The story starts in Kenya in December of 2007, when there was a disputed presidential election, and in the immediate aftermath of that election, there was an outbreak of ethnic violence. And there was a lawyer in Nairobi, Ory Okolloh -- who some of you may know from her TEDTalk -- who began blogging about it on her site, Kenyan Pundit. And shortly after the election and the outbreak of violence, the government suddenly imposed a significant media blackout. And so weblogs went from being commentary as part of the media landscape to being a critical part of the media landscape in trying to understand where the violence was. And Okolloh solicited from her commenters more information about what was going on. The comments began pouring in, and Okolloh would collate them. She would post them. And she quickly said, "It's too much. I could do this all day every day and I can't keep up. There is more information about what's going on in Kenya right now than any one person can manage. If only there was a way to automate this."
故事开始于2007年12月的 肯尼亚, 一届备受争议的总统选举。 此次选举刚刚结束, 就发生了种族暴力事件。 一位在内罗毕市的律师-奥里欧克罗, 你们当中有些人可能通过她的TED讲话认识她- 她在她的博客上报道这个事件, 她的博客叫肯尼亚观点。 就在选举结束和暴力事件发生之后的短短时间内, 肯尼亚政府突然实施了 对媒体的强有力管制。 博客们纷纷从作为 媒体平台的评述部分 变为媒体平台的批评部分, 试着了解到底在什么地方出现暴力。 欧克罗向她的博客读者们 征求更多 关于暴力事件的信息。 大量的评论涌入进来。 欧克罗就收集起来。 再发表。 她很快意识到,“这太多了。 我每天都可以工作一整天, 还忙不过来。 现在关于 肯尼亚的信息 简直多得让单独一个人无法整理。 除非有个自动化的方式来整理。”
And two programmers who read her blog held their hands up and said, "We could do that," and in 72 hours, they launched Ushahidi. Ushahidi -- the name means "witness" or "testimony" in Swahili -- is a very simple way of taking reports from the field, whether it's from the web or, critically, via mobile phones and SMS, aggregating it and putting it on a map. That's all it is, but that's all that's needed because what it does is it takes the tacit information available to the whole population -- everybody knows where the violence is, but no one person knows what everyone knows -- and it takes that tacit information and it aggregates it, and it maps it and it makes it public. And that, that maneuver called "crisis mapping," was kicked off in Kenya in January of 2008.
两位程序员读了她的博客后 说:“我们可以帮助你建立一个自动化的程序。” 72个小时后,他们推出了Ushahidi。 Ushahidi-这个名字来源于 斯瓦西里的“目击者”或“证人”- 它的运作方式很简单,就是将现场, 无论是来自于互联网,更重要的 是来自于移动电话或短信 的报告汇总起来再发表到地图上。 那就行了,那就是所需要的了。 因为它所做的就是获取 全人类那些不为人知的隐形信息- 每个人都知道暴力发生在什么地方, 但是没有人通晓所有信息- 所以这个程序就是将获取的那些不为人知的隐性信息汇总, 再到地图上定位, 最后公之于众。 那网站叫做 “危机信息地图” 于2008年一月 在肯尼亚开始。
And enough people looked at it and found it valuable enough that the programmers who created Ushahidi decided they were going to make it open source and turn it into a platform. It's since been deployed in Mexico to track electoral fraud. It's been deployed in Washington D.C. to track snow cleanup. And it's been used most famously in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake. And when you look at the map now posted on the Ushahidi front page, you can see that the number of deployments in Ushahidi has gone worldwide, all right? This went from a single idea and a single implementation in East Africa in the beginning of 2008 to a global deployment in less than three years.
有足够多的人关注这网站,也发现了它有足够的价值, 于是发明Ushahidi的程序员们 决定继续改变它为开放源, 形成一个平台。 它被运用在跟踪墨西哥的 选举舞弊中。 它也被用在跟踪华盛顿特区的积雪清理。 最著名的是它被运用在 震后的海地。 现在当你看到在 Ushahidi首页公布的地图, 你会发现Ushahidi运用在世界各个角落, 对吧? 这项技术已经在短短三年 从2008年初在 东非的一个想法, 一个部署发展成为 一个网络全球的部署。
Now what Okolloh did would not have been possible without digital technology. What Okolloh did would not have been possible without human generosity. And the interesting moment now, the number of environments where the social design challenge relies on both of those things being true. That is the resource that I'm talking about. I call it cognitive surplus. And it represents the ability of the world's population to volunteer and to contribute and collaborate on large, sometimes global, projects. Cognitive surplus is made up of two things. The first, obviously, is the world's free time and talents. The world has over a trillion hours a year of free time to commit to shared projects. Now, that free time existed in the 20th century, but we didn't get Ushahidi in the 20th century.
欧克罗所做的 离开了数字科技 是远远不可能实现的。 欧克罗所做的离开了人类共享 也是远远不可能实现的。 现在有趣的是, 社会设计挑战所需的 氛围 依赖于这两个条件都具备。 这就是我所讲的资源。 我称它为认知盈余。 它代表了 人类 在大型,全球化的项目上 自愿贡献和合作的能力。 认知盈余由两部分组成。 起初,很明显的,是全球的空闲时间和才能。 世界上 每年有超过一万亿的 空闲时间 来供我们合作项目。 那是20世纪的空闲时间数据, 不过20世纪我们没有Ushahidi。
That's the second half of cognitive surplus. The media landscape in the 20th century was very good at helping people consume, and we got, as a result, very good at consuming. But now that we've been given media tools -- the Internet, mobile phones -- that let us do more than consume, what we're seeing is that people weren't couch potatoes because we liked to be. We were couch potatoes because that was the only opportunity given to us. We still like to consume, of course. But it turns out we also like to create, and we like to share. And it's those two things together -- ancient human motivation and the modern tools to allow that motivation to be joined up in large-scale efforts -- that are the new design resource. And using cognitive surplus, we're starting to see truly incredible experiments in scientific, literary, artistic, political efforts. Designing.
接下来说到认知盈余的另一半。 20世纪的媒体 在帮助人们消费方面做得非常好。 所以结果是, 我们非常善于消费。 但是现在,我们使用的媒体- 互联网,移动手机-都让我们做更多的事情,而不仅仅是消费, 我们正看见的是人们不再是坐在电视机前, 因为我们更喜欢做其它的事情。 我们原先坐在电视机前是因为 我们只有那一个选择。 当然,我们还是喜欢消费。 但是,我们也喜欢创造, 同时喜欢分享。 这两项加起来- 就是人类自古就有的激情, 现代工具使得这种激情 扩大化- 变成新的设计资源。 使用认知盈余, 我们更加看到真正的无与伦比的 在自然、文学 艺术、政治的各种实验。 设计。
We're also getting, of course, a lot of LOLcats. LOLcats are cute pictures of cats made cuter with the addition of cute captions. And they are also part of the abundant media landscape we're getting now. This is one of the participatory -- one of the participatory models we see coming out of that, along with Ushahidi. Now I want to stipulate, as the lawyers say, that LOLcats are the stupidest possible creative act. There are other candidates of course, but LOLcats will do as a general case. But here's the thing: The stupidest possible creative act is still a creative act. Someone who has done something like this, however mediocre and throwaway, has tried something, has put something forward in public. And once they've done it, they can do it again, and they could work on getting it better.
我们还有了很多很多的狂笑猫咪LOLcats。 狂笑猫咪LOLcats是一组 很多可爱的猫咪在最可爱的时候的照片。 它们也是 我们当前广阔的媒体景观的一部分。 这只是其中的一种参与模式, 我们看到同Ushahidi一块儿的 众多参与模式的一种。 我只想说,正如律师们说过的, 狂笑猫咪LOLcats是最愚蠢可行的 创作艺术。 当然还有其它的一些, 不过狂笑猫咪LOLcats是个大众化的例子。 但有一点是 即便是最愚蠢可行的创作艺术 也还是创作艺术。 一些人已经创作了类似的创作, 无论创作是平庸或者一次性作品, 他们都尝试过了,也展示给了大众。 他们一旦完成了,就可以再次创作, 还可以做得更好。
There is a spectrum between mediocre work and good work, and as anybody who's worked as an artist or a creator knows, it's a spectrum you're constantly struggling to get on top of. The gap is between doing anything and doing nothing. And someone who makes a LOLcat has already crossed over that gap. Now it's tempting to want to get the Ushahidis without the LOLcats, right, to get the serious stuff without the throwaway stuff. But media abundance never works that way. Freedom to experiment means freedom to experiment with anything. Even with the sacred printing press, we got erotic novels 150 years before we got scientific journals.
在平庸的作品和优秀作品之间有段空间。 任何艺术家或创作者都知道, 这段空间是你一直 努力都想达到的最高境界。 这也是 做出点名堂和一事无成的鸿沟。 创作出狂笑猫咪的人 已经跨越了这个鸿沟。 现在没有狂笑猫咪,我们希望得到Ushahidis, 对, 从一次性作品过渡到严肃的创作作品。 但是大众媒体从来都不是那样工作的。 自由实验意味着自由地去尝试任何事情的实验。 即便是在神圣的印刷业, 色情小说比科技期刊 早出现150年。
So before I talk about what is, I think, the critical difference between LOLcats and Ushahidi, I want to talk about their shared source. And that source is design for generosity. It is one of the curiosities of our historical era that even as cognitive surplus is becoming a resource we can design around, social sciences are also starting to explain how important our intrinsic motivations are to us, how much we do things because we like to do them rather than because our boss told us to do them, or because we're being paid to do them.
在我谈 狂笑猫咪和Ushahidi的 关键区别之前, 我想, 先谈谈它们共享的资源。 那资源是为了共享所设计的。 这是我们历史上充满好奇心的一段时期, 即便是认知盈余 也成为我们设计的资源, 社会学家们也开始解释 我们内在动机 对于我们是如何的重要, 我们做什么事是因为我们喜欢这样做, 而不是我们的老板告诉我们要这样做, 或者是我们通过做这些事而拿到工钱。
This is a graph from a paper by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, who set out to test, at the beginning of this decade, what they called "deterrence theory." And deterrence theory is a very simple theory of human behavior: If you want somebody to do less of something, add a punishment and they'll do less of it. Simple, straightforward, commonsensical -- also, largely untested. And so they went and studied 10 daycare centers in Haifa, Israel. They studied those daycare centers at the time of highest tension, which is pick-up time. At pick-up time the teachers, who have been with your children all day, would like you to be there at the appointed hour to take your children back. Meanwhile, the parents -- perhaps a little busy at work, running late, running errands -- want a little slack to pick the kids up late.
这张图来自于 Uri Gneezy和Afredo Rusticini的作品, 他们测试,在十年前, 他们称为“威慑理论”的东西。 威慑理论是人类行为最简单的理论。 如果你不想要人们做某些事情, 只需要加上惩罚,人们便不会去做了。 简单的,直白的,常识性的, 同时很大程度上也是未加实验验证的。 他们前往以色列 海法市研究了十所日托中心。 他们研究了这些日托中心 最忙碌的时刻, 也就是接孩子的时刻。 在接孩子的时刻, 已经跟你的孩子呆了一整天的老师们 希望家长们按照预定的时间接回孩子。 与此同时,家长们-可能因为工作,忙忙碌碌,琐事- 在接孩子的时候有可能迟到。
So Gneezy and Rustichini said, "How many instances of late pick-ups are there at these 10 daycare centers?" Now they saw -- and this is what the graph is, these are the number of weeks and these are the number of late arrivals -- that there were between six and 10 instances of late pick-ups on average in these 10 daycare centers. So they divided the daycare centers into two groups. The white group there is the control group; they change nothing. But the group of daycare centers represented by the black line, they said, "We are changing this bargain as of right now. If you pick your kid up more than 10 minutes late, we're going to add a 10 shekel fine to your bill. Boom. No ifs, ands or buts."
所以Gneezy和Rusticini说过, “那十所日托中心 有多少晚接孩子的例子?” 现在他们看到-就是这张图表显示的, 这是星期的数量,这是晚接孩子的数量- 这十所日托中心平均 有6到10个 晚接孩子的例子。 所以他们将这十所日托中心分成两组。 白色的一组是 对照组,不做变化。 但是黑线代表的日托中心那组, 他们说:“现在我们做 这样的改变。 如果你接孩子比预定的晚了十分钟, 我们就罚你多交10锡克尔。 就这样了。没有什么如果,但是的借口。”
And the minute they did that, the behavior in those daycare centers changed. Late pick-ups went up every week for the next four weeks until they topped out at triple the pre-fine average, and then they fluctuated at between double and triple the pre-fine average for the life of the fine. And you can see immediately what happened, right? The fine broke the culture of the daycare center. By adding a fine, what they did was communicate to the parents that their entire debt to the teachers had been discharged with the payment of 10 shekels, and that there was no residue of guilt or social concern that the parents owed the teachers. And so the parents, quite sensibly, said, "10 shekels to pick my kid up late? What could be bad?" (Laughter)
就在他们做出改变的那一刻, 日托中心也发生了变化。 接下来的四周内, 每周晚接孩子的数量都在上升, 直到他们将罚金增加到原先的三倍, 而后, 他们徘徊在 两倍到三倍罚金之间。 你看到了立马的变化,是吧。 罚金打破了日托中心 的规律。 因为增加了罚金, 原先他们同家长间的交流, 让家长们欠下老师的债务 变为了 10锡克尔的罚金, 家长们也不会因为感到欠了老师的罚金 而觉得内疚或者受到社会关注。 所以家长们,感慨地说, “10锡克尔就可以晚接会儿孩子。 还有什么更坏的呢?” (笑声)
The explanation of human behavior that we inherited in the 20th century was that we are all rational, self-maximizing actors, and in that explanation -- the daycare center had no contract -- should have been operating without any constraints. But that's not right. They were operating with social constraints rather than contractual ones. And critically, the social constraints created a culture that was more generous than the contractual constraints did. So Gneezy and Rustichini run this experiment for a dozen weeks -- run the fine for a dozen weeks -- and then they say, "Okay, that's it. All done; fine." And then a really interesting thing happens: Nothing changes. The culture that got broken by the fine stayed broken when the fine was removed. Not only are economic motivations and intrinsic motivations incompatible, that incompatibility can persist over long periods. So the trick in designing these kinds of situations is to understand where you're relying on the economic part of the bargain -- as with the parents paying the teachers -- and when you're relying on the social part of the bargain, when you're really designing for generosity.
自20世纪遗传下来的人类行为的解释 说法, 那就是我们人类都是理性的,自我最大化的演员。 在这解释下- 日托中心没有合约- 也没有任何运营限制。 但不对。 他们在社会的约束下运营, 而不是合同条款。 关键的是,社会的约束 创造了比合同条款 更广泛的一种文化。 所以在Gneezy和Rustichini进行这个实验的几周后- 也就是增加罚款的几周- 他们说:“好啦,就到这里。都很好。” 真正有趣的现象发生了。 什么也没有改变。 罚款所改变的晚接孩子现象 并没有随着罚款的取消而有所变化。 不仅仅是经济动机 和内在动机 不相容, 那种不相容 能持续很长一段时间。 设计这样的情形的关键 在于 理解交易双方的经济行为部分, 你依靠什么-就像家长们支付老师工钱- 和什么时候你依靠交易双方的社会行为部分, 什么时候你真正为人们共享而设计。
This brings me back to the LOLcats and to Ushahidi. This is, I think, the range that matters. Both of these rely on cognitive surplus. Both of these design for the assumption that people like to create and we want to share. Here is the critical difference between these: LOLcats is communal value. It's value created by the participants for each other. Communal value on the networks we have is everywhere -- every time you see a large aggregate of shared, publicly available data, whether it's photos on Flickr or videos on Youtube or whatever. This is good. I like LOLcats as much as the next guy, maybe a little more even, but this is also a largely solved problem. I have a hard time envisioning a future in which someone is saying, "Where, oh where, can I find a picture of a cute cat?"
这个将我引回狂笑猫咪LOLcats 和Ushahidi中。 我认为,范围很重要 它们两者都依赖认知盈余。 它们两者都为 喜欢创造和分享的人们而设计。 两者的关键差别是: 狂笑猫咪LOLcats具有公共价值(communal value)。 它的价值产生于参与者之间的 互动。 网络上的公共价值 到处都是。 每次你看到的那些庞大集合的,共享的 公共数据, 无论是Flickr上的照片 还是Youtube上的视频,或者其它什么。 这些都很好。我跟另一个人一样喜欢狂笑猫咪, 或许更加喜爱。 但这也是 一个未被完全解决了的问题。 我很难设想未来, 就像有人说的, “哪里,在哪里,我们能找到 一张可爱的猫咪图?”
Ushahidi, by contrast, is civic value. It's value created by the participants but enjoyed by society as a whole. The goals set out by Ushahidi are not just to make life better for the participants, but to make life better for everyone in the society in which Ushahidi is operating. And that kind of civic value is not just a side effect of opening up to human motivation. It really is going to be a side effect of what we, collectively, make of these kinds of efforts. There are a trillion hours a year of participatory value up for grabs. That will be true year-in and year-out. The number of people who are going to be able to participate in these kinds of projects is going to grow, and we can see that organizations designed around a culture of generosity can achieve incredible effects without an enormous amount of contractual overhead -- a very different model than our default model for large-scale group action in the 20th century.
相反,Ushahidi 是一种公民价值(civic value)。 它的价值产生于参与者, 但是整个社会都能共享。 Ushahidi的目标 不仅仅让参与者的生活 变得更好, 而让操作Ushahidi的社会中的 每一个人都生活得更好。 公民价值 不仅仅是 激发人类动力的伴随现象, 而是它真正的成为 我们一起共同 努力的巨大效应。 每年一万亿的 小时 可供大家自由争取 共享价值。 年复一年的确如此。 参与这些项目 的人数 正逐渐增加。 我们也会看见不同组织 在共享的文化下,尽管没有巨额的合同开销, 也可以设计出不可思议的 作品。 这是一个非常不同于 20世纪的大规模团体行动的默认模式。
What's going to make the difference here is what Dean Kamen said, the inventor and entrepreneur. Kamen said, "Free cultures get what they celebrate." We've got a choice before us. We've got this trillion hours a year. We can use it to crack each other up, and we're going to do that. That, we get for free. But we can also celebrate and support and reward the people trying to use cognitive surplus to create civic value. And to the degree we're going to do that, to the degree we're able to do that, we'll be able to change society.
有所不同的是, 正如一位发明家和企业家狄安卡门所说 的话。 卡门说:“自由文化让大家得到所崇尚的东西而庆祝。” 我们现在正面临一个选择。 每年我们有成千上万亿小时的空闲时间。 我们能利用它们让每个人都快乐起来,我们就要那么做。 而且,我们免费共享。 但我们也要庆祝 和支持以及奖励那些 使用认知盈余 创造公民价值的人们。 在多大程度上,我们要那么做,我们能那么做, 我们就能改变社会。
Thank you very much.
非常谢谢大家。