What I'm going to do, in the spirit of collaborative creativity, is simply repeat many of the points that the three people before me have already made, but do them -- this is called "creative collaboration;" it's actually called "borrowing" -- but do it through a particular perspective, and that is to ask about the role of users and consumers in this emerging world of collaborative creativity that Jimmy and others have talked about.
我要做的呢,就是以集體創造力這個信念 來簡單地重述一些 前面三位講者已經提過的論點 但是實踐它們 這美其名是集體創造力 但其實是借用他們的觀點 不過從比較特別的角度闡述 並瞭解使用者和消費者 在吉米和其他人所談及的 集體創造的世界裡 所扮演的角色
Let me just ask you, to start with, this simple question: who invented the mountain bike? Because traditional economic theory would say, well, the mountain bike was probably invented by some big bike corporation that had a big R&D lab where they were thinking up new projects, and it came out of there. It didn't come from there. Another answer might be, well, it came from a sort of lone genius working in his garage, who, working away on different kinds of bikes, comes up with a bike out of thin air.
首先我想問問各位 這個簡單的問題 誰發明了登山腳踏車? 因為傳統的經濟理論會說 應該是某個大型的自行車企業發明的 他們有大規模的研發實驗室 研發人員總是有新的創意 所以登山腳踏車是他們發明的。但事實並非如此 另外一個答案可能是,某個孤單的天才發明的 他在自己的車庫工作 不停地測試不同車種,最後 有如天上掉下來的禮物,他發明了登山腳踏車
It didn't come from there. The mountain bike came from users, came from young users, particularly a group in Northern California, who were frustrated with traditional racing bikes, which were those sort of bikes that Eddy Merckx rode, or your big brother, and they're very glamorous. But also frustrated with the bikes that your dad rode, which sort of had big handlebars like that, and they were too heavy. So, they got the frames from these big bikes, put them together with the gears from the racing bikes, got the brakes from motorcycles, and sort of mixed and matched various ingredients. And for the first, I don't know, three to five years of their life, mountain bikes were known as "clunkers." And they were just made in a community of bikers, mainly in Northern California.
但也不是這麼一回事。登山腳踏車 是使用者發明的,而且是年輕人 尤其是北加州一群自行車的愛好者 他們對傳統的競速腳踏車非常的不滿意 就像艾迪墨克斯(自行車手) 或你哥會騎的那種,看起來很炫 他們也對像是爸爸會騎的那種有大手把的腳踏車感到不滿意 因為手把太重了 因此他們把那些大型腳踏車的骨架拆下 用競速腳踏車的齒輪重新組合 裝上摩托車的煞車系統 再混合組裝不同的零件 一開始的三到五年 登山腳踏車被稱為「破鐵車」 而且主要是由 北加州的一群自行車愛好者所製造
And then one of these companies that was importing parts for the clunkers decided to set up in business, start selling them to other people, and gradually another company emerged out of that, Marin, and it probably was, I don't know, 10, maybe even 15, years, before the big bike companies realized there was a market. Thirty years later, mountain bike sales and mountain bike equipment account for 65 percent of bike sales in America. That's 58 billion dollars.
後來其中一家替「破鐵車」進口零件的公司 決定作這門生意 開始銷售「破鐵車」 後來另外一家公司,Marin,也加入銷售行列 或許經過了,我不知道 10年,甚至15年之後 這些大型自行車企業 才了解登山腳踏車的市場商機無限 30年之後 登山腳踏車 和登山腳踏車配備的銷售額 佔了全美腳踏車銷售額的百分之65 總共是580億美元
This is a category entirely created by consumers that would not have been created by the mainstream bike market because they couldn't see the need, the opportunity; they didn't have the incentive to innovate. The one thing I think I disagree with about Yochai's presentation is when he said the Internet causes this distributive capacity for innovation to come alive. It's when the Internet combines with these kinds of passionate pro-am consumers -- who are knowledgeable; they've got the incentive to innovate; they've got the tools; they want to -- that you get this kind of explosion of creative collaboration. And out of that, you get the need for the kind of things that Jimmy was talking about, which is our new kinds of organization, or a better way to put it: how do we organize ourselves without organizations? That's now possible; you don't need an organization to be organized, to achieve large and complex tasks, like innovating new software programs.
這塊市場完全是由消費者開拓出來的 而不是被主流的自行車市場所發掘 因為他們看不到消費者的需求 看不到商機 也就沒有動力去創新 在約柴教授的演講中 有一件事我並不認同 那就是,他說網際網路提供了分散性 而這種分散性正是創新所需要的 只有當網路結合了 這些有熱情的專業餘消費者 他們有知識,有創新的動力 他們有辦法,他們有渴求 在這種情況下 你才會看到集體創造力所激起的火花 如此一來,你就能了解 剛剛吉米所談到的事情有多重要,那就是新組織型態的出現 或者這樣說比較清楚 在沒有實際組織的情況下,我們要如何形成一個團體? 現在這不成問題,你不需要一個組織而結集起來 去達成龐大而複雜的任務 像是發明新的軟體
So this is a huge challenge to the way we think creativity comes about. The traditional view, still enshrined in much of the way that we think about creativity -- in organizations, in government -- is that creativity is about special people: wear baseball caps the wrong way round, come to conferences like this, in special places, elite universities, R&D labs in the forests, water, maybe special rooms in companies painted funny colors, you know, bean bags, maybe the odd table-football table. Special people, special places, think up special ideas, then you have a pipeline that takes the ideas down to the waiting consumers, who are passive. They can say "yes" or "no" to the invention. That's the idea of creativity. What's the policy recommendation out of that if you're in government, or you're running a large company? More special people, more special places. Build creative clusters in cities; create more R&D parks, so on and so forth. Expand the pipeline down to the consumers.
這是大大挑戰 我們對於「創意來源」的既定印象 一直以來 我們都認為有創意的人 是一群非比尋常的人 只出現在企業裡,或政府機構 把棒球帽反戴 參加像這樣的會議,或其他特別的場合 例如頂尖大學、建築在森林裡或水裡的研發實驗室 或者在公司裡那些漆滿怪異顏色的的特別房間 你知道的,有懶骨頭,或許還有古怪的桌上足球 特別的人,在特別的地方,想出特別的點子 然後接上一條管子 把這些點子傳送給被動等待的消費者 再由他們認可或否定這項發明 這就是你所認為的創意 如果你在政府機關工作或經營大公司 你會怎麼建議政策方針? 更多特別的人,更多特別的地方 在城市裡建設創意集群 建造更多研發園區...等等 擴大將創意傳播給消費者的管道
Well this view, I think, is increasingly wrong. I think it's always been wrong, because I think always creativity has been highly collaborative, and it's probably been largely interactive. But it's increasingly wrong, and one of the reasons it's wrong is that the ideas are flowing back up the pipeline. The ideas are coming back from the consumers, and they're often ahead of the producers. Why is that? Well, one issue is that radical innovation, when you've got ideas that affect a large number of technologies or people, have a great deal of uncertainty attached to them. The payoffs to innovation are greatest where the uncertainty is highest. And when you get a radical innovation, it's often very uncertain how it can be applied.
我覺得這樣的觀念錯得越來越離譜了 而我認為這樣的觀念一直都是錯的 因為我認為創意是高度共同合作的結果 互動性可能是非常強的 但是大家對於創意的觀點越來越偏差,其中一個錯誤的理由就是 其實這些點子是從管子的另外一端流回來的 也就是消費者的那一端 他們常常比製造商還要先發現商機 為什麼呢? 其中一點 是突破性創新 具有高度的未知性 尤其是當你的點子 牽涉到很多技術,影響到很多人的時候 未知性最高的同時 創新所帶來的收益也最多 當你執行突破性創新時 常常無法確定要如何運用它
The whole history of telephony is a story of dealing with that uncertainty. The very first landline telephones, the inventors thought that they would be used for people to listen in to live performances from West End theaters. When the mobile telephone companies invented SMS, they had no idea what it was for; it was only when that technology got into the hands of teenage users that they invented the use.
例如整個電話史 就是一個關於未知性的故事 最早發明陸線電話的發明家 他們想用這種電話 讓民眾可以聽到 倫敦西區劇院的 現場表演 當電信業者發明了SMS(簡訊服務) 他們不知道可以拿來做什麼用 直到這項科技到了 十幾歲的使用者手中 他們才發現用途
So the more radical the innovation, the more the uncertainty, the more you need innovation in use to work out what a technology is for. All of our patents, our entire approach to patents and invention, is based on the idea that the inventor knows what the invention is for; we can say what it's for. More and more, the inventors of things will not be able to say that in advance. It will be worked out in use, in collaboration with users. We like to think that invention is a sort of moment of creation: there is a moment of birth when someone comes up with an idea. The truth is that most creativity is cumulative and collaborative; like Wikipedia, it develops over a long period of time.
所以,突破性越高的創新 未知性就越高 也更需要使用那個創新 來找出新科技的用途 所有的專利權,我們對於 發明的構想和專利權的整個系統是建立在 發明者知道為什麼要發明的前提之下 或者說知道這個東西是做什麼用的 越來越多的發明者 將無法事先預測發明物的用途 透過使用經驗 以及使用者的通力合作才能找出答案 我們喜歡把發明想成是 一種創造的瞬間 某個人想到點子的那一刻發明物也同時產生 事實上,絕大多數的創意 是累積和共同合作的結果 像是維基百科,就發展了很長一段時間
The second reason why users are more and more important is that they are the source of big, disruptive innovations. If you want to find the big new ideas, it's often difficult to find them in mainstream markets, in big organizations. And just look inside large organizations and you'll see why that is so. So, you're in a big corporation. You're obviously keen to go up the corporate ladder. Do you go into your board and say, "Look, I've got a fantastic idea for an embryonic product in a marginal market, with consumers we've never dealt with before, and I'm not sure it's going to have a big payoff, but it could be really, really big in the future?" No, what you do, is you go in and you say, "I've got a fantastic idea for an incremental innovation to an existing product we sell through existing channels to existing users, and I can guarantee you get this much return out of it over the next three years."
使用者越來越重要的理由之二 是因為他們是劃時代創新的來源 如果你想要找到絕妙的新點子 通常很難在主流市場 或大型組織裡找到 只要看看大型組織的內部 你就知道為什麼了 如果你在一間大公司 你一定會積極地往公司的高階層爬 你會這樣對你的董事會說嗎? 嘿,我想到一個超棒的點子 有個草創期的產品 沒什麼市場 消費者類型是我們從沒面對過的 雖然我不敢保證投資報酬率會很高,但我相信它一定是未來的趨勢 不,你會做的,是對他們說 我有個超棒的漸進式創新的點子 透過現有的管道銷售現有的產品 給現有的使用者,而且我可以保證 在未來三年之內你可以回收多少的利潤
Big corporations have an in-built tendency to reinforce past success. They've got so much sunk in it that it's very difficult for them to spot emerging new markets. Emerging new markets, then, are the breeding grounds for passionate users. Best example: who in the music industry, 30 years ago, would have said, "Yes, let's invent a musical form which is all about dispossessed black men in ghettos expressing their frustration with the world through a form of music that many people find initially quite difficult to listen to. That sounds like a winner; we'll go with it." (Laughter). So what happens? Rap music is created by the users. They do it on their own tapes, with their own recording equipment; they distribute it themselves. 30 years later, rap music is the dominant musical form of popular culture -- would never have come from the big companies. Had to start -- this is the third point -- with these pro-ams.
大型企業天生就易於 鞏固過去的成就 他們太沉迷於此 以致於他們很難發現 新興市場。然而新興市場 培育了許多富有熱忱的使用者 舉個最好的例子 在音樂產業裡 誰會在30年前就說 好,讓我們來創造一種音樂類型 內容是關於流離失所的黑人 在貧民窟裡用音樂 表達他們對世界的失望 而這種音樂許多人一開始很難聽得下去 聽起來似乎會大賣,我們就這麼做吧 (笑聲) 所以到底是怎麼樣呢?黑人創造了饒舌音樂 他們用自己的錄音設備錄製音樂 自己銷售這些音樂 30年後 饒舌音樂是流行文化主要的音樂類型 而這絕對不會來自於大公司 接著我要講的第三點 跟專業餘者有關
This is the phrase that I've used in some stuff which I've done with a think tank in London called Demos, where we've been looking at these people who are amateurs -- i.e., they do it for the love of it -- but they want to do it to very high standards. And across a whole range of fields -- from software, astronomy, natural sciences, vast areas of leisure and culture like kite-surfing, so on and so forth -- you find people who want to do things because they love it, but they want to do these things to very high standards. They work at their leisure, if you like. They take their leisure very seriously: they acquire skills; they invest time; they use technology that's getting cheaper -- it's not just the Internet: cameras, design technology, leisure technology, surfboards, so on and so forth. Largely through globalization, a lot of this equipment has got a lot cheaper. More knowledgeable consumers, more educated, more able to connect with one another, more able to do things together. Consumption, in that sense, is an expression of their productive potential. Why, we found, people were interested in this, is that at work they don't feel very expressed. They don't feel as if they're doing something that really matters to them, so they pick up these kinds of activities. This has huge organizational implications for very large areas of life.
我與倫敦Demos智庫 一起共事時 曾經用過這個詞 在Demos智庫,我們一直在關注業餘者 也就是那些作自己有興趣的事 卻用高標準來要求自己的人 而且這些人來自各行各業 上至軟體,天文 自然科學 下至範圍廣大的休閒、文化 像是風箏衝浪,諸如此類 你會發現這些人是為了自己的興趣而做事 而且是用高標準在做事 你也可以說他們為自己的興趣努力付出 而且一點也不馬虎 他們習得技能,投注時間 不只是網路而已,他們也使用越來越便宜的科技產品 像是相機,設計科技 休閒科技,衝浪板...等等 透過全球化 許多像這樣的設備已經變得便宜許多 更多有智識的消費者,教育程度更好 與人接觸的機會變多 也更能一起共事 在這種情況下,消費一詞 意味著他們的生產潛力 為什麼呢?我們發現這些人之所以致力於自己的興趣 是因為他們在工作上無法一展長才 他們覺得自己好像在做些不重要的事 所以他們選擇在閒暇之餘做自己有興趣的事 這對各行各業來說 都隱含著可以形成組織的可能性
Take astronomy as an example, which Yochai has already mentioned. Twenty years ago, 30 years ago, only big professional astronomers with very big telescopes could see far into space. And there's a big telescope in Northern England called Jodrell Bank, and when I was a kid, it was amazing, because the moon shots would take off, and this thing would move on rails. And it was huge -- it was absolutely enormous. Now, six amateur astronomers, working with the Internet, with Dobsonian digital telescopes -- which are pretty much open source -- with some light sensors developed over the last 10 years, the Internet -- they can do what Jodrell Bank could only do 30 years ago. So here in astronomy, you have this vast explosion of new productive resources. The users can be producers.
舉個剛剛約柴教授提到的 天文學的例子 20, 30年以前 只有專業級的天文學家 有大型望遠鏡能觀測遙遠的星空 英格蘭北邊的喬德雷爾•班克天文台有個大型望遠鏡 我小的時候覺得那個望遠鏡真是太了不起了 人類可以登入月球,而這個望遠鏡會繞著軌道轉 而且它很巨大,令人嘆為觀止 現在,六個 業餘天文學家,用網路 用數位的杜普森望遠鏡(Dobsonian telescope) 這基本上是開放軟件 還有一些光感測器 經過過去十年的發展,在網路上 他們可以做到三十年前只有喬德雷爾˙班克天文台作得到的事 所以在天文上,新的生產性資源 有了爆炸性的進展 使用者也可以成為生產者
What does this mean, then, for our organizational landscape? Well, just imagine a world, for the moment, divided into two camps. Over here, you've got the old, traditional corporate model: special people, special places; patent it, push it down the pipeline to largely waiting, passive consumers. Over here, let's imagine we've got Wikipedia, Linux, and beyond -- open source. This is open; this is closed. This is new; this is traditional. Well, the first thing you can say, I think with certainty, is what Yochai has said already -- is there is a great big struggle between those two organizational forms. These people over there will do everything they can to stop these kinds of organizations succeeding, because they're threatened by them. And so the debates about copyright, digital rights, so on and so forth -- these are all about trying to stifle, in my view, these kinds of organizations. What we're seeing is a complete corruption of the idea of patents and copyright. Meant to be a way to incentivize invention, meant to be a way to orchestrate the dissemination of knowledge, they are increasingly being used by large companies to create thickets of patents to prevent innovation taking place.
那麼這對我們的企業遠景 有什麼意義呢? 想像一下,在這一刻 世界被分為兩個群體 其中一邊是老舊傳統的企業型態 特別的人,特別的地方 取得專利,塞給在管子另一端 眾多被動等待的消費者 另外一邊呢,想像一下我們有 維基百科、Linux作業系統,以及其他開放性資源 一邊是開放的,一邊是封閉的 一邊是新的,一邊是傳統的 你想說的第一件事,我很肯定 就跟約柴教授之前說的一樣 在新舊組織型態中找到平衡 是一件極為困難的事情 傳統這一邊的人,會無所不用其極 來阻撓新的組織模式 因為新的模式威脅到他們 也因此有了關於 著作權,數位版權...等的爭議 在我看來,這些都是他們扼殺 新組織模式的手段 我們現在所看到的 是專利和著作權觀念的崩解 這個變化本來可以刺激創新 本來可以整合知識的傳播方式 卻漸漸被大型公司利用來 建立自己的專利叢林(防止專利被入侵的保護政策) 以防止創新的發生
Let me just give you two examples. The first is: imagine yourself going to a venture capitalist and saying, "I've got a fantastic idea. I've invented this brilliant new program that is much, much better than Microsoft Outlook." Which venture capitalist in their right mind is going to give you any money to set up a venture competing with Microsoft, with Microsoft Outlook? No one. That is why the competition with Microsoft is bound to come -- will only come -- from an open-source kind of project.
舉兩個例子 第一,想像你來到一個風險資本家的面前 對他說,我有個超棒的點子 我發明了一個超棒的程式 比微軟的Outlook還要好上幾百倍 哪個正常的風險資本家會考慮給你錢讓你去成立一家公司 跟微軟的Outlook競爭?沒有 這就是為什麼要跟微軟競爭就要用 也只能用 開放資源的方式
So, there is a huge competitive argument about sustaining the capacity for open-source and consumer-driven innovation, because it's one of the greatest competitive levers against monopoly. There'll be huge professional arguments as well. Because the professionals, over here in these closed organizations -- they might be academics; they might be programmers; they might be doctors; they might be journalists -- my former profession -- say, "No, no -- you can't trust these people over here."
所以,要如何維持 開放性資源以及消費者導向創新的產能 是在與主流市場競爭時非常重要的議題 因為這是能和壟斷企業抗衡的 競爭手段之一 同樣地也會有來自專家的爭論 因為那些來自 封閉組織的專家 可能是學者、可能是程式設計師 可能是醫生、可能是新聞業者 也就是我之前的工作 他們會說不行不行,不可以相信另一邊的人
When I started in journalism -- Financial Times, 20 years ago -- it was very, very exciting to see someone reading the newspaper. And you'd kind of look over their shoulder on the Tube to see if they were reading your article. Usually they were reading the share prices, and the bit of the paper with your article on was on the floor, or something like that, and you know, "For heaven's sake, what are they doing! They're not reading my brilliant article!" And we allowed users, readers, two places where they could contribute to the paper: the letters page, where they could write a letter in, and we would condescend to them, cut it in half, and print it three days later. Or the op-ed page, where if they knew the editor -- had been to school with him, slept with his wife -- they could write an article for the op-ed page. Those were the two places.
20年前當我在金融時報 從事新聞業時 看到有人在讀金融時報 我就會非常非常興奮 在搭地鐵的時候,你會想要從他肩膀後瞄過去 看他是否在讀你的文章 但通常他們在看的是股價 而刊有你文章的報紙 則掉在地上,或者其他類似的狀況 你的反應會是,天啊!他們在幹嘛! 他們沒有在讀我的大作 我們讓使用者和讀者 能在兩個版面投稿 一個是讀者來信版,讀者可以寫信過來 我們會放下身段,把它裁成兩半 三天之後印出來 另一個是讀者投書版 如果編輯曾經跟他一起上學,跟他老婆亂搞 讀者可以寫篇文章到讀者投書版 這就是我說的那兩個版面
Shock, horror: now, the readers want to be writers and publishers. That's not their role; they're supposed to read what we write. But they don't want to be journalists. The journalists think that the bloggers want to be journalists; they don't want to be journalists; they just want to have a voice. They want to, as Jimmy said, they want to have a dialogue, a conversation. They want to be part of that flow of information. What's happening there is that the whole domain of creativity is expanding. So, there's going to be a tremendous struggle. But, also, there's going to be tremendous movement from the open to the closed.
現在令人驚恐的是,這些讀者想成為作家和出版商 那不是他們所該扮演的角色,他們應該讀我們寫的東西才對啊 但是他們並不想當記者,那些記者覺得 部落客想搶他們的飯碗 但是這些部落客並不想當記者,他們只想要有個發聲的管道 就像吉米說的一樣,他們要的是對話溝通 他們想成為資訊流的一部份 現在,創意的整個範疇 還在持續擴大中 所以未來還有更大的挑戰 但同時,不管是開放性組織還是封閉性組織 都將面臨劇烈的變遷
What you'll see, I think, is two things that are critical, and these, I think, are two challenges for the open movement. The first is: can we really survive on volunteers? If this is so critical, do we not need it funded, organized, supported in much more structured ways? I think the idea of creating the Red Cross for information and knowledge is a fantastic idea, but can we really organize that, just on volunteers? What kind of changes do we need in public policy and funding to make that possible? What's the role of the BBC, for instance, in that world? What should be the role of public policy? And finally, what I think you will see is the intelligent, closed organizations moving increasingly in the open direction. So it's not going to be a contest between two camps, but, in between them, you'll find all sorts of interesting places that people will occupy. New organizational models coming about, mixing closed and open in tricky ways. It won't be so clear-cut; it won't be Microsoft versus Linux -- there'll be all sorts of things in between. And those organizational models, it turns out, are incredibly powerful, and the people who can understand them will be very, very successful.
我想,你會看到的是兩件非常重要的事 而這兩件事,我覺得是 邁向開放的兩個挑戰 第一 我們真的可以仰賴義工嗎? 如果開放性資源真的這麼重要 我們難道不需要用更有架構的方式 去投注資金並且加以組織嗎? 我認為創立資訊和知識的紅十字會 是個非常棒的主意 但是我們真的可以靠義工就達到目的嗎? 在公共政策和資金提供方面 需要做哪些改變呢? 例如英國廣播公司BBC 應該在哪裡扮演什麼角色呢? 而公共政策又應該扮演什麼角色 最後,你將會看到 那些明智、封閉的企業 會一步步走向開放 所以這並不是兩個陣營的競賽 相反地,你會發現有些人 佔據兩個陣營中間的灰色地帶 新的組織模式將會出現 並巧妙地融合封閉和開放的優點 界線將不再分明,競爭不會只存在於微軟與Linux之間 而是在兩者的中間地帶 而這些新的組織模式 將會變得極為強大 能夠看出箇中玄機的人 將來就能出人頭地
Let me just give you one final example of what that means. I was in Shanghai, in an office block built on what was a rice paddy five years ago -- one of the 2,500 skyscrapers they've built in Shanghai in the last 10 years. And I was having dinner with this guy called Timothy Chan. Timothy Chan set up an Internet business in 2000. Didn't go into the Internet, kept his money, decided to go into computer games. He runs a company called Shanda, which is the largest computer games company in China. Nine thousand servers all over China, has 250 million subscribers. At any one time, there are four million people playing one of his games. How many people does he employ to service that population? 500 people. Well, how can he service 250 million people from 500 employees? Because basically, he doesn't service them. He gives them a platform; he gives them some rules; he gives them the tools and then he kind of orchestrates the conversation; he orchestrates the action. But actually, a lot of the content is created by the users themselves. And it creates a kind of stickiness between the community and the company which is really, really powerful.
我舉最後一個例子 說明我剛剛的論點 我之前在上海的時候 有去一棟辦公大樓,而那塊辦公大樓的用地 在五年前還是一片稻田 那棟辦公大樓,是上海在過去十年內 所建的2500棟摩天大樓之一 當時我和一位叫做陳天橋的先生共進晚餐 陳天橋在2000年的時候 創立了網路公司 但他並未就此投身網路業,他把錢留著 決定往電腦遊戲業發展 他經營一家叫做盛大網路(Shanda)的公司 是中國最大的電腦遊戲公司 在全中國有9000個伺服器 兩億五千萬個玩家 不管在任何時候,平均都有四百萬人玩這家公司的遊戲 他雇用了多少人 來服務這些玩家? 五百個 用五百人來服務兩億五千人 他怎麼做到的? 因為基本上,他根本不用服務玩家 而是給玩家一個平台 制訂一些規則,給他們一些工具 並且從中扮演 和玩家溝通協調的角色 但是事實上,有許多遊戲內容 是玩家自己創造的 這種作法讓玩家對 遊戲社群和盛大網路產生黏性 而這種黏性是非常非常強而有力的
The best measure of that: so you go into one of his games, you create a character that you develop in the course of the game. If, for some reason, your credit card bounces, or there's some other problem, you lose your character. You've got two options. One option: you can create a new character, right from scratch, but with none of the history of your player. That costs about 100 dollars. Or you can get on a plane, fly to Shanghai, queue up outside Shanda's offices -- cost probably 600, 700 dollars -- and reclaim your character, get your history back. Every morning, there are 600 people queuing outside their offices to reclaim these characters. (Laughter) So this is about companies built on communities, that provide communities with tools, resources, platforms in which they can share. He's not open source, but it's very, very powerful.
證明這點的最好辦法就是去玩他某一款遊戲 在遊戲過程中 創造一個角色 如果因為某些原因,你的信用卡被拒絕使用 或其他問題 失去了遊戲角色 你有兩個選擇 一,創造一個新的角色 從頭開始玩,但是之前的遊戲記錄都會消失 這大概要花100元美金 或者你可以搭飛機搭到上海 到盛大網路的辦公室外排隊 大約要花600或700元美金 要回你的遊戲角色和遊戲記錄 每天早上,有600人 在辦公室外面排隊 等著拿回他們的遊戲角色 這是一個以社群為基石的公司實例 提供社群工具 資源,還有可以讓玩家彼此分享的平台 盛大網路並不是開放性資源 但卻非常具有影響力
So here is one of the challenges, I think, for people like me, who do a lot of work with government. If you're a games company, and you've got a million players in your game, you only need one percent of them to be co-developers, contributing ideas, and you've got a development workforce of 10,000 people. Imagine you could take all the children in education in Britain, and one percent of them were co-developers of education. What would that do to the resources available to the education system? Or if you got one percent of the patients in the NHS to, in some sense, be co-producers of health.
我想,對於像我一樣 與政府合作多項工作的人來說 這是其中一個挑戰 如果你經營遊戲公司 擁有一百萬個玩家 你只需要其中百分之一的人 當你的共同開發者,貢獻想法 那你就有一萬個 開發人員 想像所有在英國受教育的兒童 其中百分之一的人口 是教育界的共同開發者 對於教育系統可利用的資源 會有什麼影響 或者從英國國家醫療保健服務(NHS)找來其中百分之一的病人 成為醫療保健的共同生產者
The reason why -- despite all the efforts to cut it down, to constrain it, to hold it back -- why these open models will still start emerging with tremendous force, is that they multiply our productive resources. And one of the reasons they do that is that they turn users into producers, consumers into designers.
即使想盡辦法阻止 開放模式產生 開放模式還是會挾著巨大的影響力 而展露頭角 原因在於 這種模式讓生產性資源變得多樣化 其中一個原因 就是它把使用者變成生產者 把消費者變成設計者
Thank you very much.
謝謝各位