Vi tager alle beslutninger hver dag; vi vil gerne vide hvad der er det rigtige at gøre -- på områder fra det finansielle til det gastronomiske, til det professionelle, til det romantiske. Og bestemt, hvis nogen virkelig kunne fortælle os hvordan vi gør præcis det rigtige, hver gang det er muligt, ville det være en mægtig gave.
We all make decisions every day; we want to know what the right thing is to do -- in domains from the financial to the gastronomic to the professional to the romantic. And surely, if somebody could really tell us how to do exactly the right thing at all possible times, that would be a tremendous gift.
Det viser sig, faktisk, at verden fik denne gave i 1738 af en hollandsk polyhistor der hed Daniel Bernoulli. Og hvad jeg vil tale til jer om i dag, er hvad den gave er og jeg vil også forklare jer, hvorfor det ikke har gjort nogen forbandet forskel.
It turns out that, in fact, the world was given this gift in 1738 by a Dutch polymath named Daniel Bernoulli. And what I want to talk to you about today is what that gift is, and I also want to explain to you why it is that it hasn't made a damn bit of difference.
Nuvel, dette er Bernoullis gave. Dette er et direkte citat. Og hvis det ligner græsk for jer, er det fordi, jamen, det er græsk. Men den simple engelske oversættelse -- meget mindre præcis, men det fanger essensen af det Bernoulli havde at sige -- var dette: Den forventede værdi af enhver af vores handlinger -- det vil sige, godheden som vi kan regne med at få -- er produktet af to simple ting: oddsene for at denne handling giver os lov til at vinde noget, og værdien af denne gevinst for os.
Now, this is Bernoulli's gift. This is a direct quote. And if it looks like Greek to you, it's because, well, it's Greek. But the simple English translation -- much less precise, but it captures the gist of what Bernoulli had to say -- was this: The expected value of any of our actions -- that is, the goodness that we can count on getting -- is the product of two simple things: the odds that this action will allow us to gain something, and the value of that gain to us.
På en måde prøvede Bernoulli at sige, at hvis vi kan vurdere og gange disse to ting, vil vi altid vide præcis hvordan vi skal handle.
In a sense, what Bernoulli was saying is, if we can estimate and multiply these two things, we will always know precisely how we should behave.
Nuvel, denne simple ligning, selv for de af jer der ikke kan lide ligninger, er noget som I er ret vant til. Her er et eksempel: Hvis jeg fortalte dig, lad os spille et lille spil møntkast, og jeg vil slå plat og krone med en mønt, og hvis det bliver krone, vil jeg give dig 10 dollars, men du skal betale 4 dollars for privilegiet af at spille med mig, de fleste af jer ville sige, "ok, det væddemål er jeg med på". Fordi I ved at oddsene for at I vinder er halvdelen, og gevinsten er 10 dollars, det ganges til fem, og det er mere end jeg afkræver jer for at spille. Så, svaret er ja. Dette er hvad statistikkerne teknisk set kalder et forbandet godt væddemål.
Now, this simple equation, even for those of you who don't like equations, is something that you're quite used to. Here's an example: if I were to tell you, let's play a little coin toss game, and I'm going to flip a coin, and if it comes up heads, I'm going to pay you 10 dollars, but you have to pay four dollars for the privilege of playing with me, most of you would say, sure, I'll take that bet. Because you know that the odds of you winning are one half, the gain if you do is 10 dollars, that multiplies to five, and that's more than I'm charging you to play. So, the answer is, yes. This is what statisticians technically call a damn fine bet.
Nuvel, ideen er simpel når vi bruger den på møntkast, men faktisk er den ikke særlig simpel i hverdagen. Mennesker er forfærdelig dårlige til at vurdere begge disse ting, og det er hvad jeg vil tale til Jer om i dag.
Now, the idea is simple when we're applying it to coin tosses, but in fact, it's not very simple in everyday life. People are horrible at estimating both of these things, and that's what I want to talk to you about today.
Der er to slags fejl mennesker laver, når de prøver at beslutte hvad der er det rigtige at gøre, og det er fejl i at vurdere oddsene for at de vil lykkedes og fejl i at vurdere værdien af deres egne succeser. Men, lad mig starte med at tale om den første. At beregne odds, ser ud til at være noget ret nemt: Der er seks sider på en terning, to sider på en mønt, 52 kort i et spil kort. I ved alle hvad sandsynligheden er for at trække spar es eller at kaste krone. Men det viser sig, at dette ikke er en særlig nem ide at anvende i hverdagen. Det er derfor amerikanere spenderer mere -- -- jeg burde sige, taber mere -- på hasard end alle de andre former for underholdning tilsammen. Grunden er, at det ikke er hvordan folk beregner odds.
There are two kinds of errors people make when trying to decide what the right thing is to do, and those are errors in estimating the odds that they're going to succeed, and errors in estimating the value of their own success. Now, let me talk about the first one first. Calculating odds would seem to be something rather easy: there are six sides to a die, two sides to a coin, 52 cards in a deck. You all know what the likelihood is of pulling the ace of spades or of flipping a heads. But as it turns out, this is not a very easy idea to apply in everyday life. That's why Americans spend more -- I should say, lose more -- gambling than on all other forms of entertainment combined. The reason is, this isn't how people do odds.
Måden hvor folk regner odds på kræver at vi først snakker lidt om grise. Nuvel, spørgsmålet jeg vil stille jer, er om I tror der bliver observeret flere hunde eller grise i snor, en hvilken som helst dag i Oxford. Og selvfølgelig, ved I alle sammen at svaret er hunde. Og måden hvorpå I ved at svaret er hunde er, at I hurtigt kigger i hukommelsen efter de gange I har set hunde og grise i snor. Det var meget nemt at huske, at se hunde men ikke så nemt at huske grise. Og hver af jer antog, at hvis hunde i snore kom hurtigere frem i hukommelsen, så er hunde i snor mere sandsynligt. Det er ikke nogen dårlig tommelfingerregel, bortset fra når det er det.
The way people figure odds requires that we first talk a bit about pigs. Now, the question I'm going to put to you is whether you think there are more dogs or pigs on leashes observed in any particular day in Oxford. And of course, you all know that the answer is dogs. And the way that you know that the answer is dogs is you quickly reviewed in memory the times you've seen dogs and pigs on leashes. It was very easy to remember seeing dogs, not so easy to remember pigs. And each one of you assumed that if dogs on leashes came more quickly to your mind, then dogs on leashes are more probable. That's not a bad rule of thumb, except when it is.
Så, for eksempel, her er en ordgåde. Er der flest engelske fire bogstavs ord med R på tredje pladsen eller R på første pladsen? Jamen, man kigger kort i hukommelsen, laver en hurtig scanning, og det er forfærdelig nemt at sige til sig selv, Ring, Rang, Rung, og det er sværere at sige til sig selv, Pare, Park: de kommer langsommere. Men faktisk, så er der mange flere ord i det engelske sprog, med R på tredje pladsen end på første pladsen. Grunden til at ord med R på tredjepladsen kommer langsommere frem i hukommelsen, er ikke fordi de er usandsynlige eller sjældne. Det er fordi hjernen husker ord ved deres første bogstav. Man kan råbe lyden, S -- og så kommer ordet. Det er ligesom ordbogen; Det er svært at finde ting efter det tredje bogstav. Så, dette er et eksempel på at ideen om, at hastigheden som tingene kommer frem i hjernen på, kan give en ideen om sandsynligheden --
So, for example, here's a word puzzle. Are there more four-letter English words with R in the third place or R in the first place? Well, you check memory very briefly, make a quick scan, and it's awfully easy to say to yourself, Ring, Rang, Rung, and very hard to say to yourself, Pare, Park: they come more slowly. But in fact, there are many more words in the English language with R in the third than the first place. The reason words with R in the third place come slowly to your mind isn't because they're improbable, unlikely or infrequent. It's because the mind recalls words by their first letter. You kind of shout out the sound, S -- and the word comes. It's like the dictionary; it's hard to look things up by the third letter. So, this is an example of how this idea that the quickness with which things come to mind can give you a sense of their probability --
hvordan denne ide kan lede en på afveje. Det er dog ikke kun puslespil. For eksempel, når amerikanere bliver bedt om at vurdere oddsene for at de vil dø på forskellige interessante måder -- dette er vurderinger af antallet af dødsfald per år per 200 millioner amerikanske borgere. Og dette er bare almindelige mennesker ligesom jer, der bliver bedt om at gætte hvor mange folk der dør af tornadoer, fyrværkeri, astma, drukning, osv. Sammenlign dette med de faktiske tal.
how this idea could lead you astray. It's not just puzzles, though. For example, when Americans are asked to estimate the odds that they will die in a variety of interesting ways -- these are estimates of number of deaths per year per 200 million U.S. citizens. And these are just ordinary people like yourselves who are asked to guess how many people die from tornado, fireworks, asthma, drowning, etc. Compare these to the actual numbers.
Det man ser er et meget interessant mønster her, hvilket for det første er, at to ting bliver enormt overvurderet, nemlig tornadoer og fyrværkeri. To ting bliver enormt undervurderet: Død ved drukning og død af astma. Hvorfor? Hvornår var sidste gang I kiggede i en avis og overskriften var, "Dreng død af astma?" Det er ikke interessant, fordi det er så almindeligt. Det er meget nemt for os at huske de tilfælde hvor vi har set nyheder der viser tornadoer der ødelægger byer, eller en eller anden tosse der har sprængt sine hænder af med fyrværkeri til Fourth of July. Død ved drukning og astma får ikke meget dækning. De kommer ikke hurtig frem i hukommelsen, og resultatet er at vi undervurderer dem utrolig meget.
Now, you see a very interesting pattern here, which is first of all, two things are vastly over-estimated, namely tornadoes and fireworks. Two things are vastly underestimated: dying by drowning and dying by asthma. Why? When was the last time that you picked up a newspaper and the headline was, "Boy dies of Asthma?" It's not interesting because it's so common. It's very easy for all of us to bring to mind instances of news stories or newsreels where we've seen tornadoes devastating cities, or some poor schmuck who's blown his hands off with a firework on the Fourth of July. Drownings and asthma deaths don't get much coverage. They don't come quickly to mind, and as a result, we vastly underestimate them.
Dette er ganske vist denne slags gemmelege som "Hvilken ting hører ikke hjemme?", og I har ret i at sige at det er swimmingpoolen der ikke hører hjemme, fordi swimmingpoolen er den eneste ting på den slide, der faktisk er rigtig farlig. Måden hvorpå flere af jer mest sandsynlig vil dø på, i stedet for kombinationen af alle tre, kan I se på sliden.
Indeed, this is kind of like the Sesame Street game of "Which thing doesn't belong?" And you're right to say it's the swimming pool that doesn't belong, because the swimming pool is the only thing on this slide that's actually very dangerous. The way that more of you are likely to die than the combination of all three of the others that you see on the slide.
Lotto er et rigtig godt eksempel, selvfølgelig -- en glimrende testcase af menneskers evne til at beregne sandsynligheder. Og økonomerne -- tilgiv mig, jer der spiller i lotteriet -- men økonomer, i hvert fald blandt dem selv, refererer til lotteriet som en dumhedsskat, fordi oddsene for at få en fortjeneste ved at investere ens penge i en lottokupon er omtrent det samme som at skylle pengene direkte ud i toilettet -- som, forresten, ikke kræver at man ligefrem behøver at gå ind i butikken og købe noget.
The lottery is an excellent example, of course -- an excellent test-case of people's ability to compute probabilities. And economists -- forgive me, for those of you who play the lottery -- but economists, at least among themselves, refer to the lottery as a stupidity tax, because the odds of getting any payoff by investing your money in a lottery ticket are approximately equivalent to flushing the money directly down the toilet -- which, by the way, doesn't require that you actually go to the store and buy anything.
Hvorfor i alverden ville nogen have lyst til at spille i lotteriet? Jamen, der er mange svar, men et svar er helt sikkert, vi ser en masse vindere. Ikke? Da dette par vinder lotteriet, eller Ed McMahon står ved jeres dør for at aflevere denne kæmpe check -- hvordan dælen man indløser en check på den størrelse ved jeg ikke. Vi ser dette i fjernsynet; vi læser om det i avisen. Hvornår så I sidste gang et dybdegående interview med alle dem der tabte? Og rigtignok, hvis vi krævede at tv-stationerne viser et 30 sekunders interview med hver taber hver gang de interviewer en vinder, ville de 100 million tabere i det sidste lotteri kræve ni og et halvt år af jeres udelte opmærksomhed, bare for at se dem sige "Mig, jeg tabte." "Mig, jeg tabte." Nuvel, hvis man ser ni og et halvt års tv -- ingen søvn, ingen toilet pauser -- og man ser taber, efter taber, efter taber, og til slut et 30 sekunders klip med, "og jeg vandt", er sandsynligheden for at man ville spille i lotteriet meget lille.
Why in the world would anybody ever play the lottery? Well, there are many answers, but one answer surely is, we see a lot of winners. Right? When this couple wins the lottery, or Ed McMahon shows up at your door with this giant check -- how the hell do you cash things that size, I don't know. We see this on TV; we read about it in the paper. When was the last time that you saw extensive interviews with everybody who lost? Indeed, if we required that television stations run a 30-second interview with each loser every time they interview a winner, the 100 million losers in the last lottery would require nine-and-a-half years of your undivided attention just to watch them say, "Me? I lost." "Me? I lost." Now, if you watch nine-and-a-half years of television -- no sleep, no potty breaks -- and you saw loss after loss after loss, and then at the end there's 30 seconds of, "and I won," the likelihood that you would play the lottery is very small.
Se, jeg kan bevise det for jer: Her er et lille lotteri. Der er 10 kuponer i dette lotteri. Ni af dem er solgt til disse individer. Det koster en dollar at købe en kupon, og hvis man vinder, får man 20 dollars. Er dette et godt væddemål? Jamen, det fortæller Bernoulli os. Den forventede værdi af dette lotteri er to dollars; dette er et lotteri som man burde investere sine penge i. Og de fleste mennesker siger, "Ok, jeg er med.".
Look, I can prove this to you: here's a little lottery. There's 10 tickets in this lottery. Nine of them have been sold to these individuals. It costs you a dollar to buy the ticket and, if you win, you get 20 bucks. Is this a good bet? Well, Bernoulli tells us it is. The expected value of this lottery is two dollars; this is a lottery in which you should invest your money. And most people say, "OK, I'll play."
Nuvel, en lille anderledes version af dette lotteri: forestil jer at de ni kuponer alle ejes af en fed fyr der hedder Leroy. Leroy har ni kuponer; der er en tilbage. Vil man have den? De fleste mennesker vil ikke spille i dette lotteri. I kan se at oddsene for at vinde er uændrede, men nu er det utrolig nemt at se hvem der kommer til at vinde. Det er nemt at se Leroy få den check, ikke? I kan ikke sige til jer selv, "Der er lige så stor sandsynlighed for at jeg vinder, som alle andre fordi der er ikke lige så stor sandsynlighed for at I vinder, som Leroy. Faktum er, at alle disse kuponer ejes af en fyr og det ændrer ens beslutning om at spille selvom det ikke ændrer det mindste ved oddsene.
Now, a slightly different version of this lottery: imagine that the nine tickets are all owned by one fat guy named Leroy. Leroy has nine tickets; there's one left. Do you want it? Most people won't play this lottery. Now, you can see the odds of winning haven't changed, but it's now fantastically easy to imagine who's going to win. It's easy to see Leroy getting the check, right? You can't say to yourself, "I'm as likely to win as anybody," because you're not as likely to win as Leroy. The fact that all those tickets are owned by one guy changes your decision to play, even though it does nothing whatsoever to the odds.
Nuvel, at beregne odds, uanset hvor svært det ser ud, er utrolig nemt sammenlignet med at prøve at beregne værdi: At prøve at vurdere hvad noget er værd, hvor meget man vil nyde det, hvor meget glæde det vil give os. Jeg vil nu tale om fejl i værdi. Hvor meget er en Big Mac værd? Er den 25 dollars værd? De fleste af jer syntes intuitivt, at den ikke er det værd -- I vil ikke betale det for den.
Now, estimating odds, as difficult as it may seem, is a piece of cake compared to trying to estimate value: trying to say what something is worth, how much we'll enjoy it, how much pleasure it will give us. I want to talk now about errors in value. How much is this Big Mac worth? Is it worth 25 dollars? Most of you have the intuition that it's not -- you wouldn't pay that for it.
Men faktisk, at beslutte om en Big Mac er 25 dollars værd, kræver at man spørger sig selv om en ting, hvilket er: Hvad kan jeg ellers gøre med 25 dollars? Hvis I nogensinde har været på et af de langtursflyvninger til Australien og opdaget at de ikke kommer til at servere noget mad, men nogen i rækken foran en lige har åbnet en McDonalds pose, og duften af den gyldne måge flyder hen over sædet, man tænker, jeg kan ikke bruge disse 25 dollars på andet de næste 16 timer. Jeg kan ikke engang sætte ild til dem -- de tog min lighter! Pludselig er 25 dollars for en Big Mac måske en god handel.
But in fact, to decide whether a Big Mac is worth 25 dollars requires that you ask one, and only one question, which is: What else can I do with 25 dollars? If you've ever gotten on one of those long-haul flights to Australia and realized that they're not going to serve you any food, but somebody in the row in front of you has just opened the McDonald's bag, and the smell of golden arches is wafting over the seat, you think, I can't do anything else with this 25 dollars for 16 hours. I can't even set it on fire -- they took my cigarette lighter! Suddenly, 25 dollars for a Big Mac might be a good deal.
På den anden side, hvis man besøger et uland, og man for 25 dollars får et gourmet måltid, er det mange penge for en Big Mac. Hvorfor var I alle sikre på at svaret var nej, før jeg havde fortalt noget om konteksten? Fordi de fleste af jer sammenligner prisen af en Big Mac med prisen I plejer at betale. I stedet for at spørge, "Hvad kan jeg ellers gøre med mine penge," og sammenligne denne investering med tidligere mulige investeringer, I sammenlignede med fortiden. Og dette er en systematisk fejl folk begår. Hvad man ved er, man betalte 3 dollars i fortiden; 25 er skandaløst.
On the other hand, if you're visiting an underdeveloped country, and 25 dollars buys you a gourmet meal, it's exorbitant for a Big Mac. Why were you all sure that the answer to the question was no, before I'd even told you anything about the context? Because most of you compared the price of this Big Mac to the price you're used to paying. Rather than asking, "What else can I do with my money," comparing this investment to other possible investments, you compared to the past. And this is a systematic error people make. What you knew is, you paid three dollars in the past; 25 is outrageous.
Dette er en fejl og jeg kan bevise det for jer, ved at vise jer den slags irrationelle handlinger det leder til. For eksempel, dette er, selvfølgelig, et af de lækreste marketing tricks, at sige at noget plejede at være dyrere, og pludselig ser det ud til at være en rigtig god handel. Når folk bliver spurgt om disse to jobs: et job hvor man tjener 60.000, så 50.000, så 40.000, et job hvor man får en lønnedgang hvert år, og et hvor man får en lønstigning, kan folk bedst lide det andet job, frem for det første, på trods af at de får at vide at de tjener en del færre penge. Hvorfor? Fordi de havde følelsen af at lønnedgang er værre, end lønstigning, selv når den totale mængde af lønnen er højere i den nedgående periode. Her er endnu et sjovt eksempel.
This is an error, and I can prove it to you by showing the kinds of irrationalities to which it leads. For example, this is, of course, one of the most delicious tricks in marketing, is to say something used to be higher, and suddenly it seems like a very good deal. When people are asked about these two different jobs: a job where you make 60K, then 50K, then 40K, a job where you're getting a salary cut each year, and one in which you're getting a salary increase, people like the second job better than the first, despite the fact they're all told they make much less money. Why? Because they had the sense that declining wages are worse than rising wages, even when the total amount of wages is higher in the declining period. Here's another nice example.
Her er en feriepakke til Hawaii til 2.000 dollars; den er nu på tilbud til 1.600. Hvis vi går ud fra at man gerne ville til Hawaii, ville I købe denne pakke? De fleste folk siger de ville. Her er en lidt anderledes historie: Pakken til Hawaii til 2.000 dollars er nu på tilbud til 700 dollars, så man tænker over det i en uge. Da man kommer til rejsebureauet, er de bedste rejser taget -- pakken koster nu 1.500. Ville I købe den? De fleste siger nej. Hvorfor? Fordi den plejede at koste 700, og jeg betaler under ingen omstændigheder 1.500 for noget der kostede 700 i sidste uge.
Here's a $2,000 Hawaiian vacation package; it's now on sale for 1,600. Assuming you wanted to go to Hawaii, would you buy this package? Most people say they would. Here's a slightly different story: $2,000 Hawaiian vacation package is now on sale for 700 dollars, so you decide to mull it over for a week. By the time you get to the ticket agency, the best fares are gone -- the package now costs 1,500. Would you buy it? Most people say, no. Why? Because it used to cost 700, and there's no way I'm paying 1,500 for something that was 700 last week.
Denne tendens til at sammenligne med fortiden får folk til at afslå den bedste handel. Med andre ord, en god handel, der plejede at være en suveræn handel, er ikke nær så god som en dårlig handel, der plejede at være en elendig handel.
This tendency to compare to the past is causing people to pass up the better deal. In other words, a good deal that used to be a great deal is not nearly as good as an awful deal that was once a horrible deal.
Her er et andet eksempel af hvordan det at sammenligne med fortiden kan forvirre vores beslutninger. Forestil jer, at man tager i teateret. Man er på vej til teatret. I ens pung har man en billet, som man har betalt 20 dollars for. Man har også en 20 dollar seddel. Da man ankommer til teatret, finder man ud af, at man har tabt billetten på vejen. Ville man bruge de sidste penge på at købe en ny? De fleste mennesker siger nej. Nuvel, lad os ændre en ting i dette eksempel. Man er på vej til teatret, og i pungen har man to 20 dollar sedler. Da man ankommer finder man ud af, at man har mistet den ene. Ville I bruge de sidste 20 dollars på at købe en billet? Jamen, selvfølgelig, jeg tog i teatret for at se stykket. Hvad har tabet af 20 dollars på vejen at gøre med det?
Here's another example of how comparing to the past can befuddle our decisions. Imagine that you're going to the theater. You're on your way to the theater. In your wallet you have a ticket, for which you paid 20 dollars. You also have a 20-dollar bill. When you arrive at the theater, you discover that somewhere along the way you've lost the ticket. Would you spend your remaining money on replacing it? Most people answer, no. Now, let's just change one thing in this scenario. You're on your way to the theater, and in your wallet you have two 20-dollar bills. When you arrive you discover you've lost one of them. Would you spend your remaining 20 dollars on a ticket? Well, of course, I went to the theater to see the play. What does the loss of 20 dollars along the way have to do?
Ok, hvis i tilfælde af at I ikke forstod det, så er der et diagram af hvad der skete her, ok? (Latter) På vejen tabte man noget. I begge tilfælde, var det et stykke papir. I det ene tilfælde, var der en amerikansk præsident på det; i det andet var der ikke. Hvilken forbandet forskel gør det? Forskellen er, at da man tabte billetten siger man til sig selv, jeg betaler ikke to gange for den samme ting. Man sammenligner prisen for stykket nu -- 40 dollars -- med prisen den plejede at have -- 20 dollars -- og man siger det er en dårlig handel. At sammenligne med fortiden skaber mange problemer som adfærdsøkonomer og psykologer identificerer i menneskers forsøg på at angive værdi. Men selv når vi sammenligner med mulighederne i stedet for fortiden, begår vi stadig bestemte fejl. Og jeg vil vise jer en eller to af dem.
Now, just in case you're not getting it, here's a schematic of what happened, OK? (Laughter) Along the way, you lost something. In both cases, it was a piece of paper. In one case, it had a U.S. president on it; in the other case it didn't. What the hell difference should it make? The difference is that when you lost the ticket you say to yourself, I'm not paying twice for the same thing. You compare the cost of the play now -- 40 dollars -- to the cost that it used to have -- 20 dollars -- and you say it's a bad deal. Comparing with the past causes many of the problems that behavioral economists and psychologists identify in people's attempts to assign value. But even when we compare with the possible, instead of the past, we still make certain kinds of mistakes. And I'm going to show you one or two of them.
En af tingene vi ved om sammenligning: at når vi sammenligner en ting med en anden, ændrer det værdi. Så i 1992, denne gut, George Bush, for de af os der var på den lidt liberale side af det politiske spektrum, virkede han ikke som en særlig god fyr. Pludselig, sukker vi næsten efter at få ham tilbage. (Latter) Sammenligningen ændrer hvordan vi evaluerer ham.
One of the things we know about comparison: that when we compare one thing to the other, it changes its value. So in 1992, this fellow, George Bush, for those of us who were kind of on the liberal side of the political spectrum, didn't seem like such a great guy. Suddenly, we're almost longing for him to return. (Laughter) The comparison changes how we evaluate him.
Nuvel, sælgere vidste dette før nogen andre selvfølgelig, og de bruger denne viden til at hjælpe dig -- at spare dig for byrden af penge. Så en sælger, hvis man går ind i en vinbutik og man skulle købe en flaske vin, og man ser dem der for otte, 27 og 33 dollar, hvad gør man så? De fleste mennesker vil ikke have det dyreste, de vil ikke have det billigste. Så de vælger den ting midt i mellem. Hvis man er en klog sælger, så vil man sætte en rigtig dyr ting, som ingen nogensinde vil købe, på hylden, fordi pludselig ser vinen til 33 dollar pludselig ikke dyr ud i sammenligning.
Now, retailers knew this long before anybody else did, of course, and they use this wisdom to help you -- spare you the undue burden of money. And so a retailer, if you were to go into a wine shop and you had to buy a bottle of wine, and you see them here for eight, 27 and 33 dollars, what would you do? Most people don't want the most expensive, they don't want the least expensive. So, they will opt for the item in the middle. If you're a smart retailer, then, you will put a very expensive item that nobody will ever buy on the shelf, because suddenly the $33 wine doesn't look as expensive in comparison.
Så jeg fortæller jer noget I allerede ved: nemlig, at sammenligning ændrer værdien af ting. Her er hvorfor det er et problem: problemet er, at når man tager den vin til 33 dollars med hjem, betyder det ikke noget hvad der stod på hylden ved siden af. Sammenligningen vi laver når vi fastsætter værdien, hvor vi prøver at evaluere hvor meget vi kan lide ting, er ikke de samme sammenligninger vi laver, når vi nyder dem. Dette problem af at ændre sammenligninger kan ødelægge vores forsøg på at lave rationelle beslutninger.
So I'm telling you something you already knew: namely, that comparison changes the value of things. Here's why that's a problem: the problem is that when you get that $33 bottle of wine home, it won't matter what it used to be sitting on the shelf next to. The comparisons we make when we are appraising value, where we're trying to estimate how much we'll like things, are not the same comparisons we'll be making when we consume them. This problem of shifting comparisons can bedevil our attempts to make rational decisions.
Lad mig give jer et eksempel. Jeg vil vise jer noget fra mit eget laboratorium, så lad mig snige dette ind. Disse er forsøgspersoner der kommer til et eksperiment, for at blive spurgt det simpleste spørgsmål: Hvor meget vil du nyde at spise chips om et minut? De sidder i et rum med chips foran sig. For nogle af forsøgspersonerne, står der i det modsatte hjørne af værelset en æske med Godiva chokolade, og for andre er det en dåseskinke. Faktisk, ændrer disse ting der står i værelset hvor meget forsøgspersonen regner med at nyde at spise chips. Nemlig, dem der kigger på dåseskinken tror at chipsene bliver ret lækre; dem der kigger på Godiva chokolade tror ikke det bliver nær så lækkert. Selvfølgelig, hvad sker der så når de spiser chipsene? Jamen, hør, man behøver ikke en psykolog for at fortælle en, at når man har munden fuld af fede, saltede, sprøde, lækre snacks, så betyder det der står i hjørnet af værelset ikke det mindste for ens smagsoplevelse. Ikke desto mindre, så bliver deres forudsigelser perverteret af sammenligningen der ikke følger med over, og ændrer deres oplevelse.
Let me just give you an example. I have to show you something from my own lab, so let me sneak this in. These are subjects coming to an experiment to be asked the simplest of all questions: How much will you enjoy eating potato chips one minute from now? They're sitting in a room with potato chips in front of them. For some of the subjects, sitting in the far corner of a room is a box of Godiva chocolates, and for others is a can of Spam. In fact, these items that are sitting in the room change how much the subjects think they're going to enjoy the potato chips. Namely, those who are looking at Spam think potato chips are going to be quite tasty; those who are looking at Godiva chocolate think they won't be nearly so tasty. Of course, what happens when they eat the potato chips? Well, look, you didn't need a psychologist to tell you that when you have a mouthful of greasy, salty, crispy, delicious snacks, what's sitting in the corner of the room makes not a damn bit of difference to your gustatory experience. Nonetheless, their predictions are perverted by a comparison that then does not carry through and change their experience.
I har alle oplevet dette selv, selv om I aldrig har været i vores laboratorium for at spise chips. Så her er spørgsmålet: Du vil købe en bilstereo. Forhandleren i nærheden af dit hus, sælger dette anlæg for 200 dollars, men hvis man kører gennem byen, kan man købe det for 100 dollars. Vil du køre for at spare 50 procent, og spare 100 dollars? De fleste mennesker siger de ville. De kan ikke forestille sig at købe det til den dobbelte pris, når man med en køretur gennem byen kan få det til halv pris.
You've all experienced this yourself, even if you've never come into our lab to eat potato chips. So here's a question: You want to buy a car stereo. The dealer near your house sells this particular stereo for 200 dollars, but if you drive across town, you can get it for 100 bucks. So would you drive to get 50 percent off, saving 100 dollars? Most people say they would. They can't imagine buying it for twice the price when, with one trip across town, they can get it for half off.
Nuvel, lad os i stedet forestille og, at man vil købe en bil med stereoanlæg i, og forhandleren i nærheden af huset solgte den til 31.000 dollars. Men hvis man kørte gennem byen, kunne man få den til 30.900. Ville man køre for at få den? Her er det 0.003 sparet -- de hundrede dollars. De fleste mennesker ville sige, nej, skal jeg slæbe mig selv gennem byen for at spare 100 dask på et bilkøb?
Now, let's imagine instead you wanted to buy a car that had a stereo, and the dealer near your house had it for 31,000. But if you drove across town, you could get it for 30,900. Would you drive to get it? At this point, 0.003 savings -- the 100 dollars. Most people say, no, I'm going to schlep across town to save 100 bucks on the purchase of a car?
Denne slags tænkning driver økonomer til vanvid, og det bør det. Fordi disse 100 dollars man sparer -- hallo! -- ved ikke hvor de kom fra. De ved ikke hvor man har sparet dem. Når man tager ud og køber ind for dem, siger de ikke, Jeg er de penge du sparede på anlægget, eller, Jeg er de dumme penge du sparede på bilen. Det er penge. Hvis en køretur gennem byen er 100 dollars værd, er det 100 dollars værd, uanset hvordan man sparer dem. Folk tænker ikke sådan. Det er derfor de ikke ved om deres investeringsforening tager 0.1 procent eller 0.15 procent af deres investering, men de klipper kuponer for at spare en dollar på tandpasta.
This kind of thinking drives economists crazy, and it should. Because this 100 dollars that you save -- hello! -- doesn't know where it came from. It doesn't know what you saved it on. When you go to buy groceries with it, it doesn't go, I'm the money saved on the car stereo, or, I'm the dumb money saved on the car. It's money. And if a drive across town is worth 100 bucks, it's worth 100 bucks no matter what you're saving it on. People don't think that way. That's why they don't know whether their mutual fund manager is taking 0.1 percent or 0.15 percent of their investment, but they clip coupons to save one dollar off of toothpaste.
Ok, I kan se at dette er problemet ved skiftende sammenligninger, fordi det man gør er, at man sammenligner de 100 dollars med det køb man foretager sig, men hvis man går ud og bruger de penge, laver man ikke sammenligningen. I har alle haft denne oplevelse.
Now, you can see, this is the problem of shifting comparisons, because what you're doing is, you're comparing the 100 bucks to the purchase that you're making, but when you go to spend that money you won't be making that comparison. You've all had this experience.
Hvis du er amerikaner, for eksempel, har du sikkert rejst i Frankrig. Og på et tidspunkt har du måske mødt et par fra ens hjemby, og du tænkte, "Ej for Søren, disse mennesker er så varme. De er så flinke overfor mig. Jeg mener, sammenlignet med disse mennesker der hader mig når jeg prøver at tale deres sprog, og hader mig endnu mere når jeg ikke gør, er disse mennesker vidunderlige.". Så du rejser gennem Frankrig med dem, og når du kommer hjem og man inviterer dem over til middag, hvad finder du så ud af? Sammenlignet med dine almindelige venner, er de kedelige og uinteressante, ikke? Fordi i denne nye sammenhæng, er sammenligningen meget, meget anderledes. Faktisk, synes du at du kan lide dem så lidt, at de kvalificerer sig til et fransk statsborgerskab.
If you're an American, for example, you've probably traveled in France. And at some point you may have met a couple from your own hometown, and you thought, "Oh, my God, these people are so warm. They're so nice to me. I mean, compared to all these people who hate me when I try to speak their language and hate me more when I don't, these people are just wonderful." And so you tour France with them, and then you get home and you invite them over for dinner, and what do you find? Compared to your regular friends, they are boring and dull, right? Because in this new context, the comparison is very, very different. In fact, you find yourself disliking them enough almost to qualify for French citizenship.
Og du har præcis det samme problem, når man er på indkøb efter et stereoanlæg. Du går ind i butikken og ser to sæt højtalere, disse store, firkantede monolitter, og disse små, slanke højtalere, og du hører dem, og siger, ved du, jeg kan høre en forskel: de store lyder lidt bedre. Så dem køber man, og man tager dem med hjem, og man smadrer fuldstændig indretningen i ens hus. Og problemet er selvfølgelig, at denne sammenligning man lavede i butikken, er en sammenligning man aldrig laver igen. Hvad er oddsene for, at man flere år senere tænder for anlægget og siger, "Det lyder meget bedre end de små" som man ikke engang kan huske at have hørt.
Now, you have exactly the same problem when you shop for a stereo. You go to the stereo store, you see two sets of speakers -- these big, boxy, monoliths, and these little, sleek speakers, and you play them, and you go, you know, I do hear a difference: the big ones sound a little better. And so you buy them, and you bring them home, and you entirely violate the décor of your house. And the problem, of course, is that this comparison you made in the store is a comparison you'll never make again. What are the odds that years later you'll turn on the stereo and go, "Sounds so much better than those little ones," which you can't even remember hearing.
Problemet med skiftende sammenligninger er endnu svære, når disse valgmuligheder bliver spredt over tid. Mennesker har en masse besvær med at træffe beslutninger om ting der vil ske på forskellige tidspunkter. Og hvad psykologer og adfærdsøkonomer har opdaget er at mennesker mere eller mindre bruger to regler. Så lad mig give jer et meget nemt problem, et andet meget nemt problem og så et tredje, svært problem.
The problem of shifting comparisons is even more difficult when these choices are arrayed over time. People have a lot of trouble making decisions about things that will happen at different points in time. And what psychologists and behavioral economists have discovered is that by and large people use two simple rules. So let me give you one very easy problem, a second very easy problem and then a third, hard, problem.
Her er det første, nemme problem: Man kan få 60 dollars nu, eller 50 dollars nu. Hvad foretrækker I? Det er hvad vi kalder en én-genstands IQ test, OK? Vi foretrækker alle, håber jeg, flere penge og grunden er, at mere er bedre end mindre.
Here's the first easy problem: You can have 60 dollars now or 50 dollars now. Which would you prefer? This is what we call a one-item IQ test, OK? All of us, I hope, prefer more money, and the reason is, we believe more is better than less.
Her er det andet problem: I kan få 60 dollars nu eller 60 dollars om en måned. Hvad foretrækker I? Igen, en nem beslutning, fordi vi ved alle at nu er bedre end senere. Hvad der er svært i vores beslutningsprocess, er når disse to regler konflikter. For eksempel, hvis man bliver tilbudt 50 dollars nu, eller 60 dollars om en måned. Dette er symptomatisk for mange situationer i livet, hvor man vil få mere ved at vente, men hvor man skal være tålmodig. Hvad ved vi? Hvad gør folk i denne slags situationer? Jamen, i det store hele er folk utrolig utålmodige. Altså, de kræver renter i størrelsesordenen hundrede eller tusinde procent, for at behovsudsætte og vente til næste måned, for at få de ekstra 10 dollars. Måske er det ikke så bemærkelsesværdigt, men hvad der er bemærkelsesværdigt er, hvor nemt det er at få denne utålmodighed til at gå væk, ved simpelthen at ændre hvornår afleveringen af disse monetære enheder vil ske. Forestil jer, at man kan få 50 dollars om et år -- det er 12 måneder -- eller 60 dollars om 13 måneder. Hvad ser vi nu? Mennesker venter gladeligt: Når de alligevel venter 12 måneder, så kan de lige så godt vente 13.
Here's the second problem: You can have 60 dollars today or 60 dollars in a month. Which would you prefer? Again, an easy decision, because we all know that now is better than later. What's hard in our decision-making is when these two rules conflict. For example, when you're offered 50 dollars now or 60 dollars in a month. This typifies a lot of situations in life in which you will gain by waiting, but you have to be patient. What do we know? What do people do in these kinds of situations? Well, by and large people are enormously impatient. That is, they require interest rates in the hundred or thousands of percents in order to delay gratification and wait until next month for the extra 10 dollars. Maybe that isn't so remarkable, but what is remarkable is how easy it is to make this impatience go away by simply changing when the delivery of these monetary units will happen. Imagine that you can have 50 dollars in a year -- that's 12 months -- or 60 dollars in 13 months. What do we find now? People are gladly willing to wait: as long as they're waiting 12, they might as well wait 13.
Hvad får denne dynamiske inkonsistens til at forekomme? Sammenligning. Bekymrende sammenligning. Lad mig vise jer.
What makes this dynamic inconsistency happen? Comparison. Troubling comparison. Let me show you.
Her er en graf der viser resultaterne som jeg foreslog ville vise, at hvis jeg gav jer tid til at svare, finder mennesker at den subjektive værdi af 50 er højere, end den subjektive værdi af 60, når de bliver afleveret henholdsvis nu eller om en måned -- en 30 dages forsinkelse -- men de viser det modsatte, når man skubber hele beslutningen et år ind i fremtiden. Men, hvorfor i alverden får man dette mønster af resultater?
This is just a graph showing the results that I just suggested you would show if I gave you time to respond, which is, people find that the subjective value of 50 is higher than the subjective value of 60 when they'll be delivered in now or one month, respectively -- a 30-day delay -- but they show the reverse pattern when you push the entire decision off into the future a year. Now, why in the world do you get this pattern of results?
Disse gutter kan fortælle os det. Hvad man ser her er to gutter, en af dem er større end den anden: Brandmanden og en spillemand. De vil trække sig mod forsvindingspunktet i horisonten, og man vil bemærke to ting. På intet tidspunkt vil brandmanden syne højere end spillemanden. Intet tidspunkt. Men, forskellen mellem dem virker til at blive mindre. Til at begynde med er det to og en halv centimeter, så er det en halv centimeter, så halvanden centimeter, for til sidst at forsvinde over jordens kant.
These guys can tell us. What you see here are two lads, one of them larger than the other: the fireman and the fiddler. They are going to recede towards the vanishing point in the horizon, and I want you to notice two things. At no point will the fireman look taller than the fiddler. No point. However, the difference between them seems to be getting smaller. First it's an inch in your view, then it's a quarter-inch, then a half-inch, and then finally they go off the edge of the earth.
Her er resultaterne af hvad jeg lige har vist jer. Dette er den subjektive højde -- højden af de to gutter som I lige så, på forskellige tidspunkter. Og jeg vil gerne have at I lægger mærke til to ting der er sande. Et, jo længere væk de er, jo mindre ser de ud; og to, brandmanden er altid større end spillemanden. Men læg mærke til hvad der sker, når vi lader nogle af dem forsvinde. Ikke. På meget tæt hold, ser spillemanden højere ud end brandmanden, men på lang afstand deres normale, er deres sande forhold bevaret. Som Platon sagde, hvad rum er for størrelse, er tid for værdi. Dette er resultaterne af det svære problem jeg gav jer: 60 nu, eller 50 om en måned? Og dette er de subjektive værdier, og hvad I kan ser er, at vores to regler er bevaret.
Here are the results of what I just showed you. This is the subjective height -- the height you saw of these guys at various points. And I want you to see that two things are true. One, the farther away they are, the smaller they look; and two, the fireman is always bigger than the fiddler. But watch what happens when we make some of them disappear. Right. At a very close distance, the fiddler looks taller than the fireman, but at a far distance their normal, their true, relations are preserved. As Plato said, what space is to size, time is to value. These are the results of the hard problem I gave you: 60 now or 50 in a month? And these are subjective values, and what you can see is, our two rules are preserved.
Mennesker mener altid mere er bedre end mindre: 60 er altid bedre end 50, og de mener altid at nu er bedre end senere: Søjlerne på denne side er højere end søjlerne på denne side. Se hvad der sker, når vi lader nogle forsvinde. Pludselig har en den dynamiske inkonsistens der forvirrede os. Vi har en tendens til at folk går efter 50 dollars nu i stedet for at vente en måned, men ikke hvis den beslutning ligger langt ude i fremtiden. Læg mærke til noget interessant som dette antyder -- nemlig det, at når mennesker når fremtiden, vil de ændre mening. Det vil sige, som den tolvte måned kommer tættere på, siger man, hvad tænkte jeg dog på, at vente en ekstra måned for 60 dollars? Jeg tager de 50 dollars nu.
People always think more is better than less: 60 is always better than 50, and they always think now is better than later: the bars on this side are higher than the bars on this side. Watch what happens when we drop some out. Suddenly we have the dynamic inconsistency that puzzled us. We have the tendency for people to go for 50 dollars now over waiting a month, but not if that decision is far in the future. Notice something interesting that this implies -- namely, that when people get to the future, they will change their minds. That is, as that month 12 approaches, you will say, what was I thinking, waiting an extra month for 60 dollars? I'll take the 50 dollars now.
Jamen, spørgsmålet som jeg gerne vil slutte med, er dette: Hvis vi er så forbandet dumme, hvordan kom vi til månen? Fordi jeg kunne fortsætte et par timer med at vise beviser, på menneskers manglende evne til at vurdere odds og manglende evne til at vurdere værdi.
Well, the question with which I'd like to end is this: If we're so damn stupid, how did we get to the moon? Because I could go on for about two hours with evidence of people's inability to estimate odds and inability to estimate value.
Svaret på spørgsmålet er, tror jeg, er et svar I allerede har hørt i nogle af disse taler, og jeg tør godt sige at I vil høre det igen: nemlig, at vores hjerne er udviklet til en meget anden verden, end den vi bor i nu. De blev udviklet til en verden hvor mennesker boede sammen i meget små grupper, sjældent mødte nogen der var meget anderledes end sig selv, havde ret korte liv, med færre valg involveret og den højeste prioritet var at spise og parre sig i dag.
The answer to this question, I think, is an answer you've already heard in some of the talks, and I dare say you will hear again: namely, that our brains were evolved for a very different world than the one in which we are living. They were evolved for a world in which people lived in very small groups, rarely met anybody who was terribly different from themselves, had rather short lives in which there were few choices and the highest priority was to eat and mate today.
Bernoullis gave, Bernoullis lille formel, tillader os, fortæller os hvordan vi burde tænke i en verden, som naturen ikke har designet os til. Det forklarer hvorfor vi er så dårlige til at bruge den, men det forklarer også hvorfor det er så utrolig vigtigt at vi bliver gode, hurtigt. Vi er den eneste art på denne planet, der har holdt sin egen skæbne i hænderne. Der er ikke nogen rovdyr der lever af mennesker, vi er herrer over vores fysiske omgivelser; tingene der normalt får en art til at uddø, er ikke længere en trussel for os. Den eneste ting -- den eneste ting -- der kan knuse os og blive vores undergang er vores egne beslutninger. Hvis vi ikke er her om 10.000 år, er det fordi vi ikke kunne udnytte den gave der er givet os, af en ung, hollandsk gut i 1738, fordi vi undervurderede oddsene af vores fremtidige pinsler, og overvurderede værdien af vores nutidige glæder.
Bernoulli's gift, Bernoulli's little formula, allows us, it tells us how we should think in a world for which nature never designed us. That explains why we are so bad at using it, but it also explains why it is so terribly important that we become good, fast. We are the only species on this planet that has ever held its own fate in its hands. We have no significant predators, we're the masters of our physical environment; the things that normally cause species to become extinct are no longer any threat to us. The only thing -- the only thing -- that can destroy us and doom us are our own decisions. If we're not here in 10,000 years, it's going to be because we could not take advantage of the gift given to us by a young Dutch fellow in 1738, because we underestimated the odds of our future pains and overestimated the value of our present pleasures.
Tak. (Bifald)
Thank you. (Applause)
Chris Anderson: Det var bemærkelsesværdigt. Vi har tid til et par spørgsmål til Dan Gilbert. Et og to.
Chris Anderson: That was remarkable. We have time for some questions for Dan Gilbert. One and two.
Bill Lyell: Ville du sige, at denne mekanisme til dels er hvordan terrorisme faktisk virker for at skræmme os, og er der en måde hvorpå vi kan modvirke det?
Bill Lyell: Would you say that this mechanism is in part how terrorism actually works to frighten us, and is there some way that we could counteract that?
Dan Gilbert: Jeg rådgav faktisk for nyligt ministeriet for national sikkerhed, som generelt tror på at amerikanske sikkerhedsdollars burde gå til at gøre vores grænser mere sikre. Jeg prøvede at forklare dem, at terrorisme var et navn som er baseret på menneskers psykologiske reaktion på en række begivenheder, og hvis de var bekymrede for terrorisme, burde de spørge hvad der forårsager terror, og hvordan vi kan stoppe mennesker fra at blive rædselsslagne, i stedet for -- ikke i stedet for, men i tillæg til at stoppe grusomhederne som vi alle er bekymrede for. Den slags opmærksomhed som, i hvert fald den amerikanske presse, helt sikkert giver til -- og undskyld mig, men i hårde tal, er dette meget små uheld. Vi ved allerede, for eksempel, i USA, er flere folk døde som resultat af ikke at flyve, fordi de var bange -- og valgte motorvejen, end der blev dræbt ved 11. september angrebene. OK? Hvis jeg fortalte dig, at der var en pest der ville dræbe 15.000 amerikanere næste år, ville du måske blive foruroliget, hvis du ikke vidste at det er influenza. Dette er uheld i en lille målestok, og vi burde spekulere over om de burde få den opmærksomhed, den slags dækning, som de gør. Det får helt sikkert folk til at overvurdere sandsynligheden for at de vil komme til skade, på disse forskellige måder og giver magt til præcis de mennesker der vil skræmme os.
Dan Gilbert: I actually was consulting recently with the Department of Homeland Security, which generally believes that American security dollars should go to making borders safer. I tried to point out to them that terrorism was a name based on people's psychological reaction to a set of events, and that if they were concerned about terrorism they might ask what causes terror and how can we stop people from being terrified, rather than -- not rather than, but in addition to stopping the atrocities that we're all concerned about. Surely the kinds of play that at least American media give to -- and forgive me, but in raw numbers these are very tiny accidents. We already know, for example, in the United States, more people have died as a result of not taking airplanes -- because they were scared -- and driving on highways, than were killed in 9/11. OK? If I told you that there was a plague that was going to kill 15,000 Americans next year, you might be alarmed if you didn't find out it was the flu. These are small-scale accidents, and we should be wondering whether they should get the kind of play, the kind of coverage, that they do. Surely that causes people to overestimate the likelihood that they'll be hurt in these various ways, and gives power to the very people who want to frighten us.
CA: Dan, jeg kunne godt tænke mig at høre mere om dette. Så det du siger er, at vores reaktion på terror er, jeg mener, det er en slags mental fejl? Fortæl mere om det.
CA: Dan, I'd like to hear more on this. So, you're saying that our response to terror is, I mean, it's a form of mental bug? Talk more about it.
DG: Det er overdimensioneret. Jeg mener, hør engang. Hvis Australien forsvinder i morgen, er rædsel nok den rigtige reaktion. Det er en utrolig stor mængde rigtig søde mennesker. På den anden side, når en bus springer i luften og 30 mennesker bliver dræbt, blev der dræbt flere mennesker end der bliver ved ikke at bruge deres sikkerhedssele i det samme land. Er rædsel den rigtige reaktion?
DG: It's out-sized. I mean, look. If Australia disappears tomorrow, terror is probably the right response. That's an awful large lot of very nice people. On the other hand, when a bus blows up and 30 people are killed, more people than that were killed by not using their seatbelts in the same country. Is terror the right response?
CA: Hvad forårsager fejlen? Er det det dramatiske ved begivenheden -- at det er så opsigtsvækkende? Skyldes det at det er et forsætligt angreb af, anførselstegn, fremmede? Hvad er det?
CA: What causes the bug? Is it the drama of the event -- that it's so spectacular? Is it the fact that it's an intentional attack by, quote, outsiders? What is it?
DG: Ja. Det er en række ting, og du har nævnt nogle af dem. For det første, det er en menneskelig aktør der prøver at dræbe os -- det er ikke et træ der falder over os ved et uheld. For det andet, er dette fjender der måske vil angribe og dræbe os igen. Mennesker bliver dræbt uden nogen grund, i stedet for en god grund -- som om der er en god grund, men nogen gange tror mennesker der er det. Så der er en række ting der til sammen får dette til at se ud som en fantastisk begivenhed, men lad os ikke undervurdere det faktum, at aviserne sælger når folk ser noget i dem som de vil læse. Så medierne spiller en stor rolle her, som vil have at disse ting er så spektakulære som muligt.
DG: Yes. It's a number of things, and you hit on several of them. First, it's a human agent trying to kill us -- it's not a tree falling on us by accident. Second, these are enemies who may want to strike and hurt us again. People are being killed for no reason instead of good reason -- as if there's good reason, but sometimes people think there are. So there are a number of things that together make this seem like a fantastic event, but let's not play down the fact that newspapers sell when people see something in it they want to read. So there's a large role here played by the media, who want these things to be as spectacular as they possibly can.
CA: Jeg mener, hvad ville det kræve at overbevise vores kultur at nedtone det?
CA: I mean, what would it take to persuade our culture to downplay it?
DG: Jamen, se på Israel. Du ved, se på Israel. Og et indkøbscenter sprænger i luften, og så er alle ulykkelige over det, og halvanden time senere -- i hvert fald da jeg var der, og jeg stod 45 meter derfra da det sprængte i luften -- jeg tog tilbage til mit hotel og brylluppet der var planlagt, var stadig i gang. Og som den israelske mor sagde, hun sagde, "Vi lader dem aldrig vinde, ved at stoppe bryllupper". Jeg mener, dette er et samfund der har lært -- og der er også andre -- der har lært at leve med en bestemt mængde terrorisme og ikke blive helt så berørt af det, skulle jeg sige, som os der ikke har oplevet nogen terror angreb.
DG: Well, go to Israel. You know, go to Israel. And a mall blows up, and then everybody's unhappy about it, and an hour-and-a-half later -- at least when I was there, and I was 150 feet from the mall when it blew up -- I went back to my hotel and the wedding that was planned was still going on. And as the Israeli mother said, she said, "We never let them win by stopping weddings." I mean, this is a society that has learned -- and there are others too -- that has learned to live with a certain amount of terrorism and not be quite as upset by it, shall I say, as those of us who have not had many terror attacks.
CA: Men er der en rationel frygt der faktisk, grunden til at vi er bange for dette, er fordi vi tror at Den Store kommer?
CA: But is there a rational fear that actually, the reason we're frightened about this is because we think that the Big One is to come?
DG: Ja, selvfølgelig. Så, hvis vi vidste at dette var det værste angreb der ville komme, der ville måske være flere og flere busser med 30 mennesker -- ville vi nok ikke være nær så skrækslange. Jeg vil ikke sige -- vær så venlig ikke at citere mig nogen steder for at sige, "Terrorisme er fint, og vi burde ikke være så ulykkelige". Det er slet ikke min pointe. Det jeg siger er, at forhåbentligt, rationelt, er vores ulykkelighed over ting der sker, over trusler, burde være nogenlunde proportionelle med størrelsen af disse trusler og kommende trusler. Jeg tror i tilfælde af terrorisme, er det ikke sådan. Og mange af tingene som vi har hørt om, fra vores talere i dag -- hvor mange mennesker kender du, der kom op og sagde, Fattigdom! Jeg kan ikke forestille mig hvad fattigdom gør ved os. Mennesker står op om morgenen; de er ligeglade med fattigdom. Det skaber ikke overskrifter, det skaber ikke nyheder, det er ikke iøjefaldende. Der bliver ikke skudt med pistoler. Jeg mener, hvis du skulle løse et af disse problemer, Chris, hvilket ville du løse? Terrorisme eller fattigdom? (Latter) (Bifald) Det er en svær én.
DG: Yes, of course. So, if we knew that this was the worst attack there would ever be, there might be more and more buses of 30 people -- we would probably not be nearly so frightened. I don't want to say -- please, I'm going to get quoted somewhere as saying, "Terrorism is fine and we shouldn't be so distressed." That's not my point at all. What I'm saying is that, surely, rationally, our distress about things that happen, about threats, should be roughly proportional to the size of those threats and threats to come. I think in the case of terrorism, it isn't. And many of the things we've heard about from our speakers today -- how many people do you know got up and said, Poverty! I can't believe what poverty is doing to us. People get up in the morning; they don't care about poverty. It's not making headlines, it's not making news, it's not flashy. There are no guns going off. I mean, if you had to solve one of these problems, Chris, which would you solve? Terrorism or poverty? (Laughter) (Applause) That's a tough one.
CA: Der er ikke nogen tvivl. Fattigdom, med henblik på størrelsesordenen, en enorm størrelsesorden, medmindre nogen kan vise mig at det er, du ved, sandsynligt at der kommer terrorister med en atombombe. Det jeg senest har læst, set, tænkt er at det er utrolig svært for dem at gøre det. Hvis det viser sig at være forkert, ser vi alle dumme ud, men med fattigdom er det lidt --
CA: There's no question. Poverty, by an order of magnitude, a huge order of magnitude, unless someone can show that there's, you know, terrorists with a nuke are really likely to come. The latest I've read, seen, thought is that it's incredibly hard for them to do that. If that turns out to be wrong, we all look silly, but with poverty it's a bit --
DG: Selv hvis det var sandt, stadig flere mennesker dør af fattigdom.
DG: Even if that were true, still more people die from poverty.
CA: Vi har udviklet os til at blive ophidset over disse dramatiske angreb. Det er fordi, i fortiden, i forhistorisk tid, forstod vi bare ikke ting som sygdom og systemer der forårsagede fattigdom og så videre, så det gav ikke nogen mening for os som art, at bruge nogen energi på at bekymre os om disse ting? Mennesker døde; sådan er det. Men hvis man blev angrebet, var det noget man kunne gøre noget ved. Så vi udviklede disse reaktioner. Er det hvad der skete?
CA: We've evolved to get all excited about these dramatic attacks. Is that because in the past, in the ancient past, we just didn't understand things like disease and systems that cause poverty and so forth, and so it made no sense for us as a species to put any energy into worrying about those things? People died; so be it. But if you got attacked, that was something you could do something about. And so we evolved these responses. Is that what happened?
DG: Jamen, du ved, de mennesker der er mest skeptiske over at bruge evolutionære forklaringer til alt, er de evolutions psykologerne selv. Mit gæt er, at der ikke er noget der er helt så specifikt i vores evolutionære fortid. Men, hvis man i stedet kigger efter en evolutionær forklaring, kunne man sige at de fleste organismer er neofobe -- det vil sige, at de er lidt skræmte af ting der er nye og anderledes. Og det er der en god grund til, fordi gamle ting ikke spiste en. Ikke? Ethvert dyr man ser, som man har set før, er der mindre sandsynlighed for at være et rovdyr, end et dyr man aldrig har set før. Så, du ved, når en skolebus bliver sprængt i luften, og man aldrig har set det før, er vores generelle tendens at orientere os imod det der er nyt og uset på området. Jeg tror ikke det er lige så specifik en mekanisme, som den du hentydede til, men måske mere en fundamental der ligger under den.
DG: Well, you know, the people who are most skeptical about leaping to evolutionary explanations for everything are the evolutionary psychologists themselves. My guess is that there's nothing quite that specific in our evolutionary past. But rather, if you're looking for an evolutionary explanation, you might say that most organisms are neo-phobic -- that is, they're a little scared of stuff that's new and different. And there's a good reason to be, because old stuff didn't eat you. Right? Any animal you see that you've seen before is less likely to be a predator than one that you've never seen before. So, you know, when a school bus is blown up and we've never seen this before, our general tendency is to orient towards that which is new and novel is activated. I don't think it's quite as specific a mechanism as the one you alluded to, but maybe a more fundamental one underlying it.
Jay Walker: Du ved, økonomer elsker at tale om dumheden af mennesker der køber lottokuponer. Men jeg formoder at du laver præcis den samme fejl, som du anklager mennesker for som er fejlen af værdi. Jeg ved det, fordi jeg har interviewet cirka 1.000 lottokupon købere over årene. Det viser sig, at den ægte værdi af at købe en lottokupon ikke er at vinde. Det er det man tror det er. Ikke? Den gennemsnitlige lottokuponkøber, køber cirka 150 kuponer om året, så køberen ved udemærket, at han eller hun vil tabe, og alligevel køber hun 150 kuponer om året. Hvorfor det? Det er ikke fordi hun er dum eller han er dum. Det er fordi forventningen om muligvis at vinde udløser serotonin i hjernen, og faktisk udløser en god fornemmelse indtil trækningen viser at man har tabt. Eller, for at sige det på denne måde, for en investering på en dollar kan man have en meget bedre følelse, end ved at skylle pengene ud af toilettet, som man ikke kan få en god følelse fra. Men økonomer har en tendens til -- (Bifald) -- økonomer har en tendens til at se verden gennem deres egen linse, hvilket er: dette er bare en stakfuld dumme mennesker. Og som resultat, ser mange mennesker på økonomer som dumme mennesker. Så fundamentalt, er grunden til at vi tog til månen, er fordi vi ikke lyttede til økonomer. Mange tak. (Bifald)
Jay Walker: You know, economists love to talk about the stupidity of people who buy lottery tickets. But I suspect you're making the exact same error you're accusing those people of, which is the error of value. I know, because I've interviewed about 1,000 lottery buyers over the years. It turns out that the value of buying a lottery ticket is not winning. That's what you think it is. All right? The average lottery buyer buys about 150 tickets a year, so the buyer knows full well that he or she is going to lose, and yet she buys 150 tickets a year. Why is that? It's not because she is stupid or he is stupid. It's because the anticipation of possibly winning releases serotonin in the brain, and actually provides a good feeling until the drawing indicates you've lost. Or, to put it another way, for the dollar investment, you can have a much better feeling than flushing the money down the toilet, which you cannot have a good feeling from. Now, economists tend to -- (Applause) -- economists tend to view the world through their own lenses, which is: this is just a bunch of stupid people. And as a result, many people look at economists as stupid people. And so fundamentally, the reason we got to the moon is, we didn't listen to the economists. Thank you very much. (Applause)
DG: Jamen, nej, det er en god pointe. Det vil vise sig om forventningens glæde svarer præcis til mængden af skuffelse efter trækningen. Fordi, husk lige på, at mennesker der ikke købte kuponer, har det heller ikke dårligt dagen efter, selvom de ikke har en god følelse under trækningen. Jeg er uenig i at mennesker ved at de ikke vinder. Jeg mener, at de tror det er usandsynligt, men at det kunne ske hvilket er hvorfor de foretrækker det frem for udskylningen. Men jeg ser bestemt pointen: at der kan være nogen nytteværdi i at købe en lottokupon, andet end at vinde. Nu synes jeg der er mange gode grunde til ikke at stole på økonomer. Det er ikke én af dem, for mig, men der er mange andre.
DG: Well, no, it's a great point. It remains to be seen whether the joy of anticipation is exactly equaled by the amount of disappointment after the lottery. Because remember, people who didn't buy tickets don't feel awful the next day either, even though they don't feel great during the drawing. I would disagree that people know they're not going to win. I think they think it's unlikely, but it could happen, which is why they prefer that to the flushing. But certainly I see your point: that there can be some utility to buying a lottery ticket other than winning. Now, I think there's many good reasons not to listen to economists. That isn't one of them, for me, but there's many others.
CA: Sidste spørgsmål.
CA: Last question.
Aubrey de Grey: Mit navn er Aubrey de Grey, fra Cambridge. Jeg arbejder med tingen der dræber flere mennesker end noget andet -- jeg arbejder med aldring -- og jeg er interesseret i at gøre noget ved det, som vi alle kommer til at høre i morgen. Det du siger giver utrolig meget genlyd hos mig, fordi det virker på mig til at problemet med at få mennesker interesseret i at gøre noget ved aldring er, at over tid vil aldring slå en ihjel, det ligner kræft eller hjerteproblemer eller noget andet. Har du nogen råd? (Latter)
Aubrey de Grey: My name's Aubrey de Grey, from Cambridge. I work on the thing that kills more people than anything else kills -- I work on aging -- and I'm interested in doing something about it, as we'll all hear tomorrow. I very much resonate with what you're saying, because it seems to me that the problem with getting people interested in doing anything about aging is that by the time aging is about to kill you it looks like cancer or heart disease or whatever. Do you have any advice? (Laughter)
DG: Til dig eller til dem?
DG: For you or for them?
AdG: I at overtale dem.
AdG: In persuading them.
DG: Ah, for at du kan overtale dem. Jamen, det er notorisk svært at få folk til at tænke langsigtet. Men en ting psykologerne har prøvet, der lader til at virke er at få folk til at tænke mere levende på fremtiden. Et af problemerne med at tage beslutninger om den fjerne fremtid er og den nærme fremtid er, at vi forestiller at den nærme fremtid meget mere levende end den fjerne fremtid. I den udstrækning at man kan udligne mængden af detaljer som mennesker sætter i mentale repræsentationer af den nære og fjerne fremtid, mennesker begynder at tage beslutninger om de to, på samme måde. Så, hvis man vil have 100.000 dollars ekstra når man bliver 65 er et spørgsmål der er meget anderledes end, forestil dig hvem du er, når du bliver 65: vil du være i live, hvordan vil du se ud, hvor meget hår har du, hvem vil du leve sammen med. Når vi har alle detaljerne af det tænkte scenarie, føler vi pludselig, at det måske er vigtigt at spare op så den fyr har en lille pensionsopsparing. Men dette er kneb i småtingsafdelingen. Jeg tror, at du generelt kæmper mod en meget fundamental menneskelig tendens, hvilket er at sige, "Jeg er her i dag, så nu er mere vigtigt end senere".
DG: Ah, for you in persuading them. Well, it's notoriously difficult to get people to be farsighted. But one thing that psychologists have tried that seems to work is to get people to imagine the future more vividly. One of the problems with making decisions about the far future and the near future is that we imagine the near future much more vividly than the far future. To the extent that you can equalize the amount of detail that people put into the mental representations of near and far future, people begin to make decisions about the two in the same way. So, would you like to have an extra 100,000 dollars when you're 65 is a question that's very different than, imagine who you'll be when you're 65: will you be living, what will you look like, how much hair will you have, who will you be living with. Once we have all the details of that imaginary scenario, suddenly we feel like it might be important to save so that that guy has a little retirement money. But these are tricks around the margins. I think in general you're battling a very fundamental human tendency, which is to say, "I'm here today, and so now is more important than later."
CA: Dan, tak. Medlemmer af publikummet, det var en fantastisk forelæsning. Tak. (Bifald)
CA: Dan, thank you. Members of the audience, that was a fantastic session. Thank you. (Applause)