My talk today is about something maybe a couple of you have already heard about. It's called the Arab Spring. Anyone heard of it?
我今天的演讲的内容 也许你们中间的一些人已经听说过了。 它就是阿拉伯之春。 有没有人听说过?
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So in 2011, power shifted, from the few to the many, from oval offices to central squares, from carefully guarded airwaves to open-source networks. But before Tahrir was a global symbol of liberation, there were representative surveys already giving people a voice in quieter but still powerful ways.
在2011年,权力发生了转移, 从少数人手中到多数人手里, 从椭圆形办公室转移到了中心广场上, 从被严密控制的管道 到开发的网络。 但是在Tahrir广场成为解放的符号之前, 已经有有代表性的调查 给了人们一个表达自己的话语的机会 用一种无声的,但是有力的方法。
I study Muslim societies around the world at Gallup. Since 2001, we've interviewed hundreds of thousands of people -- young and old, men and women, educated and illiterate. My talk today draws on this research to reveal why Arabs rose up and what they want now.
我在Gallup公司研究世界各地的穆斯林社会。 从2001年开始, 我们采访了成千上万的人们—— 各个年龄的,男的和女的, 受过教育的,和没有受过教育的。 我今天的演讲利用这些研究 来揭示为什么阿拉伯人会起来反抗 和他们现在想要什么。
Now this region's very diverse, and every country is unique. But those who revolted shared a common set of grievances and have similar demands today. I'm going to focus a lot of my talk on Egypt. It has nothing to do with the fact that I was born there, of course. But it's the largest Arab country and it's also one with a great deal of influence. But I'm going to end by widening the lens to the entire region to look at the mundane topics of Arab views of religion and politics and how this impacts women, revealing some surprises along the way.
现在这个地区非常多元化, 所以每个国家都很独特。 但是那些起来反抗的人们 都有同意的苦难 并且有同样的诉求。 我会在我的演讲中很大程度上集中讲述埃及。 当然,这并不是因为我出生在那里。 而是因为它是最大的阿拉伯国家 而且它有很大的影响力。 但是最后我会把视角放大到整个地区 来讨论更广泛性的话题 针对阿拉伯世界的宗教和政治 和它们如何影响妇女, 这个过程中会讲到一些令人意外的发现。
So after analyzing mounds of data, what we discovered was this: Unemployment and poverty alone did not lead to the Arab revolts of 2011. If an act of desperation by a Tunisian fruit vendor sparked these revolutions, it was the difference between what Arabs experienced and what they expected that provided the fuel.
在分析了成堆的数据之后, 我们发现: 仅仅是失业率和贫困本身 并不是引起2011年大规模阿拉伯世界反抗的唯一原因。 如果说一个突尼斯水果商贩的铤而走险 直接导致了这次革命, 那么就是阿拉伯人所经历的 和他们的期盼之间的差距 是这次革命的内因。
To tell you what I mean, consider this trend in Egypt. On paper the country was doing great. In fact, it attracted accolades from multinational organizations because of its economic growth. But under the surface was a very different reality. In 2010, right before the revolution, even though GDP per capita had been growing at five percent for several years, Egyptians had never felt worse about their lives.
为了说明我的意思, 请大家考虑在埃及的这种趋势。 从纸面上看,这个国家的状况非常好。 事实上, 国际组织都对它给予了很高评价 因为它的经济发展。 但是表面之下的,是非常不同的现实。 在2010年,就在革命之前, 即使从国民生产总值看 已经连续数年以5%的速度增长, 埃及人从来没有感到生活如此的糟糕。
Now this is very unusual, because globally we find that, not surprisingly, people feel better as their country gets richer. And that's because they have better job opportunities and their state offers better social services. But it was exactly the opposite in Egypt. As the country got more well-off, unemployment actually rose and people's satisfaction with things like housing and education plummeted. But it wasn't just anger at economic injustice. It was also people's deep longing for freedom. Contrary to the clash of civilizations theory, Arabs didn't despise Western liberty, they desired it.
这非常反常, 因为从全球看,我们发现,一点儿也不出意料的是, 当他们的国家变得富裕的时候,人们的感受应该更好。 那是因为他们有更多的工作机会 并且他们的国家也会提供更好的社会服务。 但是在埃及情况正好相反。 当国家的情况变好的时候, 失业率而发是上升的 人们的满意度 对于像住房和教育这样的事物直线下降。 但是这并不仅仅是针对经济不公平的愤怒。 这也是人们对于自由的长久的诉求。 和文明理论相反, 阿拉伯人并不轻视西方式的自由, 他们非常渴望它。
As early as 2001, we asked Arabs, and Muslims in general around the world, what they admired most about the West. Among the most frequent responses was liberty and justice. In their own words to an open-ended question we heard, "Their political system is transparent and it's following democracy in its true sense." Another said it was "liberty and freedom and being open-minded with each other." Majorities as high as 90 percent and greater in Egypt, Indonesia and Iran told us in 2005 that if they were to write a new constitution for a theoretical new country that they would guarantee freedom of speech as a fundamental right, especially in Egypt. Eighty-eight percent said moving toward greater democracy would help Muslims progress -- the highest percentage of any country we surveyed.
早在2001, 我们问阿拉伯人,和全球的穆斯林, 关于西方,他们最渴望的是什么。 在最常见的答案中 是自由和公正。 以他们自己的语言回答一个开放式的问题时, 我们听到这样的话,“他们的政治体制更透明 “并且真正实现了民主。” 另一个答案是:“解放和自由 和它们的完全相溶。” 高达90%以上的人 埃及,印度尼西亚和伊朗 在2005年告诉我们 他们将要起草新的宪法 对于 一个理论上的新国家 它能保证言论自由 作为一项基本的自由, 尤其是在埃及。 88%的人说,向着更为民族的方向发展 会有助于穆斯林的发展—— 在所有的国家中这是最高的比例了。
But pressed up against these democratic aspirations was a very different day-to-day experience, especially in Egypt. While aspiring to democracy the most, they were the least likely population in the world to say that they had actually voiced their opinion to a public official in the last month -- at only four percent. So while economic development made a few people rich, it left many more worse off. As people felt less and less free, they also felt less and less provided for. So rather than viewing their former regimes as generous if overprotective fathers, they viewed them as essentially prison wardens.
但是(民众)表达这种民主的诉求 却是另外一种情况, 尤其是在埃及。 一方面,对于民主非常的渴求, 他们又是世界上最不可能 向官方表达自己的意见的人群 上个月 这个数据是仅仅4%。 所以一方面,经济发展让一些人先富起来, 却让更多的人状况更差。 当人们感到越来越不自由, 他们也感受到得到的越来越少。 所以,人们并没有把以前的政权看作是 慷慨的过度保护自己的长辈, 他们把他们视作是监狱的典狱长。
So now that Egyptians have ended Mubarak's 30-year rule, they potentially could be an example for the region. If Egypt is to succeed at building a society based on the rule of law, it could be a model. If, however, the core issues that propelled the revolution aren't addressed, the consequences could be catastrophic -- not just for Egypt, but for the entire region.
所以现在埃及人终止了穆巴拉克长达30年的统治, 他们可以成为 这个地区的一个榜样。 如果埃及可以成功地 建立一个法治之上的社会, 它可以成为一个榜样。 如果,然而 导致革命的核心问题不能被解决, 后果可能是灾难性的—— 不仅仅是对埃及, 而是对整个地区来说。
The signs don't look good, some have said. Islamists, not the young liberals that sparked the revolution, won the majority in Parliament. The military council has cracked down on civil society and protests and the country's economy continues to suffer. Evaluating Egypt on this basis alone, however, ignores the real revolution. Because Egyptians are more optimistic than they have been in years, far less divided on religious-secular lines than we would think and poised for the demands of democracy.
迹象看起来并不好,有些人说。 伊斯兰份子,而不是引起革命的开明派 赢得了议会的大多数。 军方 已经镇压了平民的抗议 并且这个国家的经济还在继续遭受打击。 单独从这个基础上考查埃及,而且, 忽视了真正的革命。 因为埃及人更加乐观 和过去的数年相比, 宗教差别造成的分离远远比 我们想象的要小 而且表现出了渴求民主的姿态。
Whether they support Islamists or liberals, Egyptians' priorities for this government are identical, and they are jobs, stability and education, not moral policing. But most of all, for the first time in decades, they expect to be active participants, not spectators, in the affairs of their country.
不管他们是支持伊斯兰份子,还是开明派, 埃及人对于政府优先考虑的问题的看法非常一致, 那就是工作,稳定和教育, 并不是道德上的管制。 但是归根结底 在过去数十年中,首次 他们想活跃地成为参与者,而不是旁观者, 在他们国家的事物中。
I was meeting with a group of newly-elected parliamentarians from Egypt and Tunisia a couple of weeks ago. And what really struck me about them was that they weren't only optimistic, but they kind of struck me as nervous, for lack of a better word. One said to me, "Our people used to gather in cafes to watch football" -- or soccer, as we say in America -- "and now they gather to watch Parliament." (Laughter) "They're really watching us, and we can't help but worry that we're not going to live up to their expectations." And what really struck me is that less than 24 months ago, it was the people that were nervous about being watched by their government.
我曾经和一群刚刚当选的议员们见面 埃及和突尼斯的, 在几个周之前。 真正使得我对于他们感到惊奇的, 是他们不仅仅乐观, 他们让我惊奇的对于一个更好的 世界的渴求。 他们中的一个人对我说, “我们的人曾经习惯于聚集在咖啡馆看足球比赛”—— 或者是我们北美叫的所谓英式足球—— “现在他们聚集在一起看议会会议。” (笑声) “他们真的在看我们, 我们不由自主的担心 我们不能达到他们的期望。” 真正让我震撼的 是在不到两年之前, 真正让人们感到紧张的 是担心他们被他们的政府监视。
And the reason that they're expecting a lot is because they have a new-found hope for the future. So right before the revolution we said that Egyptians had never felt worse about their lives, but not only that, they thought their future would be no better. What really changed after the ouster of Mubarak wasn't that life got easier. It actually got harder. But people's expectations for their future went up significantly. And this hope, this optimism, endured a year of turbulent transition.
他们有那么多期待的原因 正是因为他们有一个刚刚建立起来的,对于未来的期望。 所以就在革命发生之前 我们说,埃及人对于自己的生活从来没有感到如此的糟糕, 但是不仅仅是那样,他们认为他们的未来也不会更好。 当穆巴拉克被赶下台之后,真正发生改变的, 不是生活变得容易了。 实际上更困难了。 但是人们对于未来的期许 在明显的变好。 这种期待,这种乐观, 在一年的动荡中一直在延续着。
One reason that there's this optimism is because, contrary to what many people have said, most Egyptians think things really have changed in many ways. So while Egyptians were known for their single-digit turnout in elections before the revolution, the last election had around 70 percent voter turnout -- men and women. Where scarcely a quarter believed in the honesty of elections in 2010 -- I'm surprised it was a quarter -- 90 percent thought that this last election was honest. Now why this matters is because we discovered a link between people's faith in their democratic process and their faith that oppressed people can change their situation through peaceful means alone.
他们如此乐观的一个原因 是因为,和很多人说的不同, 大多数埃及人都认为,事情在很多方面都真得在发生变化。 所以,以前埃及人 参加选举的投票率是个位数 在革命之前, 上次选举的投票率是在70%左右—— 男人和女人。 2010年选举的时候,仅仅有大概25%的人相信选举的可信度—— 我很惊奇是四分之一—— 90%的人认为上次选举是可信的。 这一点很重要, 是因为我们发现了一种联系: 在人们对于他们民主进程的信念 和他们对于被 压迫的人们 可以改变他们的处境的这种信念之间 这种改变仅仅是通过和平的方式。
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Now I know what some of you are thinking. The Egyptian people, and many other Arabs who've revolted and are in transition, have very high expectations of the government. They're just victims of a long-time autocracy, expecting a paternal state to solve all their problems. But this conclusion would ignore a tectonic shift taking place in Egypt far from the cameras in Tahrir Square. And that is Egyptians' elevated expectations are placed first on themselves.
现在我知道你们中的一些人在想什么。 埃及人, 和其他的那些站起来,处在变革中的阿拉伯人, 对政府有很高的期许。 他们是长期的独裁统治的受害者, 向往着一个父亲般的国家 能解决他们所有的问题。 但是这样的结论忽视了 正在埃及发生的一次上层建筑的变革 而不仅仅是在Tahrir广场摄像机拍摄下的景象。 那就是,埃及人对于他们自己提出了更高 的希望。
In the country once known for its passive resignation, where, as bad as things got, only four percent expressed their opinion to a public official, today 90 percent tell us that if there's a problem in their community, it's up to them to fix it. (Applause) And three-fourths believe they not only have the responsibility, but the power to make change.
在一个一直以来被认为是非常顺从的国家, 在那儿,事情变得很糟糕, 只有4%的人向公众的官方表达他们的不满, 今天,90%的人告诉我们 如果他们的社会中有问题, 将由他们来决定解决这些问题。 (鼓掌) 四分之三的人 相信他们不仅仅有责任, 而且有能力做出改变。
And this empowerment also applies to women, whose role in the revolts cannot be underestimated. They were doctors and dissidents, artists and organizers. A full third of those who braved tanks and tear gas to ask or to demand liberty and justice in Egypt were women.
这种情况 也发生在女性身上, 她们在变革中的角色 不能被低估。 她们中有医生,持不同政见者, 艺术家和组织者。 多达三分之一的和坦克和催泪弹作斗争的人 争取埃及自由和公正 的是妇女。
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Now people have raised some real concerns about what the rise of Islamist parties means for women. What we've found about the role of religion in law and the role of religion in society is that there's no female consensus. We found that women in one country look more like the men in that country than their female counterparts across the border. Now what this suggests is that how women view religion's role in society is shaped more by their own country's culture and context than one monolithic view that religion is simply bad for women. Where women agree, however, is on their own role, and that it must be central and active.
现在人们开始认真的关注 伊斯兰派别的兴起对于妇女意味着什么。 我们发现,关于宗教在法律 和社会中的角色的结论 是妇女的地位的不一致。 我们发现妇女在一个国家 看起来更像是男人在另外一个国家 而不是像那个国家里的女性。 这一点给我们的启示是 女性如何看待宗教在社会中的角色 更多地是由她们自己的国家的文化和环境塑造的 而不是由单一的观点 这种观点是,宗教就是简单地对女性不利。 女性们认为, 她们自己的角色 必须是起到关键作用,并且是主动的。
And here is where we see the greatest gender difference within a country -- on the issue of women's rights. Now how men feel about women's rights matters to the future of this region. Because we discovered a link between men's support for women's employment and how many women are actually employed in professional fields in that country.
这是我们看到的在一个国家里,性别的差距最大的地方—— 在女性权利的问题上。 现在,女性对于女性权利的感觉 对于这个地区的将来是很重要的。 因为我们发现了一种关联 在男性对于女性就业的支持率 和多少妇女实际被雇佣之间 在那个国家的职业领域。
So the question becomes, What drives men's support for women's rights? What about men's views of religion and law? [Does] a man's opinion of the role of religion in politics shape their view of women's rights? The answer is no. We found absolutely no correlation, no impact whatsoever, between these two variables. What drives men's support for women's employment is men's employment, their level of education as well as a high score on their country's U.N. Human Development Index. What this means is that human development, not secularization, is what's key to women's empowerment in the transforming Middle East.
问题就变成了, 什么导致了男性对于女性权利的支持? 男人对于宗教和法律的观点是怎么样的? 一个人 对于整治中宗教的角色的观点 是不是塑造他们对于女性权利的看法? 答案是不。 我们没有发现任何关联, 无论如何没有任何相互影响 在这两个变量之间。 决定男性对于女性就业的支持的 是男人的就业, 他们受教育的水平 和 联合国人类发展指数的高分数。 这意味着 人类的发展 而不是把宗教从教育中分离 是女性参与的关键 在中东变革中。
And the transformation continues. From Wall Street to Mohammed Mahmoud Street, it has never been more important to understand the aspirations of ordinary people.
这种变革还在继续。 从华尔街到Mohammed Mahmoud大街 理解普通人的理想理想 从来没有如此的 重要过。
Thank you.
谢谢。
(Applause)
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