What I'd like to do is talk to you a little bit about fear and the cost of fear and the age of fear from which we are now emerging. I would like you to feel comfortable with my doing that by letting you know that I know something about fear and anxiety. I'm a Jewish guy from New Jersey.
Ono što želim ovdje je malo popričati s vama o strahu, i cijeni straha, i razdoblju straha iz kojeg sada isplovljavamo. Želim da se osjećate ugodno što to činim, kad vam dam do znanja da znam ponešto o strahu i tjeskobi. Židov sam iz New Jerseyja.
(Laughter)
(smijeh)
I could worry before I could walk.
Brinuo sam prije nego što sam prohodao.
(Laughter)
(smijeh)
Please, applaud that.
Molim vas, zaplješčite tome.
(Applause)
(pljesak)
Thank you.
Hvala.
But I also grew up in a time where there was something to fear. We were brought out in the hall when I was a little kid and taught how to put our coats over our heads to protect us from global thermonuclear war. Now even my seven-year-old brain knew that wasn't going to work. But I also knew that global thermonuclear war was something to be concerned with.
Ali sam također odrastao u razdoblju kad je strah bio opravdan. Doveli su nas hodnik kad sam bio malo dijete i naučili nas kako da stavimo kaput preko glave da se zaštitimo od svjetskog termonuklearnog rata. Čak je i moj sedmogodišnji mozak znao da to neće funkcionirati. Ali sam također znao da je svjetski termonuklearni rat nešto oko čega trebamo biti zabrinuti.
And yet, despite the fact that we lived for 50 years with the threat of such a war, the response of our government and of our society was to do wonderful things. We created the space program in response to that. We built our highway system in response to that. We created the Internet in response to that. So sometimes fear can produce a constructive response. But sometimes it can produce an un-constructive response.
I iako smo živjeli 50 godina s prijetnjom takvog rata, odgovor naše vlade i našeg društva je bio raditi divne stvari. Kreirali smo svemirski program kao odgovor na to. Izgradili smo sustav autocesta kao odgovor na to. Stvorili smo internet kao odgovor na to. Tako da strah nekada može proizvesti konstruktivni odgovor. Ali nekada može priozvesti nekonstruktivni odgovor.
On September 11, 2001, 19 guys took over four airplanes and flew them into a couple of buildings. They exacted a horrible toll. It is not for us to minimize what that toll was. But the response that we had was clearly disproportionate -- disproportionate to the point of verging on the unhinged. We rearranged the national security apparatus of the United States and of many governments to address a threat that, at the time that those attacks took place, was quite limited. In fact, according to our intelligence services, on September 11, 2001, there were 100 members of core Al-Qaeda. There were just a few thousand terrorists. They posed an existential threat to no one.
11. rujna 2001., 19 mladića je otelo četiri zrakoplova i zabilo se njima u par zgrada. Iznudili su užasan danak. Nije na nama da umanjimo što je bio danak. Ali odgovor koji smo imali je bio očito neproporcionalan -- neproporcionalan do točke koja graniči sa poremećenim. Restrukturirali smo aparat nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a i mnogih vlada da bismo odgovorili na prijetnju, koja je u vrijeme kad su se napadi dogodili bila dosta ograničena. Zapravo, prema izvještaju naših obavještajnih službi, 11. rujna 2001. postojalo je 100 članova jezgre Al-Qaeda-e. Bilo je samo par tisuća terorista. Oni nikome nisu predstavljali egzistencijalnu prijetnju.
But we rearranged our entire national security apparatus in the most sweeping way since the end of the Second World War. We launched two wars. We spent trillions of dollars. We suspended our values. We violated international law. We embraced torture. We embraced the idea that if these 19 guys could do this, anybody could do it. And therefore, for the first time in history, we were seeing everybody as a threat. And what was the result of that? Surveillance programs that listened in on the emails and phone calls of entire countries -- hundreds of millions of people -- setting aside whether those countries were our allies, setting aside what our interests were. I would argue that 15 years later, since today there are more terrorists, more terrorist attacks, more terrorist casualties -- this by the count of the U.S. State Department -- since today the region from which those attacks emanate is more unstable than at any time in its history, since the Flood, perhaps, we have not succeeded in our response.
Ali mi smo reorganizirali naš cijeli aparat nacionalne sigurnosti na najobuhvatniji način od kraja Drugog svjetskog rata. Pokrenuli smo dva rata. Potrošili smo trilijune dolara. Zanemarili smo svoje vrijednosti. Prekršili smo međunarodno pravo. Prihvatili smo mučenje. Prihvatili smo ideju, da ako je tih 19 mladića to moglo, svatko to može. I zato, prvi put u povijesti smo svakoga vidjeli kao prijetnju. I koji je bio rezultat toga? Programi praćenja e-mailova, prisluškivanje telefonskih poziva cijelih država -- stotine miljuna ljudi -- stavljajući na stranu jesu li nam te zemlje saveznici, stavljajući na stranu koji su naši interesi. Usudio bih se reći da 15 godina kasnije, jer danas ima više terorista, više terorističkih napada, više žrtava terorizma -- ovo su podaci američkog Ministarstva vanjskih poslova -- s obzirom da je danas regija iz koje ti napadi proizlaze nestabilnija nego ikad prije, od Velikog potopa, možda, nismo uspjeli u našem odgovoru.
Now you have to ask, where did we go wrong? What did we do? What was the mistake that was made? And you might say, well look, Washington is a dysfunctional place. There are political food fights. We've turned our discourse into a cage match. And that's true. But there are bigger problems, believe it or not, than that dysfunction, even though I would argue that dysfunction that makes it impossible to get anything done in the richest and most powerful country in the world is far more dangerous than anything that a group like ISIS could do, because it stops us in our tracks and it keeps us from progress.
Sigurno se pitate, gdje smo pogriješili? Što smo napravili? Koju pogrešku smo počinili? I možete reći, čujte, Washington je disfunkcionalno mjesto. Tamo se odvijaju političke borbe. Pretvorili smo naš govor u borbe u kavezu. I to je istina. Ali postoje veći problemi, vjerovali ili ne, od te disfunkcionalnosti, iako bih rekao da je disfunkcionalnost koja čini nemogućim išta učiniti u najbogatijoj i najmoćnijoj zemlji svijeta puno opasnija od bilo čega što grupe poput ISIS-a mogu, zato što nas zaustavlja i spriječava u napretku.
But there are other problems. And the other problems came from the fact that in Washington and in many capitals right now, we're in a creativity crisis. In Washington, in think tanks, where people are supposed to be thinking of new ideas, you don't get bold new ideas, because if you offer up a bold new idea, not only are you attacked on Twitter, but you will not get confirmed in a government job. Because we are reactive to the heightened venom of the political debate, you get governments that have an us-versus-them mentality, tiny groups of people making decisions. When you sit in a room with a small group of people making decisions, what do you get? You get groupthink. Everybody has the same worldview, and any view from outside of the group is seen as a threat. That's a danger. You also have processes that become reactive to news cycles. And so the parts of the U.S. government that do foresight, that look forward, that do strategy -- the parts in other governments that do this -- can't do it, because they're reacting to the news cycle. And so we're not looking ahead.
Ali ima i drugih problema. I drugi problemi su proizašli iz činjenice da smo u Washingtonu i mnogim drugim glavnim gradovima u krizi kreativnosti. U Washingtonu, u think tankovima, gdje bi ljudi trebali razmišljati o novim idejama, ne dobivate hrabre nove ideje, jer ako ponudite hrabru novu ideju, ne samo da vas napadnu na Twitteru, nego vas neće ni potvrditi u vladinom poslu. Zato što smo reaktivni na povišen otrov političke debate, dobivamo vlade koje imaju mentalitet mi-protiv-njih, mala grupa ljudi koja donosi odluke. Kada sjednete u sobu s malom grupom ljudi koji donose odluke, što dobijete? Dobijete grupno razmišljanje. Svi imaju isti pogled na svijet i svaki pogled izvan grupe je protumačen kao prijetnja. To je opasnost. Također imate procese koji postaju reaktivni na cikluse novosti. I tako dijelovi američke vlade koji rade predviđanja, koji gledaju naprijed, koji razvijaju strategiju -- dijelovi drugih vlada koji to čine -- ne mogu to činiti, jer reagiraju na ciklus novosti. I tako ne gledamo naprijed.
On 9/11, we had a crisis because we were looking the wrong way. Today we have a crisis because, because of 9/11, we are still looking in the wrong direction, and we know because we see transformational trends on the horizon that are far more important than what we saw on 9/11; far more important than the threat posed by these terrorists; far more important even than the instability that we've got in some areas of the world that are racked by instability today. In fact, the things that we are seeing in those parts of the world may be symptoms. They may be a reaction to bigger trends. And if we are treating the symptom and ignoring the bigger trend, then we've got far bigger problems to deal with.
11.9. smo imali krizu, jer smo gledali u krivom smjeru. Danas imamo krizu zbog 11.9., još uvijek gledamo u krivom smjeru i znamo, jer vidimo transformacijske trendove na horizontu koji su daleko važniji od onog što smo vidjeli 11.9.; daleko važniji od prijetnje koju predstavljaju teroristi; daleko važniji čak i od nestabilnosti koju imamo u nekim dijelovima svijeta koji su danas mučeni nestabilnošću. Zapravo, stvari koje vidimo u tim dijelovima svijeta bi mogle biti simptomi. Mogle bi biti reakcija na veće trendove. I ako tretiramo simptome, a ignoriramo veći trend, onda imamo mnogo veće probleme s kojima se trebamo baviti.
And so what are those trends? Well, to a group like you, the trends are apparent. We are living at a moment in which the very fabric of human society is being rewoven. If you saw the cover of The Economist a couple of days ago -- it said that 80 percent of the people on the planet, by the year 2020, would have a smartphone. They would have a small computer connected to the Internet in their pocket. In most of Africa, the cell phone penetration rate is 80 percent. We passed the point last October when there were more mobile cellular devices, SIM cards, out in the world than there were people. We are within years of a profound moment in our history, when effectively every single human being on the planet is going to be part of a man-made system for the first time, able to touch anyone else -- touch them for good, touch them for ill. And the changes associated with that are changing the very nature of every aspect of governance and life on the planet in ways that our leaders ought to be thinking about, when they're thinking about these immediate threats.
Što su, dakle,ti trendovi? Pa, grupi poput vas trendovi su očiti. Živimo u trenutku u kojem se sama osnova ljudskog društva ponovo tkuje. Ako ste vidjeli naslovnicu The Economista prije par dana -- pisalo je da će 80 posto ljudi na planetu do 2020. godine imati pametni telefon. Imat će malo računalo povezano na internet u svom džepu. U većini Afrike, porast broja mobitela je 80 posto. Shvatili smo to prošlog listopada kada je bilo više mobilnih uređaja, SIM kartica, na svijetu, nego što je bilo ljudi. Živimo u godinama iznimno važnog trenutka u našoj povijesti, kada će svako ljudsko biće na planetu biti dio sustava koji je stvorio čovjek po prvi put, u mogućnosti dodirnuti bilo koga -- dodirnuti ih u dobro, dodirnuti ih u zlo. I promjene povezane s tim mijenjaju samu prirodu svakog aspekta vladanja i života na planetu, na način o kojem bi naši vođe trebali razmišljati kada razmišljaju o tim neposrednim prijetnjama.
On the security side, we've come out of a Cold War in which it was too costly to fight a nuclear war, and so we didn't, to a period that I call Cool War, cyber war, where the costs of conflict are actually so low, that we may never stop. We may enter a period of constant warfare, and we know this because we've been in it for several years. And yet, we don't have the basic doctrines to guide us in this regard. We don't have the basic ideas formulated. If someone attacks us with a cyber attack, do have the ability to respond with a kinetic attack? We don't know. If somebody launches a cyber attack, how do we deter them? When China launched a series of cyber attacks, what did the U.S. government do? It said, we're going to indict a few of these Chinese guys, who are never coming to America. They're never going to be anywhere near a law enforcement officer who's going to take them into custody. It's a gesture -- it's not a deterrent.
Sa sigurnosne strane, izašli smo iz Hladnog rata u kojem je bilo preskupo voditi nuklearni rat, pa ga onda nismo vodili, i ušli u razdoblje koje zovem Cool rat, kibernetički rat, u kojem su cijene ratovanja zapravo tako male, da možda nikad ne prestanemo. Mogli bismo ući u razdoblje konstantnog ratovanja, a to znamo, jer smo u tome već nekoliko godina. A ipak, nemamo osnovne doktrine da nas vode kroz to. Nemamo formulirane osnovne ideje. Ako nas netko napadne kibernetički, imamo li mogućnost odgovoriti kinetičkim napadom? Ne znamo. Ako netko započne kibernetički napad, kako ga zaustavimo? Kada je Kina započela seriju kibernetičkih napada, što je napravila američka vlada? Rekli su, optužit ćemo par Kineza, koji više nikada neće doći u Ameriku. Oni nikada neće biti blizu nekog službenika koji provodi zakon, koji će ih uhititi. To je gesta -- ne sredstvo zastrašivanja.
Special forces operators out there in the field today discover that small groups of insurgents with cell phones have access to satellite imagery that once only superpowers had. In fact, if you've got a cell phone, you've got access to power that a superpower didn't have, and would have highly classified 10 years ago. In my cell phone, I have an app that tells me where every plane in the world is, and its altitude, and its speed, and what kind of aircraft it is, and where it's going and where it's landing. They have apps that allow them to know what their adversary is about to do. They're using these tools in new ways. When a cafe in Sydney was taken over by a terrorist, he went in with a rifle... and an iPad. And the weapon was the iPad. Because he captured people, he terrorized them, he pointed the iPad at them, and then he took the video and he put it on the Internet, and he took over the world's media.
Pripadnici specijalnih snaga koji su danas na terenu otkrivaju da male grupe pobunjenika s mobitelima imaju pristup satelitskim slikama koje su nekad imale samo supersile. Zapravo, ako imate mobitel, imate pristup moći kakvu supersila nije imala, i koja bi bila strogo zaštićena prije 10 godina. U svom mobitelu imam aplikaciju koja mi pokazuje gdje je svaki avion na svijetu, njegovu visinu, njegovu brzinu, vrstu letjelice, kamo ide, gdje će sletjeti. Imaju aplikacije koje im omogućavaju da saznaju na što se sprema protivnik. Koriste te alate na nov način. Kada je kafić u Sydneyju zauzeo terorist, ušao je s puškom... i iPadom. I oružje je bio iPad. Zato što je zarobio ljude, terorizirao ih, u njih uperio iPad, i onda ih snimio i stavio to na internet, tako osvojivši svjetske medije.
But it doesn't just affect the security side. The relations between great powers -- we thought we were past the bipolar era. We thought we were in a unipolar world, where all the big issues were resolved. Remember? It was the end of history. But we're not. We're now seeing that our basic assumptions about the Internet -- that it was going to connect us, weave society together -- are not necessarily true. In countries like China, you have the Great Firewall of China. You've got countries saying no, if the Internet happens within our borders we control it within our borders. We control the content. We are going to control our security. We are going to manage that Internet. We are going to say what can be on it. We're going to set a different set of rules. Now you might think, well, that's just China. But it's not just China. It's China, India, Russia. It's Saudi Arabia, it's Singapore, it's Brazil. After the NSA scandal, the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Brazilians, they said, let's create a new Internet backbone, because we can't be dependent on this other one. And so all of a sudden, what do you have? You have a new bipolar world in which cyber-internationalism, our belief, is challenged by cyber-nationalism, another belief.
Ali to ne utječe samo na sigurnosnu stranu. Odnosi između velikih sila -- mislili smo da smo prerasli bipolarno razdoblje. Mislili smo da smo u unipolarnom svijetu gdje se svi veliki problemi riješavaju. Sjećate se? Bio je to kraj povijesti. Ali nije tako. Sada vidimo da naše osnovne pretpostavke o internetu -- koji će nas povezati, satkati zajedničko društvo -- nisu nužno točne. U zemljama poput Kine postoji Veliki kineski Firewall. Postoje zemlje koje kažu ne, ako se internet odvija u našim granicama, kontroliramo ga u našim granicama. Kontroliramo sadržaj. Kontrolirat ćemo naše društvo. Vodit ćemo internet. Reći ćemo što se može nalaziti na njemu. Postavit ćemo drukčija pravila. Možda sad mislite, pa, to je Kina. Ali nije samo Kina. To su Indija, Kina, Rusija. To su Saudijska Arabija, Singapur, Brazil. Nakon skandala NSA, Rusi, Kinezi, Indijci, Brazilci su rekli, idemo prozvesti novu kralješnicu interneta, jer ne možemo ovisiti o ovoj drugoj. I što se odjednom dogodilo? Imamo novi bipolarni svijet u kojem je kiber-internacionalizam, naša vjerovanje, u sukobu s kiber-nacionalizmom, drugim vjerovanjem.
We are seeing these changes everywhere we look. We are seeing the advent of mobile money. It's happening in the places you wouldn't expect. It's happening in Kenya and Tanzania, where millions of people who haven't had access to financial services now conduct all those services on their phones. There are 2.5 million people who don't have financial service access that are going to get it soon. A billion of them are going to have the ability to access it on their cell phone soon. It's not just going to give them the ability to bank. It's going to change what monetary policy is. It's going to change what money is. Education is changing in the same way. Healthcare is changing in the same way. How government services are delivered is changing in the same way.
Vidimo te promjene gdje god pogledamo. Vidimo dolazak mobilnog novca. Događa se u zemljama u kojima to ne biste očekivali. Događa se u Keniji i Tanzaniji, gdje milijuni ljudi koji nisu imali pristup financijskim uslugama, sada sve te usluge vrše preko svojih telefona. Postoji 2.5 milijuna ljudi koji nemaju pristup financijskim uslugama, ali će ga ubrzo dobiti. Njih milijarda će uskoro imati mogućnost pristupiti im preko svojih mobitela. To im neće dati samo mogućnost bankarstva. To će promijeniti monetarnu politiku. Promijenit će ono što novac jest. Obrazovanje se jednako tako mijenja. Zdravstvo isto tako. Način ispostave vladinih usluga također.
And yet, in Washington, we are debating whether to call the terrorist group that has taken over Syria and Iraq ISIS or ISIL or Islamic State. We are trying to determine how much we want to give in a negotiation with the Iranians on a nuclear deal which deals with the technologies of 50 years ago, when in fact, we know that the Iranians right now are engaged in cyber war with us and we're ignoring it, partially because businesses are not willing to talk about the attacks that are being waged on them.
A ipak, u Washingtonu raspravljamo trebamo li zvati terorističku grupu koja je zauzela Siriju i Irak ISIS ili ISIL ili Islamska država. Pokušavamo odrediti koliko želimo dati u pregovorima s Irancima o nuklearnom sporazumu koji se bavi tehnologijama od prije 50 godina, iako zapravo znamo da su Iranci sada uključeni u kibernetički rat s nama i mi to ignoriramo, djelomice zato što businessi nisu voljni pričati o napadima koji im se naplaćuju.
And that gets us to another breakdown that's crucial, and another breakdown that couldn't be more important to a group like this, because the growth of America and real American national security and all of the things that drove progress even during the Cold War, was a public-private partnership between science, technology and government that began when Thomas Jefferson sat alone in his laboratory inventing new things. But it was the canals and railroads and telegraph; it was radar and the Internet. It was Tang, the breakfast drink -- probably not the most important of those developments. But what you had was a partnership and a dialogue, and the dialogue has broken down. It's broken down because in Washington, less government is considered more. It's broken down because there is, believe it or not, in Washington, a war on science -- despite the fact that in all of human history, every time anyone has waged a war on science, science has won.
I to nas dovodi do još jednog rasula, koje je ključno, i još jednog rasula koji ne može biti važniji ovakvoj grupi, jer rast Amerike i prava američka nacionalna sigurnost i sve stvari koje su vodile napredak čak i u godinama Hladnog rata, je bilo javno-privatno partnerstvo znanosti, tehnologije i vlade koje je započelo kada je Thomas Jefferson sam sjedio u laboratoriju izumljujući nove stvari. Ali to su bili kanali, željezničke pruge, telegraf; to su bili radar i internet. To je bio Tang, jutarnje piće -- vjerojatno ne i najvažnije od ovih izuma. Ali ono što je postojalo su bili partnerstvo i dijalog, a dijalog se raspao. Raspao se, jer se u Washingtonu manje vlada smatra više. Raspao se, jer, vjerovali ili ne, u Wahingtonu, rat protiv znanosti -- unatoč činjenici da u cjelokupnoj ljudskoj povijesti, svaki put kad je netko započeo rat sa znanošću, znanost je pobijedila.
(Applause)
(pljesak)
But we have a government that doesn't want to listen, that doesn't have people at the highest levels that understand this. In the nuclear age, when there were people in senior national security jobs, they were expected to speak throw-weight. They were expected to know the lingo, the vocabulary. If you went to the highest level of the U.S. government now and said, "Talk to me about cyber, about neuroscience, about the things that are going to change the world of tomorrow," you'd get a blank stare. I know, because when I wrote this book, I talked to 150 people, many from the science and tech side, who felt like they were being shunted off to the kids' table. Meanwhile, on the tech side, we have lots of wonderful people creating wonderful things, but they started in garages and they didn't need the government and they don't want the government. Many of them have a political view that's somewhere between libertarian and anarchic: leave me alone.
Ali mi imao vladu koja ne želi slušati, koja nema ljude na najvišim pozicijama koji to razumiju. U nuklearnom razdoblju, kada je bilo ljudi na višim poslovima nacionalne sigurnosti, od njih se očekivalo da govore "težinom udara". Očekivalo se da znaju sleng, da znaju terminologiju. Da sada odete na najviše pozicije američke vlade i kažete: "Pričajte mi o kibernetici, o neuroznanosti, o stvarima koje će promijeniti svijet sutrašnjice" , dočekao bi vas prazan pogled. Znam to, jer, kad sam napisao knjigu, razgovorao sam sa 150 ljudi, od koji su mnogi bili sa znanstvene i tehnološke strane, koji su se osjećali kao da ih isključuju i šalju za dječji stol. Za to vrijeme, na tehnološkoj strani, postoje mnogi predivni ljudi koji stvaraju predivne stvari, ali započeli su u garažama i nisu trebali vladu i nisu htjeli vladu. Mnogi od njih imaju politički svjetonazor negdje između libertarijanskog i anarhističkog: pustite me na miru.
But the world's coming apart. All of a sudden, there are going to be massive regulatory changes and massive issues associated with conflict and massive issues associated with security and privacy. And we haven't even gotten to the next set of issues, which are philosophical issues. If you can't vote, if you can't have a job, if you can't bank, if you can't get health care, if you can't be educated without Internet access, is Internet access a fundamental right that should be written into constitutions? If Internet access is a fundamental right, is electricity access for the 1.2 billion who don't have access to electricity a fundamental right? These are fundamental issues. Where are the philosophers? Where's the dialogue?
Ali svijet se raspada. Odjednom će započeti masovne regulatorne promjene i masovni problemi povezani sa sukobom, i masovni problemi povezani sa sigurnošću i privatnošću. I nismo čak došli do sljedeće skupine problema, a to su filozofski problemi. Ako ne možete glasati, ako ne možete imati posao, ako ne možete bankariti, ako ne možete dobiti zdravstvenu skrb, ako se ne možete obrazovati bez pristupa internetu, je li pristup internetu osnovno pravo koje bi trebalo upisati u ustav? Ako je pravo pristupa internetu osnovno pravo, je li pristup električnoj energiji koji nema 1.2 milijarde ljudi osnovno pravo? Ovo su osnovni problemi. Gdje su filozofi? Gdje je dijalog?
And that brings me to the reason that I'm here. I live in Washington. Pity me.
I to me dovodi do razloga zašto sam ovdje. Živim u Washingtonu. Sažalite se nada mnom
(Laughter)
(smijeh)
The dialogue isn't happening there. These big issues that will change the world, change national security, change economics, create hope, create threats, can only be resolved when you bring together groups of people who understand science and technology back together with government. Both sides need each other. And until we recreate that connection, until we do what helped America grow and helped other countries grow, then we are going to grow ever more vulnerable. The risks associated with 9/11 will not be measured in terms of lives lost by terror attacks or buildings destroyed or trillions of dollars spent. They'll be measured in terms of the costs of our distraction from critical issues and our inability to get together scientists, technologists, government leaders, at a moment of transformation akin to the beginning of the Renaissance, akin to the beginning of the major transformational eras that have happened on Earth, and start coming up with, if not the right answers, then at least the right questions.
Tamo ne dolazi do dijaloga. Ovi veliki problemi koji će promijeniti svijet, promijeniti nacionalnu sigurnost, promijeniti ekonomiju, stvoriti nadu, stvoriti prijetnje, se jedino mogu riješiti kada opet okupite grupu ljudi koji razumiju znanost i tehnologiju s vladom. Obje strane trebaju jedni druge. I sve dok opet ne uspostavimo tu vezu, dok ne napravimo ono što je pomoglo Americi i drugim zemljama da narastu, postajat ćemo sve ranjiviji. Rizik povezan s 11. 9. neće biti izmjeren izgubljenim životima, uništenim zgradama, potrošenim trilijunima dolara. Bit će izmjeren cijenom našeg odvraćanja pažnje od kritičnih problema i našom nesposobnošću da okupimo znanstvenike, tehničare, političke vođe u trenutku transformacije koja je početak renesanse, početak najvećeg razdoblja tranformacije koje se ikad dogodilo na Zemlji, i da počnemo osmišljavati, ako već ne točne odgovore, onda barem prava pitanja.
We are not there yet, but discussions like this and groups like you are the places where those questions can be formulated and posed. And that's why I believe that groups like TED, discussions like this around the planet, are the place where the future of foreign policy, of economic policy, of social policy, of philosophy, will ultimately take place. And that's why it's been a pleasure speaking to you.
Još to nismo dostigli, ali ovakve rasprave i grupe poput vas su mjesta gdje se ta pitanja mogu formulirati i postaviti. I zato vjerujem da su grupe poput TED-a, ovakve rasprave diljem svijeta, mjesta na kojima će stvoriti budućnost vanjskih poslova, ekonomske politike, socijalne politike, filozofije. I zato mi je bio užitak pričati s vama.
Thank you very, very much.
Puno, puno vam hvala.
(Applause)
(pljesak)