What I'd like to do is talk to you a little bit about fear and the cost of fear and the age of fear from which we are now emerging. I would like you to feel comfortable with my doing that by letting you know that I know something about fear and anxiety. I'm a Jewish guy from New Jersey.
Želeo bih da vam govorim na kratko o strahu i ceni straha i o dobu straha iz koga trenutno izranjamo. Želim da se osećate ugodno dok ja to činim tako što ću vas obavestiti da znam ponešto o strahu i nespokoju. Ja sam Jevrej iz Nju Džerzija.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
I could worry before I could walk.
Bio sam zabrinut pre nego što sam prohodao.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
Please, applaud that.
Izvolite, aplaudirajte tome.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)
Thank you.
Hvala vam.
But I also grew up in a time where there was something to fear. We were brought out in the hall when I was a little kid and taught how to put our coats over our heads to protect us from global thermonuclear war. Now even my seven-year-old brain knew that wasn't going to work. But I also knew that global thermonuclear war was something to be concerned with.
Ali sam takođe odrastao u vremenu u kome je bilo razloga za strah. Kada sam bio maleno dete, izveli su nas u hodnik i učili nas kako da stavljamo kapute preko glave kako bismo se zaštitili od globalnog termonuklearnog rata. E sad, čak i moj mozak sedmogodišnjaka je znao da to neće da funkcioniše. Ali sam takođe znao da je globalni termonuklearni rat nešto zbog čega valja biti zabrinut.
And yet, despite the fact that we lived for 50 years with the threat of such a war, the response of our government and of our society was to do wonderful things. We created the space program in response to that. We built our highway system in response to that. We created the Internet in response to that. So sometimes fear can produce a constructive response. But sometimes it can produce an un-constructive response.
Pa ipak, uprkos činjenici da smo živeli 50 godina s pretnjom od takvog rata, odgovor naše vlade i našeg društva je bio u vidu neverovatnih podviga. Stvorili smo svemirski program kao odgovor na to. Sagradili smo sistem auto-puteva kao odgovor na to. Stvorili smo internet kao odgovor na to. Dakle, strah ponekad može da izazove konstruktivan odgovor. Ali ponekad može da izazove nekonstruktivan odgovor.
On September 11, 2001, 19 guys took over four airplanes and flew them into a couple of buildings. They exacted a horrible toll. It is not for us to minimize what that toll was. But the response that we had was clearly disproportionate -- disproportionate to the point of verging on the unhinged. We rearranged the national security apparatus of the United States and of many governments to address a threat that, at the time that those attacks took place, was quite limited. In fact, according to our intelligence services, on September 11, 2001, there were 100 members of core Al-Qaeda. There were just a few thousand terrorists. They posed an existential threat to no one.
11. septembra 2001, 19 momaka je preuzelo četiri naša aviona i s njima su uleteli u nekoliko zgrada. Iznudili su užasan danak. Nije na nama da umanjujemo njegov značaj. Ali naš odgovor je bio očigledno neproporcionalan - neproporcionalan do tačke koja se graniči s ludilom. Preuredili smo aparaturu državne bezbednosti SAD-a i mnogih ministarstava kako bismo se bavili pretnjom koja je u vreme tih napada bila prilično ograničena. Zapravo, prema našim službama bezbednosti, 11. septembra 2001. imali smo 100 članova matične Al-Kaide. Bilo je samo nekoliko hiljada terorista. Nisu predstavljali egzistencijalnu opasnost bilo kome.
But we rearranged our entire national security apparatus in the most sweeping way since the end of the Second World War. We launched two wars. We spent trillions of dollars. We suspended our values. We violated international law. We embraced torture. We embraced the idea that if these 19 guys could do this, anybody could do it. And therefore, for the first time in history, we were seeing everybody as a threat. And what was the result of that? Surveillance programs that listened in on the emails and phone calls of entire countries -- hundreds of millions of people -- setting aside whether those countries were our allies, setting aside what our interests were. I would argue that 15 years later, since today there are more terrorists, more terrorist attacks, more terrorist casualties -- this by the count of the U.S. State Department -- since today the region from which those attacks emanate is more unstable than at any time in its history, since the Flood, perhaps, we have not succeeded in our response.
Ali mi smo preuredili našu celokupnu aparaturu državne bezbednosti na najtemeljniji mogući način od završetka Drugog svetskog rata. Pokrenuli smo dva rata. Potrošili trilione dolara. Suspendovali smo naše vrednosti. Prekršili međunarodni zakon. Prigrlili mučenje. Prigrlili pretpostavku da, ako je ovih 19 momaka moglo da uradi to, može svako. I shodno tome, prvi put u istoriji na svakoga smo gledali kao na pretnju. A koji su rezultati toga? Programi za nadzor koji su prisluškivali mejlove i telefonske pozive čitavih država - stotina miliona ljudi - zanemarujući to da li su te države bile naši saveznici, zanemarujući naše interese. Tvrdio bih da 15 godina kasnije, pošto danas imamo više terorista, više terorističkih napada, više žrtava terorizma - prema informacijama američkog Stejt departmenta - pošto je danas region iz koga ti napadi potiču nestabilniji nego ikad u istoriji, od potopa, možda, naš odgovor je bio neuspešan.
Now you have to ask, where did we go wrong? What did we do? What was the mistake that was made? And you might say, well look, Washington is a dysfunctional place. There are political food fights. We've turned our discourse into a cage match. And that's true. But there are bigger problems, believe it or not, than that dysfunction, even though I would argue that dysfunction that makes it impossible to get anything done in the richest and most powerful country in the world is far more dangerous than anything that a group like ISIS could do, because it stops us in our tracks and it keeps us from progress.
Morate da se zapitate gde smo pogrešili? Šta smo uradili? Koju smo grešku počinili? I možda ćete reći, pazite, Vašington je nefunkcionalno mesto. Imamo politička prepucavanja. Pretvorili smo naš diskurs u obračune u kavezu. To je istina. Ali imamo veće probleme, verovali ili ne, od te nefunkcionalnosti, iako bih tvrdio da je ta nefunkcionalnost, zbog koje je nemoguće postići bilo šta, u najbogatijoj i najmoćnijoj državi na svetu daleko opasnija od bilo čega što grupe, poput ISIS-a mogu da urade jer nas to zakopava u mestu i sprečava naš napredak.
But there are other problems. And the other problems came from the fact that in Washington and in many capitals right now, we're in a creativity crisis. In Washington, in think tanks, where people are supposed to be thinking of new ideas, you don't get bold new ideas, because if you offer up a bold new idea, not only are you attacked on Twitter, but you will not get confirmed in a government job. Because we are reactive to the heightened venom of the political debate, you get governments that have an us-versus-them mentality, tiny groups of people making decisions. When you sit in a room with a small group of people making decisions, what do you get? You get groupthink. Everybody has the same worldview, and any view from outside of the group is seen as a threat. That's a danger. You also have processes that become reactive to news cycles. And so the parts of the U.S. government that do foresight, that look forward, that do strategy -- the parts in other governments that do this -- can't do it, because they're reacting to the news cycle. And so we're not looking ahead.
Ali imamo i druge probleme. A drugi problemi proizilaze iz činjenice da u Vašingtonu i mnogim glavnim gradovima trenutno imamo krizu kreativnosti. U Vašingtonu, u sektorima za inovacije, gde bi ljudi trebalo da dolaze do novih ideja, nemate odvažne nove ideje jer ako ponudite odvažnu novu ideju, ne samo da vas napadaju na Tviteru, već vam neće poveriti državni posao. Jer reagujemo na naglašeni otrov političkih debata, imate vlade koje imaju mi-protiv-njih mentalitet, malene grupe ljudi koje donose odluke. Kada sedite u prostoriji s malom grupom ljudi koji donose odluke, šta dobijate? Dobijate grupno razmišljanje. Svi imaju isti pogled na svet i svaki pogled van grupe se posmatra kao pretnja. To je opasno. Takođe imate procese koji su reakcija na cikluse vesti. Pa tako delovi američke vlade koji se bave predviđanjima, koji gledaju napred, koji prave strategije - delovi drugih vlada koji se bave ovim - ne mogu to da rade jer reaguju na vesti. Pa tako mi ne gledamo napred.
On 9/11, we had a crisis because we were looking the wrong way. Today we have a crisis because, because of 9/11, we are still looking in the wrong direction, and we know because we see transformational trends on the horizon that are far more important than what we saw on 9/11; far more important than the threat posed by these terrorists; far more important even than the instability that we've got in some areas of the world that are racked by instability today. In fact, the things that we are seeing in those parts of the world may be symptoms. They may be a reaction to bigger trends. And if we are treating the symptom and ignoring the bigger trend, then we've got far bigger problems to deal with.
11. septembra smo imali krizu jer smo gledali u pogrešnom smeru. Danas imamo krizu jer zbog 11. septembra i dalje gledamo u pogrešnom smeru, a znamo to jer vidimo trendove preobražaja na horizontu koji su daleko važniji od onoga što smo videli 11. septembra; daleko važniji od pretnje koju predstavljaju teroristi; daleko važnije čak i od nestabilnosti koju imamo u nekim delovima sveta koje ovih dana potresa nestabilnost. Zapravo, ono što viđamo u tim delovima sveta su možda simptomi. Možda su reakcije na veće trendove. A ako tretiramo simptom, ignorišući širi trend, onda imamo daleko veće probleme sa kojima se suočavamo.
And so what are those trends? Well, to a group like you, the trends are apparent. We are living at a moment in which the very fabric of human society is being rewoven. If you saw the cover of The Economist a couple of days ago -- it said that 80 percent of the people on the planet, by the year 2020, would have a smartphone. They would have a small computer connected to the Internet in their pocket. In most of Africa, the cell phone penetration rate is 80 percent. We passed the point last October when there were more mobile cellular devices, SIM cards, out in the world than there were people. We are within years of a profound moment in our history, when effectively every single human being on the planet is going to be part of a man-made system for the first time, able to touch anyone else -- touch them for good, touch them for ill. And the changes associated with that are changing the very nature of every aspect of governance and life on the planet in ways that our leaders ought to be thinking about, when they're thinking about these immediate threats.
Pa koji su to trendovi? Pa, za grupe, poput vas, trendovi su očigledni. Živimo u momentu u kom se samo tkanje ljudskog društva nanovo tka. Ako ste videli naslovnu stranu "Ekonomista" od pre nekoliko dana - kažu da će 80% ljudi na planeti do 2020. godine imati pametni telefon. Imaće maleni kompjuter povezan na internet u svom džepu. U većem delu Afrike stopa prodora mobilne tehnologije je 80%. Prošlog oktobra smo prešli tačku kada smo imali u svetu više mobilnih telefona, SIM kartica, nego što imamo ljudi. Godine nas dele od ključnog momenta u našoj istoriji kada će praktično svako ljudsko biće na planeti prvi put da bude deo veštački napravljenog sistema koji je u stanju da dotakne bilo koga - da ga dotakne na dobar ili loš način. A promene koje idu uz to menjaju samu prirodu svakog aspekta našeg upravljanja i života na planeti na načine na koje bi naše vođe trebalo da razmišljaju, kada misle na sve te trenutne pretnje.
On the security side, we've come out of a Cold War in which it was too costly to fight a nuclear war, and so we didn't, to a period that I call Cool War, cyber war, where the costs of conflict are actually so low, that we may never stop. We may enter a period of constant warfare, and we know this because we've been in it for several years. And yet, we don't have the basic doctrines to guide us in this regard. We don't have the basic ideas formulated. If someone attacks us with a cyber attack, do have the ability to respond with a kinetic attack? We don't know. If somebody launches a cyber attack, how do we deter them? When China launched a series of cyber attacks, what did the U.S. government do? It said, we're going to indict a few of these Chinese guys, who are never coming to America. They're never going to be anywhere near a law enforcement officer who's going to take them into custody. It's a gesture -- it's not a deterrent.
Kada je bezbednost u pitanju, izašli smo iz Hladnog rata u kome je bilo suviše skupo boriti se u nuklearnom ratu, pa i nismo u period, koji ja zovem Rashlađenim ratom, sajber ratom, gde je cena konflikata zapravo toliko niska da možda nikada nećemo stati. Možda uđemo u period stalnog ratovanja, a znamo to jer smo u njemu već nekoliko godina. Pa ipak, nemamo osnovne doktrine kojima bismo se vodili u ovom slučaju. Nemamo formulisane osnovne ideje. Ako nas neko napadne sajber napadom, imamo li mogućnost da odgovorimo kinetičkim napadom? Ne znamo. Ako neko pokrene sajber napad, kako da ga odbijemo? Kada je Kina pokrenula niz sajber napada, šta je uradila vlada SAD? Rekla je da ćemo podići optužnicu protiv nekoliko kineskih momaka, koji nikada neće kročiti u Ameriku. Nikada neće biti u blizini policajca koji bi ih odveo u pritvor. To je gest - nije zastrašivanje.
Special forces operators out there in the field today discover that small groups of insurgents with cell phones have access to satellite imagery that once only superpowers had. In fact, if you've got a cell phone, you've got access to power that a superpower didn't have, and would have highly classified 10 years ago. In my cell phone, I have an app that tells me where every plane in the world is, and its altitude, and its speed, and what kind of aircraft it is, and where it's going and where it's landing. They have apps that allow them to know what their adversary is about to do. They're using these tools in new ways. When a cafe in Sydney was taken over by a terrorist, he went in with a rifle... and an iPad. And the weapon was the iPad. Because he captured people, he terrorized them, he pointed the iPad at them, and then he took the video and he put it on the Internet, and he took over the world's media.
Operateri specijalnih snaga koji su danas na terenu su otkrili da male grupe pobunjenika sa mobilnim telefonima imaju pristup satelitskim snimcima koje su nekad imale samo supersile. Zapravo, ako imate mobilni telefon, imate moć koju supersile nisu imale i koja bi bila veoma tajna pre 10 godina. U svom telefonu imam aplikaciju koja me obaveštava gde se nalazi svaki avion na svetu, njegovu visinu, brzinu i koji je tip vazduhoplova, kuda ide i gde će da sleti. Postoje aplikacije koje teroristima omogućavaju da znaju šta njihovi protivnici smeraju. Koriste ove alate na nove načine. Kada su kafić u Sidneju preuzeli teroristi, ušao je sa puškom... u ajpedom. A oružje je bilo ajped. Jer je zarobio ljude, terorisao ih, uperio ajped u njih, a potom je napravio snimak i postavio ga na internet i preuzeo je svetske medije.
But it doesn't just affect the security side. The relations between great powers -- we thought we were past the bipolar era. We thought we were in a unipolar world, where all the big issues were resolved. Remember? It was the end of history. But we're not. We're now seeing that our basic assumptions about the Internet -- that it was going to connect us, weave society together -- are not necessarily true. In countries like China, you have the Great Firewall of China. You've got countries saying no, if the Internet happens within our borders we control it within our borders. We control the content. We are going to control our security. We are going to manage that Internet. We are going to say what can be on it. We're going to set a different set of rules. Now you might think, well, that's just China. But it's not just China. It's China, India, Russia. It's Saudi Arabia, it's Singapore, it's Brazil. After the NSA scandal, the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Brazilians, they said, let's create a new Internet backbone, because we can't be dependent on this other one. And so all of a sudden, what do you have? You have a new bipolar world in which cyber-internationalism, our belief, is challenged by cyber-nationalism, another belief.
Ali to ne utiče samo na sigurnosnu stranu. Odnos među velikim silama - mislili smo da smo prevazišli bipolarno doba. Mislil smo da smo u unipolarnom svetu, gde su sva velika pitanja razrešena. Sećate li se? Beše to kraj istorije. Ali nismo. Sada vidimo da naše osnovne pretpostavke o internetu - da će nas povezati, zašiti društvo - nisu nužno istinite. U državama, poput Kine, imate veliki kineski zaštitni zid. Imate države koje govore ne, ako se internet desi unutar naših granica, mi ćemo ga kontrolisati tu. Mi kontrolišemo sadržaj. Mi ćemo kontrolisati našu bezbednost. Mi ćemo da upravljamo internetom. Mi ćemo odlučivati šta može da sadrži. Mi ćemo postaviti drugačiji niz pravila. Sad, možda mislite, pa to je samo Kina. Ali nije to samo Kina. To su Kina, Indija, Rusija. To je Saudijska Arabija, to je Singapur, to je Brazil. Nakon NSA skandala, Rusi, Kinezi, Indijci, Brazilci, rekli su, napravimo internetu novu kičmu jer ne možemo da se oslanjamo na postojeću. I iznenada, šta imamo? Imamo novi bipolarni svet u kome je sajber internacionalizam, naše ubeđenje, izazvano sajber nacionalizmom, drugim ubeđenjem.
We are seeing these changes everywhere we look. We are seeing the advent of mobile money. It's happening in the places you wouldn't expect. It's happening in Kenya and Tanzania, where millions of people who haven't had access to financial services now conduct all those services on their phones. There are 2.5 million people who don't have financial service access that are going to get it soon. A billion of them are going to have the ability to access it on their cell phone soon. It's not just going to give them the ability to bank. It's going to change what monetary policy is. It's going to change what money is. Education is changing in the same way. Healthcare is changing in the same way. How government services are delivered is changing in the same way.
Vidimo ove promene gde god da se osvrnemo. Vidimo pojavu novca u vidu kredita za mobilni. Dešava se na mestima gde to ne biste očekivali. Dešava se u Keniji i Tanzaniji gde milioni ljudi koji nisu imali pristup finansijskim uslugama, sada sve te usluge obavljaju preko svojih telefona. 2,5 miliona ljudi koji nemaju pristup finansijskim uslugama, uskoro će ga dobiti. Milijardu njih će uskoro dobiti mogućnost da im pristupe preko svojih mobilnih. Neće im to samo dati pristup bankarstvu. To će da promeni monetarnu politiku. Promeniće značenje novca. Obrazovanje se menja na isti način. Zdravstvo se menja na isti način. Delovanje vladinih službi će se promeniti na isti način.
And yet, in Washington, we are debating whether to call the terrorist group that has taken over Syria and Iraq ISIS or ISIL or Islamic State. We are trying to determine how much we want to give in a negotiation with the Iranians on a nuclear deal which deals with the technologies of 50 years ago, when in fact, we know that the Iranians right now are engaged in cyber war with us and we're ignoring it, partially because businesses are not willing to talk about the attacks that are being waged on them.
Pa ipak, u Vašingtonu raspravljamo da li da nazovemo terorističke grupe koje su osvojile Siriju i Irak ISIS ili ISIL ili Islamska država. Pokušavamo da odredimo koliko da popustimo u pregovorima sa Irancima u nuklearnom dogovoru koji se bavi tehnologijom starom 50 godina, kada zapravo znamo da su Iranci trenutno zauzeti sajber ratovanjem s nama, a mi to ignorišemo, delimično jer kompanije nisu spremne da govore o napadima koji se vode protiv njih.
And that gets us to another breakdown that's crucial, and another breakdown that couldn't be more important to a group like this, because the growth of America and real American national security and all of the things that drove progress even during the Cold War, was a public-private partnership between science, technology and government that began when Thomas Jefferson sat alone in his laboratory inventing new things. But it was the canals and railroads and telegraph; it was radar and the Internet. It was Tang, the breakfast drink -- probably not the most important of those developments. But what you had was a partnership and a dialogue, and the dialogue has broken down. It's broken down because in Washington, less government is considered more. It's broken down because there is, believe it or not, in Washington, a war on science -- despite the fact that in all of human history, every time anyone has waged a war on science, science has won.
A to nas dovodi do novog kraha koji je ključan, a taj krah je najvažniji za grupe, poput ove ovde, jer američki rast i istinska američka državna bezbednost i sve stvari koje su dovele do napretka čak i tokom Hladnog rata bile su deo javno-privatnog partnerstva između nauke, tehnologije i vlade koji je počeo kada je Tomas Džeferson sedeo sam u svojoj laboratoriji, izmišljajući novotarije. Ali to su bili kanali, železnice i telegraf; to je bio radar i internet. To je bio Tang, piće uz doručak - verovatno ne najvažnije od ovih otkrića. Ali imali ste partnerstvo i dijalog, a dijalog se raspao. Raspao se jer se u Vašingtonu smatra da što manje upravljate, to bolje Raspao se jer u Vašingtonu imamo, verovali ili ne, rat protiv nauke - uprkos činjenici da u čitavoj ljudskoj istoriji svaki put kad je neko vodio rat protiv nauke, nauka je pobedila.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)
But we have a government that doesn't want to listen, that doesn't have people at the highest levels that understand this. In the nuclear age, when there were people in senior national security jobs, they were expected to speak throw-weight. They were expected to know the lingo, the vocabulary. If you went to the highest level of the U.S. government now and said, "Talk to me about cyber, about neuroscience, about the things that are going to change the world of tomorrow," you'd get a blank stare. I know, because when I wrote this book, I talked to 150 people, many from the science and tech side, who felt like they were being shunted off to the kids' table. Meanwhile, on the tech side, we have lots of wonderful people creating wonderful things, but they started in garages and they didn't need the government and they don't want the government. Many of them have a political view that's somewhere between libertarian and anarchic: leave me alone.
Ali mi imamo vladu koja ne želi da sluša, koja nema ljude na najvišim instancama koji razumeju ovo. U nuklearnom dobu, kada smo imali ljude na seniorskim pozicijama na poslovima bezbednosti, od njih se očekivalo da govore o balističkim merama. Od njih se očekivalo da znaju žargon, rečnik. Kada biste danas krenuli do najviših instanci vlade SAD-a i rekli: "Razgovarajmo o sajberu, o neuronauci, o stvarima koje će sutra da promene svet", bledo bi zurili u vas. Znam, jer kad sam pisao ovu knjigu, razgovarao sam sa 150 ljudi, mnogima s naučne i tehničke strane koji su osećali kao da su ih odgurnuli za dečji sto. U međuvremenu, na tehnološkoj strani, imamo mnogo divnih ljudi koji stvaraju divne stvari, ali počinjali su u garažama i vlada im nije bila potrebna i oni ne žele vladino uplitanje. Politički pogled mnogih od njih se kreće negde između liberala i anarhista: ostavite me na miru.
But the world's coming apart. All of a sudden, there are going to be massive regulatory changes and massive issues associated with conflict and massive issues associated with security and privacy. And we haven't even gotten to the next set of issues, which are philosophical issues. If you can't vote, if you can't have a job, if you can't bank, if you can't get health care, if you can't be educated without Internet access, is Internet access a fundamental right that should be written into constitutions? If Internet access is a fundamental right, is electricity access for the 1.2 billion who don't have access to electricity a fundamental right? These are fundamental issues. Where are the philosophers? Where's the dialogue?
Ali svet se raspada. Iznenada će da dođe do masovnih promena u regulativama i do masovnih pitanja koja se tiču konflikata i masovnih pitanja koja se tiču bezbednosti i privatnosti. A čak smo stigli do narednog niza pitanja, a to su filozofska pitanja. Ako ne možete da glasate, ako ne možete da imate posao, ako nemate pristup bankarstvu, ako nemate zdravstvenu zaštitu, ako ne možete da se obrazujete bez pristupa internetu, da li je pristup internetu osnovno pravo koje bi trebalo da bude određeno ustavom? Ako je pristup internetu osnovno pravo, da li je pristup električnoj mreži za 1,2 milijarde koji nemaju taj pristup osnovno pravo? Ovo su osnovna ljudska prava. Gde su filozofi? Gde je dijalog?
And that brings me to the reason that I'm here. I live in Washington. Pity me.
A to me dovodi do razloga zašto sam ovde. Živim u Vašingtonu. Sažaljevajte me.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
The dialogue isn't happening there. These big issues that will change the world, change national security, change economics, create hope, create threats, can only be resolved when you bring together groups of people who understand science and technology back together with government. Both sides need each other. And until we recreate that connection, until we do what helped America grow and helped other countries grow, then we are going to grow ever more vulnerable. The risks associated with 9/11 will not be measured in terms of lives lost by terror attacks or buildings destroyed or trillions of dollars spent. They'll be measured in terms of the costs of our distraction from critical issues and our inability to get together scientists, technologists, government leaders, at a moment of transformation akin to the beginning of the Renaissance, akin to the beginning of the major transformational eras that have happened on Earth, and start coming up with, if not the right answers, then at least the right questions.
Tamo nema dijaloga. Ova velika pitanja koja će da promene svet, promeniće državnu bezbednost, promeniće ekonomiju, pružaju nadu, predstavljaju pretnju, jedino mogu da budu rešena kada okupite grupe ljudi koje se razumeju u nauku i tehnologiju zajedno sa vladom. Obe strane trebaju jedno drugo. A dok ponovo ne stvorimo tu vezu, dok ne učinimo ono što je potpomoglo rast Amerike i drugih zemalja, do tad ćemo postajati čak i ranjiviji. Rizici koji su u vezi sa 11. septembrom neće se meriti u broju života izgubljenih u terorističkim napadima ili u uništenim zgradama ili u trilionima potrošenih dolara. Meriće se u ceni naše odvraćenosti od kritičnih pitanja i u našoj nemogućnosti da okupimo naučnike, tehničare, vođe iz vlade u momentu transformacije, nalik početku renesanse, nalik početku velikih era promena koje su se desile na Zemlji i ako ne počnemo da dolazimo, ako ne do pravih odgovora, onda barem do pravih pitanja.
We are not there yet, but discussions like this and groups like you are the places where those questions can be formulated and posed. And that's why I believe that groups like TED, discussions like this around the planet, are the place where the future of foreign policy, of economic policy, of social policy, of philosophy, will ultimately take place. And that's why it's been a pleasure speaking to you.
Nismo još stigli dotle, ali ovakve rasprave i grupe poput vas su mesta mesta gde ta pitanja mogu da se formulišu i postave. I zato verujem da su grupe, poput TED-a, rasprave poput ove, širom planete da su mesta gde će se budućnost spoljne politike, ekonomske politike, društvene politike, filozofije konačno desiti. I zato je bilo zadovoljstvo govoriti pred vama.
Thank you very, very much.
Mnogo, mnogo vam hvala.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)