What I'm going to do, in the spirit of collaborative creativity, is simply repeat many of the points that the three people before me have already made, but do them -- this is called "creative collaboration;" it's actually called "borrowing" -- but do it through a particular perspective, and that is to ask about the role of users and consumers in this emerging world of collaborative creativity that Jimmy and others have talked about.
Ono što ću ja uraditi, u duhu zajedničke kreativnosti, je to da ću jednostavno da ponovim stvari koje je ovo troje ljudi pre mene već reklo. Ali ponoviću ih - Ovo se zove kreativna saradnja; u stvari pozajmljivanje. Ali uradiću to kroz posebnu perspektivu pitaću o ulozi korisnika i potrošača u ovom rastućem svetu zajedničke kreativnosti, o kojem su pričali Džimi i ostali.
Let me just ask you, to start with, this simple question: who invented the mountain bike? Because traditional economic theory would say, well, the mountain bike was probably invented by some big bike corporation that had a big R&D lab where they were thinking up new projects, and it came out of there. It didn't come from there. Another answer might be, well, it came from a sort of lone genius working in his garage, who, working away on different kinds of bikes, comes up with a bike out of thin air.
Za početak, dopustite mi da vam postavim ovo jednostavno pitanje: ko je izmislio "mountain" bicikl? Jer, tradicionalna teorija ekonomije bi rekla, pa, verovatno ga je izmislila neka velika biciklistička firma koja je imala veliko odeljenje istraživanja i razvoja u kom su smišljali nove projekte i tamo je i nastao. Nije tamo nastao. Još jedan odgovor bi mogao biti, pa, napravio ga je neki usamljeni genije koji je radio u svojoj garaži i koji je, radeći na raznim vrstama bicikala, smislio novi bajs iz vedra neba.
It didn't come from there. The mountain bike came from users, came from young users, particularly a group in Northern California, who were frustrated with traditional racing bikes, which were those sort of bikes that Eddy Merckx rode, or your big brother, and they're very glamorous. But also frustrated with the bikes that your dad rode, which sort of had big handlebars like that, and they were too heavy. So, they got the frames from these big bikes, put them together with the gears from the racing bikes, got the brakes from motorcycles, and sort of mixed and matched various ingredients. And for the first, I don't know, three to five years of their life, mountain bikes were known as "clunkers." And they were just made in a community of bikers, mainly in Northern California.
Nije tako nastao. "Mountain" bajs su napravili korisnici; mladi korisnici, posebno jedna grupa iz Severne Kalifornije, koja je bila frustrirana tradicionalnim trkačkim biciklima, a to su bili oni kakve je Edi Merks vozio, ili vaš stariji brat i vrlo su glamurozni. Ali isto tako frustrirani biciklima koje je vaš tata vozio, koji su imali velike kormane i bili preteški. Znači, oni su uzeli ramove sa tih velikih bicikala, spojili ih sa opremom sa trkačkih bicikala, uzeli kočnice sa motocikala i tako smućkali različite sastojke. I prvih, ne znam, tri do pet godina svog života, "mountain" bajsevi su zvani "klankers". Nastali su među biciklistima u Severnoj Kaliforniji.
And then one of these companies that was importing parts for the clunkers decided to set up in business, start selling them to other people, and gradually another company emerged out of that, Marin, and it probably was, I don't know, 10, maybe even 15, years, before the big bike companies realized there was a market. Thirty years later, mountain bike sales and mountain bike equipment account for 65 percent of bike sales in America. That's 58 billion dollars.
I onda je jedna on kompanija koja je uvozila delove za te bicikle, odlučila da pokrene posao, da počne da ih prodaje drugima, i polako je druga kompanija nastala iz te, "Marin", i prošlo je, ne znam, možda 10 ili 15 godina pre nego što su velike biciklističke firme shvatile da postoji tržište. Posle trideset godina, prodaja "mountain" bajseva i opreme za njih, čini 65% ukupne prodaje bicikala u Americi. To je 58 milijardi dolara.
This is a category entirely created by consumers that would not have been created by the mainstream bike market because they couldn't see the need, the opportunity; they didn't have the incentive to innovate. The one thing I think I disagree with about Yochai's presentation is when he said the Internet causes this distributive capacity for innovation to come alive. It's when the Internet combines with these kinds of passionate pro-am consumers -- who are knowledgeable; they've got the incentive to innovate; they've got the tools; they want to -- that you get this kind of explosion of creative collaboration. And out of that, you get the need for the kind of things that Jimmy was talking about, which is our new kinds of organization, or a better way to put it: how do we organize ourselves without organizations? That's now possible; you don't need an organization to be organized, to achieve large and complex tasks, like innovating new software programs.
Ovo je kategorija koju su u potpunosti stvorili potrošači, koju ne bi stvorilo mejnstrim tržište jer nisu videli potrebu, priliku; nisu bili motivisani za inovacije. Mislim da se u jednoj stvari ne slažem sa Jokaijevom prezentacijom, a to je kada je rekao da internet uzrokuje da distributivni kapacitet za inovacije oživi. Tek kada spojite internet sa tim strastvenim potrošačima, profesionalnim amaterima koji imaju znanja, motivisani su za inovacije, imaju alate, želju - onda dobijate nekakvu eksploziju kreativne saradnje. I iz toga dobijate potrebu za stvarima o kojima je Džimi pričao, a to su nove vrste organizacija, ili bolje rečeno: kako se organizujemo bez organizacija? To je sada moguće; nije vam potrebna organizacija da biste bili organizovani, da biste rešili velike i kompleksne zadatke, kao što je smišljanje novih softverskih programa.
So this is a huge challenge to the way we think creativity comes about. The traditional view, still enshrined in much of the way that we think about creativity -- in organizations, in government -- is that creativity is about special people: wear baseball caps the wrong way round, come to conferences like this, in special places, elite universities, R&D labs in the forests, water, maybe special rooms in companies painted funny colors, you know, bean bags, maybe the odd table-football table. Special people, special places, think up special ideas, then you have a pipeline that takes the ideas down to the waiting consumers, who are passive. They can say "yes" or "no" to the invention. That's the idea of creativity. What's the policy recommendation out of that if you're in government, or you're running a large company? More special people, more special places. Build creative clusters in cities; create more R&D parks, so on and so forth. Expand the pipeline down to the consumers.
Ovo je veliki izazov za naše razmišljanje o kreativnosti. Tradicionalno shvatanje, još uvek ukorenjeno u velikom delu našeg razmišljanja o kreativnosti - u organizacijama, u vladi - je da kreativnost važi za posebne ljude: koji nose kačkete naopačke, dolaze na ovakve konferencije, na posebna mesta, idu na elitne univerzitete, imaju laboratorije u šumama, vodi, možda u firmama imaju posebne sobe sa smešnim bojama, znate, "lazy bag"-ove, možda čudan sto oblika stonog fudbala. Posebni ljudi, na posebnim mestima smišljaju posebne stvari, onda imate put koji prenosi te ideje do pasivnih potrošača koji čekaju. Oni tom izumu mogu reći "da" ili "ne". To je ideja kreativnosti. Kakve preporuke iz toga možete izvući, ako ste u vladi ili ako vodite veliku kompaniju? Još više posebnih ljudi, još posebnih mesta. Pravite kreativne grupe u gradovima; pravite više istraživačkih i razvojnih parkova, itd. Proširite put do potrošača.
Well this view, I think, is increasingly wrong. I think it's always been wrong, because I think always creativity has been highly collaborative, and it's probably been largely interactive. But it's increasingly wrong, and one of the reasons it's wrong is that the ideas are flowing back up the pipeline. The ideas are coming back from the consumers, and they're often ahead of the producers. Why is that? Well, one issue is that radical innovation, when you've got ideas that affect a large number of technologies or people, have a great deal of uncertainty attached to them. The payoffs to innovation are greatest where the uncertainty is highest. And when you get a radical innovation, it's often very uncertain how it can be applied.
Ja mislim da je ovaj stav izuzetno pogrešan. Mislim da je oduvek pogrešan, jer mislim da je kreativnost uvek bila uglavnom saradnja, i u velikom delu interaktivna. Ali to je izuzetno pogrešno i jedan razlog za to je što se ideje vraćaju nazad kroz cev. Ideje se vraćaju od potrošača koji su često ispred proizvođača. Zašto je to tako? Pa, jedna stvar je ta da radikalne inovacije, kada imate ideje koje utiču na veliki broj tehnologija ili ljudi, nose sa sobom veliku dozu nesigurnosti. Dobitak od inovacije je najveći kada je nesigurnost najveća. I kada imate radikalnu inovaciju, često nije sigurno kako ona može da se primeni.
The whole history of telephony is a story of dealing with that uncertainty. The very first landline telephones, the inventors thought that they would be used for people to listen in to live performances from West End theaters. When the mobile telephone companies invented SMS, they had no idea what it was for; it was only when that technology got into the hands of teenage users that they invented the use.
Cela istorija telefonije je priča o borbi sa tom nesigurnošću. Izumitelji prvih telefona su mislili da će ih ljudi koristiti da slušaju žive izvedbe iz pozorištima na Vest Endu. Kada su kompanije mobilnih telefona izmislile SMS, nisu imali pojma čemu služe; tek kada je ta tehnologija dospela u ruke tinejdžera, osmišljena je primena.
So the more radical the innovation, the more the uncertainty, the more you need innovation in use to work out what a technology is for. All of our patents, our entire approach to patents and invention, is based on the idea that the inventor knows what the invention is for; we can say what it's for. More and more, the inventors of things will not be able to say that in advance. It will be worked out in use, in collaboration with users. We like to think that invention is a sort of moment of creation: there is a moment of birth when someone comes up with an idea. The truth is that most creativity is cumulative and collaborative; like Wikipedia, it develops over a long period of time.
Dakle, što je radikalnija inovacija, veća je nesigurnost; potrebnije vam je da tu inovaciju koristite da biste shvatili čemu neka tehnologija služi. Svi naši patenti, naš ceo pristup patentima i invencijama je zasnovan na ideji da izumitelj zna čemu taj izum služi; možemo reći čemu služi. Sve više izumitelja stvari neće moći to da kažu unapred. To će se shvatati upotrebom, u saradnji sa korisnicima. Mi volimo da mislimo da je izum nekakav trenutak kreacije: postoji momenat kada neko smisli neku ideju. Istina je da je kreativnost uglavnom kumulativna i zajednička, kao "Wikipedia", razvija se kroz dug vremenski period.
The second reason why users are more and more important is that they are the source of big, disruptive innovations. If you want to find the big new ideas, it's often difficult to find them in mainstream markets, in big organizations. And just look inside large organizations and you'll see why that is so. So, you're in a big corporation. You're obviously keen to go up the corporate ladder. Do you go into your board and say, "Look, I've got a fantastic idea for an embryonic product in a marginal market, with consumers we've never dealt with before, and I'm not sure it's going to have a big payoff, but it could be really, really big in the future?" No, what you do, is you go in and you say, "I've got a fantastic idea for an incremental innovation to an existing product we sell through existing channels to existing users, and I can guarantee you get this much return out of it over the next three years."
Drugi razlog zašto su korisnici sve važniji, je taj što su oni izvor velikih, prodornih inovacija. Ako želite da nađete velike i nove ideje, teško ih je naći na mejnstrim tržištima, u velikim organizacijama. Samo pogledajte u velike organizacije i videćete zašto je to tako. Dakle, vi ste u velikoj korporaciji; očigledno vam je stalo da se penjete na korporativnoj lestvici. Da li dođete u odbor i kažete, vidite, imam odličnu ideju za jedan novi proizvod na marginalnom tržištu, za potrošače sa kojima se nismo do sada susreli, nisam siguran da li će se isplatiti, ali mogao bi da bude stvarno uspešan u budućnosti? Ne, vi dođete i kažete, imam odličnu ideju za postepenu inovaciju jednog postojećeg proizvoda koji prodajemo poznatim kanalima, poznatim potrošačima i mogu da garantujem
Big corporations have an in-built tendency to reinforce past success. They've got so much sunk in it that it's very difficult for them to spot emerging new markets. Emerging new markets, then, are the breeding grounds for passionate users. Best example: who in the music industry, 30 years ago, would have said, "Yes, let's invent a musical form which is all about dispossessed black men in ghettos expressing their frustration with the world through a form of music that many people find initially quite difficult to listen to. That sounds like a winner; we'll go with it." (Laughter). So what happens? Rap music is created by the users. They do it on their own tapes, with their own recording equipment; they distribute it themselves. 30 years later, rap music is the dominant musical form of popular culture -- would never have come from the big companies. Had to start -- this is the third point -- with these pro-ams.
da ćete od njega zaraditi toliko u naredne tri godine. Velike korporacije imaju ugrađenu tendenciju da osnaže prošle uspehe. Toliko su u tome, da im je veoma teško da uoče nastajanje novih tržišta. Nova tržišta su, potom, plodna tla za strastvene korisnike. Najbolji primer: ko bi, u muzičkoj industriji, pre 30 godina rekao: "Da, hajde da izmislimo muzički oblik koji govori samo o nesrećnim crncima u getoima koji izražavaju svoju frustriranost svetom kroz muzičku formu koju mnogi ljudi smatraju teškom za slušanje. To zvuči kao dobitna kombinacija, to ćemo uraditi." (Smeh) I šta se dešava? Rep muziku stvaraju korisnici. Na svojim kasetama, sa svojom opremom za snimanje; sami je distribuiraju. Trideset godina kasnije, rep muzika je dominantan muzički oblik popularne kulture - koji nikada ne bi nastao u velikim kompanijama. Morao je da počne - ovo je treća tačka -
This is the phrase that I've used in some stuff which I've done with a think tank in London called Demos, where we've been looking at these people who are amateurs -- i.e., they do it for the love of it -- but they want to do it to very high standards. And across a whole range of fields -- from software, astronomy, natural sciences, vast areas of leisure and culture like kite-surfing, so on and so forth -- you find people who want to do things because they love it, but they want to do these things to very high standards. They work at their leisure, if you like. They take their leisure very seriously: they acquire skills; they invest time; they use technology that's getting cheaper -- it's not just the Internet: cameras, design technology, leisure technology, surfboards, so on and so forth. Largely through globalization, a lot of this equipment has got a lot cheaper. More knowledgeable consumers, more educated, more able to connect with one another, more able to do things together. Consumption, in that sense, is an expression of their productive potential. Why, we found, people were interested in this, is that at work they don't feel very expressed. They don't feel as if they're doing something that really matters to them, so they pick up these kinds of activities. This has huge organizational implications for very large areas of life.
sa profesionalnim amaterima. To je fraza koju sam koristio za neke stvari koje sam radio sa jednom radnom grupom u Londonu zvanom Demo, gde su bili ti ljudi koji su amateri - tj rade to iz ljubavi - ali žele da rade na veoma visokom nivou. I na različitim poljima - od softvera, astronomije, prirodnih nauka, širokom polju zabave i kulture kao što je kajt surfing itd - nalazite ljude koji žele da rade stvari jer ih vole, ali žele da ih rade na veoma visokom nivou. Rade u svoje slobodno vreme, ako hoćete. To slobodno vreme veoma ozbiljno shvataju: razvijaju veštine, ulažu vreme, koriste tehnologiju koja postaje jevtinija: to nije samo internet; kamere, tehnologije dizajna, slobodnog vremena, daske za surf, itd. Mnoštvo ove opreme je uglavnom globalizacijom postalo mnogo jevtinije. Potrošači su obrazovaniji, više u mogućnosti da se međusobno povežu, da rade stvari zajedno. Potrošnja, u tom smislu, je izraz njihovog produktivnog potencijala. Otkrili smo da su ljudi zainteresovani za ovo zato što ne osećaju da mogu da se izraze na poslu. Ne osećaju da se bave nečim do čega im je zaista stalo, pa se onda bave ovakvim aktivnostima. Ovo ima veoma velike organizacijske implikacije
Take astronomy as an example, which Yochai has already mentioned. Twenty years ago, 30 years ago, only big professional astronomers with very big telescopes could see far into space. And there's a big telescope in Northern England called Jodrell Bank, and when I was a kid, it was amazing, because the moon shots would take off, and this thing would move on rails. And it was huge -- it was absolutely enormous. Now, six amateur astronomers, working with the Internet, with Dobsonian digital telescopes -- which are pretty much open source -- with some light sensors developed over the last 10 years, the Internet -- they can do what Jodrell Bank could only do 30 years ago. So here in astronomy, you have this vast explosion of new productive resources. The users can be producers.
za velika životna polja. Uzmite na primer astronomiju, koju je Jokai već pomenuo. Pre 20, 30 godina, jedino su veliki profesionalni astronomi sa veoma velikim teleskopima mogli da vide daleko u svemir. U Severnoj Engleskoj postoji veliki teleskop, Džodrel Bank, i kada sam bio klinac bilo je neverovatno, jer bi slikao mesec i kretao se na šinama. I bio je ogroman - apsolutno ogroman. Sad, šest astronoma amatera, koji rade sa internetom, sa "Dobsonian" digitalnim teleskopima - koji su uglavnom "open source" - sa nekim svetlosnim senzorima, razvijenim u poslednjih 10 godina, uz internet - mogu da rade ono što je Džodrel Bank radio pre 30 godina. Dakle, u astronomiji imate veliku eksploziju novih produktivnih izvora. Korisnici mogu biti stvaraoci.
What does this mean, then, for our organizational landscape? Well, just imagine a world, for the moment, divided into two camps. Over here, you've got the old, traditional corporate model: special people, special places; patent it, push it down the pipeline to largely waiting, passive consumers. Over here, let's imagine we've got Wikipedia, Linux, and beyond -- open source. This is open; this is closed. This is new; this is traditional. Well, the first thing you can say, I think with certainty, is what Yochai has said already -- is there is a great big struggle between those two organizational forms. These people over there will do everything they can to stop these kinds of organizations succeeding, because they're threatened by them. And so the debates about copyright, digital rights, so on and so forth -- these are all about trying to stifle, in my view, these kinds of organizations. What we're seeing is a complete corruption of the idea of patents and copyright. Meant to be a way to incentivize invention, meant to be a way to orchestrate the dissemination of knowledge, they are increasingly being used by large companies to create thickets of patents to prevent innovation taking place.
Šta onda ovo znači za naše organizaciono okruženje? Pa, za trenutak zamislite svet podeljen u dva kampa. Sa ove strane imate stari, tradicionalni korporacijski model. Posebni ljudi, posebna mesta; patentirajte, pustite kroz cev do pasivnih potrošača koji čekaju. Sa druge strane, zamislimo da imamo "Vikipediju", "Linux" itd - "open source". Ovo je otvoreno, ovo zatvoreno; ovo je novo, ovo tradicionalno. Pa, sa sigurnošću mislim da biste prvo rekli ono što je Jokai već rekao - postoji velika borba između ova dva organizacijska oblika. Ljudi sa ove strane će uraditi sve što mogu da zaustave ovakve organizacije jer se osećaju ugroženim. Tako da su debate o autorskim pravima, digitalnim pravima, itd - po mom mišljenju, pokušaji da se uguše ovakve vrste organizacija. Vidimo potpuno kvarenje ideje o patentima i autorskim pravima. Trebalo bi da motivišu inovacije, da budu način organizovanja širenja znanja, a velike kompanije ih sve više koriste da kreiraju šumu patenata da spreče inovacije.
Let me just give you two examples. The first is: imagine yourself going to a venture capitalist and saying, "I've got a fantastic idea. I've invented this brilliant new program that is much, much better than Microsoft Outlook." Which venture capitalist in their right mind is going to give you any money to set up a venture competing with Microsoft, with Microsoft Outlook? No one. That is why the competition with Microsoft is bound to come -- will only come -- from an open-source kind of project.
Daću vam dva primera. Prvo, zamislite sebe kako odlazite kod finansijera i kažete: "Ima jednu fantastičnu ideju. Smislio sam izuzetan novi program koji je mnogo, mnogo bolji od "Microsoft Outlook"-a." Koji normalni kapitalista bi vam dao pare da krenete u poduhvat takmičenja protiv "Microsofta", protiv "Microsoft Outlooka"? Nijedan. Zato konkurencija "Microsoft"-u mora doći - i jedino će doći - iz projekata koji su "open source".
So, there is a huge competitive argument about sustaining the capacity for open-source and consumer-driven innovation, because it's one of the greatest competitive levers against monopoly. There'll be huge professional arguments as well. Because the professionals, over here in these closed organizations -- they might be academics; they might be programmers; they might be doctors; they might be journalists -- my former profession -- say, "No, no -- you can't trust these people over here."
Dakle, postoji veliki takmičarski argument o održanju kapaciteta za open-source i inovacije koje pokreću potrošači, jer to je jedna od najjačih konkurentskih poluga protiv monopola. Biće i velikih profesionalnih razloga. Jer profesionalci, ovde u ovim zatvorenim organizacijama - možda su oni akademici, možda su programeri, možda lekari, novinari - što sam ja bio - oni kažu, "Ne, ne - ne možete verovati tim ljudima tamo."
When I started in journalism -- Financial Times, 20 years ago -- it was very, very exciting to see someone reading the newspaper. And you'd kind of look over their shoulder on the Tube to see if they were reading your article. Usually they were reading the share prices, and the bit of the paper with your article on was on the floor, or something like that, and you know, "For heaven's sake, what are they doing! They're not reading my brilliant article!" And we allowed users, readers, two places where they could contribute to the paper: the letters page, where they could write a letter in, and we would condescend to them, cut it in half, and print it three days later. Or the op-ed page, where if they knew the editor -- had been to school with him, slept with his wife -- they could write an article for the op-ed page. Those were the two places.
Kada sam ja započeo u novinarstvu - u "Financial Times", pre 20 godina - bilo je veoma, veoma uzbudljivo videti nekoga kako čita novine. I pogledali biste preko njihovog ramena u metrou da vidite da li čitaju vaš tekst. Obično su čitali cene deonica, a deo novina s vašim člankom bio je na podu, ili tako nešto i znate, "Zaboga, šta to rade! Ne čitaju moj sjajni članak!" Dozvoljavali smo korisnicima, čitaocima, da na dva mesta doprinesu novinama: na strani sa pismima, gde mogu da pošalju pismo i mi bismo im udovoljili, prepolovili ga i objavili tri dana kasnije. Ili na strani pored urednikove, gde, ako su znali urednika - išli s njim u školu, spavali s njegovom ženom - mogli su da napišu članak na toj strani. To su bila ta dva mesta.
Shock, horror: now, the readers want to be writers and publishers. That's not their role; they're supposed to read what we write. But they don't want to be journalists. The journalists think that the bloggers want to be journalists; they don't want to be journalists; they just want to have a voice. They want to, as Jimmy said, they want to have a dialogue, a conversation. They want to be part of that flow of information. What's happening there is that the whole domain of creativity is expanding. So, there's going to be a tremendous struggle. But, also, there's going to be tremendous movement from the open to the closed.
Šok, užas: sad, čitaoci žele da budu pisci i izdavači. To nije njihova uloga; oni bi trebalo da čitaju ono što mi napišemo. Ali oni ne žele da budu novinari. Novinari misle da blogeri žele da budu novinari; oni ne žele da budu novinari, samo žele da se čuju. Kao što je Džimi rekao, žele da razgovaraju. Žele da budu deo protoka informacija. Dešava se da se ceo domen kreativnosti širi. Dakle, biće velika borba. Ali takođe će biti i veliki prelaz sa otvorenog na zatvoreno.
What you'll see, I think, is two things that are critical, and these, I think, are two challenges for the open movement. The first is: can we really survive on volunteers? If this is so critical, do we not need it funded, organized, supported in much more structured ways? I think the idea of creating the Red Cross for information and knowledge is a fantastic idea, but can we really organize that, just on volunteers? What kind of changes do we need in public policy and funding to make that possible? What's the role of the BBC, for instance, in that world? What should be the role of public policy? And finally, what I think you will see is the intelligent, closed organizations moving increasingly in the open direction. So it's not going to be a contest between two camps, but, in between them, you'll find all sorts of interesting places that people will occupy. New organizational models coming about, mixing closed and open in tricky ways. It won't be so clear-cut; it won't be Microsoft versus Linux -- there'll be all sorts of things in between. And those organizational models, it turns out, are incredibly powerful, and the people who can understand them will be very, very successful.
Mislim da ćete videti dve bitne stvari, a to su, po mom mišljenju, dva izazova za otvoreni pokret. Prvi je: da li stvarno možemo preživeti sa volonterima? Ako je ovo toliko bitno, zar nam nisu potrebne investicije, organizovane, podržane na strukturisaniji način? Mislim da je ideja da se osnuje Crveni Krst za informacije i znanje sjajna, ali da li možemo to organizovati samo sa volonterima? Kakve su promene potrebne u zakonima i finansiranju, da bismo to omogućili? Kakva je na primer, uloga BBC-a u tom svetu? Kakva bi trebalo da bude uloga javne politike? I na kraju, mislim da ćete videti da se inteligentne, zatvorene organizacije sve više pomeraju u pravcu otvaranja. Znači neće biti takmičenja između dva kampa, ali ćete između njih pronaći mnogo zanimljivih mesta gde će se ljudi okupljati. Nastaju novi modeli organizacija, zatvorene i otvorene se mešaju na čudne načine. To neće biti tako jasno; neće biti "Microsoft" protiv "Linuxa" - biće mnogo stvari između. A ispostavlja se da su ti organizacijski modeli neverovatno moćni i ljudi koji mogu da ih razumeju biće veoma, veoma uspešni.
Let me just give you one final example of what that means. I was in Shanghai, in an office block built on what was a rice paddy five years ago -- one of the 2,500 skyscrapers they've built in Shanghai in the last 10 years. And I was having dinner with this guy called Timothy Chan. Timothy Chan set up an Internet business in 2000. Didn't go into the Internet, kept his money, decided to go into computer games. He runs a company called Shanda, which is the largest computer games company in China. Nine thousand servers all over China, has 250 million subscribers. At any one time, there are four million people playing one of his games. How many people does he employ to service that population? 500 people. Well, how can he service 250 million people from 500 employees? Because basically, he doesn't service them. He gives them a platform; he gives them some rules; he gives them the tools and then he kind of orchestrates the conversation; he orchestrates the action. But actually, a lot of the content is created by the users themselves. And it creates a kind of stickiness between the community and the company which is really, really powerful.
Daću vam poslednji primer toga šta to znači. Bio sam u Šangaju, u poslovnoj zgradi izgrađenoj na nekadašnjem pirinčanom polju - jedan od 2500 nebodera izgrađenih u Šangaju za poslednjih 10 godina. Večerao sam sa momkom koji se zove Timoti Čen. Timoti Čen je pokrenuo posao sa internetom 2000. godine. Nije ušao na internet, zadržao je svoj novac, odlučio je da se bavi kompjuterskim igrama. Vodi kompaniju koja se zove "Šanda", koja je najveća kompanija za kompjuterske igre u Kini. Ima 9000 servera širom Kine; 250 miliona pretplatnika. U svakom trenutku 4 miliona ljudi igra neku od njegovih igara. Koliko ljudi on zapošljava da usluži toliku populaciju? 500 ljudi. Pa, kako može da usluži 250 miliona ljudi sa 500 zaposlenih? Jer, u suštini on ih ne uslužuje. Daje im platformu, daje im neka pravila, daje im alate i onda upravlja tim razgovorom; upravlja akcijom. Ali u stvari, sami korisnici kreiraju mnogo tog sadržaja. To stvara neku vezanost između zajednice i kompanije koja je veoma, veoma moćna.
The best measure of that: so you go into one of his games, you create a character that you develop in the course of the game. If, for some reason, your credit card bounces, or there's some other problem, you lose your character. You've got two options. One option: you can create a new character, right from scratch, but with none of the history of your player. That costs about 100 dollars. Or you can get on a plane, fly to Shanghai, queue up outside Shanda's offices -- cost probably 600, 700 dollars -- and reclaim your character, get your history back. Every morning, there are 600 people queuing outside their offices to reclaim these characters. (Laughter) So this is about companies built on communities, that provide communities with tools, resources, platforms in which they can share. He's not open source, but it's very, very powerful.
Najbolji pokazatelj toga: uđete u neku od igara, kreirate svog lika koga razvijate u toku igre. Ako vam iz nekog razloga kreditna kartica ne radi ili dođe do nekog drugog problema, izgubite lika. Imate dve mogućnosti. Prva: možete da napravite novog lika, od početka, ali bez ikakve istorije tog lika. To košta oko 100 dolara. Ili možete da sednete na avion, odletite u Šangaj, stanete u red ispred zgrade "Šande" - što košta oko 600, 700 dolara - i da vratite svog lika i njegovu istoriju. Svakog jutra 600 ljudi koji žele da vrate svoje likove, stoji u redu ispred njihove zgrade. Ovde se radi o kompanijama koje su izgrađene na zajednicama, koje zajednicama daju alate, izvore, platforme koje mogu da dele. On nije u otvorenom sistemu, ali to je veoma, veoma moćno.
So here is one of the challenges, I think, for people like me, who do a lot of work with government. If you're a games company, and you've got a million players in your game, you only need one percent of them to be co-developers, contributing ideas, and you've got a development workforce of 10,000 people. Imagine you could take all the children in education in Britain, and one percent of them were co-developers of education. What would that do to the resources available to the education system? Or if you got one percent of the patients in the NHS to, in some sense, be co-producers of health.
Dakle tu je jedan od izazova za ljude kao što sam ja, koji mnogo rade sa vladom. Ako ste kompanija za igre i imate milion igrača u svojoj igri, potreban vam je samo 1 procenat njih da rade razvoj, daju ideje i imaćete razvojnu radnu silu od 10.000 ljudi. Zamislite da uzmete svu decu koja se obrazuju u Britaniji i da jedan procenat njih učestvuje u razvoju obrazovanja. Šta bi to učinilo za izvore dostupne obrazovnom sistemu? Ili ako bi jedan procenat pacijenata u NHS-u na neki način bio stvaralac zdravlja.
The reason why -- despite all the efforts to cut it down, to constrain it, to hold it back -- why these open models will still start emerging with tremendous force, is that they multiply our productive resources. And one of the reasons they do that is that they turn users into producers, consumers into designers.
Razlog zašto - uprkos svim naporima da se smanje, ograniče i zadrže - zašto će ovi otvoreni modeli nastajati sa velikom silinom, je taj da oni umnožavaju naše produktivne izvore. A razlog zbog kog to rade je zato što pretvaraju korisnike u stvaraoce; potrošače u kreatore.
Thank you very much.
Mnogo vam hvala.