We all make decisions every day; we want to know what the right thing is to do -- in domains from the financial to the gastronomic to the professional to the romantic. And surely, if somebody could really tell us how to do exactly the right thing at all possible times, that would be a tremendous gift.
大家每天都在做决定;谁都想知道 如何做正确的决定——无论是金融、 烹饪,还是职业、爱情方面。 那么,如果有人能指导我们 每次都做出正确的决定, 那将是一个非常了不起的才能。
It turns out that, in fact, the world was given this gift in 1738 by a Dutch polymath named Daniel Bernoulli. And what I want to talk to you about today is what that gift is, and I also want to explain to you why it is that it hasn't made a damn bit of difference.
其实,早在1738年, 世人就见识过了拥有这项才能的人, 他是荷兰学者丹尼尔·伯努利 (Daniel Bernoulli)。 今天我们就来讲讲 这是怎样一种才能, 我还会告诉你为什么即使知道 其中的道理,也不会事事顺利。
Now, this is Bernoulli's gift. This is a direct quote. And if it looks like Greek to you, it's because, well, it's Greek. But the simple English translation -- much less precise, but it captures the gist of what Bernoulli had to say -- was this: The expected value of any of our actions -- that is, the goodness that we can count on getting -- is the product of two simple things: the odds that this action will allow us to gain something, and the value of that gain to us.
这就是伯努利的思路, 最原始的表述。 如果这看起来像希腊文字,是因为, 嗯,这确实是希腊字母。 虽然翻译成英语后 没有原文那样精确, 但基本上诠释了伯努利的 主要思想——那就是: 我们任何行为的预估价值—— 或者说期望能得到的好处—— 是两样东西的乘积: 一个是成功的概率, 另一个是成功所带来的价值。
In a sense, what Bernoulli was saying is, if we can estimate and multiply these two things, we will always know precisely how we should behave.
从某种程度上说, 伯努利想表达的是 如果我们能预估 这两个因素并将其相乘, 我们就总能够 预测自己的行为。
Now, this simple equation, even for those of you who don't like equations, is something that you're quite used to. Here's an example: if I were to tell you, let's play a little coin toss game, and I'm going to flip a coin, and if it comes up heads, I'm going to pay you 10 dollars, but you have to pay four dollars for the privilege of playing with me, most of you would say, sure, I'll take that bet. Because you know that the odds of you winning are one half, the gain if you do is 10 dollars, that multiplies to five, and that's more than I'm charging you to play. So, the answer is, yes. This is what statisticians technically call a damn fine bet.
而这个简单的等式, 即使对于你们中间 不喜欢等式的人来说, 也是非常容易理解的。 举个例子:假如我告诉你, 我们来猜硬币,我扔一枚硬币, 人头朝上,我输你10美元, 但你必须先付给我4美元才能玩。 很多人会说,好啊,我跟你玩。 因为你知道 你有50%的赢面, 而赢了能得到10美元, 两者相乘得5, 要比你付的4美元多, 所以当然要玩儿。 统计学家们称之为“完美赌局”。
Now, the idea is simple when we're applying it to coin tosses, but in fact, it's not very simple in everyday life. People are horrible at estimating both of these things, and that's what I want to talk to you about today.
在丢硬币的游戏中,道理很简单。 然而在日常生活中 就没那么简单了。 人们预估这两件事情的 水平都很差。 而这正是我今天要讲的。
There are two kinds of errors people make when trying to decide what the right thing is to do, and those are errors in estimating the odds that they're going to succeed, and errors in estimating the value of their own success. Now, let me talk about the first one first. Calculating odds would seem to be something rather easy: there are six sides to a die, two sides to a coin, 52 cards in a deck. You all know what the likelihood is of pulling the ace of spades or of flipping a heads. But as it turns out, this is not a very easy idea to apply in everyday life. That's why Americans spend more -- I should say, lose more -- gambling than on all other forms of entertainment combined. The reason is, this isn't how people do odds.
人们做决策时 会犯两种错误, 即错误地估算成功的概率, 和错误地估算成功的价值。 我们先说第一种错误。 计算成功的概率貌似比较容易: 1个骰子6个面、一个硬币2个面, 一叠扑克52张。 谁都知道抽到黑桃A, 或者丢硬币 人头朝上的概率。 然而事实证明, 实际情况似乎没有那么简单。 这也就是为什么美国人 在赌博上的花费—— 更确切地说是赌博输掉的钱—— 比其它所有娱乐活动 花费的总和还多。 其原因就是, 概率并不是人们计算的那样。
The way people figure odds requires that we first talk a bit about pigs. Now, the question I'm going to put to you is whether you think there are more dogs or pigs on leashes observed in any particular day in Oxford. And of course, you all know that the answer is dogs. And the way that you know that the answer is dogs is you quickly reviewed in memory the times you've seen dogs and pigs on leashes. It was very easy to remember seeing dogs, not so easy to remember pigs. And each one of you assumed that if dogs on leashes came more quickly to your mind, then dogs on leashes are more probable. That's not a bad rule of thumb, except when it is.
人们如何计算概率呢? 说到这里我们先要 讨论一个关于猪的问题。 这个问题就是,你们觉得 任意一天,在牛津镇上 被链子拴着的狗更多, 还是猪更多? 你们都会说:当然狗更多。 大家得出这个狗比猪多的 结论是因为 你们迅速回忆以前 曾经见过的被拴着的狗和猪, 很容易就想起见过狗, 但好像没怎么见过猪。 所以每个人都会假设 既然能快速地想起见过狗, 那被拴着的狗就应该更多些。 凭经验判断通常是对的, 但有时候却行不通。
So, for example, here's a word puzzle. Are there more four-letter English words with R in the third place or R in the first place? Well, you check memory very briefly, make a quick scan, and it's awfully easy to say to yourself, Ring, Rang, Rung, and very hard to say to yourself, Pare, Park: they come more slowly. But in fact, there are many more words in the English language with R in the third than the first place. The reason words with R in the third place come slowly to your mind isn't because they're improbable, unlikely or infrequent. It's because the mind recalls words by their first letter. You kind of shout out the sound, S -- and the word comes. It's like the dictionary; it's hard to look things up by the third letter. So, this is an example of how this idea that the quickness with which things come to mind can give you a sense of their probability --
再拿猜字游戏举个例子。 哪种4个字母的单词更多, R是其中的第三个字母, 还是第一个? 你又开始迅速回忆, 很容易想到 Ring,Rang,Rung, 很难回忆出,Pare, Park: 至少要慢很多。 但实际上,在英文中更多的是 第三个字母是R的单词。 想到这些单词要慢一些, 并不是因为它们不重要、不常见, 而是因为我们的大脑是 根据首字母回忆单词的。 你发出一个S音—— 就能想起一大串单词来。 就像字典一样; 而根据第3个字母去查单词 往往很难。 所以这是一个例子, 关于大脑的反应速度 能暗示你某件事概率的大小——
how this idea could lead you astray. It's not just puzzles, though. For example, when Americans are asked to estimate the odds that they will die in a variety of interesting ways -- these are estimates of number of deaths per year per 200 million U.S. citizens. And these are just ordinary people like yourselves who are asked to guess how many people die from tornado, fireworks, asthma, drowning, etc. Compare these to the actual numbers.
这个结果将把你引向错误的道路。 而且不仅限于填字游戏。 例如,当美国人被要求预测 各种各样匪夷所思的死法 发生的几率—— 估计每年每2亿美国人 当中的死亡人数。 这些被调查者都是 跟你我一样的普通人, 要猜测因以下原因死亡的人数: 飓风、烟火、哮喘、溺水。 然后和真实发生的数据对比。
Now, you see a very interesting pattern here, which is first of all, two things are vastly over-estimated, namely tornadoes and fireworks. Two things are vastly underestimated: dying by drowning and dying by asthma. Why? When was the last time that you picked up a newspaper and the headline was, "Boy dies of Asthma?" It's not interesting because it's so common. It's very easy for all of us to bring to mind instances of news stories or newsreels where we've seen tornadoes devastating cities, or some poor schmuck who's blown his hands off with a firework on the Fourth of July. Drownings and asthma deaths don't get much coverage. They don't come quickly to mind, and as a result, we vastly underestimate them.
一个非常有意思的现象出现了, 首先 两项数据大大超过实际值: 飓风和烟火。 两项数据又被大大地低估了: 即死于溺水和哮喘病。 为什么呢? 你什么时候在报纸的头版上读到过 “男童死于哮喘”? 这条新闻非常无趣, 因为它太常见了。 而大家却很容易想起来 曾经看过的电视或者新闻中报道 飓风摧毁城市,或者某个倒霉鬼 在国庆日被烟火崩掉了手。 因为对溺水、哮喘报道的不多。 在我们头脑中的印象不深, 所以 我们大大低估了这些事件。
Indeed, this is kind of like the Sesame Street game of "Which thing doesn't belong?" And you're right to say it's the swimming pool that doesn't belong, because the swimming pool is the only thing on this slide that's actually very dangerous. The way that more of you are likely to die than the combination of all three of the others that you see on the slide.
实际上,这就好像“芝麻街” 游戏中的这个问题: “以下哪个选项与其他不同?” 理所应当你会觉得 游泳池跟其它的都不一样, 因为游泳池 其实是最最危险的场所! 你们在游泳池中死亡的概率 比其它三个的总和还高。
The lottery is an excellent example, of course -- an excellent test-case of people's ability to compute probabilities. And economists -- forgive me, for those of you who play the lottery -- but economists, at least among themselves, refer to the lottery as a stupidity tax, because the odds of getting any payoff by investing your money in a lottery ticket are approximately equivalent to flushing the money directly down the toilet -- which, by the way, doesn't require that you actually go to the store and buy anything.
买彩票是一个绝佳案例—— 可以很好地测试人们 计算概率的能力。 经济学家——你们中间买彩票的人 请原谅我这么说—— 至少经济学家们, 认为买彩票是一种 为愚蠢交的税,因为买彩票 中大奖的几率, 几乎和你直接用马桶 把钱冲掉是一样的—— 起码这样还不用你费力 跑到商店去买一趟。
Why in the world would anybody ever play the lottery? Well, there are many answers, but one answer surely is, we see a lot of winners. Right? When this couple wins the lottery, or Ed McMahon shows up at your door with this giant check -- how the hell do you cash things that size, I don't know. We see this on TV; we read about it in the paper. When was the last time that you saw extensive interviews with everybody who lost? Indeed, if we required that television stations run a 30-second interview with each loser every time they interview a winner, the 100 million losers in the last lottery would require nine-and-a-half years of your undivided attention just to watch them say, "Me? I lost." "Me? I lost." Now, if you watch nine-and-a-half years of television -- no sleep, no potty breaks -- and you saw loss after loss after loss, and then at the end there's 30 seconds of, "and I won," the likelihood that you would play the lottery is very small.
究竟为什么还有人买彩票呢? 有很多种解释, 但其中有一个一定是 我们看到了很多赢家,对吗? 有一对夫妇中了头彩, 或者Ed McMahon在你家门口, 拿着巨大的一张支票—— 我完全想不出要怎么花掉这笔钱。 我们在电视里面看到过; 在报纸上也看到过。 但你什么时候看到大规模采访 买彩票输了的人? 实际上,如果我们要求电视台 在采访每个赢家的同时, 对每位没有中彩的人来一个 30秒的采访,那么这1亿位 上一个彩票开奖后的输家 将要花9.5年的时间 不断地告诉你说: “我,输了”,“我,输了”…… 如果你看了九年半的电视—— 不休不眠—— 看到一个接一个的输家, 然后最后的30秒钟有一个 “我赢了!” 你买彩票的可能性就会小很多。
Look, I can prove this to you: here's a little lottery. There's 10 tickets in this lottery. Nine of them have been sold to these individuals. It costs you a dollar to buy the ticket and, if you win, you get 20 bucks. Is this a good bet? Well, Bernoulli tells us it is. The expected value of this lottery is two dollars; this is a lottery in which you should invest your money. And most people say, "OK, I'll play."
现在我证明给你们看: 这里有一个小彩票游戏。 一共10张。 其中的9张已经卖给了不同的人 1张彩票1美元,如果你赢了, 你将得到20美元。 这个赌局怎么样? 按照伯努利的逻辑, 这个彩票的期望回报是2美元: 那么你应该去买。 而且大多数人都会说, “嗯,我要买”
Now, a slightly different version of this lottery: imagine that the nine tickets are all owned by one fat guy named Leroy. Leroy has nine tickets; there's one left. Do you want it? Most people won't play this lottery. Now, you can see the odds of winning haven't changed, but it's now fantastically easy to imagine who's going to win. It's easy to see Leroy getting the check, right? You can't say to yourself, "I'm as likely to win as anybody," because you're not as likely to win as Leroy. The fact that all those tickets are owned by one guy changes your decision to play, even though it does nothing whatsoever to the odds.
现在我稍稍改变一下条件: 设想其它9张彩票都卖给了 一个叫Leroy的胖子。 Leroy有9张,还剩下1张。 你买不买? 大多数人不会买。 其实赢的几率并没有变, 但很容易就能看出谁会赢。 显然Leroy会赢,对吗? 你现在不敢说, “我和其它人一样有机会赢”, 显然你的赢面不可能和Leroy一样。 所有彩票都被一个人买走的事实 改变了你的决定, 即使这对概率丝毫没有影响。
Now, estimating odds, as difficult as it may seem, is a piece of cake compared to trying to estimate value: trying to say what something is worth, how much we'll enjoy it, how much pleasure it will give us. I want to talk now about errors in value. How much is this Big Mac worth? Is it worth 25 dollars? Most of you have the intuition that it's not -- you wouldn't pay that for it.
估算概率也许看起来比较复杂, 但是相对于 估算价值来说却是小巫见大巫了。 估算价值即试图说出某东西的价值, 我们有多喜欢它。 它给我带来多少快乐。 我想多谈谈估值的误差。 麦当劳的一个“巨无霸”值多少钱? 值25美元吗? 大家的直觉都是“不值”—— 你不会花那么多钱去买它。
But in fact, to decide whether a Big Mac is worth 25 dollars requires that you ask one, and only one question, which is: What else can I do with 25 dollars? If you've ever gotten on one of those long-haul flights to Australia and realized that they're not going to serve you any food, but somebody in the row in front of you has just opened the McDonald's bag, and the smell of golden arches is wafting over the seat, you think, I can't do anything else with this 25 dollars for 16 hours. I can't even set it on fire -- they took my cigarette lighter! Suddenly, 25 dollars for a Big Mac might be a good deal.
然而,决定一个“巨无霸” 是否值25美元的前提 是你要问且只问一个问题: 我还能用这25美元做什么? 如果你曾经坐过长途飞机 去澳大利亚, 而且你知道飞机上不提供食物, 当坐在你前排的人打开了一个 麦当劳的盒子,那诱人的香味 飘过椅背传到你鼻子里,你会觉得 这16小时里25美元做不了其它事情, 我甚至不能把它烧掉—— 过安检的时候打火机被没收了! 突然间,花25美元买一个“巨无霸”汉堡 成了一笔划算的买卖。
On the other hand, if you're visiting an underdeveloped country, and 25 dollars buys you a gourmet meal, it's exorbitant for a Big Mac. Why were you all sure that the answer to the question was no, before I'd even told you anything about the context? Because most of you compared the price of this Big Mac to the price you're used to paying. Rather than asking, "What else can I do with my money," comparing this investment to other possible investments, you compared to the past. And this is a systematic error people make. What you knew is, you paid three dollars in the past; 25 is outrageous.
反过来, 如果你去一个贫穷的国家, 花25美元就可以买一顿丰盛的晚餐, 那么“巨无霸”就显得贵得离谱了。 那为什么大家在我说出 特定条件之间 都认为答案应该是“不”呢? 因为大家在比较 从前买的“巨无霸”的价格, 而不是问自己一个问题, “我还能用这些钱做什么?”, 与其它可能的消费比较, 你比较的是“过去”。 这是人们很容易犯的常规性错误。 你想的是,曾经花3美元买巨无霸, 现在要花25美元,简直是岂有此理。
This is an error, and I can prove it to you by showing the kinds of irrationalities to which it leads. For example, this is, of course, one of the most delicious tricks in marketing, is to say something used to be higher, and suddenly it seems like a very good deal. When people are asked about these two different jobs: a job where you make 60K, then 50K, then 40K, a job where you're getting a salary cut each year, and one in which you're getting a salary increase, people like the second job better than the first, despite the fact they're all told they make much less money. Why? Because they had the sense that declining wages are worse than rising wages, even when the total amount of wages is higher in the declining period. Here's another nice example.
这是错误的,我可以给大家证明 这个错误所导致的非理性行为。 例如,当然了, 这是一个在市场营销中 非常常见的把戏, 告诉你一样东西曾经非常贵, 然后买下这个东西就显得很划算。 我们做过一个试验, 考察人们对两种工作的看法: 一个工作承诺你第一年6万, 然后5万,4万, 这个工作每年都会减薪, 而另一个工作则承诺你加薪, 人们会更希望得到第二个工作, 即使知道 这个工作挣得少一些,为什么呢? 因为他们觉得减薪比加薪糟糕, 即使减薪期间的总收入更高。 另外一个例子。
Here's a $2,000 Hawaiian vacation package; it's now on sale for 1,600. Assuming you wanted to go to Hawaii, would you buy this package? Most people say they would. Here's a slightly different story: $2,000 Hawaiian vacation package is now on sale for 700 dollars, so you decide to mull it over for a week. By the time you get to the ticket agency, the best fares are gone -- the package now costs 1,500. Would you buy it? Most people say, no. Why? Because it used to cost 700, and there's no way I'm paying 1,500 for something that was 700 last week.
有一个2000美元的夏威夷度假套餐, 现在只卖1600美元 假设你想去夏威夷, 你会不会买这个产品? 大多数人是会的。 现在稍稍改变一下, 2000美元的夏威夷度假套餐 现在只卖700美元, 你决定再考虑一个礼拜。 但后来你去旅行社的时候, 最好的价格已经没有了—— 现在需要1500美元。你会买么? 很多人都会说:不会! 为什么?因为曾经只卖700, 而我绝不会花1500 买上周还是700的旅游产品。
This tendency to compare to the past is causing people to pass up the better deal. In other words, a good deal that used to be a great deal is not nearly as good as an awful deal that was once a horrible deal.
这种”比较过去“的倾向 使人们放弃了很多好交易, 换句话说, 一个从前有更好价格的交易即使 现在仍然是一个好交易,也不如 一个曾经更烂的差交易能打动人。
Here's another example of how comparing to the past can befuddle our decisions. Imagine that you're going to the theater. You're on your way to the theater. In your wallet you have a ticket, for which you paid 20 dollars. You also have a 20-dollar bill. When you arrive at the theater, you discover that somewhere along the way you've lost the ticket. Would you spend your remaining money on replacing it? Most people answer, no. Now, let's just change one thing in this scenario. You're on your way to the theater, and in your wallet you have two 20-dollar bills. When you arrive you discover you've lost one of them. Would you spend your remaining 20 dollars on a ticket? Well, of course, I went to the theater to see the play. What does the loss of 20 dollars along the way have to do?
还有一个例子, 说明“比较过去”如何 迷惑了我们的眼睛。 假设你要去剧场看表演。 在去剧场的路上, 你钱包里有一张票, 是花20美元买的。 你还有一张20美金的纸币。 当你到达剧场的时候 发现你在路上把票搞丢了。 你会花剩下的钱再去买一张么? 很多人会说,不会! 现在,我只改变一个条件。 你在去剧场的路上, 你钱包里有两张20美元。 到达剧场的时候发现丢了一张。 你会不会拿剩下的20美元去买票? 当然会!我去剧院就是要看戏的。 跟我在路上丢没丢20美元没关系。
Now, just in case you're not getting it, here's a schematic of what happened, OK? (Laughter) Along the way, you lost something. In both cases, it was a piece of paper. In one case, it had a U.S. president on it; in the other case it didn't. What the hell difference should it make? The difference is that when you lost the ticket you say to yourself, I'm not paying twice for the same thing. You compare the cost of the play now -- 40 dollars -- to the cost that it used to have -- 20 dollars -- and you say it's a bad deal. Comparing with the past causes many of the problems that behavioral economists and psychologists identify in people's attempts to assign value. But even when we compare with the possible, instead of the past, we still make certain kinds of mistakes. And I'm going to show you one or two of them.
如果你还没明白我的意思, 还有另一种简单的解释。 (笑声) 在路上,你丢了一样东西。 在两种情况下, 这个东西都是一张纸。 一张纸上有美国总统头像, 另一张没有。 这到底有什么区别? 区别就是,当你丢了票的时候, 你会这样对自己说, ”我不会为买样东西花双份的钱。“ 你将现在的花费——40美元—— 和原来20美元相比,会觉得不值。 比较过去会导致很多问题, 行为经济学家和心理学家 认为这些问题 会影响人们对价值的估算。 但即使不”比较过去“, 而去比较其它的可能, 我们还是会犯类似的错误。 举几个例子。
One of the things we know about comparison: that when we compare one thing to the other, it changes its value. So in 1992, this fellow, George Bush, for those of us who were kind of on the liberal side of the political spectrum, didn't seem like such a great guy. Suddenly, we're almost longing for him to return. (Laughter) The comparison changes how we evaluate him.
“比较”有一个特点: 当一样东西和另一样东西比较时, 它的价值会改变。 所以在1992年的时候,乔治布什, 对于我们这些 政治上站在自由主义一边的人来说, 他好像不是一个理想的人物。 突然间,我们又非常盼着他复出。 (笑声) "比较"改变了我们对他的看法。
Now, retailers knew this long before anybody else did, of course, and they use this wisdom to help you -- spare you the undue burden of money. And so a retailer, if you were to go into a wine shop and you had to buy a bottle of wine, and you see them here for eight, 27 and 33 dollars, what would you do? Most people don't want the most expensive, they don't want the least expensive. So, they will opt for the item in the middle. If you're a smart retailer, then, you will put a very expensive item that nobody will ever buy on the shelf, because suddenly the $33 wine doesn't look as expensive in comparison.
当然,零售商们早就 懂得这个道理, 他们利用这一点使你—— 不知不觉花掉更多的钱。 当你走进一家红酒零售店, 要买一瓶红酒, 你看到了红酒的价钱: 8、27和33美元,你会怎样做? 大多数人不会买最贵的, 也不会买最便宜的。 所以他们选择价格适中的。 如果你是一个聪明的零售商, 就会放一个最贵的商品在架上 即使根本没人买, 因为相比之下33美元的红酒 就显得没那么贵了。
So I'm telling you something you already knew: namely, that comparison changes the value of things. Here's why that's a problem: the problem is that when you get that $33 bottle of wine home, it won't matter what it used to be sitting on the shelf next to. The comparisons we make when we are appraising value, where we're trying to estimate how much we'll like things, are not the same comparisons we'll be making when we consume them. This problem of shifting comparisons can bedevil our attempts to make rational decisions.
其实这些你们早就知道了: “比较”可以改变价值。 但问题在哪里呢? 问题就出在: 你把这瓶33美元的红酒带回家后, 它的价值跟原来 放在旁边的酒没有关系。 当初为估量价值而做的比较, 即我们试图决定 我们有多喜欢一样东西, 当我们在使用它的时候, 这种比较早已不复存在了。 这个“比较转移”的问题 影响了我们的理性决策。
Let me just give you an example. I have to show you something from my own lab, so let me sneak this in. These are subjects coming to an experiment to be asked the simplest of all questions: How much will you enjoy eating potato chips one minute from now? They're sitting in a room with potato chips in front of them. For some of the subjects, sitting in the far corner of a room is a box of Godiva chocolates, and for others is a can of Spam. In fact, these items that are sitting in the room change how much the subjects think they're going to enjoy the potato chips. Namely, those who are looking at Spam think potato chips are going to be quite tasty; those who are looking at Godiva chocolate think they won't be nearly so tasty. Of course, what happens when they eat the potato chips? Well, look, you didn't need a psychologist to tell you that when you have a mouthful of greasy, salty, crispy, delicious snacks, what's sitting in the corner of the room makes not a damn bit of difference to your gustatory experience. Nonetheless, their predictions are perverted by a comparison that then does not carry through and change their experience.
再举一个例子。 我要给大家看一个 我们自己做的实验。 这些实验对象们 被问到一个最简单的问题: 一分钟之后你会有 多享受这包薯片? 实验对象坐在房间里, 前面放着一些薯片。 对于这些实验对象,他们所在 房间的另一个角落,还放着 一盒Godiva巧克力, 或者一罐Spam午餐肉。 事实上,这些角落里的东西改变了 试验者对薯片的预期享受程度。 也就是说,这些看到午餐肉的人 会觉得薯条非常美味; 而看到巧克力的人 觉得薯片不会很美味。 然而,当他们吃薯条的时候 会怎样呢? 显然,不需要心理学家告诉你, 当你嘴里都是焦香四溢, 脆脆的美味薯片的时候 在屋子的角落放着什么 根本不会影响你的味觉。 然而在吃之前, 人们对食物的预期被“比较”迷惑了, 而这种“比较”在我们吃的过程中 是完全不存在的。
You've all experienced this yourself, even if you've never come into our lab to eat potato chips. So here's a question: You want to buy a car stereo. The dealer near your house sells this particular stereo for 200 dollars, but if you drive across town, you can get it for 100 bucks. So would you drive to get 50 percent off, saving 100 dollars? Most people say they would. They can't imagine buying it for twice the price when, with one trip across town, they can get it for half off.
大家都亲身经历过类似的事情, 即使你以前没有 来过我的实验室吃薯片。 那我现在有一个问题: 你想买一个汽车音响。 你家附近的经销商卖200美元, 但如果你开车穿过市区, 只要100美元就能买个一样的。 你会为了节省100美元 开车去买这个五折的音响吗? 多数人都会。 他们不能想象多花一倍的钱 去买一个在城市的另一端 只要半价的东西。
Now, let's imagine instead you wanted to buy a car that had a stereo, and the dealer near your house had it for 31,000. But if you drove across town, you could get it for 30,900. Would you drive to get it? At this point, 0.003 savings -- the 100 dollars. Most people say, no, I'm going to schlep across town to save 100 bucks on the purchase of a car?
现在我再假设你想 买一辆有音响的车, 你家旁边的经销商卖31000美元。 同样开车穿过市区, 只要30900块, 你会去么?这次你节省了0.3%—— 也是100美元。 很多人会说,不。 我才不会开车穿过拥堵的市区 就为了节省100美元去买一辆车。
This kind of thinking drives economists crazy, and it should. Because this 100 dollars that you save -- hello! -- doesn't know where it came from. It doesn't know what you saved it on. When you go to buy groceries with it, it doesn't go, I'm the money saved on the car stereo, or, I'm the dumb money saved on the car. It's money. And if a drive across town is worth 100 bucks, it's worth 100 bucks no matter what you're saving it on. People don't think that way. That's why they don't know whether their mutual fund manager is taking 0.1 percent or 0.15 percent of their investment, but they clip coupons to save one dollar off of toothpaste.
这种想法令经济学家们抓狂, 而也确实应该这样。 因为你节省下来的这100美元 ——拜托!—— 根本无关是怎么节省出来的。 它并不知道是通过 买什么东西节省下来的。 你去超市买东西的时候, 它不会说, ”我是从汽车音响节省下来的,或者, 我是一个笨蛋在买车时省下来的。“ 钱就是钱! 如果开车穿过市区值100美元, 就是值100美元 不管你是通过什么方式节省下来的。 可是人们并不这么认为。 这就是为什么人们不关心基金经理 从他们的投资中拿0.1% 还是0.15%的佣金, 但是他们会收集折扣券, 就为了买牙膏的时候少花1美元。
Now, you can see, this is the problem of shifting comparisons, because what you're doing is, you're comparing the 100 bucks to the purchase that you're making, but when you go to spend that money you won't be making that comparison. You've all had this experience.
现在你看到了, 也是“转移比较”的问题。 因为你在比较100美元 和你要买的东西之间的关系。 而当你去花这笔钱的时候, 你不会再做那样的比较了。 你们都有过这样的经历。
If you're an American, for example, you've probably traveled in France. And at some point you may have met a couple from your own hometown, and you thought, "Oh, my God, these people are so warm. They're so nice to me. I mean, compared to all these people who hate me when I try to speak their language and hate me more when I don't, these people are just wonderful." And so you tour France with them, and then you get home and you invite them over for dinner, and what do you find? Compared to your regular friends, they are boring and dull, right? Because in this new context, the comparison is very, very different. In fact, you find yourself disliking them enough almost to qualify for French citizenship.
举个例子,如果你是一个美国人, 去法国旅游。 在那儿可能会遇到一对夫妇, 跟你是老乡,你会想 ”天呐!这些人真热情。 他们对我太好了。 比起那些讨厌我试着说法语, 还更讨厌我不说法语的当地人, 这对夫妇简直太好了。“ 所以你和他们一起游历法国, 之后你回到家, 邀请这对夫妇来家里吃饭, 现在的感觉呢? 和你的其它朋友相比, 他们又无聊又闷,对吗? 因为处在新的环境里, 这种比较大不一样了。 实际上你发现 你对他们的讨厌程度简直都 够资格申请法国国籍了。
Now, you have exactly the same problem when you shop for a stereo. You go to the stereo store, you see two sets of speakers -- these big, boxy, monoliths, and these little, sleek speakers, and you play them, and you go, you know, I do hear a difference: the big ones sound a little better. And so you buy them, and you bring them home, and you entirely violate the décor of your house. And the problem, of course, is that this comparison you made in the store is a comparison you'll never make again. What are the odds that years later you'll turn on the stereo and go, "Sounds so much better than those little ones," which you can't even remember hearing.
其实,如果你去买音响, 也会遇上同样的问题。 你去到一个音响商店, 你看到了两款扬声器—— 一款是又大又方像石头的, 一款是小巧玲珑外表光滑的, 然后你都试了一下, 觉得确实听到了它们的区别: 大的那个听起来好一些。 于是你付了钱,把音响带回家, 而根本不在乎彻底破坏了 家里的装饰风格。 问题在于, 你在音响商店做的“比较” 回家之后永远不可能再发生。 你不会再回到那个音响商店说: “大的听起来就是比那些小的好,” “小的”效果如何 你自己可能都不记得了。
The problem of shifting comparisons is even more difficult when these choices are arrayed over time. People have a lot of trouble making decisions about things that will happen at different points in time. And what psychologists and behavioral economists have discovered is that by and large people use two simple rules. So let me give you one very easy problem, a second very easy problem and then a third, hard, problem.
“比较转移”的问题在跨越时间的 某些情况下显得更复杂。 关于不同时间点发生的几件事, 人们在做决策时往往 显得尤其困难。 心理学家和行为经济学家发现 大体上来讲有两个简单的原则。 现在我先连续给你 两个非常简单的问题, 最后是一个困难的问题。
Here's the first easy problem: You can have 60 dollars now or 50 dollars now. Which would you prefer? This is what we call a one-item IQ test, OK? All of us, I hope, prefer more money, and the reason is, we believe more is better than less.
第一个简单问题是: 给你60或者50美元,你要哪个? 这个叫做单项智商测验。 大家都想要更多的钱, 因为我们认为多比少好。
Here's the second problem: You can have 60 dollars today or 60 dollars in a month. Which would you prefer? Again, an easy decision, because we all know that now is better than later. What's hard in our decision-making is when these two rules conflict. For example, when you're offered 50 dollars now or 60 dollars in a month. This typifies a lot of situations in life in which you will gain by waiting, but you have to be patient. What do we know? What do people do in these kinds of situations? Well, by and large people are enormously impatient. That is, they require interest rates in the hundred or thousands of percents in order to delay gratification and wait until next month for the extra 10 dollars. Maybe that isn't so remarkable, but what is remarkable is how easy it is to make this impatience go away by simply changing when the delivery of these monetary units will happen. Imagine that you can have 50 dollars in a year -- that's 12 months -- or 60 dollars in 13 months. What do we find now? People are gladly willing to wait: as long as they're waiting 12, they might as well wait 13.
第二个问题来了。 你可以今天或者在一个月后 得到60美元,你选哪个? 同样的,非常简单的决策。 因为我们知道"现在"比"以后"好。 当这两条规则相互冲突时, 困难来了。 例如,现在得到50美元或者 一个月后得到60美元,你选哪个? 生活中有很多类似情况, 想得到就必须等待,要有耐心。 那么人们在这样的情形下 会怎么做呢? 多数情况下,人们很缺乏耐心。 也就是说他们会要求很高的利息 才能推迟他们的满足感, 而等到下个月去获得额外的10美元。 也许这个还不足为奇, 但是奇怪的是 让人们变得有耐心是如此容易, 只要改变一下 给钱的时间。 假设你可以一年之后获得50美元 ——那是12个月, 或者13个月之后获得60美元。 我们得到了什么结果? 人们开始愿意等待了, 既然他们已经等了12个月, 多等1个月也无妨。
What makes this dynamic inconsistency happen? Comparison. Troubling comparison. Let me show you.
是什么让决策不一致了呢? 比较!麻烦的比较。 我来给大家解释一下。
This is just a graph showing the results that I just suggested you would show if I gave you time to respond, which is, people find that the subjective value of 50 is higher than the subjective value of 60 when they'll be delivered in now or one month, respectively -- a 30-day delay -- but they show the reverse pattern when you push the entire decision off into the future a year. Now, why in the world do you get this pattern of results?
这是我刚刚提到的 那个结果的数据图。 如果我给大家足够时间去思考, 你们得到的结论就是, 人们发现主观上现在的50美元要比 未来的60美元更有价值, 虽然仅仅是30天的差别—— 然而当我们把决策时间推迟1年, 他们表现出了完全相反的 行为模式。 那么,为什么你会看到 这样的结果呢?
These guys can tell us. What you see here are two lads, one of them larger than the other: the fireman and the fiddler. They are going to recede towards the vanishing point in the horizon, and I want you to notice two things. At no point will the fireman look taller than the fiddler. No point. However, the difference between them seems to be getting smaller. First it's an inch in your view, then it's a quarter-inch, then a half-inch, and then finally they go off the edge of the earth.
这两个人可以帮我们解释。 大家看到的是两个小伙子, 其中一个比另外一个块头大些: 消防员和小提琴家。 他们要往后退直到消失, 我希望大家注意两样东西。 这个消防员是永远不可能比 小提琴家小的,绝对不会。 然而,他们之间的差距 却是越来越小的。 刚开始你看到一英寸的差距, 然后是四分之三, 然后是半英寸, 最终他们从地平线上消失了。
Here are the results of what I just showed you. This is the subjective height -- the height you saw of these guys at various points. And I want you to see that two things are true. One, the farther away they are, the smaller they look; and two, the fireman is always bigger than the fiddler. But watch what happens when we make some of them disappear. Right. At a very close distance, the fiddler looks taller than the fireman, but at a far distance their normal, their true, relations are preserved. As Plato said, what space is to size, time is to value. These are the results of the hard problem I gave you: 60 now or 50 in a month? And these are subjective values, and what you can see is, our two rules are preserved.
这就是我刚刚给大家看的结果。 这是主观高度—— 即你在不同阶段看到的高度。 现在我想让你看到, 有两样东西是真的。 第一,他们离我们越远, 看起来越小。 第二,消防队员总是比 小提琴师高。 但是当我们让一些东西 消失之后发生了什么? 如果我们非常近距离观察, 小提琴师要比消防队员更高大, 但是如果离远了, 他们正常的, 真实的关系就出来了。 就像柏拉图说的,时间对于价值的 影响同空间对于大小的影响一样。 这是刚才那道难题的答案。 现在拿50美元还是 一个月后拿60? 这些是主观的判断, 大家可以看到, 我们的两条原则都是成立的。
People always think more is better than less: 60 is always better than 50, and they always think now is better than later: the bars on this side are higher than the bars on this side. Watch what happens when we drop some out. Suddenly we have the dynamic inconsistency that puzzled us. We have the tendency for people to go for 50 dollars now over waiting a month, but not if that decision is far in the future. Notice something interesting that this implies -- namely, that when people get to the future, they will change their minds. That is, as that month 12 approaches, you will say, what was I thinking, waiting an extra month for 60 dollars? I'll take the 50 dollars now.
人们总是会觉得多比少好: 60美元永远比50美元好, 人们还会觉得现在永远比将来好: 左边的柱形图比右边的要高。 看看去掉几个图形时发生了什么。 现在突然有些困惑了, 刚才比较的结果一下子反了过来。 我们看到人们更希望现在获得50元, 而不是去等一个月拿60, 但是在更长的时间里却又反过来了。 我们看到了一个有趣的现象—— 那就是 人们会在未来改变主意。 当第12个月马上到了的时候, 你会说 为什么还要为了那60块钱 再等一个月呢? 我现在就想要这50块钱。
Well, the question with which I'd like to end is this: If we're so damn stupid, how did we get to the moon? Because I could go on for about two hours with evidence of people's inability to estimate odds and inability to estimate value.
那么,在演讲结束的时候 想问大家一个问题: 如果我们都这么笨, 人类是怎么登上月球的? 因为我可以在这里讲两个小时, 举例证明 人类在估计概率和价值方面的 无能表现。
The answer to this question, I think, is an answer you've already heard in some of the talks, and I dare say you will hear again: namely, that our brains were evolved for a very different world than the one in which we are living. They were evolved for a world in which people lived in very small groups, rarely met anybody who was terribly different from themselves, had rather short lives in which there were few choices and the highest priority was to eat and mate today.
这个问题的答案, 我想大家都已经知道了, 以前听过相关的演讲, 我敢保证大家还会听到: 那就是,我们的大脑是朝着 一个完全不同的世界进化的。 在大脑为之进化的世界里, 人类生活在很小的群体当中, 周围都是和自己一样的人, 人们的寿命非常短, 选择也非常少, 最重要的事情就是 “今朝有酒今朝醉”。
Bernoulli's gift, Bernoulli's little formula, allows us, it tells us how we should think in a world for which nature never designed us. That explains why we are so bad at using it, but it also explains why it is so terribly important that we become good, fast. We are the only species on this planet that has ever held its own fate in its hands. We have no significant predators, we're the masters of our physical environment; the things that normally cause species to become extinct are no longer any threat to us. The only thing -- the only thing -- that can destroy us and doom us are our own decisions. If we're not here in 10,000 years, it's going to be because we could not take advantage of the gift given to us by a young Dutch fellow in 1738, because we underestimated the odds of our future pains and overestimated the value of our present pleasures.
伯努利的天赋, 他的小等式,告诉我们 要如何用这个不符合自然规律的 大脑思考问题。 这揭示了为什么我们思考问题的 能力这么差,也解释了 让自己变得勤奋,高效 有多么重要。 人类是这个星球上唯一 将命运掌握在自己手中的物种。 我们没有主要的天敌。 我们征服了大自然; 通常导致物种灭绝的东西 已经不能对人类够成威胁。 唯一一样可以毁灭我们的东西 就是我们自己的决定。 如果在1万年之后人类灭亡了, 原因就是 我们没能用好那个荷兰年轻人 在1738年对世界的馈赠, 因为我们低估了未来的痛苦, 也高估了眼前快乐的价值。
Thank you. (Applause)
谢谢。 (掌声)
Chris Anderson: That was remarkable. We have time for some questions for Dan Gilbert. One and two.
Chris Anderson (CA): 讲得太精彩了。 我们还有些时间向丹·吉尔伯特提问。 现在有一个,两个人举手了。
Bill Lyell: Would you say that this mechanism is in part how terrorism actually works to frighten us, and is there some way that we could counteract that?
(观众)Bill Lyell: 你是不是说这种思考模式 也是恐怖分子用来 恐吓我们的一种手段, 有没有方法可以克服它呢?
Dan Gilbert: I actually was consulting recently with the Department of Homeland Security, which generally believes that American security dollars should go to making borders safer. I tried to point out to them that terrorism was a name based on people's psychological reaction to a set of events, and that if they were concerned about terrorism they might ask what causes terror and how can we stop people from being terrified, rather than -- not rather than, but in addition to stopping the atrocities that we're all concerned about. Surely the kinds of play that at least American media give to -- and forgive me, but in raw numbers these are very tiny accidents. We already know, for example, in the United States, more people have died as a result of not taking airplanes -- because they were scared -- and driving on highways, than were killed in 9/11. OK? If I told you that there was a plague that was going to kill 15,000 Americans next year, you might be alarmed if you didn't find out it was the flu. These are small-scale accidents, and we should be wondering whether they should get the kind of play, the kind of coverage, that they do. Surely that causes people to overestimate the likelihood that they'll be hurt in these various ways, and gives power to the very people who want to frighten us.
丹·吉尔伯特(DG):其实, 最近我正在做一个咨询项目, 和国土安全部合作, 大概的内容就是 美国的国防经费应该用在 防卫边境的项目上。 我试图告诉他们, 恐怖主义只是一个词, 是人们对一系列的事件 产生的心理反应, 如果他们真的担心恐怖主义, 就应该问问 是什么导致了恐怖活动, 以及如何让人们不再恐惧, 而不是——不,应该说, 在此基础上, 再去制止我们所担心的暴行。 事实上,美国媒体在 这类事件上的报道—— 请原谅我的直接,这些 恐怖袭击的数量其实是非常小的。 我们已经知道,例如,在美国 更多的人因为没有 坐飞机而死亡—— 因为他们害怕坐飞机—— 但其实在 高速公路上死亡的 人数比911要多。 如果我告诉你有一个瘟疫, 致使明年美国要死亡15000人, 如果你不知道这只是“感冒", 你可能会非常惶恐。 这些都是小规模事件, 而我们应该反思 这些东西是否应该得到 这样多的报道。 显然导致人们过高地估计了 这些事件的伤害程度, 恰恰让那些企图 恐吓我们的人达到目的了。
CA: Dan, I'd like to hear more on this. So, you're saying that our response to terror is, I mean, it's a form of mental bug? Talk more about it.
CA:丹,我想插一句。 你的意思是说 我们对恐怖事件的反应, 是一种精神上的缺陷吗? 给我们讲讲好吗?
DG: It's out-sized. I mean, look. If Australia disappears tomorrow, terror is probably the right response. That's an awful large lot of very nice people. On the other hand, when a bus blows up and 30 people are killed, more people than that were killed by not using their seatbelts in the same country. Is terror the right response?
DG: 这个是被夸大了的。你看 如果明天澳大利亚消失了, 大家的第一感觉 可能就是恐怖袭击。 那么大的国家,那么善良的人民。 但是另一方面, 当一辆公共汽车爆炸了, 30个人遇难, 而在同一个国家更多人 因为不系安全带死亡。 你觉得恐惧应该是 正常的反应吗?
CA: What causes the bug? Is it the drama of the event -- that it's so spectacular? Is it the fact that it's an intentional attack by, quote, outsiders? What is it?
CA:是什么导致了这样的精神 缺陷呢?是事件的震撼效果—— 对人们的触动太大了吗? 是因为那是一个由“外国人” 发动的蓄意袭击吗? 或者是别的什么?
DG: Yes. It's a number of things, and you hit on several of them. First, it's a human agent trying to kill us -- it's not a tree falling on us by accident. Second, these are enemies who may want to strike and hurt us again. People are being killed for no reason instead of good reason -- as if there's good reason, but sometimes people think there are. So there are a number of things that together make this seem like a fantastic event, but let's not play down the fact that newspapers sell when people see something in it they want to read. So there's a large role here played by the media, who want these things to be as spectacular as they possibly can.
DG:是的,很多的因素, 你说出了其中的一些。 首先,是一个人类的组织 试图杀死我们—— 而不是一棵树倒下来 意外地砸到我们。 其次,我们的敌人也许会 再次发动袭击伤害我们。 人们是无缘无故地被杀害, 而不是死于合理的原因—— 就像真的有合理的原因似的, 但是有时候人们就是这样想的。 所以这是很多的因素集合在一起, 把这件事变成一个显著事件, 但是我们不要忘了 当人们看到想读的内容时, 报纸的销量就会比较好。 所以媒体在其中起了很大作用, 他们希望这些事情 越引人入胜越好。
CA: I mean, what would it take to persuade our culture to downplay it?
CA:我想知道, 要怎样去降低这种情绪呢?
DG: Well, go to Israel. You know, go to Israel. And a mall blows up, and then everybody's unhappy about it, and an hour-and-a-half later -- at least when I was there, and I was 150 feet from the mall when it blew up -- I went back to my hotel and the wedding that was planned was still going on. And as the Israeli mother said, she said, "We never let them win by stopping weddings." I mean, this is a society that has learned -- and there are others too -- that has learned to live with a certain amount of terrorism and not be quite as upset by it, shall I say, as those of us who have not had many terror attacks.
DG:去以色列吧。 去以色列。 发生了一起商场爆炸事, 所有人都非常气愤, 一个半小时后—— 至少当我在场的时候, 一个离我们150英尺的商场 爆炸了——我回到了酒店, 一个筹备好的婚礼还在照常进行。 就像一个以色列母亲所说的, 她说,”我们永远不会让他们得逞, 影响到我们的婚礼。“ 我的意思是, 这是一个已经习惯了的社会—— 当然有些其他地方也是—— 学会了如何在 一定的恐怖主义威胁中生存, 而且不会过分担心,被打扰, 就像我们中间那些没怎么经历过 恐怖袭击的人一样。
CA: But is there a rational fear that actually, the reason we're frightened about this is because we think that the Big One is to come?
CA:但是这样的恐惧 是不是理性的呢, 我们之所以恐惧是因为下一轮袭击 可能更严重?
DG: Yes, of course. So, if we knew that this was the worst attack there would ever be, there might be more and more buses of 30 people -- we would probably not be nearly so frightened. I don't want to say -- please, I'm going to get quoted somewhere as saying, "Terrorism is fine and we shouldn't be so distressed." That's not my point at all. What I'm saying is that, surely, rationally, our distress about things that happen, about threats, should be roughly proportional to the size of those threats and threats to come. I think in the case of terrorism, it isn't. And many of the things we've heard about from our speakers today -- how many people do you know got up and said, Poverty! I can't believe what poverty is doing to us. People get up in the morning; they don't care about poverty. It's not making headlines, it's not making news, it's not flashy. There are no guns going off. I mean, if you had to solve one of these problems, Chris, which would you solve? Terrorism or poverty? (Laughter) (Applause) That's a tough one.
DG:当然,如果我们知道 这次袭击已经是最严重的了, 当然,也许还会有更多的 30人大巴爆炸事件—— 我们很可能就没那么害怕了。 我并不是说—— 我要引用一句别人的话, “恐怖主义并不可怕, 我们不应该那么紧张。” 这决不是我的意思。 我要说的是,理性地讲, 我们对这些事实和威胁 产生的恐惧心理, 应该和所面对的威胁及将要到来的 威胁的规模成比例。 我认为在对待恐怖主义 这件事上,人们不是这样的。 今天我们听到那么多的演讲—— 有多少人站起来说, 贫穷! 真想不到贫穷的状况这么严重!!! 人们早上起来的时候 还完全不关心贫穷。 贫穷成不了新闻头条, 因为它一点都不吸引人。 那里没有枪声。 我是说,Christ,如果你必须去 解决其中的一个问题, 你会选哪个?恐怖主义还是贫穷? (笑声) (掌声) 这个问题很难。
CA: There's no question. Poverty, by an order of magnitude, a huge order of magnitude, unless someone can show that there's, you know, terrorists with a nuke are really likely to come. The latest I've read, seen, thought is that it's incredibly hard for them to do that. If that turns out to be wrong, we all look silly, but with poverty it's a bit --
CA: 毫无疑问。 贫穷,从重要性上来讲 无疑是优先的, 除非什么人在这里可以证明 恐怖主义已经拥有了核武器。 我最近读到、看到、想到的是 核武器对于恐怖主义来说 还是比较难获得的。 如果那个判断是错误的, 我们可就出大糗了, 但是相对于贫穷, 有那么一点儿——
DG: Even if that were true, still more people die from poverty.
DG:即使那是真的, 还是有更多的人死于贫困。
CA: We've evolved to get all excited about these dramatic attacks. Is that because in the past, in the ancient past, we just didn't understand things like disease and systems that cause poverty and so forth, and so it made no sense for us as a species to put any energy into worrying about those things? People died; so be it. But if you got attacked, that was something you could do something about. And so we evolved these responses. Is that what happened?
CA: 我们变得对待恐怖袭击时 会非常激动。那是因为 在很久以前,我们还不知道是疾病 和其他种种原因导致了贫穷, 所以我们这个物种并没有 投入太多精力 去担心这些事情? 人们死去了,正常的。 但如果你被袭击了, 是可以做些什么去应对的。 所以我们会有这样的反应。 是这个原因吗?
DG: Well, you know, the people who are most skeptical about leaping to evolutionary explanations for everything are the evolutionary psychologists themselves. My guess is that there's nothing quite that specific in our evolutionary past. But rather, if you're looking for an evolutionary explanation, you might say that most organisms are neo-phobic -- that is, they're a little scared of stuff that's new and different. And there's a good reason to be, because old stuff didn't eat you. Right? Any animal you see that you've seen before is less likely to be a predator than one that you've never seen before. So, you know, when a school bus is blown up and we've never seen this before, our general tendency is to orient towards that which is new and novel is activated. I don't think it's quite as specific a mechanism as the one you alluded to, but maybe a more fundamental one underlying it.
DG:你知道吗, 那些对用进化论解释所有问题 持最大怀疑态度的人, 恰恰是进化心理学者们自己。 我的猜测是, 从人类的进化史上看 从来没有任何东西是特定的。 然而,如果你去寻找 一个进化论的解释,你也许会说 绝大多数物种都有一种“恐新症” ——就是说,他们害怕 新的、不一样的东西。 有个充分的理由是, 见过的东西不会吃掉你,对吗? 见过的动物都不可能 比那些没见过的动物更可怕。 所以,当一个学校的校车爆炸, 我们以前从来没有见过这样的事情, 这种恐惧新生事物的倾向 就被激活了。 我并不认为这是一种 特别的机制在里面起作用, 就像你刚才暗指的那样, 但背后也许是更基础的原因。
Jay Walker: You know, economists love to talk about the stupidity of people who buy lottery tickets. But I suspect you're making the exact same error you're accusing those people of, which is the error of value. I know, because I've interviewed about 1,000 lottery buyers over the years. It turns out that the value of buying a lottery ticket is not winning. That's what you think it is. All right? The average lottery buyer buys about 150 tickets a year, so the buyer knows full well that he or she is going to lose, and yet she buys 150 tickets a year. Why is that? It's not because she is stupid or he is stupid. It's because the anticipation of possibly winning releases serotonin in the brain, and actually provides a good feeling until the drawing indicates you've lost. Or, to put it another way, for the dollar investment, you can have a much better feeling than flushing the money down the toilet, which you cannot have a good feeling from. Now, economists tend to -- (Applause) -- economists tend to view the world through their own lenses, which is: this is just a bunch of stupid people. And as a result, many people look at economists as stupid people. And so fundamentally, the reason we got to the moon is, we didn't listen to the economists. Thank you very much. (Applause)
(观众)Jay Walker: 经济学家往往喜欢谈论 那些买彩票的人有多么愚蠢。 但是我怀疑 就在你指责这些人的时候, 自己也犯了同样的错误, 也就是在估值上的错误。 我这么说是因为近几年 我曾经访谈了大约1000个 买彩票的人。 结果显示, 购买彩票的价值并不是去中奖。 但这是你认为的价值,对吗? 一个普通的彩民一年要买 大约150张彩票, 这个彩民其实完全知道 他是会输掉的, 可还是会每年买150张,为什么? 这并不是因为他(她)的 脑子有问题。 而是因为中奖的预期 在大脑中释放出一种血清胺, 让人们产生快感 会一直持续到开奖的时候。 换一种说法,投资1美元, 可以获得比马桶冲钱 好很多的快感, 如果你真用马桶冲钱的话, 你是不会有好的感觉的。 现在,经济学家们都倾向于—— (掌声) 经济学家们都试图 用他们的有色眼镜 看这个世界,结果是: 看到一群愚蠢的人。 结果很多人觉得 经济学家也很愚蠢。 总之,人类能登上月球 就是因为当初没有听 经济学家的意见,谢谢。 (掌声)
DG: Well, no, it's a great point. It remains to be seen whether the joy of anticipation is exactly equaled by the amount of disappointment after the lottery. Because remember, people who didn't buy tickets don't feel awful the next day either, even though they don't feel great during the drawing. I would disagree that people know they're not going to win. I think they think it's unlikely, but it could happen, which is why they prefer that to the flushing. But certainly I see your point: that there can be some utility to buying a lottery ticket other than winning. Now, I think there's many good reasons not to listen to economists. That isn't one of them, for me, but there's many others.
DG:你的观点很好。 但是有件事还有待考察: 预期中奖的快乐是不是和 开奖之后的“沮丧”的程度相等。 请记住: 不买彩票的人开奖后第二天 不会觉得那么“沮丧”, 尽管在开奖的瞬间感觉 也没有那么好。 我不同意那些人知道 自己肯定会输。 也许他们觉得可能性不大, 但还是可能发生的, 所以他们更愿意去买彩票 而不是冲厕所。 但是我也看到了你的观点: 确实, 除了中奖之外买彩票是会 给人们带来一定的效用的。 其实还有很多很好的 不听从经济学家的理由。 对我来说这不是其中一个, 但确实还有很多别的理由。
CA: Last question.
CA:最后一个问题。
Aubrey de Grey: My name's Aubrey de Grey, from Cambridge. I work on the thing that kills more people than anything else kills -- I work on aging -- and I'm interested in doing something about it, as we'll all hear tomorrow. I very much resonate with what you're saying, because it seems to me that the problem with getting people interested in doing anything about aging is that by the time aging is about to kill you it looks like cancer or heart disease or whatever. Do you have any advice? (Laughter)
(观众)Aubrey de Grey: 我叫Aubrey de Grey,剑桥的。 我所研究的东西比其他 所有东西都能导致更多人死亡—— 我研究衰老—— 非常希望能在这个领域做些什么, 明天大家就会听到。 我很认同你的观点, 因为在我看来 人们之所以不太关心衰老的问题, 是因为衰老在即将夺去生命的时候, 它看起来像癌症, 或者心脏病什么的。 你有什么建议吗? (笑声)
DG: For you or for them?
DG: 建议是给你还是给他们?
AdG: In persuading them.
AdG: 说服他们。
DG: Ah, for you in persuading them. Well, it's notoriously difficult to get people to be farsighted. But one thing that psychologists have tried that seems to work is to get people to imagine the future more vividly. One of the problems with making decisions about the far future and the near future is that we imagine the near future much more vividly than the far future. To the extent that you can equalize the amount of detail that people put into the mental representations of near and far future, people begin to make decisions about the two in the same way. So, would you like to have an extra 100,000 dollars when you're 65 is a question that's very different than, imagine who you'll be when you're 65: will you be living, what will you look like, how much hair will you have, who will you be living with. Once we have all the details of that imaginary scenario, suddenly we feel like it might be important to save so that that guy has a little retirement money. But these are tricks around the margins. I think in general you're battling a very fundamental human tendency, which is to say, "I'm here today, and so now is more important than later."
DG: 哦,要让你说服他们。 让人们有远见是 一件非常困难的事情。 但有一件事情心理学家试过, 效果还不错, 那就是让人们更生动、 更真实地设想未来。 关于做未来和当前的 决策的问题之一 在于人们对当前的预期 要比未来生动、真实的多。 你可以试图找到很多细节 帮助人们想象 短期和长期的环境, 人们就会开始用同样的 方式对现在和未来做决定。 那么,你是否愿意在65岁的时候 得到额外的10万美元, 这个问题很复杂, 相比较当你设想 你65岁的时候是什么人: 是否还活着, 会喜欢什么东西,还剩多少头发, 和什么人生活在一起。 一旦我们想清楚了 所有未来情景下的细节, 我们会忽然感觉, 攒钱是很重要的, 这样退休的时候才会有钱。 但这也不能一概而论。 我感觉总的来说你在和 最基本的人性做斗争, 那就是:”我今天在这里, 所以此时此刻比未来更重要。“
CA: Dan, thank you. Members of the audience, that was a fantastic session. Thank you. (Applause)
CA: 谢谢你 Dan。在座的各位, 这段演讲真是很精彩,谢谢大家。 (掌声)