I want to talk about social innovation and social entrepreneurship. I happen to have triplets. They're little. They're five years old. Sometimes I tell people I have triplets. They say, "Really? How many?"
Želim da govorim o društvenoj inovaciji i društvenom preduzetništvu. Igrom slučaja imam trojke. Mali su. Imaju pet godina. Ponekad kažem ljudima da imam trojke.
(Laughter)
Oni kažu: ''Stvarno? Koliko?''
Here's a picture of the kids -- that's Sage, and Annalisa and Rider. Now, I also happen to be gay. Being gay and fathering triplets is by far the most socially innovative, socially entrepreneurial thing I have ever done.
Ovo je fotografija dece. To su Sejdž, Analisa i Rajder. Takođe sam gej. Biti gej i biti otac trojkama je ubedljivo najjača društveno inovativna i društveno preduzetnička stvar koju sam ikad uradio.
(Laughter)
(Smeh) (Aplauz)
(Applause)
The real social innovation I want to talk about involves charity. I want to talk about how the things we've been taught to think about giving and about charity and about the nonprofit sector, are actually undermining the causes we love, and our profound yearning to change the world.
Prava društvena inovacija o kojoj želim da govorim ima veze sa humanitarnošću. Želim da govorim o tome kako ono što smo naučeni da mislimo o davanju, dobrovoljnim prilozima i neprofitnom sektoru zapravo podriva ciljeve koje volimo i našu duboku čežnju za menjanjem sveta.
But before I do that, I want to ask if we even believe that the nonprofit sector has any serious role to play in changing the world. A lot of people say now that business will lift up the developing economies, and social business will take care of the rest. And I do believe that business will move the great mass of humanity forward. But it always leaves behind that 10 percent or more that is most disadvantaged or unlucky. And social business needs markets, and there are some issues for which you just can't develop the kind of money measures that you need for a market.
Ali pre nego što to uradim, želim da pitam da li uopšte verujemo da neprofitni sektor igra bilo kakvu ozbiljnu ulogu u menjanju sveta. Mnogi danas govore da će poslovi pokrenuti ekonomije u razvoju, a da će se društveni poslovi pobrinuti za ostalo. Ja zaista verujem da će poslovi pokrenuti veliki deo čovečanstva ka napretku. Ali uvek ostaje tih 10 ili više procenata koji su najugroženiji ili nesrećni. A društvenom poslu su potrebna tržišta, i postoje neki problemi zbog kojih se jednostavno ne mogu razviti takve novčane mere koje su neophodne za tržište.
I sit on the board of a center for the developmentally disabled, and these people want laughter and compassion and they want love. How do you monetize that? And that's where the nonprofit sector and philanthropy come in. Philanthropy is the market for love. It is the market for all those people for whom there is no other market coming. And so if we really want, like Buckminster Fuller said, a world that works for everyone, with no one and nothing left out, then the nonprofit sector has to be a serious part of the conversation.
Član sam odbora centra za ometene u razvoju, i ti ljudi žele smeh i saosećanje i žele ljubav. Kako to pretvoriti u novac? To je mesto gde neprofitni sektor i filantropija uskaču. Filantropija je tržište za ljubav. To je tržište za sve te ljude za koje ne postoje druga tržišta. Tako da ako zaista želimo, kako je Bakminster Fuler rekao, svet koji svima odgovara, gde niko i ništa nije izostavljeno, onda se o neprofitnom sektoru mora ozbiljno razgovarati.
But it doesn't seem to be working. Why have our breast cancer charities not come close to finding a cure for breast cancer, or our homeless charities not come close to ending homelessness in any major city? Why has poverty remained stuck at 12 percent of the U.S. population for 40 years?
Ali čini se da to ne funkcioniše. Zbog čega se naše dobrotvorne akcije protiv raka dojke nisu približile pronalasku leka protiv raka dojke, ili zašto naše akcije za beskućnike nisu bliže zaustavljanju beskućništva u bilo kom većem gradu? Zašto je siromaštvo još uvek ostalo zaglavljeno na 12 procenata od ukupne populacije Sjedinjenih Država već 40 godina?
And the answer is, these social problems are massive in scale, our organizations are tiny up against them, and we have a belief system that keeps them tiny. We have two rulebooks. We have one for the nonprofit sector, and one for the rest of the economic world. It's an apartheid, and it discriminates against the nonprofit sector in five different areas, the first being compensation.
A odgovor je da su ovi društveni problemi ogromnih razmera, naše organizacije su sićušne u poređenju sa njima, i imamo sistem verovanja koji ih održava sićušnim. Imamo dve knjige pravila. Imamo jednu za neprofitni sektor i jednu za ostatak ekonomskog sveta. To je aparthejd i diskriminiše neprofitni sektor u pet različitih oblasti, od kojih je prva kompenzacija.
So in the for-profit sector, the more value you produce, the more money you can make. But we don't like nonprofits to use money to incentivize people to produce more in social service. We have a visceral reaction to the idea that anyone would make very much money helping other people. Interestingly, we don't have a visceral reaction to the notion that people would make a lot of money not helping other people. You know, you want to make 50 million dollars selling violent video games to kids, go for it. We'll put you on the cover of Wired magazine. But you want to make half a million dollars trying to cure kids of malaria, and you're considered a parasite yourself.
U profitnom sektoru, što više vrednosti stvorite, više možete zaraditi novca. Ali mi ne volimo da neprofitne organizacije koriste novac kako bi podstakle ljude da stvaraju više u socijalnim uslugama. Imamo visceralnu reakciju na ideju da bi bilo ko mogao zaraditi dosta novca pomažući drugim ljudima. Zanimljivo je to da nemamo visceralnu reakciju na ideju da bi ljudi mogli zaraditi dosta novca ne pomažući drugima. Znate već, hoćete da zaradite 50 miliona dolara prodajući nasilne video igrice deci, samo izvolite. Stavićemo vas na naslovnicu magazina Vajerd. Ali ako želite da zaradite pola miliona dolara pokušavajući da izlečite decu od malarije, i sami ćete biti smatrani parazitom. (Aplauz)
(Applause)
Ovo smatramo našim sistemom etike,
And we think of this as our system of ethics, but what we don't realize is that this system has a powerful side effect, which is: It gives a really stark, mutually exclusive choice between doing very well for yourself and your family or doing good for the world, to the brightest minds coming out of our best universities, and sends tens of thousands of people who could make a huge difference in the nonprofit sector, marching every year directly into the for-profit sector because they're not willing to make that kind of lifelong economic sacrifice. Businessweek did a survey, looked at the compensation packages for MBAs 10 years out of business school. And the median compensation for a Stanford MBA, with bonus, at the age of 38, was 400,000 dollars. Meanwhile, for the same year, the average salary for the CEO of a $5 million-plus medical charity in the U.S. was 232,000 dollars, and for a hunger charity, 84,000 dollars. Now, there's no way you're going to get a lot of people with $400,000 talent to make a $316,000 sacrifice every year to become the CEO of a hunger charity.
ali ne shvatamo da ovaj sistem ima jedan snažan neželjeni efekat, a to je da daje veoma krut, međusobno isključiv izbor između činjenja dobrih stvari za sebe i svoju porodicu i činjenja dobrih stvari za svet najbistrijim umovima koji stižu sa naših najboljih univerziteta, i šalje desetine hiljada ljudi koji bi mogli doneti velike promene u neprofitnom sektoru da ulaze svake godine direktno u profitni sektor jer nisu spremni na takvu celoživotnu ekonomsku žrtvu. Biznisvik je uradio pregled, posmatrajući kompenzacione pakete za poslovne administratore poslovnih škola i srednja vrednost kompenzacija poslovnih administratora sa Stenforda sa bonusom, u 38. godini, iznosila je 400.000 dolara. U međuvremenu, u istoj godini, prosečna plata generalnog direktora jedne humanitarne firme u SAD vredne preko 5 miliona dolara bila je 232.000 dolara, a za humanitarce u borbi protiv gladi 84.000 dolara. Nema šanse da ćete ubediti mnogo ljudi sa talentom da zarade 400.00 da naprave žrtvu od 316.000 dolara svake godine da bi postali direktori kompanije u borbi protiv gladi.
Some people say, "Well, that's just because those MBA types are greedy." Not necessarily. They might be smart. It's cheaper for that person to donate 100,000 dollars every year to the hunger charity; save 50,000 dollars on their taxes -- so still be roughly 270,000 dollars a year ahead of the game -- now be called a philanthropist because they donated 100,000 dollars to charity; probably sit on the board of the hunger charity; indeed, probably supervise the poor SOB who decided to become the CEO of the hunger charity;
Neki će reći: "Pa to je zato što su ti biznis tipovi pohlepni." Ne nužno. Možda su pametni. Jeftinije je za tu osobu da donira 100.000 dolara svake godine u humanitarne svrhe, uštedi 50.000 dolara na porezu, tako da je ipak otprilike 270.000 dolara godišnje u plusu, nazivaju ga filantropom jer je donirao 100.000 dolara u humanitarne svrhe, verovatno sedi u odboru za borbu protiv gladi, verovatno nadgleda jadnička koji je rešio da postane direktor humanitarne firme,
(Laughter)
i čitav život ovakve moći, uticaja
and have a lifetime of this kind of power and influence and popular praise still ahead of them.
i slave tek ima pred sobom.
The second area of discrimination is advertising and marketing. So we tell the for-profit sector, "Spend, spend, spend on advertising, until the last dollar no longer produces a penny of value." But we don't like to see our donations spent on advertising in charity. Our attitude is, "Well, look, if you can get the advertising donated, you know, to air at four o'clock in the morning, I'm okay with that. But I don't want my donation spent on advertising, I want it go to the needy." As if the money invested in advertising could not bring in dramatically greater sums of money to serve the needy.
Druga oblast diskriminacije je reklamiranje i marketing. Govorimo profitnom sektoru: "Trošite, trošite, trošite na reklamiranje dok poslednji dolar više ne donosi ni peni." Ali ne volimo da vidimo da se naše donacije troše na reklamiranje humanitarnih svrha. Naš stav je: "Vidi, ako možeš da obezbediš doniranu reklamu, znaš, u četiri sata ujutru, ja sam okej sa tim. Ali ne želim da se moje donacije troše na reklamiranje. Želim da odu siromašnima." Kao da novac uložen u reklamiranje ne bi doneo drastično veće sume novca koje će služiti siromašnima.
In the 1990s, my company created the long-distance AIDSRide bicycle journeys, and the 60 mile-long breast cancer three-day walks, and over the course of nine years, we had 182,000 ordinary heroes participate, and they raised a total of 581 million dollars.
'90-ih godina, moja kompanija je započela vožnje biciklom na duge staze AIDSRajd i trodnevne šetnje duge 96km protiv raka dojke, i tokom devet godina, imali smo 182.000 običnih heroja koji su učestvovali i prikupili ukupno 581 milion dolara.
(Applause)
Prikupili su u ove svrhe više novca i brže
They raised more money more quickly for these causes than any events in history, all based on the idea that people are weary of being asked to do the least they can possibly do. People are yearning to measure the full distance of their potential on behalf of the causes that they care about deeply. But they have to be asked. We got that many people to participate by buying full-page ads in The New York Times, in The Boston Globe, in prime time radio and TV advertising. Do you know how many people we would've gotten if we put up fliers in the laundromat?
nego bilo koji događaj u istoriji, zasnovano na ideji da su ljudi umorni od toga da se od njih traži da urade najmanje od onoga što mogu. Ljudi žude da izmere svoje potencijale u celini u korist svrha do kojih im je duboko stalo. Ali morate da ih pitate. Uspeli smo da toliko ljudi učestvuje kupivši reklamu preko cele strane Njujork Tajmsa, Boston Glouba, na radiju i TV reklamama u udarno vreme. Da li znate koliko bismo ljudi sakupili da smo postavljali flajere po perionicama?
Charitable giving has remained stuck in the U.S., at two percent of GDP, ever since we started measuring it in the 1970s. That's an important fact, because it tells us that in 40 years, the nonprofit sector has not been able to wrestle any market share away from the for-profit sector. And if you think about it, how could one sector possibly take market share away from another sector if it isn't really allowed to market? And if we tell the consumer brands, "You may advertise all the benefits of your product," but we tell charities, "You cannot advertise all the good that you do," where do we think the consumer dollars are going to flow?
Davanje u dobrotvorne svrhe je u škripcu, u SAD-u, na dva procenta BDP-a otkad smo počeli sa njegovim merenjem '70-ih. To je važna činjenica, jer nam govori da neprofitni sektor za 40 godina nije uspeo da se izbori za udeo na tržištu van profitnog sektora. I ako razmislite o tome, kako bi jedan sektor mogao da oduzme udeo u tržištu od drugog sektora ako mu zapravo nije dozvoljeno da bude u prometu? Ako kažemo potrošačkim markama: "Možete reklamirati sve prednosti vašeg proizvoda", ali humanitarcima govorimo: "Ne možete da reklamirate sva dobra koja činite", gde mislimo da će se slivati novac potrošača?
The third area of discrimination is the taking of risk in pursuit of new ideas for generating revenue. So Disney can make a new $200 million movie that flops, and nobody calls the attorney general. But you do a little $1 million community fundraiser for the poor, and it doesn't produce a 75 percent profit to the cause in the first 12 months, and your character is called into question. So nonprofits are really reluctant to attempt any brave, daring, giant-scale new fundraising endeavors, for fear that if the thing fails, their reputations will be dragged through the mud. Well, you and I know when you prohibit failure, you kill innovation. If you kill innovation in fundraising, you can't raise more revenue; if you can't raise more revenue, you can't grow; and if you can't grow, you can't possibly solve large social problems.
Treća oblast diskriminacije je preuzimanje rizika u potrazi za novim idejama za stvaranje prihoda. Dizni može da napravi novi film od 200 miliona dolara koji pretrpi neuspeh, i niko ne zove tužioca. Ali napravite malo lokalno prikupljanje sredstava za siromašne od milion dolara i neka to ne proizvede 75 odsto profita toj svrsi za prvih 12 meseci, i vaše ime je dovedeno u pitanje. Zato neprofitne organizacije nerado pokušavaju bilo kakve hrabre, izazovne, nove poduhvate velikih razmera iz straha da ako stvar propadne, njihove reputacije će biti ukaljane. Vi i ja znamo da kada zabranite neuspeh, ubijate inovaciju. Ubijanjem inovacije u skupljanju sredstava ne možete prikupiti više prihoda. Ako ne možete da prikupite više prihoda, ne možete da se razvijate. A ako ne možete da se razvijate,
The fourth area is time.
nikako ne možete rešavati velike društvene probleme.
So Amazon went for six years without returning any profit to investors, and people had patience. They knew that there was a long-term objective down the line, of building market dominance. But if a nonprofit organization ever had a dream of building magnificent scale that required that for six years, no money was going to go to the needy, it was all going to be invested in building this scale, we would expect a crucifixion.
Četvrta oblast je vreme. Amazon tokom šest godina nije vraćao ni malo profita ulagačima, i ljudi su imali strpljenja. Znali su da se na kraju puta nalazi dugoročni cilj stvaranja dominacije na tržištu. Ali kada bi neprofitna organizacija sanjala o izgradnji veličanstvenog poduhvata koji bi to zahtevao tokom šest godina, novac ne bi odlazio siromašnima, u potpunosti će biti uložen u izgradnju tog projekta, očekivali bismo da nas razapnu.
The last area is profit itself. So the for-profit sector can pay people profits in order to attract their capital for their new ideas, but you can't pay profits in a nonprofit sector, so the for-profit sector has a lock on the multi-trillion-dollar capital markets, and the nonprofit sector is starved for growth and risk and idea capital.
I poslednja oblast je sam profit. Profitni sektor može da plaća ljudima kako bi privukao njihov kapital za svoje nove ideje, ali ne možete isplaćivati profit u neprofitnom sektoru, pa profitni sektor ima samo za sebe multibilionsko tržište kapitala, a neprofitni sektor umire za razvojem, rizikom i idejnim kapitalom.
Well, you put those five things together -- you can't use money to lure talent away from the for-profit sector; you can't advertise on anywhere near the scale the for-profit sector does for new customers; you can't take the kinds of risks in pursuit of those customers that the for-profit sector takes; you don't have the same amount of time to find them as the for-profit sector; and you don't have a stock market with which to fund any of this, even if you could do it in the first place -- and you've just put the nonprofit sector at an extreme disadvantage to the for-profit sector, on every level. If we have any doubts about the effects of this separate rule book, this statistic is sobering: From 1970 to 2009, the number of nonprofits that really grew, that crossed the $50 million annual revenue barrier, is 144. In the same time, the number of for-profits that crossed it is 46,136. So we're dealing with social problems that are massive in scale, and our organizations can't generate any scale. All of the scale goes to Coca-Cola and Burger King.
Postavite tih pet stvari zajedno - ne možete koristiti novac da privučete talente iz profitnog sektora, ne možete se reklamirati ni približno u onoj meri u kojoj to profitni sektor čini radi novih klijenata, ne možete da preuzimate slične rizike u potrazi za klijentima koje profitni sektor preuzima, nemate istu količinu vremena da ih pronađete kao što ima profitni sektor, i nemate berzu kojom biste finansirali bilo šta od ovoga, čak i kada biste uopšte mogli, i upravo ste ostavili neprofitni sektor sa krajnjim nedostatkom u odnosu na profitni sektor na svakom nivou. Ako imamo bilo kakvih sumnji u vezi sa posledicama ovih odvojenih pravilnika, statistika je otrežnjujuća: od 1970. do 2009. godine, broj neprofitnih organizacija koje su se zaista razvijale koje su prešle granicu od 50 miliona godišnjih prihoda, je 144. Istovremeno, broj profitnih organizacija koje su je prešle je 46.136. Dakle bavimo se društvenim problemima koji su ogromnih razmera, a naše organizacije ne mogu da stvore ništa od tih razmera. Sve odlazi Koka-Koli i Burger Kingu.
So why do we think this way? Well, like most fanatical dogma in America, these ideas come from old Puritan beliefs. The Puritans came here for religious reasons, or so they said, but they also came here because they wanted to make a lot of money. They were pious people, but they were also really aggressive capitalists, and they were accused of extreme forms of profit-making tendencies, compared to the other colonists. But at the same time, the Puritans were Calvinists, so they were taught literally to hate themselves. They were taught that self-interest was a raging sea that was a sure path to eternal damnation. This created a real problem for these people. Here they've come all the way across the Atlantic to make all this money, but making all this money will get you sent directly to Hell. What were they to do about this?
Zašto razmišljamo na ovaj način? Pa, kao i većina fanatičnih dogmi u Americi, ove ideje potiču iz starih puritanskih uverenja. Puritanci su došli ovde iz religijskih razloga, ili su bar tako rekli, ali su takođe došli ovde jer su hteli da zarade puno para. Bili su pobožni ljudi ali takođe i veoma agresivni kapitalisti, i bili su optuživani za ekstremne oblike nastojanja za stvaranjem profita u poređenju sa drugim kolonistima. Ali istovremeno, puritanci su bili kalvinisti, tako da su bukvalno bili naučeni da mrze sami sebe. Bili su naučeni da je lični interes burno more koje je siguran put ka večnom prokletstvu. Ovo je stvorilo pravi problem za te ljude, zar ne? Prešli su čitav Atlantik da steknu toliki novac. Sticanje mnogo novca vodi pravo u pakao. Šta je trebalo da rade po ovom pitanju?
Well, charity became their answer. It became this economic sanctuary, where they could do penance for their profit-making tendencies -- at five cents on the dollar. So of course, how could you make money in charity if charity was your penance for making money? Financial incentive was exiled from the realm of helping others, so that it could thrive in the area of making money for yourself, and in 400 years, nothing has intervened to say, "That's counterproductive and that's unfair."
Dobročinstvo je postalo njihov odgovor. Postalo je njihovo ekonomsko utočište gde su mogli da se iskupe za svoje težnje ka stvaranju profita za pet centi po dolaru. I naravno, kako možeš da zaradiš u humanitarnom radu ako je to tvoje iskupljenje za sticanje novca? Finansijski podstrek je izbačen iz oblasti pomaganja drugima tako da je mogao da se razvija u oblasti zarađivanja za sebe, i za vreme od 400 godina, ništa se nije umešalo da kaže: "To je kontraproduktivno i nefer."
Now, this ideology gets policed by this one very dangerous question, which is, "What percentage of my donation goes to the cause versus overhead?" There are a lot of problems with this question. I'm going to just focus on two. First, it makes us think that overhead is a negative, that it is somehow not part of the cause. But it absolutely is, especially if it's being used for growth. Now, this idea that overhead is somehow an enemy of the cause creates this second, much larger problem, which is, it forces organizations to go without the overhead things they really need to grow, in the interest of keeping overhead low.
Ovu ideologiju čuva jedno opasno pitanje, a to je: "Koji procenat moje donacije ide u dobrotvorne svrhe naspram drugih troškova?" Postoji mnogo problema sa ovim pitanjem. Ja ću se fokusirati samo na dva. Prvo, čini da mislimo da su dodatni troškovi negativni, da nekako nisu deo dobrotvorne svrhe. Ali apsolutno jesu, naročito ako se koriste za razvoj. Ideja da su troškovi nekako neprijatelji humanitarne svrhe stvara drugi, mnogo veći problem, a to je da primorava organizacije da rade bez troškova koji su im zaista potrebni da bi napredovale zarad održavanja troškova niskim.
So we've all been taught that charities should spend as little as possible on overhead things like fundraising under the theory that, well, the less money you spend on fundraising, the more money there is available for the cause. Well, that's true if it's a depressing world in which this pie cannot be made any bigger. But if it's a logical world in which investment in fundraising actually raises more funds and makes the pie bigger, then we have it precisely backwards, and we should be investing more money, not less, in fundraising, because fundraising is the one thing that has the potential to multiply the amount of money available for the cause that we care about so deeply.
Naučeni smo da humanitarne organizacije treba da potroše što je manje moguće na troškove poput skupljanja sredstava pod teorijom da što manje novca potrošite na to, više novca preostaje za dobrotvorne svrhe. Pa, to je istinito ako smo u depresivnom svetu u kome ta pita ne može da se poveća. Ali ako smo u logičnom svetu u kome ulaganje u skupljanje sredstava zapravo podstiče više sredstava i povećava pitu, onda je stvar upravo obrnuta, i trebalo bi da ulažemo više novca, a ne manje, u skupljanje sredstava, jer je to ono što ima potencijal da uvećava količinu novca raspoloživu za dobrotvorne svrhe do kojih nam je tako duboko stalo.
I'll give you two examples. We launched the AIDSRides with an initial investment of 50,000 dollars in risk capital. Within nine years, we had multiplied that 1,982 times, into 108 million dollars after all expenses, for AIDS services. We launched the breast cancer three-days with an initial investment of 350,000 dollars in risk capital. Within just five years, we had multiplied that 554 times, into 194 million dollars after all expenses, for breast cancer research. Now, if you were a philanthropist really interested in breast cancer, what would make more sense: go out and find the most innovative researcher in the world and give her 350,000 dollars for research, or give her fundraising department the 350,000 dollars to multiply it into 194 million dollars for breast cancer research? 2002 was our most successful year ever. We netted for breast cancer alone, that year alone, 71 million dollars after all expenses. And then we went out of business, suddenly and traumatically.
Daću vam dva primera. Pokrenuli smo AIDSRajds sa početnim ulaganjem od 50.000 dolara rizičnog kapitala. Za devet godina, umnožili smo to 1.982 puta u 108 miliona dolara nakon svih troškova za AIDS usluge. Pokrenuli smo tri dana protiv raka dojke sa početnim ulaganjem od 350.000 dolara rizičnog kapitala. Za samo pet godina, umnožili smo to 554 puta u 194 miliona dolara nakon svih troškova, za istraživanje raka dojke. Ako ste filantrop koji je stvarno zainteresovan za rak dojke, šta bi imalo više smisla: da odete i pronađete najinovativnijeg istraživača na svetu i date joj 350.000 dolara za istraživanje, ili da date 350.000 njenom odeljenju za skupljanje sredstava da ih povećaju na 194 miliona dolara za istraživanje raka dojke? 2002. je bila naša najuspešnija godina do sada. Pokrili smo samo za rak dojke, samo te godine, 71 milion dolara preko svih troškova. A onda nam je propao posao, iznenada i traumatično.
Why? Well, the short story is, our sponsors split on us. They wanted to distance themselves from us because we were being crucified in the media for investing 40 percent of the gross in recruitment and customer service and the magic of the experience, and there is no accounting terminology to describe that kind of investment in growth and in the future, other than this demonic label of "overhead." So on one day, all 350 of our great employees lost their jobs ... because they were labeled "overhead." Our sponsor went and tried the events on their own. The overhead went up. Net income for breast cancer research went down by 84 percent, or 60 million dollars, in one year.
Zašto? Pa, ukratko, naš sponzor nas je napustio. Želeli su da se distanciraju od nas jer smo bili kritikovani u medijima zbog ulaganja 40 odsto ukupnog dohotka za regrutovanje i korisnički servis i magiju iskustva i ne postoji terminologija u računovodstvu koja bi opisala takvu vrstu ulaganja u razvoj i budućnost, osim te demonske etikete dodatnih troškova. Tako je jednog dana svih 350 naših divnih zaposlenih izgubilo svoje poslove jer su bili obeleženi tim troškovima. Naš sponzor je pokušao da sprovede događaje samostalno. Troškovi su se povećali. Neto prihod za istraživanje raka dojke je umanjen za 84 odsto, ili 60 miliona dolara godišnje.
This is what happens when we confuse morality with frugality. We've all been taught that the bake sale with five percent overhead is morally superior to the professional fundraising enterprise with 40 percent overhead, but we're missing the most important piece of information, which is: What is the actual size of these pies? Who cares if the bake sale only has five percent overhead if it's tiny? What if the bake sale only netted 71 dollars for charity because it made no investment in its scale and the professional fundraising enterprise netted 71 million dollars because it did? Now which pie would we prefer, and which pie do we think people who are hungry would prefer?
To se desi kada pomešamo moralnost sa štedljivošću. Sve su nas učili da je dobrotvorna prodaja kolača sa 5 odsto troškova moralno iznad profesionalnog poduhvata skupljanja sredstava sa 40 odsto troškova, ali fali nam najvažniji deo informacije, a to je: koja je stvarna veličina tih pita? Koga je briga ako prodaja kolača ima pet posto troškova ako je mala? Šta ako je prodaja kolača prikupila samo 71 dolar u dobrotvorne svrhe jer nije napravila nikakva ulaganja u svom opsegu, a profesionalni poduhvat skupljanja sredstava je prikupio 71 milion dolara jer jeste? Koju bismo pitu tada više voleli, i za koju pitu mislimo da bi je gladni ljudi više voleli?
Here's how all of this impacts the big picture. I said that charitable giving is two percent of GDP in the United States. That's about 300 billion dollars a year. But only about 20 percent of that, or 60 billion dollars, goes to health and human services causes. The rest goes to religion and higher education and hospitals, and that 60 billion dollars is not nearly enough to tackle these problems. But if we could move charitable giving from two percent of GDP, up just one step to three percent of GDP, by investing in that growth, that would be an extra 150 billion dollars a year in contributions, and if that money could go disproportionately to health and human services charities, because those were the ones we encouraged to invest in their growth, that would represent a tripling of contributions to that sector. Now we're talking scale. Now we're talking the potential for real change. But it's never going to happen by forcing these organizations to lower their horizons to the demoralizing objective of keeping their overhead low.
Evo kako sve ovo utiče na širu sliku. Rekao sam da davanje u dobrotvorne svrhe čini dva posto BDP-a u SAD. To je oko 300 milijardi dolara godišnje. Ali samo oko 20 posto toga, ili 60 milijardi dolara, ide u svrhe zdravstva i društvenih službi. Ostatak ide u religiju i visoko obrazovanje i bolnice i tih 60 milijardi dolara nije ni približno dovoljno za bavljenje ovim problemima. Ali ako bismo pomerili humanitarna davanja sa dva posto BDP-a za samo jedan prag na tri posto BDP-a, ulažući u razvoj, to bi bilo dodatnih dodatnih 150 milijardi dolara godišnjeg doprinosa, i kada bi taj novac mogao da ode nesrazmerno u dobrotvorne svrhe zdravstva i društvenih službi, jer smo njih podsticali da ulažu u svoj razvoj, to bi predstavljalo trostruke doprinose tom sektoru. Sada već govorimo o većem obimu. Sada već govorimo o potencijalu za stvarnu promenu. Ali to se nikada neće dogoditi primoravanjem tih organizacija da suze svoje vidike na demorališući cilj da održavaju svoje troškove malim.
Our generation does not want its epitaph to read, "We kept charity overhead low."
Naša generacija ne želi da njen epitaf glasi: "Održavali smo niskim troškove dobrotvornih organizacija."
(Laughter)
(Smeh) (Aplauz)
(Applause)
We want it to read that we changed the world, and that part of the way we did that was by changing the way we think about these things.
Želimo da govori da smo promenili svet, i da je deo načina na koji smo to učinili bilo menjanje načina na koji razmišljamo o ovim stvarima.
So the next time you're looking at a charity, don't ask about the rate of their overhead. Ask about the scale of their dreams, their Apple-, Google-, Amazon-scale dreams, how they measure their progress toward those dreams, and what resources they need to make them come true, regardless of what the overhead is. Who cares what the overhead is if these problems are actually getting solved?
Sledeći put kada posmatrate dobrotvornu organizaciju, ne pitajte za stopu njenih troškova. Pitajte za razmere njenih snova, njihovih snova razmere Epla, Gugla, Amazona, kako mere svoj napredak prema tim snovima, i kakvi resursi su im potrebni da bi ih ostvarili bez obzira na troškove. Koga je briga kakvi su troškovi ako se ovi problemi zaista rešavaju?
If we can have that kind of generosity -- a generosity of thought -- then the non-profit sector can play a massive role in changing the world for all those citizens most desperately in need of it to change. And if that can be our generation's enduring legacy -- that we took responsibility for the thinking that had been handed down to us, that we revisited it, we revised it, and we reinvented the whole way humanity thinks about changing things, forever, for everyone -- well, I thought I would let the kids sum up what that would be.
Ako možemo da imamo tu vrstu darežljivosti, darežljivost misli, onda neprofitni sektor može igrati veliku ulogu u menjanju sveta za sve one građane kojima je očajnički potrebno da se on promeni. I ako to može biti trajno nasleđe naše generacije, da smo preuzeli odgovornost za mišljenje koje nam je bilo preneto, da smo ga ponovo razmotrili, revidirali ga, i preosmislili način na koji čovečanstvo razmišlja o menjanju stvari, zauvek, za svakoga, pa, mislim da ću pustiti da deca sumiraju kako bi to bilo.
Annalisa Smith-Pallotta: That would be
Analisa Smit-Palota: To bi bila -
Sage Smith-Pallotta: a real social
Sejdž Smit-Palota: - prava društvena -
Rider Smith-Pallotta: innovation.
Rajder Smit-Palota: - inovacija.
Dan Pallotta: Thank you very much.
Den Palota: Hvala vam mnogo. Hvala vam.
Thank you.
(Applause)
(Aplauz)
Thank you.
Hvala vam. (Aplauz)
(Applause)