I'm going to talk about the strategizing brain. We're going to use an unusual combination of tools from game theory and neuroscience to understand how people interact socially when value is on the line.
Govorit ću o strategijama mozga. Koristit ćemo neobičnu kombinaciju instrumenata iz teorije igara i neuroznanosti da biste razumjeli kako ljudi komuniciraju kada je u pitanju vrijednost.
So game theory is a branch of, originally, applied mathematics, used mostly in economics and political science, a little bit in biology, that gives us a mathematical taxonomy of social life, and it predicts what people are likely to do and believe others will do in cases where everyone's actions affect everyone else. That's a lot of things: competition, cooperation, bargaining, games like hide-and-seek and poker.
Izvorno, teorija igara je grana primijenjene matematike, korištena uglavnom u ekonomiji, političkim znanostima i malo u biologiji, daje nam matematičku taksonomiju društvenog života i predviđa što ljudi obično čine i što vjeruju da će drugi učiniti u slučajevima gdje postupci svakoga utječu na sve ostale. Tu su mnoge stvari: natjecanje, suradnja, pogađanje, igre poput skrivača i poker.
Here's a simple game to get us started. Everyone chooses a number from zero to 100. We're going to compute the average of those numbers, and whoever's closest to two-thirds of the average wins a fixed prize. So you want to be a little bit below the average number but not too far below, and everyone else wants to be a little bit below the average number as well. Think about what you might pick. As you're thinking, this is a toy model of something like selling in the stock market during a rising market: You don't want to sell too early, because you miss out on profits, but you don't want to wait too late, to when everyone else sells, triggering a crash. You want to be a little bit ahead of the competition, but not too far ahead.
Evo jednostavne igre za početak. Svatko bira broj od 0 do 100, izračunat ćemo prosjek tih brojeva i tko bude najbliže dvotrećinskom prosjeku osvojit će nagradu. Dakle, želite biti malo ispod prosječnog broja, ali ne previše, jednako kao što i svi drugi žele biti malo ispod prosječnog broja. Razmislite što biste mogli odabrati. Dok razmišljate, ovo je pojednostavljeni model nalik prodaji na burzi tijekom rastućeg tržišta. Zar ne? Ne želite prodati prerano, jer gubite na profitu, ali ne želite ni previše čekati dok svi drugi ne prodaju, jer biste propali. Želite biti malo ispred konkurencije, ali ne previše. Ok, evo dvije teorije kako bi ljudi o tome mogli razmišljati,
OK, here's two theories about how people might think about this, then we'll see some data. Some of these will sound familiar because you probably are thinking that way. I'm using my brain theory to see. A lot of people say, "I really don't know what people are going to pick, so I think the average will be 50" -- they're not being strategic at all -- and "I'll pick two-thirds of 50, that's 33." That's a start. Other people, who are a little more sophisticated, using more working memory, say, "I think people will pick 33, because they're going to pick a response to 50, and so I'll pick 22, which is two-thirds of 33." They're doing one extra step of thinking, two steps. That's better. Of course, in principle, you could do three, four or more, but it starts to get very difficult. Just like in language and other domains, we know that it's hard for people to parse very complex sentences with a recursive structure. This is called the cognitive hierarchy theory, something I've worked on and a few other people, and it indicates a kind of hierarchy, along with some assumptions about how many people stop at different steps and how the steps of thinking are affected by lots of interesting variables and variant people, as we'll see in a minute.
a potom ćemo vidjeti neke podatke. Dio toga zvučat će poznato, jer ste vjerojatno razmišljali na takav način. Koristim se vlastitim mozgom za poimanje. Mnogi ljudi kažu: "Doista ne znam što će ljudi odabrati, zato mislim da će prosjek biti 50." Oni se uopće ne koriste strategijom. " I izabrat ću dvije trećine od 50, što je 33." To je početak. Ostali ljudi koji su malo sofisticiraniji, i koriste više radne memorije, kažu: "Mislim da će ljudi odabrati 33, jer će birati odgovor na 50, i zato ću odabrati 22, to je dvije trećine od 33." Oni čine još jedan dodatan korak dok razmišljaju, dva koraka. To je bolje. I dakako, u principu, možete činiti tri, četiri ili više, ali počinje bivati veoma naporno. Baš kao u jeziku i u drugim oblastima, znamo da je ljudima teško raščlaniti veoma složene rečenice rekurzivne strukture. Uzgred, to se naziva kognitivna hijerarhijska teorija. Na njoj sam radio sa još nekoliko drugih ljudi. Teorija upućuje na neku vrstu hijerarhije s pretpostavkama o broju ljudi koji zastaju na različitim koracima i kako na njih utječu mnoge zanimljive varijable i vrste ljudi, kao što ćemo vidjeti za minutu. Vrlo različita teorija, mnogo popularnija i starija,
A very different theory, a much more popular one and an older one, due largely to John Nash of "A Beautiful Mind" fame, is what's called "equilibrium analysis." So if you've ever taken a game theory course at any level, you'll have learned a bit about this. An equilibrium is a mathematical state in which everybody has figured out exactly what everyone else will do. It is a very useful concept, but behaviorally, it may not exactly explain what people do the first time they play these types of economic games or in situations in the outside world. In this case, the equilibrium makes a very bold prediction, which is: everyone wants to be below everyone else, therefore, they'll play zero.
uglavnom zahvaljujući Johnu Nash-u iz znamenitog "Blistavog uma", naziva se ekvilibrijum analiza. Ako ste ikad pohađali tečaj teorije igara na bilo kojoj razini, naučili biste malo o tome. Ekvilibrijum je matematičko stanje u kome su svi točno shvatili što će svatko učiniti. Vrlo koristan koncept, ali bihevioralno, ne može točno razjasniti što ljudi rade kad po prvi put igraju ove ekonomske igre ili u situacijama u vanjskom svijetu. U ovom primjeru, teorija ekvilibrijuma vrlo smjelo predviđa da svatko želi biti ispod svih ostalih, te će zato odigrati igru sa nultom sumom.
Let's see what happens. This experiment's been done many, many times. Some of the earliest ones were done in the '90s by me and Rosemarie Nagel and others. This is a beautiful data set of 9,000 people who wrote in to three newspapers and magazines that had a contest. The contest said, send in your numbers, and whoever is close to two-thirds of the average will win a big prize. As you can see, there's so much data here, you can see the spikes very visibly. There's a spike at 33 -- those are people doing one step. There is another spike visible at 22. Notice, by the way, most people pick numbers right around there; they don't necessarily pick exactly 33 and 22. There's something a bit noisy around it. But you can see those spikes on that end. There's another group of people who seem to have a firm grip on equilibrium analysis, because they're picking zero or one. But they lose, right? Because picking a number that low is actually a bad choice if other people aren't doing equilibrium analysis as well. So they're smart, but poor.
Pogledajmo što se događa. Ovaj eksperiment je izveden mnogo puta. Neke od najranijih eksperimenata u 90-tim izveli smo ja i Rosemarie Nagel i drugi. Ovo su krasni podaci o 9.000 ljudi koji su se javili na tri natječaja u novinama i časopisima. U natječaju je rečeno: "Pošaljite svoje brojeve i tkogod bude blizu dvotrećinskom prosjeku osvojit će veliku nagradu." Kao što vidite, ovdje je mnogo podataka, ali skokovii se dobro vide. Postoji skok na 33. To su ljudi koji čine jedan korak. Postoji još jedan skok vidljiv na 22. Uzgred, pogledajte kako većina ljudi odabira brojeve upravo tu negdje. Ne odaberu uvjek baš točno 33. i 22. Ovdje okolo je malo življe. Ali, možete vidjeti i skokove ondje. Postoji još jedna grupa ljudi koja se izgleda čvrsto drži ekvilibrijum analiza, jer su odabrali nulu ili jedan. Ali oni gube, zar ne? Zato što je odabir tako niskog broja doista loš odabir ukoliko se i svi drugi ljudi ne pozabave ekvilibrijum analizom. Dakle, oni su pametni, ali siromašni.
(Laughter)
(Smijeh)
Where are these things happening in the brain? One study by Coricelli and Nagel gives a really sharp, interesting answer. They had people play this game while they were being scanned in an fMRI, and two conditions: in some trials, they're told, "You're playing another person who's playing right now. We'll match up your behavior at the end and pay you if you win." In other trials, they're told, "You're playing a computer, they're just choosing randomly." So what you see here is a subtraction of areas in which there's more brain activity when you're playing people compared to playing the computer. And you see activity in some regions we've seen today, medial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial, up here, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, an area that's involved in lots of types of conflict resolution, like if you're playing "Simon Says," and also the right and left temporoparietal junction. And these are all areas which are fairly reliably known to be part of what's called a "theory of mind" circuit or "mentalizing circuit." That is, it's a circuit that's used to imagine what other people might do. These were some of the first studies to see this tied in to game theory.
Gdje se to događa u mozgu? Istraživanje Coricellija i Nagelove daje vrlo jasan, zanimljiv odgovor. Kod njih su ljudi igrali ovu igru dok su ih skenirali u fMRI, u dvostrukim uvjetima. U nekim ispitivanjima, rečeno im je: "Igrate s drugom osobom koja upravo sada igra i mi ćemo vas na koncu usporediti i platiti vam ako pobijedite." U drugim ispitivanjima, rečeno im je: "Igrate s računalom." Odabir su pravili nasumično. Ono što se ovdje vidi je oduzimanje područja u kojima postoji više moždane aktivnosti kada igrate s ljudima u usporedbi na igru s računalom. I vidite aktivnost u nekim područjima koju smo danas vidjeli, u medijalnom prefrontalnom korteksu, dorzomedijalnom, ovdje gore je ventromedijalni prefrontalni korteks, prednja cingularna vijuga, područje koje uključuje razne vrste rješavanja konflikata, kao kada se igra "Simon Kaže," i također desno i lijevo temporoparietalni spoj. To su sve područja za koja se prilično pouzdano zna da su dio onoga što se naziva kružni tok "teorije uma", ili "mentalni sklop." Taj se sklop koristi da se zamisli što bi drugi ljudi mogli učiniti. Ovo su neke od prvih studija koje su uočile tu povezanost s teorijom igara.
What happens with these one- and two-step types? So, we classify people by what they picked, and then we look at the difference between playing humans versus computers, which brain areas are differentially active. On the top, you see the one-step players. There's almost no difference. The reason is, they're treating other people like a computer, and the brain is too. The bottom players, you see all the activity in dorsomedial PFC. So we know the two-step players are doing something differently.
Što se događa s ovim jedan i dva-koraka tipovima? Tako klasificiramo ljude po tome što su odabrali, a onda pogledamo na različitosti između njihovih igara s ljudima naspram njihovih igara s računalima i koja su područja mozga različito aktivna. Na vrhu vidite jedan-korak igrače. Gotovo da nema razlike. To je zato što oni tretiraju druge ljude kao računala, te to radi i mozak. Kod donjih igrača vidite sve aktivnosti u dorzomedijalnom prefrontalnom korteksu. Dakle, mi znamo da ti dva- koraka igrači rade nešto što je drukčije. Ako biste se vratili korak natrag i rekli: "Što ćemo s tim informacijama?"
Now, what can we do with this information? You might be able to look at brain activity and say, "This person will be a good poker player," or "This person's socially naive." We might also be able to study things like development of adolescent brains once we have an idea of where this circuitry exists.
Možda biste mogli pogledati na moždane aktivnosti i reći: "Ova će osoba biti dobar igrač pokera," ili "Ovaj je čovjek društveno naivan" i možda bi također mogli proučavati stvari kao što bi bio razvoj adolescentnih mozgova jednom kada saznamo gdje ovaj sklop postoji.
OK. Get ready. I'm saving you some brain activity, because you don't need to use your hair detector cells. You should use those cells to think carefully about this game. This is a bargaining game. Two players who are being scanned using EEG electrodes are going to bargain over one to six dollars. If they can do it in 10 seconds, they'll earn that money. If 10 seconds go by and they haven't made a deal, they get nothing. That's kind of a mistake together. The twist is that one player, on the left, is informed about how much on each trial there is. They play lots of trials with different amounts each time. In this case, they know there's four dollars. The uninformed player doesn't know, but they know the informed player knows. So the uninformed player's challenge is to say, "Is this guy being fair, or are they giving me a very low offer in order to get me to think there's only one or two dollars available to split?" in which case they might reject it and not come to a deal. So there's some tension here between trying to get the most money but trying to goad the other player into giving you more. And the way they bargain is to point on a number line that goes from zero to six dollars. They're bargaining over how much the uninformed player gets, and the informed player will get the rest. So this is like a management-labor negotiation in which the workers don't know how much profits the privately held company has, and they want to maybe hold out for more money, but the company might want to create the impression that there's very little to split: "I'm giving the most I can."
Ok. Spremite se. Uštedet ću vam malo moždane aktivnosti, jer ne morate koristiti svoje stanice vlasi za detekciju. Trebali biste koristiti one stanice da bi pažljivo razmislili o ovoj igri. Ovo je igra međusobnog pogađanja. Dva igrača koja će biti skenirana pomoću EEG elektroda pogađat će se oko svote od jednog do šest dolara. Ako im uspije pogoditi se za 10 sekundi, oni će zapravo zaraditi taj novac. Ako 10 sekundi prođe, a ne dogovore se, neće dobiti ništa. To je neka vrsta uzajamne pogreške. Trik je u tome što je jedan igrač, s lijeve strane, informiran kolika je svota svaki put u igri. Igraju mnogo puta i svaki put su iznosi drukčiji. U ovom slučaju znaju da su tu četiri dolara. Neinformiran igrač ne zna, ali oboje znaju da informiran igrač zna. Tako je neinformiran igrač na kušnji reći: "Da li je ovaj tip doista fer ili mi daju veoma nisku ponudu kako bi me naveli na pomisao da postoje samo jedan ili dva dolara za podijeliti? " U tom bi slučaju mogli odbaciti pregovore i ne dogovoriti se. Ovdje između postoji neka tenzija u pokušaju da se pridobije najviše novca nagovorom drugog igrača da vam da više. Pogađaju se tako što pokazuju broj reda koji se kreće od nula do šest dolara i pogađaju se oko toga koliko će neinformiran igrač dobiti, s tim da će informiranom igraču pripasti ostatak. Dakle, ovo je kao pregovor između rukovodstva i radnika u kome radnici ne znaju koliki profit privatna tvrtka ima, zar ne? I oni bi se htjeli po mogućnosti domognuti čim više novca, ali tvrtka bi htjela stvoriti dojam da je vrlo malo za podijeliti: "Dajem vam najviše što mogu"
First, some behavior: a bunch of the subject pairs play face-to-face. We have other data where they play across computers. That's an interesting difference, as you might imagine. But a bunch of the face-to-face pairs agree to divide the money evenly every single time. Boring. It's just not interesting neurally. It's good for them -- they make a lot of money. But we're interested in: Can we say something about when disagreements occur versus don't occur?
Prvo malo o ponašanju. Gomila parova, koji igraju licem u lice. Mi imamo neke druge podatke gdje igraju putem računala. To je zanimljiva razlika, što možete i zamisliti. Ali gomila licem-u-lice parova je suglasna i dijeli novac ravnomjerno odista svaki put. Dosadno. To je jednostavno neuralno nezanimljivo. Za njih je dobro, jer zarade mnogo novaca. Ali nas interesira možemo li što reći o tome kad se nesuglasice događaju, a kad ne?
So this is the other group of subjects, who often disagree. They bicker and disagree and end up with less money. They might be eligible to be on "Real Housewives," the TV show.
Ovo je druga grupa ispitanika koji se često ne slože. Dakle, oni imaju šansu - prepucavaju se i ne slažu se- okončati s manje novca. Mogu možda biti prikladni za nastup u TV šou "Prave kućanice."
(Laughter)
Na lijevoj strani vidite -
You see on the left, when the amount to divide is one, two or three dollars, they disagree about half the time; when it's four, five, six, they agree quite often. This turns out to be something that's predicted by a very complicated type of game theory you should come to graduate school at CalTech and learn about. It's a little too complicated to explain right now, but the theory tells you that this shape should occur. Your intuition might tell you that, too.
kad je iznos za podjelu jedan, dva ili tri dolara, ne slože se približno polovinu puta, a kada je iznos četiri, pet, šest, često se slože. Ispostavlja se da je to predvidljivo vrlo kompliciranim tipom teorije igara, morali biste završiti studije na CalTech-u da biste o tome naučili. Odviše je komplicirano za objasniti sada ovdje, ali teorija govori da bi se ovaj oblik na neki način trebao dogoditi. To bi vam također mogla reći vaša intuicija. Sada ću vam pokazati rezultate EEG snimanja.
Now I'm going to show you the results from the EEG recording. Very complicated. The right brain schematic is the uninformed person, and the left is the informed. Remember that we scanned both brains at the same time, so we can ask about time-synced activity in similar or different areas simultaneously, just like if you wanted to study a conversation, and you were scanning two people talking to each other. You'd expect common activity in language regions when they're listening and communicating. So the arrows connect regions that are active at the same time. The direction of the arrows flows from the region that's active first in time, and the arrowhead goes to the region that's active later. So in this case, if you look carefully, most of the arrows flow from right to left. That is, it looks as if the uninformed brain activity is happening first, and then it's followed by activity in the informed brain. And by the way, these are trials where their deals were made. This is from the first two seconds. We haven't finished analyzing this data, so we're still peeking in, but the hope is that we can say something in the first couple of seconds about whether they'll make a deal or not, which could be very useful in thinking about avoiding litigation and ugly divorces and things like that. Those are all cases in which a lot of value is lost by delay and strikes.
Vrlo komplicirano. Na shemi je desni mozak od neinformirane osobe, a lijevi je od informirane. Zapamtite da smo skenirali oba mozga u isto vrijeme, te možemo iskati vremenski sinkronizirane aktivnosti u sličnim ili različitim područjima istovremeno, baš kao kad biste željeli proučiti razgovor te skenirali razgovor dvoje ljudi i vi biste očekivali zajedničku aktivnost u jezičkom području dok oni zapravo slušaju i komuniciraju. Strelice povezuju područja koja su aktivna u isto vrijeme, a tok strelica pokazuje smjer od područja koje se prvo aktivira do vrha strelica, kasnije aktiviranog područja. Tako se u ovom slučaju, ako pozorno pogledate, većina strelica kreće s desna na lijevo. Dakle, izgleda kao da se aktivnosti neinformiranog mozga prvo događaju, a potom su pak praćene aktivnoću u informiranom mozgu. I uzgred, to su pokusi gdje su se uspjeli dogovoriti. Ovo su prve dvije sekunde. Nismo okončali s analizom ovih podataka, te i dalje virimo, ali u nadi da ćemo ponešto moći reći o vjerojatnom ishodu dogovora u prvih nekoliko sekundi, što bi moglo biti vrlo korisno za izbjegavanje parnice, ružnih razvoda i sličnog. To su sve slučajevi u kojima se gubi mnogo vrijednosti zbog zakašnjenja i protesta.
Here's the case where the disagreements occur. You can see it looks different than the one before. There's a lot more arrows. That means that the brains are synced up more closely in terms of simultaneous activity, and the arrows flow clearly from left to right. That is, the informed brain seems to be deciding, "We're probably not going to make a deal here." And then later, there's activity in the uninformed brain.
Evo slučaja gdje se nesuglasice pojavljuju. Vidi se već po izgledu da je drukčiji od prethodnog. Mnogo je više strelica. To znači da se mozak sinkronizira bliže u smislu simultane aktivnosti, i strelice jasno prelaze s lijeva na desno. To znači kao da se informiran mozak odlučuje: "ovdje se vjerojatno nećemo dogovoriti." A tek potom ta je aktivnost u neinformiranom mozgu.
Next, I'm going to introduce you to some relatives. They're hairy, smelly, fast and strong. You might be thinking back to your last Thanksgiving.
Nadalje ću vas upoznati s nekim srodnicima. Dlakavi su, smrdljivi, brzi i jaki. Pomislit ćete možda na vaš posljednji Dan zahvalnosti.
(Laughter)
Možda, ako su sa vama bile čimpanze.
Maybe, if you had a chimpanzee with you. Charles Darwin and I and you broke off from the family tree from chimpanzees about five million years ago. They're still our closest genetic kin. We share 98.8 percent of the genes. We share more genes with them than zebras do with horses. And we're also their closest cousin. They have more genetic relation to us than to gorillas. So, how humans and chimpanzees behave differently might tell us a lot about brain evolution.
Charles Darwin, ja i vi smo prekinuli to obiteljsko stablo s čimpanzama prije oko pet milijuna godina. I dalje su to naši genetski najbliži srodnici. Dijelimo 98,8 posto gena. Dijelimo više gena sa njima nego zebre sa konjima. I mi smo također njihovi najbliži srodnici. Više su genetski povezani s nama nego s gorilama. Različito ponašanje ljudi i čimpanza moglo bi nam reći mnogo o evoluciji mozga.
This is an amazing memory test from [Kyoto], Japan, the Primate Research Institute, where they've done a lot of this research. This goes back a ways. They're interested in working memory. The chimp will see, watch carefully, they'll see 200 milliseconds' exposure -- that's fast, eight movie frames -- of numbers one, two, three, four, five. Then they disappear and are replaced by squares, and they have to press the squares that correspond to the numbers from low to high to get an apple reward. Let's see how they can do it.
Ovo je nevjerojatan test pamćenja Instituta za istraživanje primata iz Nagoje u Japanu, gdje su napravili mnoga istraživanja. Ovo ide daleko unatrag. Zainteresirani su za radnu memoriju. Čimpanza će opaziti, gledajte pozorno, ugledat će ekspoziciju od 200 milisekundi - to je brzo, to je osam filmskih kadrova - brojeve jedan, dva, tri, četiri, pet. Zatim oni nestaju i zamijenjeni su praznim kvadratima koje je potrebno pritisnuti odgovarajuće nestalim brojevima od niskog do visokog da bi se dobila nagrada u vidu jabuke. Pogledajmo kako to oni rade.
This is a young chimp. The young ones are better than the old ones, just like humans.
Ovo je mlad čimpanza. Mladi su bolji od starih, baš kao i kod ljudi.
(Laughter)
I imaju veliko iskustvo, jer su ovo radili
And they're highly experienced, they've done this thousands of times. Obviously there's a big training effect, as you can imagine.
tisućama i tisućama puta. Očito vježba ima veliki učinak, što možete zamisliti. (Smijeh)
(Laughter)
Vidi se da su vrlo ravnodušni i to rade bez napora.
You can see they're very blasé and effortless. Not only can they do it very well, they do it in a sort of lazy way.
Ne samo da to rade jako dobro, već i na neki lijeni način.
(Laughter)
Zar ne? Tko misli da može pobijediti čimpanze?
Who thinks you could beat the chimps?
(Laughter)
Pogrešno. (Smijeh)
Wrong. (Laughter)
Možemo pokušati. Pokušat ćemo. Možda ćemo pokušati.
We can try. We'll try. Maybe we'll try.
Ok, sljedeći dio ove studije
OK, so the next part of the study I'm going to go quickly through is based on an idea of Tetsuro Matsuzawa. He had a bold idea he called the "cognitive trade-off hypothesis." We know chimps are faster and stronger; they're also obsessed with status. His thought was, maybe they've preserved brain activities and practice them in development that are really, really important to them to negotiate status and to win, which is something like strategic thinking during competition. So we're going to check that out by having the chimps actually play a game by touching two touch screens.
kroz koju ću preletjeti zasnovan je na ideji Tetsuro Matsuzawa. On je imao smjelu ideju koju je nazvao kognitivna hipoteza razmjene. Znamo da su čimpanze hitrije i jače. Također su vrlo opsjednute statusom. Njegova ideja je bila da su oni možda očuvali moždane aktivnosti koje kroz praksu razvijaju, jer je za njih doista, doista važno pregovarati se o statusu i pobijediti, što je nalik strategijskom razmišljanju tijekom natjecanja. To ćemo provjeriti tako što će čimpanze odigrati igru dodirivanjem dva na dodir osjetljiva ekrana.
The chimps are interacting with each other through the computers. They'll press left or right. One chimp is called a matcher; they win if they press left-left, like a seeker finding someone in hide-and-seek, or right-right. The mismatcher wants to mismatch; they want to press the opposite screen of the chimp. And the rewards are apple cube rewards. So here's how game theorists look at these data. This is a graph of the percentage of times the matcher picked right on the x-axis and the percentage of times they picked right by the mismatcher on the y-axis. So a point here is the behavior by a pair of players, one trying to match, one trying to mismatch. The NE square in the middle -- actually, NE, CH and QRE -- those are three different theories of Nash equilibrium and others, tells you what the theory predicts, which is that they should match 50-50, because if you play left too much, for example, I can exploit that if I'm the mismatcher by then playing right. And as you can see, the chimps -- each chimp is one triangle -- are circled around, hovering around that prediction.
Čimpanze zapravo međusobno komuniciraju preko kompjutera. Pritiskat će lijevo ili desno. Jedan čimpanza se zove mečer. Oni pobjeđuju ako pritisnu lijevo, lijevo, kao onaj što pronalazi u igri skrivača, ili desno, desno. Kontramečer želi oponirati. Oni žele pritisnuti suprotni ekran od čimpanza. Nagrade su kocke jabuke. Evo kako teoretičari igara gledaju na ove podatke. Ovo je grafikon postotka koliko je puta mečer izabrao desno na x-osi i postotak koliko je puta predvidio desno kontramečer na y-osi. Poenta je ovdje ponašanje para igrača, jedan pokušava odigrati, drugi pokušava odgovoriti. "NE" kvadrat u sredini - u stvari "NE, CH" i "QRE" - to su tri različite teorije Nešovog ekvilibrijuma i drugih, koje vam govore što teorija predviđa, a to je da bi oni trebali odigrati 50-50, jer, primjerice, ako odigrate previše puta lijevo, ja to mogu iskoristiti, ako sam kontramečer, igrajući desno. I kao što vidite, čimpanze, svaki od njih je jedan trokut, zaokružene su, kreću se oko te prognoze.
Now we move the payoffs. We're going to make the left-left payoff for the matcher a little higher. Now they get three apple cubes. Game theoretically, that should make the mismatcher's behavior shift: the mismatcher will think, "Oh, this guy's going to go for the big reward, so I'll go to the right, make sure he doesn't get it." And as you can see, their behavior moves up in the direction of this change in the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we changed the payoffs one more time. Now it's four apple cubes, and their behavior again moves towards the Nash equilibrium. It's sprinkled around, but if you average the chimps out, they're really close, within .01. They're actually closer than any species we've observed.
Sada ćemo prijeći na naplatu. Mi ćemo zapravo za lijevo-lijevo malo povisiti mečeru isplatu. Sada su dobili tri kocke jabuke. Po teoriji igara to bi trebalo da napravi zaokret u ponašanju kontramečera, jer ono što se događa jest da će on pomisliti: oh, ovaj tip pretendira na veliku nagradu, te ću zato ići desno, ne bi li bio siguran da je neće dobiti. I kao što vidite, njihovo ponašanje se pomiče u pravcu ove promjene u Nešovom ekvilibrijumu. Na koncu smo još jednom promijenili isplate. Sada su četiri kocke jabuke i njihovo ponašanje se ponovo kreće ka Nešovom ekvilibrijumu. To je raspršeno okolo, ali ako gledate prosjek, oni su doista vrlo blizu, unutar 0.01. Oni su zapravo bliži od bilo koje vrste koju smo promatrali.
What about humans? You think you're smarter than a chimpanzee? Here's two human groups in green and blue. They're closer to 50-50; they're not responding to payoffs as closely. And also if you study their learning in the game, they aren't as sensitive to previous rewards. The chimps play better than the humans, in terms of adhering to game theory. And these are two different groups of humans, from Japan and Africa; they replicate quite nicely. None of them are close to where the chimps are.
Kako je s ljudima? Mislite da ste pametniji od čimpanza? Evo dvije grupe ljudi u zelenom i plavom. Oni su bliže 50-50. Ne reagiraju na isplate baš toliko, i također ako proučavate njihovo učenje u igri, nisu toliko osjetljivi na prethodne nagrade. Čimpanze igraju bolje od ljudi, bolje u smislu pridržavanja teoriji igara. Radi se o dvije različite grupe ljudi iz Japana i iz Afrike. Oni ponavljaju posve lijepo. Nitko od njih nije ni blizu čimpanzama.
So, some things we learned: people seem to do a limited amount of strategic thinking using theory of mind. We have preliminary evidence from bargaining that early warning signs in the brain might be used to predict whether there'll be a bad disagreement that costs money, and chimps are "better" competitors than humans, as judged by game theory.
Dakle, evo nekoliko stvari koje smo danas naučili. Ljudi se izgleda ograničeno koriste strategijskim razmišljanjem koristeći teoriju uma. Imamo neke preliminarne dokaze kada se radi o pogađanju da bi se rani znaci upozorenja u mozgu mogli koristiti za predviđanje da li će doći do ne slaganja koje je loše i povlači troškove i da su čimpanze bolji natjecatelji od ljudi, sudeći po teoriji igara.
Thank you.
Hvala.
(Applause)
(Pljesak)