We all make decisions every day; we want to know what the right thing is to do -- in domains from the financial to the gastronomic to the professional to the romantic. And surely, if somebody could really tell us how to do exactly the right thing at all possible times, that would be a tremendous gift.
我們每天都作出決定;我們想知道如何做 正確的事情——從金融 到烹飪到職業到愛情。 當然,如果有人能夠真的能告訴我們 在所有可能的時刻如何做正確的事情, 那可是一份非凡的智慧。
It turns out that, in fact, the world was given this gift in 1738 by a Dutch polymath named Daniel Bernoulli. And what I want to talk to you about today is what that gift is, and I also want to explain to you why it is that it hasn't made a damn bit of difference.
事實上,早在1738年,荷蘭博學家Daniel Bernoulli 就為世人提供了這項智慧。 我今天想講的是這項智慧是什麽, 以及,我想向各位解釋 爲什麽這項智慧根本就沒有影響我們的生活。
Now, this is Bernoulli's gift. This is a direct quote. And if it looks like Greek to you, it's because, well, it's Greek. But the simple English translation -- much less precise, but it captures the gist of what Bernoulli had to say -- was this: The expected value of any of our actions -- that is, the goodness that we can count on getting -- is the product of two simple things: the odds that this action will allow us to gain something, and the value of that gain to us.
這就是Bernoulli提供的智慧。這是他的原文。 如果這看上去像希臘文,因為,它就是希臘文。 把它簡單翻譯成英文——雖然不夠精確, 但它抓住了Bernoulli所表達的要點: 我們所有行為的預期值—— 即是,我們所能期望得到的好處—— 是以下兩個簡單事物的乘積: 這就是,該行為能使我們獲益的機率, 和我們從中所獲得的益處的價值。
In a sense, what Bernoulli was saying is, if we can estimate and multiply these two things, we will always know precisely how we should behave.
在某種意義上而言,Bernoulli所說的是, 如果我們能夠評估這兩者並把它們相乘, 我們就會精確的知道自己應該怎麼做。
Now, this simple equation, even for those of you who don't like equations, is something that you're quite used to. Here's an example: if I were to tell you, let's play a little coin toss game, and I'm going to flip a coin, and if it comes up heads, I'm going to pay you 10 dollars, but you have to pay four dollars for the privilege of playing with me, most of you would say, sure, I'll take that bet. Because you know that the odds of you winning are one half, the gain if you do is 10 dollars, that multiplies to five, and that's more than I'm charging you to play. So, the answer is, yes. This is what statisticians technically call a damn fine bet.
那麼,這個簡單的公式,即使對那些 不喜歡公式的人而言,也是很平常簡單的。 舉個例子:如果我告訴你,讓我們來玩 一個拋硬幣的遊戲,我會拋一個硬幣, 如果是正面朝上,我會給你10元, 但你得花4元來得到這個與我玩的機會, 你們大多數人會說,好,我參加。因為你們知道 你們贏的機會是一半,如果贏的話會得到10元, 兩者相乘得5,這比我收取的 費用要多。所以,你會回答,好。 這就是統計師們技術上所稱的很棒的賭局。
Now, the idea is simple when we're applying it to coin tosses, but in fact, it's not very simple in everyday life. People are horrible at estimating both of these things, and that's what I want to talk to you about today.
那麼,當我們把這個原理應用到拋硬幣上時,是很簡單的, 但實際上,在應用到日常生活中卻並不那麼簡單。 人們評估兩者的能力非常糟糕, 而這就是我今天想要談論的話題。
There are two kinds of errors people make when trying to decide what the right thing is to do, and those are errors in estimating the odds that they're going to succeed, and errors in estimating the value of their own success. Now, let me talk about the first one first. Calculating odds would seem to be something rather easy: there are six sides to a die, two sides to a coin, 52 cards in a deck. You all know what the likelihood is of pulling the ace of spades or of flipping a heads. But as it turns out, this is not a very easy idea to apply in everyday life. That's why Americans spend more -- I should say, lose more -- gambling than on all other forms of entertainment combined. The reason is, this isn't how people do odds.
人們在為自己的行為作決策時, 會犯兩種錯誤, 即錯誤地估計成功的機率, 以及錯誤地估計成功的價值。 首先讓我談談第一個錯誤。 計算機率看起來是件很簡單的事情: 一個骰子有六面,一個硬幣有兩面,一副撲克牌有52張。 你們都知道摸到黑桃A或者 拋出硬幣正面的可能性。 但結果是,這個道理如果應用於日常生活的時候, 就不那麼容易了。這也是爲什麽美國人花了更多的錢—— 我應該說,輸了更多的錢——在賭博上。 這些錢比所有其他娛樂形式費用的總和還要多。 原因就是,人們並不用這種方式來計算機率。
The way people figure odds requires that we first talk a bit about pigs. Now, the question I'm going to put to you is whether you think there are more dogs or pigs on leashes observed in any particular day in Oxford. And of course, you all know that the answer is dogs. And the way that you know that the answer is dogs is you quickly reviewed in memory the times you've seen dogs and pigs on leashes. It was very easy to remember seeing dogs, not so easy to remember pigs. And each one of you assumed that if dogs on leashes came more quickly to your mind, then dogs on leashes are more probable. That's not a bad rule of thumb, except when it is.
要談論人們計算機率的方式, 我們先得談談和豬有關的事宜。 我現在要問你們的問題是, 在牛津的任何一天, 你認為被拴的狗多還是被拴的豬多。 當然,你們都知道答案是狗。 你知道這個答案是狗 是靠你快速地回憶 看到狗和豬被拴的次數。 我們很容易記起見到被拴的狗, 但不那麼容易記起被拴的豬。而且你們每個人會假設 如果狗被拴的情景更快地出現在你的腦海中的話, 那麼狗被拴的可能性更大。 這個憑感覺的方法還不錯,但也有例外。
So, for example, here's a word puzzle. Are there more four-letter English words with R in the third place or R in the first place? Well, you check memory very briefly, make a quick scan, and it's awfully easy to say to yourself, Ring, Rang, Rung, and very hard to say to yourself, Pare, Park: they come more slowly. But in fact, there are many more words in the English language with R in the third than the first place. The reason words with R in the third place come slowly to your mind isn't because they're improbable, unlikely or infrequent. It's because the mind recalls words by their first letter. You kind of shout out the sound, S -- and the word comes. It's like the dictionary; it's hard to look things up by the third letter. So, this is an example of how this idea that the quickness with which things come to mind can give you a sense of their probability --
舉例說,這裡有個填詞遊戲。 在四個字母的英文單詞裡,第三個字母是R的單詞 與第一個字母是R的單詞哪個比較多? 嗯,你們會很快搜索下記憶,作一個快速掃描, 對你來說記起這些單詞太容易了,Ring,Rang,Rung, 而記起Pare,Park就很難:它們在腦海中出現得更慢。 而實際上,在英文裡,第三字母是R的單詞, 比第一字母是R的單詞要多得多。 你回憶起第三字母是R的單詞比較慢的原因, 不是因為它們不存在,不大可能出現或使用頻率少。 而是因為我們的大腦是用第一個字母來回憶單詞。 我們好像是用大腦在讀這個單詞的音,S——然後單詞就出來了。 很像詞典; 我們很難用第三個字母來查找單詞。 所以,這個例子說明一個道理, 即我們大腦回憶事物的速度, 會影響你對該事物出現的可能性的感覺——
how this idea could lead you astray. It's not just puzzles, though. For example, when Americans are asked to estimate the odds that they will die in a variety of interesting ways -- these are estimates of number of deaths per year per 200 million U.S. citizens. And these are just ordinary people like yourselves who are asked to guess how many people die from tornado, fireworks, asthma, drowning, etc. Compare these to the actual numbers.
而這個道理可能會讓你出現誤差。這並不僅限於填詞遊戲。 譬如說,當讓美國人估計他們 奇奇怪怪的死因的機率時—— 這些估計數據是以每年每兩億美國人 的死亡人數而計。 他們只是一些是跟你我一樣的普通人。問他們 猜測一下會有多少人死於颶風,煙花,哮喘,溺水等等。 讓我們跟實際數據比較一下。
Now, you see a very interesting pattern here, which is first of all, two things are vastly over-estimated, namely tornadoes and fireworks. Two things are vastly underestimated: dying by drowning and dying by asthma. Why? When was the last time that you picked up a newspaper and the headline was, "Boy dies of Asthma?" It's not interesting because it's so common. It's very easy for all of us to bring to mind instances of news stories or newsreels where we've seen tornadoes devastating cities, or some poor schmuck who's blown his hands off with a firework on the Fourth of July. Drownings and asthma deaths don't get much coverage. They don't come quickly to mind, and as a result, we vastly underestimate them.
你們可以看到一個非常有趣的現象,首先, 兩者被大幅高估,即颶風和煙花; 兩者被大幅低估: 溺水和哮喘。爲什麽? 你們還記得上次拿起一張報紙, 上面的的大標題是“男孩死於哮喘”是什麽時候嗎? 這沒什麽稀奇因為太普通了。 對我們來說,非常容易記起 我們曾看到報紙和電視上的新聞報導 諸如颶風摧毀城市,或是某個可憐的笨蛋 在國慶節被煙花炸掉雙手。 對因溺水和哮喘而死的報導並不多。 我們並不會很快記起這類事件,而結果就是, 我們極度低估了它們。
Indeed, this is kind of like the Sesame Street game of "Which thing doesn't belong?" And you're right to say it's the swimming pool that doesn't belong, because the swimming pool is the only thing on this slide that's actually very dangerous. The way that more of you are likely to die than the combination of all three of the others that you see on the slide.
的確,這就有點像芝麻街遊戲 "哪樣東西與眾不同?" 你說游泳池不同 就對了,因為游泳池是 這張上唯一非常危險的東西。 也就是說,你們死於游泳池的可能性 比這張圖片上其他三種加起來還要高。
The lottery is an excellent example, of course -- an excellent test-case of people's ability to compute probabilities. And economists -- forgive me, for those of you who play the lottery -- but economists, at least among themselves, refer to the lottery as a stupidity tax, because the odds of getting any payoff by investing your money in a lottery ticket are approximately equivalent to flushing the money directly down the toilet -- which, by the way, doesn't require that you actually go to the store and buy anything.
彩票是一個很棒的例子,一個測試 人們計算可能性的能力的例子。 先對那些買彩票的朋友說聲抱歉, 但經濟學家們,至少在他們之間,把彩票稱為 愚蠢之稅,因為投資買彩票 而中獎的可能性 跟把錢直接沖進馬桶差不多 而且,沖馬桶還 不需要你親自去彩票店跑一趟。
Why in the world would anybody ever play the lottery? Well, there are many answers, but one answer surely is, we see a lot of winners. Right? When this couple wins the lottery, or Ed McMahon shows up at your door with this giant check -- how the hell do you cash things that size, I don't know. We see this on TV; we read about it in the paper. When was the last time that you saw extensive interviews with everybody who lost? Indeed, if we required that television stations run a 30-second interview with each loser every time they interview a winner, the 100 million losers in the last lottery would require nine-and-a-half years of your undivided attention just to watch them say, "Me? I lost." "Me? I lost." Now, if you watch nine-and-a-half years of television -- no sleep, no potty breaks -- and you saw loss after loss after loss, and then at the end there's 30 seconds of, "and I won," the likelihood that you would play the lottery is very small.
究竟世上爲什麽會有人想買彩票呢? 嗯,有許多答案,但其中肯定包括這個答案: 我們看到許多中大獎的人。對吧?當這對夫妻贏了大獎, 或Ed McMahon帶著一張巨大的支票來到你家門口時—— 我可不知道你怎麼用那麼巨大的支票去換錢。 我們在電視上看到這些,在報紙上讀到這些。 你們什麽時候見過對每個輸錢的人 所作出的大量採訪呢? 的確,如果我們要求電視台 每次採訪大獎得主的時候, 必須播放對每個輸家一段30秒的採訪, 那麼上次開獎後你得全神貫注地花上9年半的時間 來看那1億輸家採訪,你會看到他們說, "我?我輸了。" "我?我輸了。" 那麼,如果你看了九年半的電視—— 不睡不拉——你就會往復循環地看到輸輸輸, 然後最後的30秒"我贏了", 這樣你去買彩票的可能性就很小了。
Look, I can prove this to you: here's a little lottery. There's 10 tickets in this lottery. Nine of them have been sold to these individuals. It costs you a dollar to buy the ticket and, if you win, you get 20 bucks. Is this a good bet? Well, Bernoulli tells us it is. The expected value of this lottery is two dollars; this is a lottery in which you should invest your money. And most people say, "OK, I'll play."
來,我可以證明給你:這兒有個小彩票。 一共有10張彩票。 其中9張已經賣給其他不同的人了, 1元1張票,如果你贏了, 你得到20元。值得賭嗎? 嗯,Bernoulli告訴我們肯定的答案: 這個彩票的預期價值是2元, 你應該投資購買該彩票。 大多數人會說,"好,我會買。"
Now, a slightly different version of this lottery: imagine that the nine tickets are all owned by one fat guy named Leroy. Leroy has nine tickets; there's one left. Do you want it? Most people won't play this lottery. Now, you can see the odds of winning haven't changed, but it's now fantastically easy to imagine who's going to win. It's easy to see Leroy getting the check, right? You can't say to yourself, "I'm as likely to win as anybody," because you're not as likely to win as Leroy. The fact that all those tickets are owned by one guy changes your decision to play, even though it does nothing whatsoever to the odds.
現在,稍微改變一下彩票規則: 假設9張票全部 給一個叫Leroy的胖子買走了。 Leroy有9張票;那就只剩下1張。 你還會買嗎?大多數人不想買了。 你可以看到贏的機率並沒有改變, 但現在非常容易想像出誰會是贏家。 很容易看出Leroy會贏獎,對吧? 你不會對自己說,"我跟其他人得獎的機會一樣大。" 因為你跟Leroy得獎的機會不一樣大。 所有其他彩票被一個人買走的事實 改變了你是否要買的決定, 儘管你知道你贏的機率一點都沒變。
Now, estimating odds, as difficult as it may seem, is a piece of cake compared to trying to estimate value: trying to say what something is worth, how much we'll enjoy it, how much pleasure it will give us. I want to talk now about errors in value. How much is this Big Mac worth? Is it worth 25 dollars? Most of you have the intuition that it's not -- you wouldn't pay that for it.
那麼,評估可能性的難度,雖然看起來很難, 但與評估價值相比較,簡直是小菜一碟: 評估價值就是試圖找出某樣東西的價值,我們對它的享受程度, 它會帶給我們多少快樂。 我現在想談下價值的錯誤。 這個巨無霸漢堡包值多少錢?值25元嗎? 大多數人直覺它不值—— 你不會花那麼多錢買它。
But in fact, to decide whether a Big Mac is worth 25 dollars requires that you ask one, and only one question, which is: What else can I do with 25 dollars? If you've ever gotten on one of those long-haul flights to Australia and realized that they're not going to serve you any food, but somebody in the row in front of you has just opened the McDonald's bag, and the smell of golden arches is wafting over the seat, you think, I can't do anything else with this 25 dollars for 16 hours. I can't even set it on fire -- they took my cigarette lighter! Suddenly, 25 dollars for a Big Mac might be a good deal.
而實際上,決定一個巨無霸漢堡是否值25元, 只需要你問一個問題而已,即: 我還能用25元做什麽? 如果你曾坐過那種去澳大利亞的長途航班, 而且得知他們不會提供任何食物, 但你前排有個人剛剛打開了 麥當勞的紙袋,那金黃色圓麵包的香味 從座位上方飄了過來,這時你會想, 我在這16個小時用這25元什麽也不能做。 我甚至不能點燃它——他們把我的打火機收走了! 突然,25元買個巨無霸漢堡可能是筆好交易。
On the other hand, if you're visiting an underdeveloped country, and 25 dollars buys you a gourmet meal, it's exorbitant for a Big Mac. Why were you all sure that the answer to the question was no, before I'd even told you anything about the context? Because most of you compared the price of this Big Mac to the price you're used to paying. Rather than asking, "What else can I do with my money," comparing this investment to other possible investments, you compared to the past. And this is a systematic error people make. What you knew is, you paid three dollars in the past; 25 is outrageous.
相反的情況,如果你去參觀一個發展中國家, 25元就可以讓你大快朵頤,而買巨無霸漢堡就太貴了。 爲什麽在我還沒告訴你們所處的情境時, 你們都確定對這個問題的答案是"不"呢? 因為你們大多數人將這個巨無霸漢堡的價格 與你們過去常付的價格比較。而不是問, "我還能用這錢幹什麼",即將這項投資與 其他可能的投資比較,你們是與過去的情境比較。 而這是人們犯的一個系統性錯誤。 你所知道的是,你在過去是花3元;如果花25元就太過分了。
This is an error, and I can prove it to you by showing the kinds of irrationalities to which it leads. For example, this is, of course, one of the most delicious tricks in marketing, is to say something used to be higher, and suddenly it seems like a very good deal. When people are asked about these two different jobs: a job where you make 60K, then 50K, then 40K, a job where you're getting a salary cut each year, and one in which you're getting a salary increase, people like the second job better than the first, despite the fact they're all told they make much less money. Why? Because they had the sense that declining wages are worse than rising wages, even when the total amount of wages is higher in the declining period. Here's another nice example.
這是一個錯誤,我可以證明給大家看, 我會展示給大家看它可以導致什麼樣的非理性。 舉例來說, 一個最有效的營銷技巧是, 告訴顧客商品的原價更高, 這樣的話,現價一下子就看起來很划算了。 當人們被問及兩份工作時: 第一份工作你的年薪先是6萬元,然後5萬元,然後4萬元, 每年都會減薪, 第二份工作是每年都會加薪, 人們更喜歡第二份工作,儘管事實上 他們都被告知會賺得更少。爲什麽會這樣? 因為他們感覺逐年遞減的工資比 遞增的工資要差,儘管總數算起來前者要比 後者多。這裡有另外一個例子。
Here's a $2,000 Hawaiian vacation package; it's now on sale for 1,600. Assuming you wanted to go to Hawaii, would you buy this package? Most people say they would. Here's a slightly different story: $2,000 Hawaiian vacation package is now on sale for 700 dollars, so you decide to mull it over for a week. By the time you get to the ticket agency, the best fares are gone -- the package now costs 1,500. Would you buy it? Most people say, no. Why? Because it used to cost 700, and there's no way I'm paying 1,500 for something that was 700 last week.
這是一套價值二千元的夏威夷假日套票,現在促銷價是一千六百元 假設你想去夏威夷,你願意買這個套票嗎? 大多數人會同意購買。那麼把條件稍微改變一下: 2000元的夏威夷假日套票現在只售700元, 於是你考慮了一個星期。 等你來到售票代理的時,最好的價格過期了—— 現在的價格是一千五百元。你還會買嗎?大多數人會說,不會。 爲什麽?因為它過去的價格是七百元,而我絕不會花一千五百元 買上個星期只有七百元的東西。
This tendency to compare to the past is causing people to pass up the better deal. In other words, a good deal that used to be a great deal is not nearly as good as an awful deal that was once a horrible deal.
人們喜歡與過去的事物比較的傾向 導致人們錯過了更好的交易。換句話說, 一個划算的交易,會因為它之前更划算而導致現在顯得不那麼划算, 同樣,一個糟糕的交易,會因為之前更糟糕而導致現在顯得不那麼糟糕。
Here's another example of how comparing to the past can befuddle our decisions. Imagine that you're going to the theater. You're on your way to the theater. In your wallet you have a ticket, for which you paid 20 dollars. You also have a 20-dollar bill. When you arrive at the theater, you discover that somewhere along the way you've lost the ticket. Would you spend your remaining money on replacing it? Most people answer, no. Now, let's just change one thing in this scenario. You're on your way to the theater, and in your wallet you have two 20-dollar bills. When you arrive you discover you've lost one of them. Would you spend your remaining 20 dollars on a ticket? Well, of course, I went to the theater to see the play. What does the loss of 20 dollars along the way have to do?
這是另外一個跟過去比較是 如何迷惑我們的決策的例子。 假設你要去劇院。 你在去劇院的路上。 你錢包里放著你花了20元買的一張票。 你也有一張20元的鈔票。 當你到達劇院時, 你發現不知怎樣電影票在路上丟了。 你會花剩下的錢再買一張嗎? 大多數人的答案是,不會。 那麼,讓我們把這個情境改變一點。 你在去劇院的路上, 在你的錢包裡有兩張20元的鈔票。 當你到達劇院時你發現丟了一張。 你會花剩下的20元買電影票嗎? 嗯,當然了:我是去劇院看電影的。 在路上丟了20元跟這個有什麽關係?
Now, just in case you're not getting it, here's a schematic of what happened, OK? (Laughter) Along the way, you lost something. In both cases, it was a piece of paper. In one case, it had a U.S. president on it; in the other case it didn't. What the hell difference should it make? The difference is that when you lost the ticket you say to yourself, I'm not paying twice for the same thing. You compare the cost of the play now -- 40 dollars -- to the cost that it used to have -- 20 dollars -- and you say it's a bad deal. Comparing with the past causes many of the problems that behavioral economists and psychologists identify in people's attempts to assign value. But even when we compare with the possible, instead of the past, we still make certain kinds of mistakes. And I'm going to show you one or two of them.
萬一你還不太明白, 我用圖表來表示剛才所發生的。 (笑聲) 在路上,你丟了點東西。 在兩種情況下,丟的都是一張紙。 只不過一張紙上有美國總統頭像在上面,另外一張沒有。 那又有什麽區別呢? 區別其實在於當你丟了電影票的時候,你對自己說, 我不會為同樣的事情付兩次錢。 你把這次看電影要花的費用——40元—— 與以前的比較——20元——你會認為它是個差勁的交易。 與過去價值比較這一現象, 使行為經濟學家和心理學家發現了 人們在嘗試評估價值中所犯的許多錯誤。 但甚至當我們只是與可能的情況,而非過去作比較時, 我們仍然會犯某些錯誤。 我會講其中一兩種錯誤給大家聽。
One of the things we know about comparison: that when we compare one thing to the other, it changes its value. So in 1992, this fellow, George Bush, for those of us who were kind of on the liberal side of the political spectrum, didn't seem like such a great guy. Suddenly, we're almost longing for him to return. (Laughter) The comparison changes how we evaluate him.
對於比較,我們都知道的是: 當我們拿一件東西跟另外一件比較時,它的價值就變了。 在1992年,這個傢伙,George Bush,對我們其中一些 政治上傾向於自由的人們來說, 看上去並不怎麼樣。 現在呢,我們突然渴望他回來了。 (笑聲) 比較改變了我們如何評價他。
Now, retailers knew this long before anybody else did, of course, and they use this wisdom to help you -- spare you the undue burden of money. And so a retailer, if you were to go into a wine shop and you had to buy a bottle of wine, and you see them here for eight, 27 and 33 dollars, what would you do? Most people don't want the most expensive, they don't want the least expensive. So, they will opt for the item in the middle. If you're a smart retailer, then, you will put a very expensive item that nobody will ever buy on the shelf, because suddenly the $33 wine doesn't look as expensive in comparison.
其實,零售商們比任何人都早知道一個道理, 而且他們使用這個道理來幫助你—— 花掉你更多的錢。 如果你去一個賣酒的商店, 你得買一瓶酒, 有三種價格分別是8元,27元,33元,你會選哪種? 大多數人不想要最貴的, 也不想要最便宜的。 於是,他們會選中間的價格。 如果你是個聰明的零售商,那麼,你把一瓶非常貴 而永遠不可能有人買的的酒放在貨架上, 因此突然間,相比較而言,33元的酒看起來就不那麼貴了。
So I'm telling you something you already knew: namely, that comparison changes the value of things. Here's why that's a problem: the problem is that when you get that $33 bottle of wine home, it won't matter what it used to be sitting on the shelf next to. The comparisons we make when we are appraising value, where we're trying to estimate how much we'll like things, are not the same comparisons we'll be making when we consume them. This problem of shifting comparisons can bedevil our attempts to make rational decisions.
其實我在告訴你們已經知道的道理, 即,比較會改變事物的價值。 爲什麽它是個問題呢: 問題是當你把33美元的酒帶回家時, 它在商店里跟哪瓶酒擺在一起已經不重要了。 我們在評估價值的時候會作比較, 我們試圖通過比較來評估我們將會多喜歡它們, 而這種比較跟我們在享用它們的時候所作的比較是不同的。 這種轉移比較的問題會 在我們嘗試作出理性選擇時困擾我們。
Let me just give you an example. I have to show you something from my own lab, so let me sneak this in. These are subjects coming to an experiment to be asked the simplest of all questions: How much will you enjoy eating potato chips one minute from now? They're sitting in a room with potato chips in front of them. For some of the subjects, sitting in the far corner of a room is a box of Godiva chocolates, and for others is a can of Spam. In fact, these items that are sitting in the room change how much the subjects think they're going to enjoy the potato chips. Namely, those who are looking at Spam think potato chips are going to be quite tasty; those who are looking at Godiva chocolate think they won't be nearly so tasty. Of course, what happens when they eat the potato chips? Well, look, you didn't need a psychologist to tell you that when you have a mouthful of greasy, salty, crispy, delicious snacks, what's sitting in the corner of the room makes not a damn bit of difference to your gustatory experience. Nonetheless, their predictions are perverted by a comparison that then does not carry through and change their experience.
我再舉一個例子。 我要給你們看我自己實驗室的一項實驗,來看這個。 這些參與實驗的對象要回答 一個最最簡單的問題: 一分鐘後你對吃馬鈴薯片的享受程度會是怎樣? 他們坐在屋子里,薯片放在他們前面。 其中一些實驗對象的屋子遠角 放了一盒Godiva的巧克力,其他人的屋子遠角是放了一罐Spam午餐肉。 實際上,這些放在屋子里的東西改變了 實驗對象認為他們將會享用薯片的程度。 也就是說,那些看到Spam午餐肉的人 認為薯片會很好吃; 那些看著Godiva巧克力的人 認為薯片不怎麼樣。 當然,當他們真正吃的時候會怎樣呢? 嗯,你們根本不需要一個心理學家來告訴你們 當你滿嘴是油油的,鹹鹹的,脆脆的,美味的點心時, 這屋子的角落里放著什麽東西 難道會對你的味覺體驗造成一丁點的影響嗎? 不管怎樣,他們的預測被一個根本不會影響到 他們實際體驗的比較給破壞了。
You've all experienced this yourself, even if you've never come into our lab to eat potato chips. So here's a question: You want to buy a car stereo. The dealer near your house sells this particular stereo for 200 dollars, but if you drive across town, you can get it for 100 bucks. So would you drive to get 50 percent off, saving 100 dollars? Most people say they would. They can't imagine buying it for twice the price when, with one trip across town, they can get it for half off.
就算你們從未到實驗室吃薯片,你們也都 有過這種經歷,那麼,問題來了: 你想買套汽車音響。 你家附近的經銷商買這款音響的價格是200元, 如果你開車穿過市區去買,你花100元就行了。 那麼你願意開車去一趟,以節省百分之50,省下100元嗎? 大多數人會願意。 當開車跑一趟,可以省一半價錢時, 他們絕不願意花兩倍的價格來買。
Now, let's imagine instead you wanted to buy a car that had a stereo, and the dealer near your house had it for 31,000. But if you drove across town, you could get it for 30,900. Would you drive to get it? At this point, 0.003 savings -- the 100 dollars. Most people say, no, I'm going to schlep across town to save 100 bucks on the purchase of a car?
現在,讓我們假設一下,你想買一輛帶音響的車而不是音響, 你家附近的經銷商賣三萬一千元。 如果你駕車穿過市區去買,你可以以三萬零九百元成交。 你會開車跑一趟去買嗎?這時,節省的100元只佔0.003。 大多數人會說,不,我難道會爲了省100元 而費那麼大勁穿過市區跑一趟嗎?
This kind of thinking drives economists crazy, and it should. Because this 100 dollars that you save -- hello! -- doesn't know where it came from. It doesn't know what you saved it on. When you go to buy groceries with it, it doesn't go, I'm the money saved on the car stereo, or, I'm the dumb money saved on the car. It's money. And if a drive across town is worth 100 bucks, it's worth 100 bucks no matter what you're saving it on. People don't think that way. That's why they don't know whether their mutual fund manager is taking 0.1 percent or 0.15 percent of their investment, but they clip coupons to save one dollar off of toothpaste.
這種思維讓經濟學家們抓狂,的確是這樣。 因為你節省的這100元——聽好了—— 這100元它自己可不知道自己從哪兒來的。 它不知道你是從何處節省出來的。 你用它去買雜貨時,它不會說, 我是從汽車音響上省下來的,或, 我是從汽車上省下來的傻錢。它還是錢耶。 如果駕車穿過市區跑一趟值100元的話,那它就值100元, 不管你是從哪裡省出來的。但人們不這麼想。 這也是爲什麽他們不知道他們的共同基金經理 是從他們的投資中抽取百分之0.1還是0.15, 但他們卻會收集牙膏盒上的優惠券來省一元。
Now, you can see, this is the problem of shifting comparisons, because what you're doing is, you're comparing the 100 bucks to the purchase that you're making, but when you go to spend that money you won't be making that comparison. You've all had this experience.
現在,你看出來了吧,這就是轉移比較造成的問題, 因為你所作的是,你在用這100元 與你所購買之物比較, 但當你去花這100元的時候,你是不會作這個比較的。 你們都有過這種經歷。
If you're an American, for example, you've probably traveled in France. And at some point you may have met a couple from your own hometown, and you thought, "Oh, my God, these people are so warm. They're so nice to me. I mean, compared to all these people who hate me when I try to speak their language and hate me more when I don't, these people are just wonderful." And so you tour France with them, and then you get home and you invite them over for dinner, and what do you find? Compared to your regular friends, they are boring and dull, right? Because in this new context, the comparison is very, very different. In fact, you find yourself disliking them enough almost to qualify for French citizenship.
如果你是一個美國人,舉例來說,你可能去過法國。 你可能在某個時刻遇到一對 來自家鄉的夫婦,並且你覺得, "哇,他們真熱情。他們對我真好。 我是說,我試著說法語時,那些法國佬不喜歡我, 我不說時他們更不喜歡我,跟這些法國佬比較, 那對夫婦真是太好了。" 於是你跟他們一起遊覽法國, 回家後你請他們來吃晚餐, 你會發現什麽? 與你的正常朋友比較, 他們顯得無聊而乏味,對吧?因為在這個新的環境下, 比較變得非常非常不同。實際上,你會發現 你差不多跟法國佬一樣不喜歡他們了。
Now, you have exactly the same problem when you shop for a stereo. You go to the stereo store, you see two sets of speakers -- these big, boxy, monoliths, and these little, sleek speakers, and you play them, and you go, you know, I do hear a difference: the big ones sound a little better. And so you buy them, and you bring them home, and you entirely violate the décor of your house. And the problem, of course, is that this comparison you made in the store is a comparison you'll never make again. What are the odds that years later you'll turn on the stereo and go, "Sounds so much better than those little ones," which you can't even remember hearing.
嗯,你去購買音響時會遇到一模一樣的問題。 你去音響店,你看到兩種音響—— 這些大大的,方方的,像石頭一樣的,還有這些小巧閃亮的音響, 然後你播放它們,你會想,嗯,我是聽出點不同來了: 大個的效果要好一些。 於是你買了它們,帶回家, 然後你完全打亂了房間的裝飾風格。 問題出在哪裡?當然是你在店裡所作的比較, 是你永遠沒有機會再作的比較。 難道你會有機會在幾年后打開音響然後想, "聽起來確實比那些小傢伙好哦," 而你根本就不會記得當時曾聽過哪個了。
The problem of shifting comparisons is even more difficult when these choices are arrayed over time. People have a lot of trouble making decisions about things that will happen at different points in time. And what psychologists and behavioral economists have discovered is that by and large people use two simple rules. So let me give you one very easy problem, a second very easy problem and then a third, hard, problem.
在選項跨越時間的情況下, 轉移比較的問題會更困難。 人們在對發生在不同時刻的事情作決策時, 會有許多困難。 心理學家和行為經濟學家所發現的是, 總的來說,人們使用兩種簡單的規則。 我先提一個簡單的問題,然後再一個簡單的問題, 然後第三個很難的問題。
Here's the first easy problem: You can have 60 dollars now or 50 dollars now. Which would you prefer? This is what we call a one-item IQ test, OK? All of us, I hope, prefer more money, and the reason is, we believe more is better than less.
第一個簡單的問題是: 你可以馬上得到60元或50元。你喜歡哪個選擇? 這是我們所說的單題智商測試,好吧? 我希望我們所有人都喜歡更多的錢,原因是, 我們相信多比少好。
Here's the second problem: You can have 60 dollars today or 60 dollars in a month. Which would you prefer? Again, an easy decision, because we all know that now is better than later. What's hard in our decision-making is when these two rules conflict. For example, when you're offered 50 dollars now or 60 dollars in a month. This typifies a lot of situations in life in which you will gain by waiting, but you have to be patient. What do we know? What do people do in these kinds of situations? Well, by and large people are enormously impatient. That is, they require interest rates in the hundred or thousands of percents in order to delay gratification and wait until next month for the extra 10 dollars. Maybe that isn't so remarkable, but what is remarkable is how easy it is to make this impatience go away by simply changing when the delivery of these monetary units will happen. Imagine that you can have 50 dollars in a year -- that's 12 months -- or 60 dollars in 13 months. What do we find now? People are gladly willing to wait: as long as they're waiting 12, they might as well wait 13.
第二個問題是: 你可以今天得到60元或一個月後得到60元。你喜歡哪個? 還是一個很簡單的決定, 因為我們都知道馬上得到比遲延要好。 而當這兩條規則衝突時,我們作決策就很難了。 舉例來說,當讓你選擇馬上得到50元或一個月後得到60元。 這代表了生活中的許多情況,即你將通過等待獲益, 但你得有耐心。 我們知道什麽?在這些情況下,人們會怎麼做? 嗯,總的來說,大多數人都非常缺乏耐心。 也就是說,得給他們百分之幾百 或幾千的利息,才會讓他們願意推遲得到的滿足感, 並等到下個月來得到那額外的10元。 也許這看起來沒什麼了不起,可了不起的是, 我們可以很輕易的趕走這種急躁,只是通過很簡單的 改變發放錢的時間而已。 假設你在一年後可以得到50元——即12個月—— 或13個月後得到60元。 我們會得出什麽結論? 人們很願意得到:如果他們得等12個月, 他們也願意等13個月。
What makes this dynamic inconsistency happen? Comparison. Troubling comparison. Let me show you.
是什麽導致這種動態不一致性呢? 比較。令人困惑的比較。我來展示一下。
This is just a graph showing the results that I just suggested you would show if I gave you time to respond, which is, people find that the subjective value of 50 is higher than the subjective value of 60 when they'll be delivered in now or one month, respectively -- a 30-day delay -- but they show the reverse pattern when you push the entire decision off into the future a year. Now, why in the world do you get this pattern of results?
這張圖展示了問題的答案, 如果我給你們時間來回答,你們的答案就是這樣,也就是說, 人們發現馬上得到50元的主觀價值要比 一個月後得到60元的主觀價值高 ——30天的遲延—— 但若將兩者都向後推遲一年的話, 其展示的模式卻相反。 那麼,究竟我們爲什麽會有這樣的結果呢?
These guys can tell us. What you see here are two lads, one of them larger than the other: the fireman and the fiddler. They are going to recede towards the vanishing point in the horizon, and I want you to notice two things. At no point will the fireman look taller than the fiddler. No point. However, the difference between them seems to be getting smaller. First it's an inch in your view, then it's a quarter-inch, then a half-inch, and then finally they go off the edge of the earth.
這兩個傢伙會告訴我們答案。 你們看到這兒有兩個小傢伙, 其中一個比另外一個要大:消防員和小提琴手。 他們會後退一直到消失在地平線, 我想讓大家注意兩個事情。 任何距離消防員都不可能比小提琴手高。任何距離。 然而,他們兩者之間的差別似乎變得越來越小。 開始的時候在你的視線里他們相差一英寸,然後是四分之三英寸, 然後是半英寸,然後最終他們消失在地平線上。
Here are the results of what I just showed you. This is the subjective height -- the height you saw of these guys at various points. And I want you to see that two things are true. One, the farther away they are, the smaller they look; and two, the fireman is always bigger than the fiddler. But watch what happens when we make some of them disappear. Right. At a very close distance, the fiddler looks taller than the fireman, but at a far distance their normal, their true, relations are preserved. As Plato said, what space is to size, time is to value. These are the results of the hard problem I gave you: 60 now or 50 in a month? And these are subjective values, and what you can see is, our two rules are preserved.
這就是我剛才展示的結果。 這是主觀高度—— 你們所看到的在不同距離的兩人的高度。 我想讓大家注意兩件事是真實的。 第一,他們距離越遠,看起來就越小; 第二,消防員總是比小提琴手高大。 但是注意當我們讓其中一些消失時,會發生什麽?沒錯。 在一段很近的距離,小提琴手看上去比消防員高, 但如果相距很遠 他們正常的,真實的關係會得以保留。 如柏拉圖所說,空間之於尺寸,時間之於價值。 這些就是我所提問題——馬上得到60元或一個月後得到50元—— 的結果。 這些是主觀價值, 你可以看到,我們的兩條規則沒有改變。
People always think more is better than less: 60 is always better than 50, and they always think now is better than later: the bars on this side are higher than the bars on this side. Watch what happens when we drop some out. Suddenly we have the dynamic inconsistency that puzzled us. We have the tendency for people to go for 50 dollars now over waiting a month, but not if that decision is far in the future. Notice something interesting that this implies -- namely, that when people get to the future, they will change their minds. That is, as that month 12 approaches, you will say, what was I thinking, waiting an extra month for 60 dollars? I'll take the 50 dollars now.
人們總是認為多比少好: 60要比50好; 並且他們總是認為馬上得到比遲延要好: 這邊的條形柱要比這邊的高。 當我們撤掉一些條形柱時,注意會出現什麽。 突然間,那些困擾我們的動態不一致性出現了。 我們可以看到,人們有寧可馬上得到50元而 不願意等一個月的傾向,但如果決策在很遠的未來,結果就不同了。 注意這會導致什麽有趣的推論——即 當人們走近未來時,他們會改變想法。 也就是說,當第十二個月來臨時,你會說, 我在想什麽,爲了60元等一個月? 我還不如現在就拿那50元。
Well, the question with which I'd like to end is this: If we're so damn stupid, how did we get to the moon? Because I could go on for about two hours with evidence of people's inability to estimate odds and inability to estimate value.
嗯,在結束之前,我想問的問題是: 如果我們這麼蠢不可及,我們是怎麼登月的? 因為我可以再花兩個小時來列舉證據 證明人們在評估機率與評估價值方面的無能。
The answer to this question, I think, is an answer you've already heard in some of the talks, and I dare say you will hear again: namely, that our brains were evolved for a very different world than the one in which we are living. They were evolved for a world in which people lived in very small groups, rarely met anybody who was terribly different from themselves, had rather short lives in which there were few choices and the highest priority was to eat and mate today.
問題的答案,我想,你們已經在其他一些演講中 聽過了,我敢說你們還會再聽到: 我們的大腦是從一個與我們 現在所居住的世界截然不同的世界進化而來的。 在大腦進化過程中, 人類是以小群體居住的, 很少遇見跟他們自己差異很大的人, 他們的壽命很短,選擇不多, 並且他們的最高優先選項是當下進食和交配。
Bernoulli's gift, Bernoulli's little formula, allows us, it tells us how we should think in a world for which nature never designed us. That explains why we are so bad at using it, but it also explains why it is so terribly important that we become good, fast. We are the only species on this planet that has ever held its own fate in its hands. We have no significant predators, we're the masters of our physical environment; the things that normally cause species to become extinct are no longer any threat to us. The only thing -- the only thing -- that can destroy us and doom us are our own decisions. If we're not here in 10,000 years, it's going to be because we could not take advantage of the gift given to us by a young Dutch fellow in 1738, because we underestimated the odds of our future pains and overestimated the value of our present pleasures.
Bernoulli的智慧,Bernoulli的小公式允許我們,告訴我們 我們應該如何在這個世界上思考,雖然自然界並沒有把我們設計成這樣思考。 這也解釋了我們爲什麽使用這公式的能力如此糟糕,但也解釋了 爲什麽它如此重要以至於我們現在變得如此之好,如此之快。 我們是這顆行星上唯一的 把握自己命運的物種。 我們沒有天敵, 我們是物理環境的主人; 環境通常是導致物種滅絕的原因, 但卻不再能夠威脅到我們。 只有一樣東西——唯一能夠破壞和毀滅我們的是 我們自己的決定。 如果一萬年後我們滅絕了,那將會是因為 我們不能很好的利用這個 由1738年一個年輕的荷蘭人提供給我們的智慧, 因為我們低估了我們未來的痛苦 而且高估了我們眼下的快樂。
Thank you. (Applause)
謝謝。 (掌聲)
Chris Anderson: That was remarkable. We have time for some questions for Dan Gilbert. One and two.
Chris Anderson:非常精彩。 我們還有點時間讓大家向Dan Gilbert提問題。第一個和第二個。
Bill Lyell: Would you say that this mechanism is in part how terrorism actually works to frighten us, and is there some way that we could counteract that?
Bill Lyell:你認為在某種程度上, 這種機制是導致我們害怕恐怖主義的原因嗎? 我們是否有辦法來克服呢?
Dan Gilbert: I actually was consulting recently with the Department of Homeland Security, which generally believes that American security dollars should go to making borders safer. I tried to point out to them that terrorism was a name based on people's psychological reaction to a set of events, and that if they were concerned about terrorism they might ask what causes terror and how can we stop people from being terrified, rather than -- not rather than, but in addition to stopping the atrocities that we're all concerned about. Surely the kinds of play that at least American media give to -- and forgive me, but in raw numbers these are very tiny accidents. We already know, for example, in the United States, more people have died as a result of not taking airplanes -- because they were scared -- and driving on highways, than were killed in 9/11. OK? If I told you that there was a plague that was going to kill 15,000 Americans next year, you might be alarmed if you didn't find out it was the flu. These are small-scale accidents, and we should be wondering whether they should get the kind of play, the kind of coverage, that they do. Surely that causes people to overestimate the likelihood that they'll be hurt in these various ways, and gives power to the very people who want to frighten us.
Dan Gilbert:其實我最近在給 國土安全局作諮詢,他們普遍相信 美國的安全經費應該用在使邊境更安全的措施上。 我嘗試告訴他們,恐怖主義是一個 基於人們對一系列事件的心理反應的名詞, 而如果他們擔心恐怖主義,他們可能會問 是什麼原因產生恐懼以及我們如何阻止人們被嚇壞, 與其——不是與其,而是在此基礎上 再去阻止我們都擔心的暴行。 當然,至少美國媒體作出的報導—— 原諒我這麼說,但是從數據上看,這些是機率很小的意外事件。 我們已經知道,譬如,在美國, 死於不坐飛機的人—— 因為他們害怕——於是駕車上高速公路, 要比911事件的遇難者要多。對吧? 假設我告訴你,有一種疾病 將在明年導致1萬5千個美國人死亡, 你可能會感到驚慌,如果你不知道我說的其實是感冒。 這是些小概率事件,我們應該思考, 它們是否值得 像現在這樣得到這麼多的報導。 理所當然地,這些報導會導致人們高估 他們可能會在這些不同情況下受傷害的可能性, 同時也給了那些想恐嚇我們的人更大的權力。
CA: Dan, I'd like to hear more on this. So, you're saying that our response to terror is, I mean, it's a form of mental bug? Talk more about it.
CA:Dan,我希望你能多談下這個問題。那麼,你是說, 我們對恐怖事件的反應是,我是說,它是一種心理問題? 能否就此多談一下。
DG: It's out-sized. I mean, look. If Australia disappears tomorrow, terror is probably the right response. That's an awful large lot of very nice people. On the other hand, when a bus blows up and 30 people are killed, more people than that were killed by not using their seatbelts in the same country. Is terror the right response?
DG:它是被誇大了的。我的意思是,看。 如果澳大利亞明天消失了, 也許這才叫真正的恐怖。 那可是好多好多善良的人。但另一方面, 當一輛公共汽車爆炸,30人遇難, 而同一個國家有更多的人 因為沒有繫安全帶而死亡。 我們應感到恐怖嗎?
CA: What causes the bug? Is it the drama of the event -- that it's so spectacular? Is it the fact that it's an intentional attack by, quote, outsiders? What is it?
CA:是什麽導致這個心理問題呢?是因為事件的發生 太過驚人嗎? 是因為它是一場國際襲擊嗎?由"外人"發起的? 到底是什麽原因呢?
DG: Yes. It's a number of things, and you hit on several of them. First, it's a human agent trying to kill us -- it's not a tree falling on us by accident. Second, these are enemies who may want to strike and hurt us again. People are being killed for no reason instead of good reason -- as if there's good reason, but sometimes people think there are. So there are a number of things that together make this seem like a fantastic event, but let's not play down the fact that newspapers sell when people see something in it they want to read. So there's a large role here played by the media, who want these things to be as spectacular as they possibly can.
DG:是的,有幾個原因,你說對了其中幾個。 首先,想殺死我們的是人—— 而不是一棵樹意外砸到我們身上。 其次,這是一些想要再次襲擊傷害我們的敵人。 人們是無緣無故被殺死的,而不是因為正當理由—— 這麼說好像應該有正當理由似的,但有時人們的確是這麼認為的。 所以幾件事情合在一起 造成了其看起來是一件驚人的事件,但我們也不要輕描淡寫 這樣一個事實,即報紙報導人們想要看的東西時 才會大賣。所以媒體在此事上也起了很大作用, 它們想要這類事情 看起來越轟動越好。
CA: I mean, what would it take to persuade our culture to downplay it?
CA:我的意思是,我們應該怎樣做才能說服我們的文化減少這類做法?
DG: Well, go to Israel. You know, go to Israel. And a mall blows up, and then everybody's unhappy about it, and an hour-and-a-half later -- at least when I was there, and I was 150 feet from the mall when it blew up -- I went back to my hotel and the wedding that was planned was still going on. And as the Israeli mother said, she said, "We never let them win by stopping weddings." I mean, this is a society that has learned -- and there are others too -- that has learned to live with a certain amount of terrorism and not be quite as upset by it, shall I say, as those of us who have not had many terror attacks.
DG:嗯,去以色列吧。你知道, 去以色列。一個商場爆炸了, 然後每個人都不高興,而一個半小時之後—— 至少我在時是那樣,當那個商場爆炸時, 我距離它150英尺——我回到酒店 那個計劃好的婚禮照常舉行。 那個以色列母親說, "我們絕不會停止婚禮讓他們獲勝。" 我是說,這個社會已經學會了如何應付—— 還有其他國家也是這樣——學會了如何應付 某種程度的恐怖主義,他們所受的影響, 是否可以說,要遠遠少於我們那些沒有經歷過那麼多襲擊的人呢?
CA: But is there a rational fear that actually, the reason we're frightened about this is because we think that the Big One is to come?
CA:但是是否存在一種理性的恐懼呢, 之所以我們對此恐懼,是因為我們認為 會有特大襲擊來臨嗎?
DG: Yes, of course. So, if we knew that this was the worst attack there would ever be, there might be more and more buses of 30 people -- we would probably not be nearly so frightened. I don't want to say -- please, I'm going to get quoted somewhere as saying, "Terrorism is fine and we shouldn't be so distressed." That's not my point at all. What I'm saying is that, surely, rationally, our distress about things that happen, about threats, should be roughly proportional to the size of those threats and threats to come. I think in the case of terrorism, it isn't. And many of the things we've heard about from our speakers today -- how many people do you know got up and said, Poverty! I can't believe what poverty is doing to us. People get up in the morning; they don't care about poverty. It's not making headlines, it's not making news, it's not flashy. There are no guns going off. I mean, if you had to solve one of these problems, Chris, which would you solve? Terrorism or poverty? (Laughter) (Applause) That's a tough one.
DG:是的,當然。那麼,如果我們知道這是史上 最嚴重的襲擊,如果有更多的30人的公共汽車被炸—— 我們可能就不會那麼恐懼了。 我不想這麼說——拜託,我將被某處引用說 "恐怖主義沒什麼,我們不必太擔心。" 我根本不是這個意思。 我想說的是,當然,理性地說, 我們對事情的擔心程度,對威脅的擔心, 應該大體上同這些威脅以及可能來臨的威脅大小 成正比。 我想就恐怖主義而言,它並不成正比。 而我們今天從許多演講者中所聽到的—— 多少人會早上起來說, 貧窮!我無法相信貧窮對我們造成的影響。 人們早上起來;他們不在乎貧窮。 貧窮不會佔據頭條;它不會上新聞,它不引人注目。 它沒有放槍。 我的意思是,如果你必須解決其中一個問題,Chris, 你會解決哪個,恐怖主義還是貧窮? (笑聲) (掌聲) 很困難吧。
CA: There's no question. Poverty, by an order of magnitude, a huge order of magnitude, unless someone can show that there's, you know, terrorists with a nuke are really likely to come. The latest I've read, seen, thought is that it's incredibly hard for them to do that. If that turns out to be wrong, we all look silly, but with poverty it's a bit --
CA:毫無疑問。 貧窮,按次序來講它是優先的,遠遠優先於恐怖主義, 除非有人能證明,你知道, 恐怖分子會真的用核彈來襲擊。 我最近讀到的,看到的,想到的是 他們想要做到這點是極其困難的。 如果這是錯的,我們就都看起來很愚蠢, 但貧窮有點——
DG: Even if that were true, still more people die from poverty.
DG:即便那是真的,還是有更多的人死於貧窮。
CA: We've evolved to get all excited about these dramatic attacks. Is that because in the past, in the ancient past, we just didn't understand things like disease and systems that cause poverty and so forth, and so it made no sense for us as a species to put any energy into worrying about those things? People died; so be it. But if you got attacked, that was something you could do something about. And so we evolved these responses. Is that what happened?
CA:我們的進化讓我們對於 這類戲劇性的襲擊很興奮。這是因為在過去, 在古代,我們只是不理解像疾病這樣的事 以及造成貧窮的系統等等, 所以對我們作為一個物種而言,沒有道理將精力 放在這些事情上? 人們死了;那就死了唄。 但如果你遭到襲擊,那麼你其實是可以做些什麽來應付襲擊的, 於是我們就進化成有這些反應。 是這種情況嗎?
DG: Well, you know, the people who are most skeptical about leaping to evolutionary explanations for everything are the evolutionary psychologists themselves. My guess is that there's nothing quite that specific in our evolutionary past. But rather, if you're looking for an evolutionary explanation, you might say that most organisms are neo-phobic -- that is, they're a little scared of stuff that's new and different. And there's a good reason to be, because old stuff didn't eat you. Right? Any animal you see that you've seen before is less likely to be a predator than one that you've never seen before. So, you know, when a school bus is blown up and we've never seen this before, our general tendency is to orient towards that which is new and novel is activated. I don't think it's quite as specific a mechanism as the one you alluded to, but maybe a more fundamental one underlying it.
DG:嗯,你知道,動不動跳到進化理論解釋每件事, 對於這種做法最持懷疑態度的, 恰恰是進化心理學家他們自己。 我估計在我們的進化史中,並沒有那麼 具體的東西。相反,如果你要找 進化理論解釋的話,你可以說 大多數有機體是恐新的——也就是說,它們對於 新的和不同的事物是有點害怕的。 一個很好的理由是, 因為舊東西不會吃了你。對吧? 一隻你從未見過的動物,比你早已見過的任何動物 都有可能成為你的敵人。 所以,你知道,當一個學校校車被炸掉時,而我們從未見過這種情形, 我們的普遍傾向是, 對新的奇怪的事物的反應傾向被激活了。 我不認為它是一個如你所暗示的 那麼具體的機制,但也許是一個更基礎的潛在的機制在起作用。
Jay Walker: You know, economists love to talk about the stupidity of people who buy lottery tickets. But I suspect you're making the exact same error you're accusing those people of, which is the error of value. I know, because I've interviewed about 1,000 lottery buyers over the years. It turns out that the value of buying a lottery ticket is not winning. That's what you think it is. All right? The average lottery buyer buys about 150 tickets a year, so the buyer knows full well that he or she is going to lose, and yet she buys 150 tickets a year. Why is that? It's not because she is stupid or he is stupid. It's because the anticipation of possibly winning releases serotonin in the brain, and actually provides a good feeling until the drawing indicates you've lost. Or, to put it another way, for the dollar investment, you can have a much better feeling than flushing the money down the toilet, which you cannot have a good feeling from. Now, economists tend to -- (Applause) -- economists tend to view the world through their own lenses, which is: this is just a bunch of stupid people. And as a result, many people look at economists as stupid people. And so fundamentally, the reason we got to the moon is, we didn't listen to the economists. Thank you very much. (Applause)
Jay Walker:你知道,經濟學家喜歡談論 人們買彩票是多麼愚蠢。但我懷疑 你所犯的錯誤與你所指責那些人犯的錯誤完全一樣, 即對價值的錯估。 我之所以知道,是因為這些年來我採訪了 大約1000名彩票買家。 結果是,購買彩票的價值不在於贏大獎。 而這就是你所認為的。對吧? 一個普通的彩票買家大約每年買150張彩票, 所以買家完全知道他或她會輸錢, 但她仍然會每年買150張。爲什麽會這樣? 並不是因為她或他是愚蠢的。 而是因為對可能贏大獎的期待 會使大腦釋放抑制血清胺素,並使人感覺舒服 一直持續到開獎時知道你沒贏為止。 或者,用另外的話來說,買彩票的投入的錢, 可以讓你比把錢沖進馬桶的感覺好得多, 而把錢沖馬桶可不會讓你有什麽好感覺。 現在,經濟學家傾向於—— (掌聲) ——經濟學家傾向於透過 他們自己的鏡片看世界,即: 這不過是一幫笨蛋人們。 而結果是,許多人把經濟學家們當成笨蛋看。 所以從根本上而言,我們能夠登月的原因是, 我們沒有聽經濟學家的話。謝謝大家。 (掌聲)
DG: Well, no, it's a great point. It remains to be seen whether the joy of anticipation is exactly equaled by the amount of disappointment after the lottery. Because remember, people who didn't buy tickets don't feel awful the next day either, even though they don't feel great during the drawing. I would disagree that people know they're not going to win. I think they think it's unlikely, but it could happen, which is why they prefer that to the flushing. But certainly I see your point: that there can be some utility to buying a lottery ticket other than winning. Now, I think there's many good reasons not to listen to economists. That isn't one of them, for me, but there's many others.
DG:嗯,不,這個觀點很好。對於期望的喜悅 是否完全等同於開獎後的失望, 我們尚未得知。因為不要忘記, 沒有買彩票的人並不會在次日感覺糟糕, 雖然他們並不會在等待抽獎過程中感覺很好。 我不同意人們知道他們不會贏大獎。 我認為他們覺得不太可能,但還是有希望發生, 這也是爲什麽他們更願意買彩票而不是把錢沖馬桶。 但是當然我明白你的意思:也就是買彩票 除了贏獎之外還是有其他用處的。 那麼,雖然我認為有許多不聽經濟學家的好理由。 但這並非其中一個理由,對我而言如此,但還有許多其他人可能不同意。
CA: Last question.
CA:最後一個問題。
Aubrey de Grey: My name's Aubrey de Grey, from Cambridge. I work on the thing that kills more people than anything else kills -- I work on aging -- and I'm interested in doing something about it, as we'll all hear tomorrow. I very much resonate with what you're saying, because it seems to me that the problem with getting people interested in doing anything about aging is that by the time aging is about to kill you it looks like cancer or heart disease or whatever. Do you have any advice? (Laughter)
Aubrey de Grey:我的名字是Aubrey de Grey,來自劍橋大學。 我的工作對象比任何其他東西殺死的人都多—— 我研究衰老——我想致力於在此領域有所建樹, 我明天會進行演講。 你所說的很能引起我的共鳴, 因為對我而言,阻礙人們 致力於在衰老領域進行研究的問題是, 當衰老令你死亡的時候,它看起來像癌症 或心臟病或其他什麽。你有什麽好建議嗎? (笑聲)
DG: For you or for them?
DG:對你的建議還是對他們的?
AdG: In persuading them.
AdG:用來說服他們。
DG: Ah, for you in persuading them. Well, it's notoriously difficult to get people to be farsighted. But one thing that psychologists have tried that seems to work is to get people to imagine the future more vividly. One of the problems with making decisions about the far future and the near future is that we imagine the near future much more vividly than the far future. To the extent that you can equalize the amount of detail that people put into the mental representations of near and far future, people begin to make decisions about the two in the same way. So, would you like to have an extra 100,000 dollars when you're 65 is a question that's very different than, imagine who you'll be when you're 65: will you be living, what will you look like, how much hair will you have, who will you be living with. Once we have all the details of that imaginary scenario, suddenly we feel like it might be important to save so that that guy has a little retirement money. But these are tricks around the margins. I think in general you're battling a very fundamental human tendency, which is to say, "I'm here today, and so now is more important than later."
DG:啊,幫助你說服他們。 嗯,讓人們有遠見是極其困難的。 但心理學家們所嘗試的一種看起來起作用的方法是, 讓人們更生動地想像未來。 對更遠的未來及較近的未來作決策時所遇到的一個問題是, 我們對於較近的未來的想像 比較遠的未來更生動。 到達這樣一種程度,你在對於較近或較遠未來的想像中, 在你的腦中想像出相同數量的細節, 這樣人們對於這兩種情況 就可以用相同的方式來作決策。 所以,你願意在65歲時多拿10萬元嗎, 這個問題與下面的截然不同, 想像你65歲時會是什麽樣子:你會活著嗎, 你的樣子如何,你的頭髮還剩多少, 你會跟誰一起住。 一旦我們有了所要想像情境的所有細節, 突然我們就會感覺也許儲蓄是很重要的, 那樣的話那個傢伙就會有一些退休金。 但這些技巧有點隔靴搔癢。 我認為普遍而言,我們在同一個非常根本的人類傾向作鬥爭, 即,"我此刻在此, 所以此刻比未來要重要。"
CA: Dan, thank you. Members of the audience, that was a fantastic session. Thank you. (Applause)
CA:Dan,謝謝你。各位聽眾, 這是一場精彩的演講。謝謝 (掌聲)