seeing everybody as a threat. And what was the result of that? Surveillance programs that listened in on the emails and phone calls of entire countries -- hundreds of millions of people -- setting aside whether those countries were our allies, setting aside what our interests were. I would argue that 15 years later, since today there are more terrorists, more terrorist attacks, more terrorist casualties -- this by the count of the U.S. State Department -- since today the region from which those attacks emanate is more unstable than at any time in its history, since the Flood, perhaps, we have not succeeded in our response.
但我们却重组了我们整个国家安全机构, 是二战以来规模最大、程度最深的一次。 我们发动了两场战争。 花费了数万亿美元。 丢弃了我们的价值观。 违反了国际法。 我们滥用私刑。 我们坚信 如果这19个人能犯下如此罪行, 那么任何人都可能。 因此,史无前例的, 我们将任何人都视作威胁。 结果怎么样呢? 我们监控电子邮件和电话 针对所有国家, 针对数以亿计的人, 无论这些国家是不是我们的盟友, 也无论这么做是不是符合我们的利益。 我认为,15年过去了, 恐怖分子反倒越来越多, 恐怖袭击越来越多, 造成的伤亡越来越大, ——这是美国国务院统计的结果—— 恐怖袭击的发源地区 处于有史以来最不稳定的时期, 即便从大洪水时代开始算起, 我们此次的应对并不成功。
Now you have to ask, where did we go wrong? What did we do? What was the mistake that was made? And you might say, well look, Washington is a dysfunctional place. There are political food fights. We've turned our discourse into a cage match. And that's true. But there are bigger problems, believe it or not, than that dysfunction, even though I would argue that dysfunction that makes it impossible to get anything done in the richest and most powerful country in the world is far more dangerous than anything that a group like ISIS could do, because it stops us in our tracks and it keeps us from progress.
你肯定会问,那我们错在哪里? 我们做错了什么? 具体犯了哪些错误? 也许你会说,你看, 华盛顿正在失去话语权。 充斥着政治斗争。 我们的竞选辩论成为了笼中摔跤赛。 的确如此。 无论你信不信, 还有比华盛顿失权更严重的问题, 尽管我坚信, 这种失权会导致我们 这个世界上最富裕最强大的国家 无法做成任何事情, 而这种危害比“伊拉克和沙姆伊斯兰国” 这种组织造成的危害要大得多, 因为它会让我们偏离轨道, 阻止我们进步。
But there are other problems. And the other problems came from the fact that in Washington and in many capitals right now, we're in a creativity crisis. In Washington, in think tanks, where people are supposed to be thinking of new ideas, you don't get bold new ideas, because if you offer up a bold new idea, not only are you attacked on Twitter, but you will not get confirmed in a government job. Because we are reactive to the heightened venom of the political debate, you get governments that have an us-versus-them mentality, tiny groups of people making decisions. When you sit in a room with a small group of people making decisions, what do you get? You get groupthink. Everybody has the same worldview, and any view from outside of the group is seen as a threat. That's a danger. You also have processes that become reactive to news cycles. And so the parts of the U.S. government that do foresight, that look forward, that do strategy -- the parts in other governments that do this -- can't do it, because they're reacting to the news cycle. And so we're not looking ahead.
然而还有其他问题存在。 这些问题 来源于一个事实,无论是在华盛顿, 还是其他国家的首都, 我们都遭遇到了创新危机。 华盛顿,智库, 本该是大家提出新想法的地方, 然而没有人这么做, 因为一旦你提出个什么新想法, 不但会在推特上被骂得体无完肤, 甚至都没法再在政府部门混下去了。 因为我们受竞选政治毒害颇深, 政府部门里派别对立严重, 而做决定的是一小群人。 当你和一小撮人一起做决策的时候, 会发生什么? 你会陷入“团体迷思”的怪圈。 (这个小团体中)每个人的世界观都一样, 任何来自这个小圈子之外的 观点都会被视为威胁。 这很危险。 你也会有一个对新的想法和环境反应的一个过程。 因此美国政府中那些需要 做预测,需要向前看的部门, 战略部门—— 包括其他国家政府中 有这项职能的部门 — 不能如此行事, 因为一旦他们开始进入新循环。 我们也就无法向前看了。
On 9/11, we had a crisis because we were looking the wrong way. Today we have a crisis because, because of 9/11, we are still looking in the wrong direction, and we know because we see transformational trends on the horizon that are far more important than what we saw on 9/11; far more important than the threat posed by these terrorists; far more important even than the instability that we've got in some areas of the world that are racked by instability today. In fact, the things that we are seeing in those parts of the world may be symptoms. They may be a reaction to bigger trends. And if we are treating the symptom and ignoring the bigger trend, then we've got far bigger problems to deal with.
在“911”事件时,我们经历了危机, 因为我们思考的方向有误。 而今天我们经历的危机, 正是因为在“911”时, 我们的思考方向不对, 我们之所以这样认为 是因为我们看到了新的转型趋势 而这比我在“911”时看到的更为重要; 比恐怖分子制造的威胁更为重要; 甚至比世界上一些地区的不稳定更为重要, 尽管这些地区动荡不安,饱受摧残。 事实上,发生在这些地区的事件 只是表象。 背后可能还隐藏着更大的问题。 如果我们只是治标不治本, 我们麻烦只会越来越大。
And so what are those trends? Well, to a group like you, the trends are apparent. We are living at a moment in which the very fabric of human society is being rewoven. If you saw the cover of The Economist a couple of days ago -- it said that 80 percent of the people on the planet, by the year 2020, would have a smartphone. They would have a small computer connected to the Internet in their pocket. In most of Africa, the cell phone penetration rate is 80 percent. We passed the point last October when there were more mobile cellular devices, SIM cards, out in the world than there were people. We are within years of a profound moment in our history, when effectively every single human being on the planet is going to be part of a man-made system for the first time, able to touch anyone else -- touch them for good, touch them for ill. And the changes associated with that are changing the very nature of every aspect of governance and life on the planet in ways that our leaders ought to be thinking about, when they're thinking about these immediate threats.
那问题的根源究竟是什么? 当然,对于你们而言, 问题显而易见。 我们生活在一个全新的时代, 人类社会基础发生了 翻天覆地的变化。 如果你还记得几天前出版的 《经济学人》的封面—— 说,到2020年,地球上80%的人 将拥有智能手机。 人人口袋里将有一部 连接互联网的小型计算机。 在非洲大部分地区, 手机的普及率为80%。 去年10月,我们跨过了一个临界点, 世界上的手机,SIM卡的数量 超过了人类的数量。 我们正在经历人类历史中 非常重要的一段时期, 那就是地球上的每一个人类, 破天荒第一次,能够成为 一个人造系统的一部分, 有能力能联系上任何一个人—— 无论这种联系是好是坏。 随之而来的变化改变了 统治阶级和老百姓生活的方方面面。 领导者们不得不考虑, 这会不会成为一种直接威胁。
On the security side, we've come out of a Cold War in which it was too costly to fight a nuclear war, and so we didn't, to a period that I call Cool War, cyber war, where the costs of conflict are actually so low, that we may never stop. We may enter a period of constant warfare, and we know this because we've been in it for several years. And yet, we don't have the basic doctrines to guide us in this regard. We don't have the basic ideas formulated. If someone attacks us with a cyber attack, do have the ability to respond with a kinetic attack? We don't know. If somebody launches a cyber attack, how do we deter them? When China launched a series of cyber attacks, what did the U.S. government do? It said, we're going to indict a few of these Chinese guys, who are never coming to America. They're never going to be anywhere near a law enforcement officer who's going to take them into custody. It's a gesture -- it's not a deterrent.
从安全角度来看, 我们躲过了冷战, 因为核战争成本太高, 但我们没法躲过 我称之为“次冷战”,网络战, 发动它们的成本很低, 我们肯定会一直这么干下去。 我们可能会进入一段连续作战的时期, 我们之所以这么肯定, 因为我们已经开始好多年了。 然而,我们缺乏基本的理论引导, 没有成型的战法可以参考。 如果我们遭受网络攻击, 我们有能力进行反击吗? 谁也不知道。 如果有人发起网络攻击, 我们如何阻止? 当中国发起一系列网络攻击时, 美国政府是怎么应对的? 据说,我们会起诉这几个中国人, 而这些人永远不会来美国。 他们才不会跑到美国警察局 来束手就擒呢。 (起诉)只是一种形式,并不是威慑。
Special forces operators out there in the field today discover that small groups of insurgents with cell phones have access to satellite imagery that once only superpowers had. In fact, if you've got a cell phone, you've got access to power that a superpower didn't have, and would have highly classified 10 years ago. In my cell phone, I have an app that tells me where every plane in the world is, and its altitude, and its speed, and what kind of aircraft it is, and where it's going and where it's landing. They have apps that allow them to know what their adversary is about to do. They're using these tools in new ways. When a cafe in Sydney was taken over by a terrorist, he went in with a rifle... and an iPad. And the weapon was the iPad. Because he captured people, he terrorized them, he pointed the iPad at them, and then he took the video and he put it on the Internet, and he took over the world's media.
今天在外执勤的特种部队队员 发现一小群叛乱分子 用手机获取了卫星图像, 这些图像曾经只掌握在超级大国手中。 实际上,只要你手机在手, 你就拥有了超级大国都不曾拥有的力量, 掌握那些在十年前还属于高度机密的信息。 我的手机有一个程序, 能显示地球上每一架飞机的位置、航向、速度 飞机的型号, 目的地是哪里,将在哪里降落。 他们(恐怖分子)只要安装了程序, 就能知道自己的对手下一步的行动。 他们(恐怖分子)找到了 使用这些工具的新方法。 一名恐怖分子占领了悉尼的一家咖啡馆, 带着一支步枪 和一个iPad。 而iPad才是武器。 因为他挟持人质,恐吓他们, 将iPad对准他们, 录下视频并传到网上, 从而攻陷了全世界的媒体。
But it doesn't just affect the security side. The relations between great powers -- we thought we were past the bipolar era. We thought we were in a unipolar world, where all the big issues were resolved. Remember? It was the end of history. But we're not. We're now seeing that our basic assumptions about the Internet -- that it was going to connect us, weave society together -- are not necessarily true. In countries like China, you have the Great Firewall of China. You've got countries saying no, if the Internet happens within our borders we control it within our borders. We control the content. We are going to control our security. We are going to manage that Internet. We are going to say what can be on it. We're going to set a different set of rules. Now you might think, well, that's just China. But it's not just China. It's China, India, Russia. It's Saudi Arabia, it's Singapore, it's Brazil. After the NSA scandal, the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Brazilians, they said, let's create a new Internet backbone, because we can't be dependent on this other one. And so all of a sudden, what do you have? You have a new bipolar world in which cyber-internationalism, our belief, is challenged by cyber-nationalism, another belief.
然而这不仅仅对安全产生了影响。 (也影响了)大国间的关系—— 我们本以为两极世界已经结束。 我们本以为我们进入了单极世界, 所有大问题都已经解决了。 还记得吗?那段历史已经结束。 然而并非如此。 我们现在对于网络的基本假设-- 它可以和整个社会和我们连结在一起-- 已经不见的是对的了。 像中国这种国家,他们拥有《长城防火墙》。 你会看到一些国家,说我们不允许各种网络 在国界里肆意妄为。 我们要在国界内对其加以控制。 我们要控制它的内容。 我们要保证我们的安全。 我们要管好网络。 我们要决定我们自己扮演的是什么角色。 我们要设定一些不同的规则。 现在你可能在想,嗯,那只是中国。 其实不止是中国。 中国,印度,俄罗斯, 沙特阿拉伯,新加坡,巴西。 在国家安全局的丑闻后, 俄罗斯人,中国人,印度人,巴西人, 他们都说要创造自己的网络构架, 因为不能再信任别人的系统。 所以一瞬间,你还有些什么? 你有一个新的强权对立的世界, 在这种网络国际主义的环境下, 我们的信念, 受到网络民族主义的挑战。 另一种信念。
We are seeing these changes everywhere we look. We are seeing the advent of mobile money. It's happening in the places you wouldn't expect. It's happening in Kenya and Tanzania, where millions of people who haven't had access to financial services now conduct all those services on their phones. There are 2.5 million people who don't have financial service access that are going to get it soon. A billion of them are going to have the ability to access it on their cell phone soon. It's not just going to give them the ability to bank. It's going to change what monetary policy is. It's going to change what money is. Education is changing in the same way. Healthcare is changing in the same way. How government services are delivered is changing in the same way.
我们到处都可以看到这些改变。 我们看到可流动货币出现 在你想不到的地方。 它发生在肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚。 那里有上百万人 没有机会使用金融服务, 现在却可以在他们手机上享受这些服务。 所以2500万无法使用金融服务的人, 很快都能用上了。 有十亿人很快的将得以透过手机 获得这个服务。 这不只让他们可以开户存款, 已将改变货币政策, 和货币本身。 教育也在以同样的方式改变着。 医疗也是。 政府服务也在改变着。
And yet, in Washington, we are debating whether to call the terrorist group that has taken over Syria and Iraq ISIS or ISIL or Islamic State. We are trying to determine how much we want to give in a negotiation with the Iranians on a nuclear deal which deals with the technologies of 50 years ago, when in fact, we know that the Iranians right now are engaged in cyber war with us and we're ignoring it, partially because businesses are not willing to talk about the attacks that are being waged on them.
但是在华盛顿,我们还在争论 要称呼控制叙利亚和伊拉克的恐怖组织 ISIS还是ISIL还是伊斯兰国。 我们还在试着决定 在和伊朗的核能交易谈判中 针对这项五十年前的技术到底要付多少。 就在我们知道伊朗人事实上 正忙着和我们进行网络战的时候。 我们忽略了这个, 一部分原因是商界不希望 去谈论它们所受到的影响。
And that gets us to another breakdown that's crucial, and another breakdown that couldn't be more important to a group like this, because the growth of America and real American national security and all of the things that drove progress even during the Cold War, was a public-private partnership between science, technology and government that began when Thomas Jefferson sat alone in his laboratory inventing new things. But it was the canals and railroads and telegraph; it was radar and the Internet. It was Tang, the breakfast drink -- probably not the most important of those developments. But what you had was a partnership and a dialogue, and the dialogue has broken down. It's broken down because in Washington, less government is considered more. It's broken down because there is, believe it or not, in Washington, a war on science -- despite the fact that in all of human history, every time anyone has waged a war on science, science has won.
而这为我们带来了另一次分离崩解, 这是决定性的, 对我们这样的群体而言, 没有比这个更重要的事情, 因为美国的发展以及真正的国家安全 以及能让我们在冷战中得以进步的东西, 就是在科学,科技和政治之间, 政府和民间的合作, 是由坐在实验室的 独自发明着东西的托马斯杰斐逊开始。 是运河,铁路,电报; 是雷达和网络。 是果珍--那种早餐饮料-- 可能不是最重要的项目。 但我们曾有的合作和对话, 现在已经瓦解。 因为在华盛顿, 人们认为政府介入越少越好, 因为,不管你信不信 在华盛顿,竟然还有人和科学宣战-- 尽管事实上在所有人类历史中, 若有任何人向科学宣战, 科学都会获得最后的胜利。
(Applause)
(掌声)
But we have a government that doesn't want to listen, that doesn't have people at the highest levels that understand this. In the nuclear age, when there were people in senior national security jobs, they were expected to speak throw-weight. They were expected to know the lingo, the vocabulary. If you went to the highest level of the U.S. government now and said, "Talk to me about cyber, about neuroscience, about the things that are going to change the world of tomorrow," you'd get a blank stare. I know, because when I wrote this book, I talked to 150 people, many from the science and tech side, who felt like they were being shunted off to the kids' table. Meanwhile, on the tech side, we have lots of wonderful people creating wonderful things, but they started in garages and they didn't need the government and they don't want the government. Many of them have a political view that's somewhere between libertarian and anarchic: leave me alone.
但是我们有个不愿意倾听的政府, 不愿意让最高层的人, 去了解这些。 在核武器时代, 那些在国家安全部门任职的人们, 被期待去谈论导弹负荷。 大家期待他们能够用听不懂的行话。 现在如果你到美国政府最高层 和他们说“跟我谈谈网络, 跟我谈谈神经学 谈谈即将改变未来世界的事情。” 你会得到一个白眼。 我之所以知道这个, 因为我写这本书的时候, 我曾和来自各类科学领域 的150名专家对谈, 他们都觉得自己被分配到儿童桌。 与此同时,在科技领域, 很多很棒的人在制作很棒的东西, 但是他们是从车库开始的-不需要政府, 他们不想要政府。 很多人有一个政治思想, 在自由派和无政府派之间: 别打扰我。
But the world's coming apart. All of a sudden, there are going to be massive regulatory changes and massive issues associated with conflict and massive issues associated with security and privacy. And we haven't even gotten to the next set of issues, which are philosophical issues. If you can't vote, if you can't have a job, if you can't bank, if you can't get health care, if you can't be educated without Internet access, is Internet access a fundamental right that should be written into constitutions? If Internet access is a fundamental right, is electricity access for the 1.2 billion who don't have access to electricity a fundamental right? These are fundamental issues. Where are the philosophers? Where's the dialogue?
但是世界正在崩溃。 突然之间,即将会有很大范围的管理改变 巨大的冲突、 巨大的安全与隐私隐患。 我们甚至还没提到下一个问题: 哲学问题。 如果你在没有网络的情况下 不能投票,工作,做金融,用医保, 接受教育, 那么网络连接 不应该被写进宪法的基本权利吗? 如果网络是权力, 那么对于1.2亿没有电用的人口来说, 电力供应是个基本权利吗? 这些都是基础问题。哲学家在哪里? 对话在哪里?
And that brings me to the reason that I'm here. I live in Washington. Pity me.
这些是我今天来的原因, 我住在华盛顿,可怜可怜我吧。
(Laughter)
(笑)
The dialogue isn't happening there. These big issues that will change the world, change national security, change economics, create hope, create threats, can only be resolved when you bring together groups of people who understand science and technology back together with government. Both sides need each other. And until we recreate that connection, until we do what helped America grow and helped other countries grow, then we are going to grow ever more vulnerable. The risks associated with 9/11 will not be measured in terms of lives lost by terror attacks or buildings destroyed or trillions of dollars spent. They'll be measured in terms of the costs of our distraction from critical issues and our inability to get together scientists, technologists, government leaders, at a moment of transformation akin to the beginning of the Renaissance, akin to the beginning of the major transformational eras that have happened on Earth, and start coming up with, if not the right answers, then at least the right questions.
在那里并没有对话发生。 这些会改变世界, 改变国家安全,经济, 创造机会,制造威胁的重大议题, 只有在你将懂科学,科技 的群体聚集在一起 恢复和政府的合作时, 才能解决。 互相需要。 唯有在我们重新建立联系, 做一些可以帮助美国 和其他国家成长的事情后, 我们才不会越来越脆弱。 911所带来的风险 不会被以伤亡而衡量 或者被摧毁的大楼 或者几亿的资产损失。 而是被以让我们从重要事务上分心 所造成的代价而衡量。 以及无法聚集起来 科学家,科技学家和政府领导人-- 在这样的转变下, 类似于文艺复兴的开端的时刻, 类似于地球上许多 重要事情的开端。 我们要有一些答案, 如果不是正确的答案, 或者至少想到正确的问题。
We are not there yet, but discussions like this and groups like you are the places where those questions can be formulated and posed. And that's why I believe that groups like TED, discussions like this around the planet, are the place where the future of foreign policy, of economic policy, of social policy, of philosophy, will ultimately take place. And that's why it's been a pleasure speaking to you.
我们还没有做到这点, 但是像这样的讨论,这样的观众, 是这些问题得以被提及的地方。 这就是为什么我相信像TED演讲的地方, 地球上类似这样进行讨论的场合, 是外交政策,经济政策, 社会政策,哲学思想的未来。 这就是为什么和你们交流这么愉快。
Thank you very, very much.
非常,非常感谢。
(Applause)
(掌声)