I'm going to talk about the strategizing brain. We're going to use an unusual combination of tools from game theory and neuroscience to understand how people interact socially when value is on the line.
Govoril bom o strategijah možganov. Uporabili bomo nenavadno kombinacijo orodij iz teorije iger in nevroznanosti, da bi razumeli komunikacijo v družbi, ko gre za neko vrednost.
So game theory is a branch of, originally, applied mathematics, used mostly in economics and political science, a little bit in biology, that gives us a mathematical taxonomy of social life, and it predicts what people are likely to do and believe others will do in cases where everyone's actions affect everyone else. That's a lot of things: competition, cooperation, bargaining, games like hide-and-seek and poker.
Teorija iger je izvirno veja uporabne matematike, ki se uporablja v ekonomiji, političnih vedah in v biologiji, daje nam matematično taksonomijo družbenega življenja in predvideva, kaj ljudje ponavadi počnejo in verjamejo, da bodo drugi storili v primerih, ko dejanja vsakogar vplivajo na vse druge. To je veliko stvari: konkurenca, sodelovanje, pogajanje, igre, kot so skrivalnice in poker.
Here's a simple game to get us started. Everyone chooses a number from zero to 100. We're going to compute the average of those numbers, and whoever's closest to two-thirds of the average wins a fixed prize. So you want to be a little bit below the average number but not too far below, and everyone else wants to be a little bit below the average number as well. Think about what you might pick. As you're thinking, this is a toy model of something like selling in the stock market during a rising market: You don't want to sell too early, because you miss out on profits, but you don't want to wait too late, to when everyone else sells, triggering a crash. You want to be a little bit ahead of the competition, but not too far ahead.
Začnimo z eno preprosto igro. Vsakdo izbere številko od 0 do 100, izračunali bomo povprečje teh števil in, kdor bo najbližji dvem tretjinam povprečja dobi fiksno nagrado. Torej hočemo biti malo pod povprečnim številom, vendar ne preveč spodaj, enako, kot vsi drugi, ki bi radi bili rahlo pod povprečjem. Razmislite, kaj bi lahko izbrali. In kot si mislite, to je poskusni model za nekaj podobnega borzni prodaji v času naraščajočega trga. Kajne? Nočete prodati prezgodaj, saj ne bo dobička, vendar ni dobro preveč čakati, da vsi drugi prodajo, kar bi povzročilo propad. Želite biti malo pred konkurenco, vendar ne preveč. Ok, tukaj sta dve teoriji, kako lahko ljudje razmišljajo o tem,
OK, here's two theories about how people might think about this, then we'll see some data. Some of these will sound familiar because you probably are thinking that way. I'm using my brain theory to see. A lot of people say, "I really don't know what people are going to pick, so I think the average will be 50" -- they're not being strategic at all -- and "I'll pick two-thirds of 50, that's 33." That's a start. Other people, who are a little more sophisticated, using more working memory, say, "I think people will pick 33, because they're going to pick a response to 50, and so I'll pick 22, which is two-thirds of 33." They're doing one extra step of thinking, two steps. That's better. Of course, in principle, you could do three, four or more, but it starts to get very difficult. Just like in language and other domains, we know that it's hard for people to parse very complex sentences with a recursive structure. This is called the cognitive hierarchy theory, something I've worked on and a few other people, and it indicates a kind of hierarchy, along with some assumptions about how many people stop at different steps and how the steps of thinking are affected by lots of interesting variables and variant people, as we'll see in a minute.
potem bomo videli podatke. Nekaj od tega bo zvenelo znano, saj ste verjetno razmišljali na takšen način. Jaz uporabljam svojo teorijo možganov, da razumem. Veliko ljudi pravi: "Res ne vem, kaj bodo ljudje izbrali, mislim pa, da bo povprečje 50". Oni se sploh ne vedejo strateško. "In jaz bom izbral dve tretjini od 50. To je 33.«. To je začetek. Drugi, ki so malo bolj sofisticirani, uporabljajo več delovnega spomina, povejo:"Mislim, da bodo ljudje izbrali 33, ker bodo izbrali odgovor na 50, zato bom izbral 22, kar je dve tretjini od 33. " Oni naredijo še en korak razmišljanja, dva koraka. To je boljše. In seveda, načeloma jih lahko naredite tri, štiri ali več, ampak postane zelo težko. Tako kot pri jezikih in drugje, je težko razčleniti zelo zapletene stavke z neke vrste rekurzivno strukturo. To je kognitivna teorija hierarhije. To je nekaj, kar sem delal s še nekaj drugimi ljudmi in to pomeni neke vrste hierarhijo skupaj s predpostavkami koliko ljudi se ustavi kje in kako na korake razmišljanja vplivajo mnoge zanimive spremenljivke in različni ljudje, kot bomo videli v minuti. Zelo drugačna teorija, veliko bolj priljubljena in starejša,
A very different theory, a much more popular one and an older one, due largely to John Nash of "A Beautiful Mind" fame, is what's called "equilibrium analysis." So if you've ever taken a game theory course at any level, you'll have learned a bit about this. An equilibrium is a mathematical state in which everybody has figured out exactly what everyone else will do. It is a very useful concept, but behaviorally, it may not exactly explain what people do the first time they play these types of economic games or in situations in the outside world. In this case, the equilibrium makes a very bold prediction, which is: everyone wants to be below everyone else, therefore, they'll play zero.
predvsem zaradi John-a Nash-a iz znamenitega "Čudovitega uma", je tista, ki se imenuje analiza ravnovesja. Torej, če ste kdaj bili na tečaju teorije iger, ste se naučili nekaj o tem. Ravnovesje je matematično stanje, v katerem so vsi natančno ugotovili, kaj bo vsakdo počel. To je zelo uporaben koncept, ampak vedenjsko ne more razložiti, kaj ljudje počnejo, ko prvič igrajo ekonomske igre teh vrst, ali v situacijah v zunanjem svetu. Tukaj teorija ravnovesja zelo drzno predvideva, da bodo vsi zato, ker želijo biti pod drugimi, odigrali igro z ničelno vsoto.
Let's see what happens. This experiment's been done many, many times. Some of the earliest ones were done in the '90s by me and Rosemarie Nagel and others. This is a beautiful data set of 9,000 people who wrote in to three newspapers and magazines that had a contest. The contest said, send in your numbers, and whoever is close to two-thirds of the average will win a big prize. As you can see, there's so much data here, you can see the spikes very visibly. There's a spike at 33 -- those are people doing one step. There is another spike visible at 22. Notice, by the way, most people pick numbers right around there; they don't necessarily pick exactly 33 and 22. There's something a bit noisy around it. But you can see those spikes on that end. There's another group of people who seem to have a firm grip on equilibrium analysis, because they're picking zero or one. But they lose, right? Because picking a number that low is actually a bad choice if other people aren't doing equilibrium analysis as well. So they're smart, but poor.
Poglejmo, kaj se zgodi. Ta poskus je bil narejen velikokrat. Prve smo naredili v devetdesetih z Rosemarie Nagel in drugimi. To je lep niz podatkov 9000 ljudi, ki so se prijavili na natečaj v treh časopisih in revijah. Pisalo je: " Pošljite vaše številke in kdor bo blizu dvem tretjinam povprečja, bo dobil veliko nagrado". Kot vidite, tukaj je veliko podatkov, dobro lahko vidite vrhove. Vrh je na 33. To so ljudje, ki naredijo en korak. Še en stolpec je viden na 22. Opazite, da večina izbira številke tam nekje. Ne izbirajo nujno točno 33 in 22. Precej je živahno tu okoli. A vidite tudi tiste vrhove tam. Tu je še ena skupina ljudi in zdi se, da se čvrsto držijo analize ravnovesja, ker so izbrali 0 ali 1. Ampak oni izgubijo, kajne? Zato, ker je izbira tako nizke številke dejansko slaba izbira, razen, če se tudi drugi ne ukvarjajo z analizami ravnovesja. Oni so pametni, vendar revni.
(Laughter)
(Smeh)
Where are these things happening in the brain? One study by Coricelli and Nagel gives a really sharp, interesting answer. They had people play this game while they were being scanned in an fMRI, and two conditions: in some trials, they're told, "You're playing another person who's playing right now. We'll match up your behavior at the end and pay you if you win." In other trials, they're told, "You're playing a computer, they're just choosing randomly." So what you see here is a subtraction of areas in which there's more brain activity when you're playing people compared to playing the computer. And you see activity in some regions we've seen today, medial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial, up here, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, an area that's involved in lots of types of conflict resolution, like if you're playing "Simon Says," and also the right and left temporoparietal junction. And these are all areas which are fairly reliably known to be part of what's called a "theory of mind" circuit or "mentalizing circuit." That is, it's a circuit that's used to imagine what other people might do. These were some of the first studies to see this tied in to game theory.
Kje do tega prihaja v možganih? Ena od študij Coricelli-ja in Nagel-ove daje zelo jasen, zanimiv odgovor. Pri njih so ljudje igrali to igro medtem, ko so jih skenirali v fMRi, pod dvema pogojema: v nekaterih preizkusih so rekli: " Igrate z drugo osebo, ki igra zdaj in pomerili bomo vajino vedenje na koncu in vam ob zmagi plačali". Drugim so rekli, da igrajo z računalnikom. Izbirali so naključno. Torej kar vidite tukaj, je odštevanje področij v katerih je več možganskih dejavnosti, ko vaš je soigralec v igri človek v primerjavi z računalnikom. Vidite dejavnost v nekaterih področjih, v medialni prefrontalni skorji, dorzomedialni, pa tu gor, v ventromedialni prefrontalni skorji, v anteriorni cingulatni skorji, področju, ki se ukvarja z veliko vrst reševanja sporov, kot če se igrate "Simon reče" in tudi desno in levo temporoparietalno stičišče. Vse to so področja, za katere se dokaj zanesljivo ve, da so del krogotoka "teorije uma", ali " mentalni krogotok." Ta krogotok se uporablja, ko razmišljmo kaj bi lahko drugi naredili. To so nekatere prvih študij, kjer so opazili povezanost s teorijo iger.
What happens with these one- and two-step types? So, we classify people by what they picked, and then we look at the difference between playing humans versus computers, which brain areas are differentially active. On the top, you see the one-step players. There's almost no difference. The reason is, they're treating other people like a computer, and the brain is too. The bottom players, you see all the activity in dorsomedial PFC. So we know the two-step players are doing something differently.
Kaj se zgodi s temi en-korak in dva-koraka tipi? Ljudi smo razvrstili glede na njihovo izbiro in potem iskali razliko v igranju proti ljudem in proti računalniku, katera možganska področja so aktivna. Na vrhu boste videli en-korak igralce. Tam skoraj ni razlike. Zato ker obravnavajo druge kot računalnike in tako tudi možgani. Spodnji igralci, vidite vse dejavnosti v dorsomedialni prefrontalni skorji. Vidimo, da dva-koraka igralci delajo drugače. Če bi se ustavili in vprašali: "Kaj naj storimo s to informacijo?"
Now, what can we do with this information? You might be able to look at brain activity and say, "This person will be a good poker player," or "This person's socially naive." We might also be able to study things like development of adolescent brains once we have an idea of where this circuitry exists.
Lahko pogledamo delovanje možganov: "Ta oseba bo dober igralec pokra," ali "Ta oseba je družbeno naivna" Morda bi lahko proučevali razvoj adolescentnih možganov ko spoznamo, kje ta krogotok obstaja.
OK. Get ready. I'm saving you some brain activity, because you don't need to use your hair detector cells. You should use those cells to think carefully about this game. This is a bargaining game. Two players who are being scanned using EEG electrodes are going to bargain over one to six dollars. If they can do it in 10 seconds, they'll earn that money. If 10 seconds go by and they haven't made a deal, they get nothing. That's kind of a mistake together. The twist is that one player, on the left, is informed about how much on each trial there is. They play lots of trials with different amounts each time. In this case, they know there's four dollars. The uninformed player doesn't know, but they know the informed player knows. So the uninformed player's challenge is to say, "Is this guy being fair, or are they giving me a very low offer in order to get me to think there's only one or two dollars available to split?" in which case they might reject it and not come to a deal. So there's some tension here between trying to get the most money but trying to goad the other player into giving you more. And the way they bargain is to point on a number line that goes from zero to six dollars. They're bargaining over how much the uninformed player gets, and the informed player will get the rest. So this is like a management-labor negotiation in which the workers don't know how much profits the privately held company has, and they want to maybe hold out for more money, but the company might want to create the impression that there's very little to split: "I'm giving the most I can."
Ok. Pripravite se. Prihranil sem vam nekaj možganskih dejavnosti, zato, ker vam ni treba uporabljati detektorskih celic las. Morali bi uporabiti te celice, za premislek o tej igri. To je pogajalska igra. Dva igralca, ki jih skenirajo s pomočjo EEG elektrod, bosta barantala za vsoto od 1 do 6 dolarjev. Dogovorita se v 10 sekundah in dobita ta denar. Če se v 10 sekundah ne dogovorita, ne dobita ničesar. To je neke vrste skupna napaka. Trik je, da je igralec na levi strani obveščen o višini zneska v vsakem preizkusu. Igrata velikokrat, vsakič z različnimi zneski. Tu sta vedela, da je znesek štiri dolarje. Neobveščeni igralec ne ve, vendar vesta, da obveščen igralec ve. Torej, se neobveščeni igralec lahko vpraša: "Ali je ta fant res pošten, ali so mi dali zelo nizko ponudbo da bi mislil, da sta v igri le en ali dva dolarja ?" V tem primeru bi lahko zavrnila dogovor in do soglasja ne bi prišla. Tukaj je nekaj napetosti med poskusom, da bi dobili največ denarja prepričevanjem drugega igralca, da vam da več. Način barantanja je kazanje na številko vrstice, ki gre od 0 do 6 dolarjev, pogajata, pa se o tem, koliko bo neobveščeni igralec dobil, ostanek dobi obveščeni igralec. Torej, to je podobno pogajanjem med vodstvom podjetja in delavci v katerem delavci ne vedo koliko dobička privatno podjetje ima, bi pa radi vztrajali pri čim več denarja, vendar bi podjetje lahko dalo vtis, da obstaja zelo malo za razdelitev: " Dajem največ, kar lahko."
First, some behavior: a bunch of the subject pairs play face-to-face. We have other data where they play across computers. That's an interesting difference, as you might imagine. But a bunch of the face-to-face pairs agree to divide the money evenly every single time. Boring. It's just not interesting neurally. It's good for them -- they make a lot of money. But we're interested in: Can we say something about when disagreements occur versus don't occur?
Najprej nekaj o obnašanju. Množica parov, igrata iz oči v oči. So tudi podatki o igri preko računalnika. To je zanimiva razlika. Ampa v množici parov, ki igrajo iz oči v oči se prav vsakič dogovorita o enakomerni porazdelitvi denarja Dolgočasno. To enostavno ni nevronsko zanimivo. Dobro je zanje, ker zaslužijo veliko denarja. Ampak nas zanima, ali lahko kaj povemo o tem kdaj pride do nesoglasja in kdaj ne?
So this is the other group of subjects, who often disagree. They bicker and disagree and end up with less money. They might be eligible to be on "Real Housewives," the TV show.
To je druga skupina, kjer se pogosto ne strinjata. Ker se prerekata in se ne strinjata, imata možnost, da končata z manj denarja. Lahko bi bili primerni za nastop v TV šovu "Prave gospodinje."
(Laughter)
Na levi strani vidite,
You see on the left, when the amount to divide is one, two or three dollars, they disagree about half the time; when it's four, five, six, they agree quite often. This turns out to be something that's predicted by a very complicated type of game theory you should come to graduate school at CalTech and learn about. It's a little too complicated to explain right now, but the theory tells you that this shape should occur. Your intuition might tell you that, too.
ko je znesek za razdelitev 1, 2 ali 3 dolarjev, se polovico časa ne strinjata , ko pa je znesek 4, 5, 6, se pogosto strinjata . Izkaže se, da je to nekaj, kar je predvidljivo z zelo zapleteno vrsto teorije iger in bi morali študirati na Caltech-u, da bi to spoznali. To je prezapleteno, da bi zdaj pojasnjeval , ampak teorija vam pove, da bi se ta oblika nekako morala zgoditi. Vaša intuicija vam lahko pove enako. Zdaj vam bom pokazal rezultate EEG snemanja.
Now I'm going to show you the results from the EEG recording. Very complicated. The right brain schematic is the uninformed person, and the left is the informed. Remember that we scanned both brains at the same time, so we can ask about time-synced activity in similar or different areas simultaneously, just like if you wanted to study a conversation, and you were scanning two people talking to each other. You'd expect common activity in language regions when they're listening and communicating. So the arrows connect regions that are active at the same time. The direction of the arrows flows from the region that's active first in time, and the arrowhead goes to the region that's active later. So in this case, if you look carefully, most of the arrows flow from right to left. That is, it looks as if the uninformed brain activity is happening first, and then it's followed by activity in the informed brain. And by the way, these are trials where their deals were made. This is from the first two seconds. We haven't finished analyzing this data, so we're still peeking in, but the hope is that we can say something in the first couple of seconds about whether they'll make a deal or not, which could be very useful in thinking about avoiding litigation and ugly divorces and things like that. Those are all cases in which a lot of value is lost by delay and strikes.
Zelo zapleteno. Na shemi so desni možgani od neobveščene, na levi od obveščene osebe. Ne pozabite, da smo skenirali možgane obeh hkrati, zato lahko iščemo časovno sinhronizirane dejavnosti v podobnih ali različnih področjih hkrati, tako kot, če bi radi preučevali pogovor in bi skenirali dva, ki se pogovarjata bi pričakovali skupno dejavnost v področju jezika, ko onadva dejansko poslušata in komunicirata. Torej puščice povezujejo področja, ki so aktivna istočasno, začetek puščice je v območju, ki je časovno najprej aktivno, vrh puščice pa v območju, ki se aktivira pozneje. Torej, v tem primeru, če ste skrbno opazovali, gra večina puščic od desne proti levi. To pomeni, da je videti, kot da se dejavnost v neobveščenih možganih zgodi prva, nato pa ji sledi dejavnost v obveščenih možganih. In mimogrede, to so bili preizkusi, v katerih sta do pogodbe prišla. To je v prvih dveh sekundah. Nismo končali analize teh podatkov, tako da še vedno kukamo, v upanju, da bomo lahko rekli nekaj v prvih nekaj sekundah o tem, ali bo do dogovora prišlo, kar bi bilo koristno pri izogibanju sporom, grdim razvezam in podobnemu. To so vse primeri, v katerih je veliko vrednosti izgubljeno zaradi zavlačevanja in zgrešenih poskusov.
Here's the case where the disagreements occur. You can see it looks different than the one before. There's a lot more arrows. That means that the brains are synced up more closely in terms of simultaneous activity, and the arrows flow clearly from left to right. That is, the informed brain seems to be deciding, "We're probably not going to make a deal here." And then later, there's activity in the uninformed brain.
Tukaj je primer, ko pride do nesoglasja. Lahko opazite, da izgleda drugače kot prejšnji. Tukaj je veliko več puščic. Možgani so bolj sinhronizirani v smislu hkratnih dejavnosti in puščice se gibljejo z leve na desno. To je, da se obveščeni možgani odločajo: "Tukaj se verjetno ne bova pogodila." In šele pozneje je dejavnost v neobveščenih možganih.
Next, I'm going to introduce you to some relatives. They're hairy, smelly, fast and strong. You might be thinking back to your last Thanksgiving.
V nadaljevanju vam bom predstavil nekaj sorodnikov. Oni so kosmati, smrdeči, hitri in močni. Mogoče vas to spomni na vaš Zahvalni dan.
(Laughter)
Morda, če so bili šimpanzi z vami.
Maybe, if you had a chimpanzee with you. Charles Darwin and I and you broke off from the family tree from chimpanzees about five million years ago. They're still our closest genetic kin. We share 98.8 percent of the genes. We share more genes with them than zebras do with horses. And we're also their closest cousin. They have more genetic relation to us than to gorillas. So, how humans and chimpanzees behave differently might tell us a lot about brain evolution.
Charles Darwin, jaz in vi smo se odlomili od družinskega drevesa s šimpanzi pred približno pet milijonov let. Oni so genetsko naši najbližji sorodniki. Skupno nam je 98,8 odstotkov genov. Imamo več skupnih genov z njimi kot zebre s konji. Mi smo njihovi najbližji sorodniki. Z nami so so si genetsko bližje kot z gorilami. Tako nam razlike v vedenju ljudi in šimpanzov lahko povedo veliko o razvoju možganov.
This is an amazing memory test from [Kyoto], Japan, the Primate Research Institute, where they've done a lot of this research. This goes back a ways. They're interested in working memory. The chimp will see, watch carefully, they'll see 200 milliseconds' exposure -- that's fast, eight movie frames -- of numbers one, two, three, four, five. Then they disappear and are replaced by squares, and they have to press the squares that correspond to the numbers from low to high to get an apple reward. Let's see how they can do it.
Torej, to je neverjeten test spomina iz Inštituta za proučevanje primatov iz Nagoje na Japonskem, kjer so naredili veliko teh raziskav. To sega daleč nazaj. Zanima jih delovni spomin. Šimpanz bo videl, glejte pozorno, videli bodo posnetek v 200 milisekundah - kar je hitro, osem filmskih sličic - številke ena, dva, tri, štiri, pet. Številke izginejo, nadomestijo jih kvadrati. Oni pa morajo pritisniti kvadrate, ki ustrezajo številkam od nizkih do visokih, da bi dobili jabolko. Poglejmo, kako to oni lahko počnejo.
This is a young chimp. The young ones are better than the old ones, just like humans.
To je mlad šimpanz. Mladi so boljši od starih, tako kot ljudje.
(Laughter)
Zelo so izkušeni, ker so to počeli
And they're highly experienced, they've done this thousands of times. Obviously there's a big training effect, as you can imagine.
več tisočkrat. Očitno je učinek treninga velik , kot si lahko predstavljate. (Smeh)
(Laughter)
Vidite, da jim ni mar in se ne naprezajo.
You can see they're very blasé and effortless. Not only can they do it very well, they do it in a sort of lazy way.
Ne le, da to lahko delajo zelo dobro, pač pa to počnejo na nekakšen len način.
(Laughter)
Kajne? Kdo si misli, da bi lahko premagal šimpanza?
Who thinks you could beat the chimps?
(Laughter)
Narobe. (Smeh)
Wrong. (Laughter)
Lahko poskusimo, morda bomo poskusili.
We can try. We'll try. Maybe we'll try.
Ok, naslednji del te študije,
OK, so the next part of the study I'm going to go quickly through is based on an idea of Tetsuro Matsuzawa. He had a bold idea he called the "cognitive trade-off hypothesis." We know chimps are faster and stronger; they're also obsessed with status. His thought was, maybe they've preserved brain activities and practice them in development that are really, really important to them to negotiate status and to win, which is something like strategic thinking during competition. So we're going to check that out by having the chimps actually play a game by touching two touch screens.
bom preletel, temelji na ideji Tetsura Matsuzawa. Svojo drzno idejo je poimenoval kognitivno kompromisna hipoteza. Vemo, da so šimpanzi hitrejši in močnejši. Prav tako so obsedeni s statusom. Njegova misel je bila, da morda ohranjajo možganske dejavnosti in jih vadijo v razvoju, ker jim je zelo, zelo pomembno, da se pogajajo o statusu in da zmagajo, kar je nekaj podobnega strateškemu razmišljanju med tekmovanjem. Torej, to bomo preverili, ko bodo šimpanzi dejansko igrali igro z dotikanjem dveh zaslonov na dotik.
The chimps are interacting with each other through the computers. They'll press left or right. One chimp is called a matcher; they win if they press left-left, like a seeker finding someone in hide-and-seek, or right-right. The mismatcher wants to mismatch; they want to press the opposite screen of the chimp. And the rewards are apple cube rewards. So here's how game theorists look at these data. This is a graph of the percentage of times the matcher picked right on the x-axis and the percentage of times they picked right by the mismatcher on the y-axis. So a point here is the behavior by a pair of players, one trying to match, one trying to mismatch. The NE square in the middle -- actually, NE, CH and QRE -- those are three different theories of Nash equilibrium and others, tells you what the theory predicts, which is that they should match 50-50, because if you play left too much, for example, I can exploit that if I'm the mismatcher by then playing right. And as you can see, the chimps -- each chimp is one triangle -- are circled around, hovering around that prediction.
Šimpanza sta dejansko v stiku prek računalnika. Pritiskala bosta levo ali desno. En šimpanz se imenuje ujemalni. Oni zmagajo, če pritisnejo levo, levo, ali desno, desno, podobno iskanju v igri skrivalnice. Neujemalni se ne bi rad ujemal. Oni bi radi pritisnili na nasprotni zaslon. Nagrada je jabolčna kocka. Tukaj vidite, kako teoretiki igre gledajo te podatke. To je graf kolikokrat je ujemalni izbral desno na x- osi in odstotek kolikokrat je dobro predvidel neujemalni na y- osi. Torej tu gre za ravnanje para igralcev en poskuša uskladiti, drugi poskuša nasprotno. NE kvadrat v sredini - dejansko NE, CH in QRE - so tri različne teorije Nash-evega ravnovesja in drugih, ki vam povejo, kaj teorija predvideva, torej da bi oni morali odigrati 50-50, ker, če levo igrate prevečkrat, na primer, jaz to izkoristim, če sem neujemalni in odigram desno. In kot vidite, šimpanzi, vsak šimpanz je en trikotnik, krožijo in se gibljejo okrog te napovedi.
Now we move the payoffs. We're going to make the left-left payoff for the matcher a little higher. Now they get three apple cubes. Game theoretically, that should make the mismatcher's behavior shift: the mismatcher will think, "Oh, this guy's going to go for the big reward, so I'll go to the right, make sure he doesn't get it." And as you can see, their behavior moves up in the direction of this change in the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we changed the payoffs one more time. Now it's four apple cubes, and their behavior again moves towards the Nash equilibrium. It's sprinkled around, but if you average the chimps out, they're really close, within .01. They're actually closer than any species we've observed.
Zdaj gremo na izplačila. Dejansko bomo za levo, levo malce povišali izplačilo ujemalnemu. Zdaj dobijo tri jabolčne kocke. Po teoriji igre bi to moralo obrniti vedenje neujemalnega ker bo neujemalni pomislil: "Oh, tale cilja na veliko nagrado, in zato bom šel na desno, da zagotovim, da je ne dobi". Njihovo vedenje se premika gor v smeri te spremembe v Nash-ovem ravnovesju. Na koncu smo spremenili izplačila še enkrat. Štiri jabolčne kocke, vedenje se premika proti Nash-ovem ravnovesju. razmetano je okoli, ampak, če izračunate povprečje, dejansko so zelo blizu, znotraj 0,01. Dejansko so bližje kot katerakoli vrsta, ki smo jo opazovali.
What about humans? You think you're smarter than a chimpanzee? Here's two human groups in green and blue. They're closer to 50-50; they're not responding to payoffs as closely. And also if you study their learning in the game, they aren't as sensitive to previous rewards. The chimps play better than the humans, in terms of adhering to game theory. And these are two different groups of humans, from Japan and Africa; they replicate quite nicely. None of them are close to where the chimps are.
Kaj pa ljudje? Mislite, da ste pametnejši od šimpanza? Tu sta dve skupini ljudi, v zeleni in modri barvi. Bližje so 50-50. Ne odzivajo se toliko na izplačila, in če pogledate njihovo učenje v igri, niso tako občutljivi na prejšnje nagrade. Šimpanzi igrajo bolje kot ljudje, v smislu, da se bolj držijo teorije iger. To sta dve različni skupini ljudi iz Japonske in Afrike. Oni to lepo ponovijo. Nihče od njih ni niti blizu šimpanzom.
So, some things we learned: people seem to do a limited amount of strategic thinking using theory of mind. We have preliminary evidence from bargaining that early warning signs in the brain might be used to predict whether there'll be a bad disagreement that costs money, and chimps are "better" competitors than humans, as judged by game theory.
Nekaj stvari, ki smo se jih naučili. Zdi se, da ljudje z uporabo teorije uma lahko omejeno strateško razmišljajo. Imamo nekaj začetnih dokazov iz pogajanj, da bi zgodnja pozorila v možganih lahko uporabljali za napoved slabega nesoglasja, ki bi nas stalo, in da šimpanzi boljši tekmovalci od nas, po oceni teorije iger.
Thank you.
Hvala.
(Applause)
(Aplavz)