So here's the most important economic fact of our time. We are living in an age of surging income inequality, particularly between those at the very top and everyone else. This shift is the most striking in the U.S. and in the U.K., but it's a global phenomenon. It's happening in communist China, in formerly communist Russia, it's happening in India, in my own native Canada. We're even seeing it in cozy social democracies like Sweden, Finland and Germany.
当今最重要的经济现状是 我们生活在一个收入差异加巨的年代 特别是处于顶层的人士收入远高于 其它阶层 这种现象在英美最为显著 但全球皆然 包括社会主义制度的中国 前共产主义苏联 印度和我的祖国加拿大 甚至在最适宜居住的社会民主国家 像瑞典,芬兰和德国都是如此
Let me give you a few numbers to place what's happening. In the 1970s, the One Percent accounted for about 10 percent of the national income in the United States. Today, their share has more than doubled to above 20 percent. But what's even more striking is what's happening at the very tippy top of the income distribution. The 0.1 percent in the U.S. today account for more than eight percent of the national income. They are where the One Percent was 30 years ago. Let me give you another number to put that in perspective, and this is a figure that was calculated in 2005 by Robert Reich, the Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration. Reich took the wealth of two admittedly very rich men, Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, and he found that it was equivalent to the wealth of the bottom 40 percent of the U.S. population, 120 million people. Now, as it happens, Warren Buffett is not only himself a plutocrat, he is one of the most astute observers of that phenomenon, and he has his own favorite number. Buffett likes to point out that in 1992, the combined wealth of the people on the Forbes 400 list -- and this is the list of the 400 richest Americans -- was 300 billion dollars. Just think about it. You didn't even need to be a billionaire to get on that list in 1992. Well, today, that figure has more than quintupled to 1.7 trillion, and I probably don't need to tell you that we haven't seen anything similar happen to the middle class, whose wealth has stagnated if not actually decreased.
我以几个数字为例,大家就会明白 在70年代的美国 (最富有的)1%的人的所得 占据了10%的国民收入 如今,这部分人的收入占有率增加了一倍多 超过20% 更让人震惊的是 顶层中的顶层们 的收入分配 那0.1%尖端人士 拥有全美8%以上的 国民收入 这是30年前顶端1%的占有率 让我再举一个数字来审视这个问题 这是2005年的统计数据 由Robert Reich 提供 他是克林顿政府的劳工部长 Reich以两个无可厚非的巨富 比尔.盖茨和沃伦.巴菲特的财富为例 发现这个总和 相当于全美最底层的40%的全部财富 即1.2亿人的总和 碰巧的是 沃伦 · 巴菲特不仅自己是个富豪 同时是此现象最敏锐的观察者之一 他有自己最偏好的数据 巴菲特指出,在1992年 福布斯400强 的财富总和 即最富有的400个美国人 总价值3000 亿美金 试想一下 不用十亿美金 你就可以在1992年跻身福布斯400强 现如今这个数字翻了五倍多 达到1.7万亿美金 不用我说大家便知 类似的增长并没发生在 中产阶级身上 他们的财富增长不是停滞就是减少
So we're living in the age of the global plutocracy, but we've been slow to notice it. One of the reasons, I think, is a sort of boiled frog phenomenon. Changes which are slow and gradual can be hard to notice even if their ultimate impact is quite dramatic. Think about what happened, after all, to the poor frog. But I think there's something else going on. Talking about income inequality, even if you're not on the Forbes 400 list, can make us feel uncomfortable. It feels less positive, less optimistic, to talk about how the pie is sliced than to think about how to make the pie bigger. And if you do happen to be on the Forbes 400 list, talking about income distribution, and inevitably its cousin, income redistribution, can be downright threatening.
我们生活在全球财阀统治的时代 但却久久才意识到这一点 我认为其中一个原因 类似于"温水青蛙"现象 缓慢和逐步的变化 很难被注意到 即使最终的结果是致命的 想想那只青蛙悲惨的结局吧 但我认为还有别的原因 当谈到收入不平等时 即使不是福布斯400 强之列的巨富 也会另人感到很不舒服 好似用消极、悲观的态度 来谈论如何切分蛋糕 而不是积极想办法使这块蛋糕变大 如果你有幸跻身福布斯400强 当讨论收入分配 以及随之而来的收入再分配时 你可能会有彻底的威胁感
So we're living in the age of surging income inequality, especially at the top. What's driving it, and what can we do about it?
我们生活在收入不平等加剧的年代 尤其是在顶端人群中 这背后的动因是什么?我们又能做些什么?
One set of causes is political: lower taxes, deregulation, particularly of financial services, privatization, weaker legal protections for trade unions, all of these have contributed to more and more income going to the very, very top.
其中之一是政治原因 降低税收,放松管制,特别是对金融服务业 私有化,削弱法律对工会的保护 这一切都造成 越来越多的收入集中到社会顶层
A lot of these political factors can be broadly lumped under the category of "crony capitalism," political changes that benefit a group of well-connected insiders but don't actually do much good for the rest of us. In practice, getting rid of crony capitalism is incredibly difficult. Think of all the years reformers of various stripes have tried to get rid of corruption in Russia, for instance, or how hard it is to re-regulate the banks even after the most profound financial crisis since the Great Depression, or even how difficult it is to get the big multinational companies, including those whose motto might be "don't do evil," to pay taxes at a rate even approaching that paid by the middle class. But while getting rid of crony capitalism in practice is really, really hard, at least intellectually, it's an easy problem. After all, no one is actually in favor of crony capitalism. Indeed, this is one of those rare issues that unites the left and the right. A critique of crony capitalism is as central to the Tea Party as it is to Occupy Wall Street.
很多这些政治因素可以大致归结为 "裙带资本主义" 政治变革使得 密切相关的圈内人士直接受益 而对一般人意义了了 在实践中,铲除裙带资本主义 是非常困难的 以俄罗斯为例,多年来有多少 改革派想尽办法铲除腐败 力尽艰辛重整银行系统 即使是在大萧条以来最严重的 金融危机之后,依然见效不大。 再有,要求那些大型跨国公司 包括一些口口声声宣扬"为善"的公司 根据中产阶级的税率来纳税 是多么困难重重 但尽管在实践中根除裙带资本主义 实属不易 但至少从理智上讲,那是个简单的问题 毕竟,没有人是真正支持裙带资本主义的 事实上这个问题 罕见地统一了左派和右派 批判裙带资本主义对茶党 和占领华尔街派而言同样重要
But if crony capitalism is, intellectually at least, the easy part of the problem, things get trickier when you look at the economic drivers of surging income inequality. In and of themselves, these aren't too mysterious. Globalization and the technology revolution, the twin economic transformations which are changing our lives and transforming the global economy, are also powering the rise of the super-rich. Just think about it. For the first time in history, if you are an energetic entrepreneur with a brilliant new idea or a fantastic new product, you have almost instant, almost frictionless access to a global market of more than a billion people. As a result, if you are very, very smart and very, very lucky, you can get very, very rich very, very quickly. The latest poster boy for this phenomenon is David Karp. The 26-year-old founder of Tumblr recently sold his company to Yahoo for 1.1 billion dollars. Think about that for a minute: 1.1 billion dollars, 26 years old. It's easiest to see how the technology revolution and globalization are creating this sort of superstar effect in highly visible fields, like sports and entertainment. We can all watch how a fantastic athlete or a fantastic performer can today leverage his or her skills across the global economy as never before. But today, that superstar effect is happening across the entire economy. We have superstar technologists. We have superstar bankers. We have superstar lawyers and superstar architects. There are superstar cooks and superstar farmers. There are even, and this is my personal favorite example, superstar dentists, the most dazzling exemplar of whom is Bernard Touati, the Frenchman who ministers to the smiles of fellow superstars like Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich or European-born American fashion designer Diane von Furstenberg.
但如果裙带资本主义从理智上讲 是比较容易解决的部分 那么经济因素催成的贫富相差巨增 就变得更为繁杂 就经济本身而言,并无特别神秘之处 但全球化和技术革命 这一对经济转型 正在改变我们的生活 改变着全球经济 也催成超级富豪的崛起 试想一下 有史以来第一次, 如果你是一个充满活力的企业家 有一个绝妙的新点子 或神奇的新产品 你可以立即顺利地 进入超过 10 亿人的全球市场 因此,如果你非常非常的聪明 又非常非常的幸运 你可以 顺间变成富豪 这种现象的最新代言人 是大卫 · 卡普 这个26岁的Tumblr 创始人 最近把他的公司卖给了雅虎 成交价11 亿美金 好好想一下 11 亿美金,26 岁 不难发现,技术革命 和全球化是如何创造这种超级巨星效应 在人人可见的领域内 如体育界和娱乐圈 我们都能看到那些出色的运动员 或明星利用他们的能力 在全球市场创造前所未有的价值 但如今,这种巨星效应 发生在整个经济体系中 我们有巨星技术专家 有巨星银行家 巨星律师和巨星建筑师 有巨星厨师 和巨星农场主 甚至有我个人最喜欢的例子 巨星牙医 其中最耀眼的 是这个法国牙医 Bernard Touati 他保障其他巨星们的露齿一笑 其中包括俄罗斯寡头阿布拉莫维奇 欧裔美国时装设计师 黛安 · 冯 · 弗斯滕伯格
But while it's pretty easy to see how globalization and the technology revolution are creating this global plutocracy, what's a lot harder is figuring out what to think about it. And that's because, in contrast with crony capitalism, so much of what globalization and the technology revolution have done is highly positive. Let's start with technology. I love the Internet. I love my mobile devices. I love the fact that they mean that whoever chooses to will be able to watch this talk far beyond this auditorium. I'm even more of a fan of globalization. This is the transformation which has lifted hundreds of millions of the world's poorest people out of poverty and into the middle class, and if you happen to live in the rich part of the world, it's made many new products affordable -- who do you think built your iPhone? — and things that we've relied on for a long time much cheaper. Think of your dishwasher or your t-shirt.
尽管显而易见全球化 和技术革命正在 创造世界超富 难解的是如何看待这一现象 因为 与裙带资本主义相反 全球化和技术革命 带来的收益多是积极向上的 我们先从技术说起 我爱互联网。也爱移动设备 我喜欢 不管是谁在什么地方都能选择观看这个演讲 远远超出这个礼堂的范围 我更是全球化的粉丝 这种转型 使数亿 世界上最贫穷的人民摆脱贫困 进入中产阶级 如果你碰巧住在发达国家 这种转型让许多新产品变得物美价廉- 想想是谁生产的你的 iPhone?— 我们依赖已久的物品变得越来越便宜 看看你的洗碗机或是你的 t 恤
So what's not to like? Well, a few things. One of the things that worries me is how easily what you might call meritocratic plutocracy can become crony plutocracy. Imagine you're a brilliant entrepreneur who has successfully sold that idea or that product to the global billions and become a billionaire in the process. It gets tempting at that point to use your economic nous to manipulate the rules of the global political economy in your own favor. And that's no mere hypothetical example. Think about Amazon, Apple, Google, Starbucks. These are among the world's most admired, most beloved, most innovative companies. They also happen to be particularly adept at working the international tax system so as to lower their tax bill very, very significantly. And why stop at just playing the global political and economic system as it exists to your own maximum advantage? Once you have the tremendous economic power that we're seeing at the very, very top of the income distribution and the political power that inevitably entails, it becomes tempting as well to start trying to change the rules of the game in your own favor. Again, this is no mere hypothetical. It's what the Russian oligarchs did in creating the sale-of-the-century privatization of Russia's natural resources. It's one way of describing what happened with deregulation of the financial services in the U.S. and the U.K.
那还有什么不喜欢的呢? 确实有一些 我担心的事情之一 是任人唯才的富豪统治 很容易成为裙带富豪统治 假设你是一位出色的企业家 成功地向全球数十亿人 销售了新产品或新点子 并一下子成为亿万富翁 此时你经不住诱惑 使用你的经济常识去 操作全球政治经济的游戏规则 为自己谋取暴利 这并不只是个假设 看看亚马逊、 苹果、 谷歌、 星巴克 这些都是属于世界上最受尊敬 最受喜爱,最具创新性的公司 他们特别擅长 利用国际税制的差别避税 大大降低税额 那为什么不继续利用现有 全球化政治经济体系 来获得最大利益呢? 因为一旦你拥有巨大的经济实力 像那些处于收入分配顶端的富豪们 以及相关的政治权力 开始尝试改变游戏规则 以谋私利的想法 就会变得非常诱人 再次重申,这绝不是假设 正如俄罗斯寡头们 在前所未有的私有化过程中 出卖俄罗斯天然资源的所作所为一样 这也描绘了英美两国 放松对金融服务业管制 所造成的后果
A second thing that worries me is how easily meritocratic plutocracy can become aristocracy. One way of describing the plutocrats is as alpha geeks, and they are people who are acutely aware of how important highly sophisticated analytical and quantitative skills are in today's economy. That's why they are spending unprecedented time and resources educating their own children. The middle class is spending more on schooling too, but in the global educational arms race that starts at nursery school and ends at Harvard, Stanford or MIT, the 99 percent is increasingly outgunned by the One Percent. The result is something that economists Alan Krueger and Miles Corak call the Great Gatsby Curve. As income inequality increases, social mobility decreases. The plutocracy may be a meritocracy, but increasingly you have to be born on the top rung of the ladder to even take part in that race.
我担心的第二件事 就是任人唯才的富豪统治 很容易成为贵族统治 形容这些富豪的一种方法 可称他们为技术达人 这些人敏锐地意识到 高度复杂的分析和计量能力 在当今的经济社会是多么重要 这就是为什么他们花 大量的时间和金钱 在孩子的教育上 中产阶级们也在加大教育投资 但在全球"教育军备竞赛"中 从幼儿园开始 到最终升入哈佛,斯坦福或麻省理工这样的顶尖大学 99%的平民阶层 越来越争不过那1%的特权子弟 结果就象经济学家艾伦 · 克鲁格 和迈尔斯.酷瑞克描绘的伟大的盖茨比曲线一样 随着收入失衡的增加 社会的流动性降低 财阀统治可能是任人为才 但你必须出生在权贵之家 否则连参加角逐的机会都没有
The third thing, and this is what worries me the most, is the extent to which those same largely positive forces which are driving the rise of the global plutocracy also happen to be hollowing out the middle class in Western industrialized economies. Let's start with technology. Those same forces that are creating billionaires are also devouring many traditional middle-class jobs. When's the last time you used a travel agent? And in contrast with the industrial revolution, the titans of our new economy aren't creating that many new jobs. At its zenith, G.M. employed hundreds of thousands, Facebook fewer than 10,000. The same is true of globalization. For all that it is raising hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the emerging markets, it's also outsourcing a lot of jobs from the developed Western economies. The terrifying reality is that there is no economic rule which automatically translates increased economic growth into widely shared prosperity. That's shown in what I consider to be the most scary economic statistic of our time. Since the late 1990s, increases in productivity have been decoupled from increases in wages and employment. That means that our countries are getting richer, our companies are getting more efficient, but we're not creating more jobs and we're not paying people, as a whole, more.
第三件事,也是我最担心的是 这股积极向上 同时推动全球富豪崛起的力量 正在挖空西方发达国家 的中产阶级 我们先谈谈技术 正在创造着亿万富翁的那股力量 也在吞食许多传统的中产阶级的工作机会 你最后一次使用旅行社是什么时候? 与工业革命相反 我们的新经济巨人 并沒有创造很多新的就业机会 在其全盛时期,通用公司雇用数十万人 而Facebook 的雇员少于一万 全球化也正是如此 虽然它使数以百万计 的发展中国家人民脱离贫困 但它将西方国家中产阶级的工作机会 向海外外包 更可怕的现实是 没有任何经济规则 能自动使 经济增长 转变成广泛共享的繁荣 这体现了当今就我个人认为 最可怕的经济统计数据. 从九十年代后期,提高工作效率 与增加工资 和就业脱钩 这意味着,我们的国家越来越富有 企业效率增长 但没有创造更多就业机会 总体工资水平没有增加
One scary conclusion you could draw from all of this is to worry about structural unemployment. What worries me more is a different nightmare scenario. After all, in a totally free labor market, we could find jobs for pretty much everyone. The dystopia that worries me is a universe in which a few geniuses invent Google and its ilk and the rest of us are employed giving them massages.
综上所述,可以得到一个可怕的结论 那就是令人担扰的结构性失业 更令我担忧的是一个不同的噩梦般的场景 毕竟,在一个完全自由的劳动力市场里 几乎每个人都能找到工作 但我担心这反乌托邦社会 由发明了谷歌的天才 和其同党们统治 其他受雇于他们的只是打杂
So when I get really depressed about all of this, I comfort myself in thinking about the Industrial Revolution. After all, for all its grim, satanic mills, it worked out pretty well, didn't it? After all, all of us here are richer, healthier, taller -- well, there are a few exceptions — and live longer than our ancestors in the early 19th century. But it's important to remember that before we learned how to share the fruits of the Industrial Revolution with the broad swathes of society, we had to go through two depressions, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Long Depression of the 1870s, two world wars, communist revolutions in Russia and in China, and an era of tremendous social and political upheaval in the West. We also, not coincidentally, went through an era of tremendous social and political inventions. We created the modern welfare state. We created public education. We created public health care. We created public pensions. We created unions.
所以当我为这一切沮丧之极时 我总用工业革命来安慰自己 毕竟,对于那些冷酷、魔鬼般的工厂 结果都还可以不是吗? 毕竟,我们现在都更富有、 更健康、更高大- 当然有几个例外 — 我们比19 世纪初的祖先要长寿 但要切记 在我们学会 与社会大众 分享工业革命的硕果之前 我们不得不经历两个经济萧条 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条 和19世纪70年代的长期萧条 两次世界大战 俄罗斯和中国的共产革命, 和西方社会 和政治极端动荡的时代 绝非巧合 现在我们也正在经历一个 社会和政治变革的时代 我们创建了现代福利国家 我们创建了公众教育 我们创建了公共卫生保障系统 我们创建了公共养老金 我们还创建了工会
Today, we are living through an era of economic transformation comparable in its scale and its scope to the Industrial Revolution. To be sure that this new economy benefits us all and not just the plutocrats, we need to embark on an era of comparably ambitious social and political change. We need a new New Deal.
今天,我们生活在一个 经济转型的时代, 其规模和范围 可与工业革命相提并论 要确保这一新经济造福天下 而不仅仅是使富豪们受益 我们需要非常 大胆的社会和政治变革 我们需要一个新政
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