What I'm going to do, in the spirit of collaborative creativity, is simply repeat many of the points that the three people before me have already made, but do them -- this is called "creative collaboration;" it's actually called "borrowing" -- but do it through a particular perspective, and that is to ask about the role of users and consumers in this emerging world of collaborative creativity that Jimmy and others have talked about.
これからお話しする 協働による創造的な発明というのは 先の3人が話したものと同じものです でもこの意味 創造的な協働とも呼ばれる この 創造的な発明の意義を 違った視点 つまり ユーザーや消費者の 役割を見直すことで 明確にしたいと思います
Let me just ask you, to start with, this simple question: who invented the mountain bike? Because traditional economic theory would say, well, the mountain bike was probably invented by some big bike corporation that had a big R&D lab where they were thinking up new projects, and it came out of there. It didn't come from there. Another answer might be, well, it came from a sort of lone genius working in his garage, who, working away on different kinds of bikes, comes up with a bike out of thin air.
簡単な質問から始めましょう マウンテンバイクは 誰が発明したのでしょう? 今までの経済理論なら 新規の事業を始める 大きな研究所を持った 大企業だと考えるでしょう でも大企業ではないのです あるいは一人の天才が 自分の車庫で 自転車部品を組み合わせ 開発したと考えるでしょう
It didn't come from there. The mountain bike came from users, came from young users, particularly a group in Northern California, who were frustrated with traditional racing bikes, which were those sort of bikes that Eddy Merckx rode, or your big brother, and they're very glamorous. But also frustrated with the bikes that your dad rode, which sort of had big handlebars like that, and they were too heavy. So, they got the frames from these big bikes, put them together with the gears from the racing bikes, got the brakes from motorcycles, and sort of mixed and matched various ingredients. And for the first, I don't know, three to five years of their life, mountain bikes were known as "clunkers." And they were just made in a community of bikers, mainly in Northern California.
実際にマウンテンバイクを 発明したのはカリフォルニアの若者達です 皆さんの兄さん達が 乗っていたようなレース用の自転車には 派手過ぎて興味が湧かず 父親が使っている 大きなハンドルの 重い自転車にも満足できなかった それで 大きな自転車からフレーム レース用自転車からは変速機 バイクからブレーキを持ってきて それらを組み合わせたのです これが”クランカー”と呼ばれる 最初のマウンテンバイクです カリフォルニアの自転車仲間達が 発明した製品なのです
And then one of these companies that was importing parts for the clunkers decided to set up in business, start selling them to other people, and gradually another company emerged out of that, Marin, and it probably was, I don't know, 10, maybe even 15, years, before the big bike companies realized there was a market. Thirty years later, mountain bike sales and mountain bike equipment account for 65 percent of bike sales in America. That's 58 billion dollars.
やがて 自転車部品の輸入業者が これを商品として売り出し ビジネスにしようと考えた やがて他の会社も参入し おそらく 10年か15年たって 自転車の大企業が 目をつけた それから30年経った今では マウンテンバイクの売上は 付属品も含めると 米国自転車市場の65% 580億ドルになります
This is a category entirely created by consumers that would not have been created by the mainstream bike market because they couldn't see the need, the opportunity; they didn't have the incentive to innovate. The one thing I think I disagree with about Yochai's presentation is when he said the Internet causes this distributive capacity for innovation to come alive. It's when the Internet combines with these kinds of passionate pro-am consumers -- who are knowledgeable; they've got the incentive to innovate; they've got the tools; they want to -- that you get this kind of explosion of creative collaboration. And out of that, you get the need for the kind of things that Jimmy was talking about, which is our new kinds of organization, or a better way to put it: how do we organize ourselves without organizations? That's now possible; you don't need an organization to be organized, to achieve large and complex tasks, like innovating new software programs.
マウンテンバイクは消費者が発明したわけです 自転車業界の主流では このビジネスチャンスは見えなかったし 新しい製品を発明する動機も なかったからです ヨーカイ氏と私の考えが 違う点があります 彼はインターネットによって 多くの人が協働で発明できるように なったと言いましたが 情熱と知識と意欲を持つプロ級の消費者が 道具を手に入れ インターネットによって 結びついた時に初めて 協働による発明という 新しい花が開いたのです ジミーの言ったある種の新しい形態の組織 あるいは組織化が 必要になっています 組織抜きで組織化できるでしょうか? 今ではソフト開発など複雑な業務を 協働で行う場合でも 必ずしも組織は必要ない
So this is a huge challenge to the way we think creativity comes about. The traditional view, still enshrined in much of the way that we think about creativity -- in organizations, in government -- is that creativity is about special people: wear baseball caps the wrong way round, come to conferences like this, in special places, elite universities, R&D labs in the forests, water, maybe special rooms in companies painted funny colors, you know, bean bags, maybe the odd table-football table. Special people, special places, think up special ideas, then you have a pipeline that takes the ideas down to the waiting consumers, who are passive. They can say "yes" or "no" to the invention. That's the idea of creativity. What's the policy recommendation out of that if you're in government, or you're running a large company? More special people, more special places. Build creative clusters in cities; create more R&D parks, so on and so forth. Expand the pipeline down to the consumers.
いかに創造性を高めるか を考える上でここが課題なのです 今までの考え方が消えたわけではなく 会社や政府機関でも 独創的な発明は 野球帽を逆さに被って こうした会議に出てくるような ちょっと変な奴の仕事と考えている 有名大学とか森や水辺の研究所 奇抜な色の特別な部屋で 卓球台なんかもあるかもしれない 変な人が妙な場所ですごい発明を考える 発明はパイプラインで運ばれ 消費者のもとに届けられる 消費者の選択肢は受け取るかどうかだけ これが世間的な理解です この理解から生まれる方策は 政府も大企業も同じで 特殊な人や場所を確保すること 研究特区を創って 独創的な人たちを集める 消費者にはより多くの発明を届ける
Well this view, I think, is increasingly wrong. I think it's always been wrong, because I think always creativity has been highly collaborative, and it's probably been largely interactive. But it's increasingly wrong, and one of the reasons it's wrong is that the ideas are flowing back up the pipeline. The ideas are coming back from the consumers, and they're often ahead of the producers. Why is that? Well, one issue is that radical innovation, when you've got ideas that affect a large number of technologies or people, have a great deal of uncertainty attached to them. The payoffs to innovation are greatest where the uncertainty is highest. And when you get a radical innovation, it's often very uncertain how it can be applied.
この考えは益々間違ったものになっています いや 最初から違っていたのです 創造的な発明は協働から生まれるのです そして対話が重要なのです 益々間違いになっている理由は アイデアが逆向きに流れているからです 消費者が専門家以上に 先進的なアイデアを生み出しています それはなぜでしょうか? 一つには 多くの技術や人々に影響を与えるような 先鋭的な発明では 何に役立つのか分からない場合が 少なくないからです 発明による報酬が最大になるのは 実は発明品の目的が見えない場合です 革新的なイノベーションが生まれた時 その発明が何に利用できるかわからない
The whole history of telephony is a story of dealing with that uncertainty. The very first landline telephones, the inventors thought that they would be used for people to listen in to live performances from West End theaters. When the mobile telephone companies invented SMS, they had no idea what it was for; it was only when that technology got into the hands of teenage users that they invented the use.
電話の歴史もその一つで 先が見えない中で進歩してきました 最初の有線電話は 発明者には ウエストエンドの劇場で ライブを聴くための 器具だった 携帯電話会社がSMSを発明した時も 何に使えるか分かってなかった この技術が利用者の手に渡り 10代の利用者が 使い方を発明したのです
So the more radical the innovation, the more the uncertainty, the more you need innovation in use to work out what a technology is for. All of our patents, our entire approach to patents and invention, is based on the idea that the inventor knows what the invention is for; we can say what it's for. More and more, the inventors of things will not be able to say that in advance. It will be worked out in use, in collaboration with users. We like to think that invention is a sort of moment of creation: there is a moment of birth when someone comes up with an idea. The truth is that most creativity is cumulative and collaborative; like Wikipedia, it develops over a long period of time.
発明が革新的であるほど 確かな見通しはなく 使ってみなければ 何の役に立つのか見えてこない 今までの特許や発明に関わる制度は 発明家は自分の発明の 価値を知っている事が 前提でした 今や発明家は発明の価値が 前もって分からないのです ユーザーと協働して 発明品を利用しながら次第に見えてくる 発明というものは 誰かが瞬間に思いつくもの と考えがちですが 実際はほとんどの発明は 蓄積と協働の結果です ウィキペディアも時間をかけて発展したものです
The second reason why users are more and more important is that they are the source of big, disruptive innovations. If you want to find the big new ideas, it's often difficult to find them in mainstream markets, in big organizations. And just look inside large organizations and you'll see why that is so. So, you're in a big corporation. You're obviously keen to go up the corporate ladder. Do you go into your board and say, "Look, I've got a fantastic idea for an embryonic product in a marginal market, with consumers we've never dealt with before, and I'm not sure it's going to have a big payoff, but it could be really, really big in the future?" No, what you do, is you go in and you say, "I've got a fantastic idea for an incremental innovation to an existing product we sell through existing channels to existing users, and I can guarantee you get this much return out of it over the next three years."
利用者が重要であるもう一つの理由は 利用者こそがすごい発明をすることです 新しくすごいアイデアを見つけたければ 業界の主流や大企業で探しても 無駄というものです 大きな組織を見ると その訳が分かります 貴方が大企業で働いているとしましょう 出世の階段を上ろうとすれば 役員会でこんな風に 話せるでしょうか? ”すごいアイデアです 新規分野で新規顧客対象で- 利益も直ぐにはでませんが- 将来はきっと儲かる商品になります” いや こう言うしかないのです ”優れた改善案です- 既存商品と既存の販売網を使った- 既存顧客向けのアイデアで- 今後3年間の利益は間違いなく確保できます”
Big corporations have an in-built tendency to reinforce past success. They've got so much sunk in it that it's very difficult for them to spot emerging new markets. Emerging new markets, then, are the breeding grounds for passionate users. Best example: who in the music industry, 30 years ago, would have said, "Yes, let's invent a musical form which is all about dispossessed black men in ghettos expressing their frustration with the world through a form of music that many people find initially quite difficult to listen to. That sounds like a winner; we'll go with it." (Laughter). So what happens? Rap music is created by the users. They do it on their own tapes, with their own recording equipment; they distribute it themselves. 30 years later, rap music is the dominant musical form of popular culture -- would never have come from the big companies. Had to start -- this is the third point -- with these pro-ams.
大企業ではこのように 過去の成功に依存します 保守性に浸かっているので 新しい市場に飛び込めない 新しいマーケットは 情熱を持つユーザーが開拓するのです 好例を話しましょう 音楽業界の一体誰が 30年前に思いついたでしょうか ”新しい音楽を創ろう- 抑圧された黒人がゲットーで- 世の中への不満を音楽にして- 表現するのだ- 大衆には最初は受けないかもしれないが- いずれきっと売れる” (笑) どうなりました? ユーザーがラップを作りました 自分達で歌を録音し 自分達で配った 30年後 ラップはポピュラー音楽の主流になった 大企業からは生まれなかった 3つ目のポイントはプロ級の素人と 始めることです
This is the phrase that I've used in some stuff which I've done with a think tank in London called Demos, where we've been looking at these people who are amateurs -- i.e., they do it for the love of it -- but they want to do it to very high standards. And across a whole range of fields -- from software, astronomy, natural sciences, vast areas of leisure and culture like kite-surfing, so on and so forth -- you find people who want to do things because they love it, but they want to do these things to very high standards. They work at their leisure, if you like. They take their leisure very seriously: they acquire skills; they invest time; they use technology that's getting cheaper -- it's not just the Internet: cameras, design technology, leisure technology, surfboards, so on and so forth. Largely through globalization, a lot of this equipment has got a lot cheaper. More knowledgeable consumers, more educated, more able to connect with one another, more able to do things together. Consumption, in that sense, is an expression of their productive potential. Why, we found, people were interested in this, is that at work they don't feel very expressed. They don't feel as if they're doing something that really matters to them, so they pick up these kinds of activities. This has huge organizational implications for very large areas of life.
ロンドンの"DEMOS"という シンクタンクで仲間との 合言葉でした 素人ではあるけれど それが好きな人たち 高い技術水準を求め どんな分野でもよいですが ソフトウェアや天文学 自然科学 幅広い分野の娯楽や文化 凧サーフィンなどなど 好きな事を好きだからやりたいという人がいます しかも高いレベルでしようとするのです 暇な時にその気になればやる 趣味だが真剣に取り組む 技術を習得し時間を注ぎ込み 安く手に入る技術を利用し インターネットの他 カメラやデザイン技術 サーフボードなどなど グローバル化によって 多くの器具がすいぶん安くなった 知識も豊かで教育のある消費者が お互いにつながり 一緒に活動できる 消費が創造性を 表現する手段なのです こうした創造的な消費に興味を持つのは 仕事では自分を表現できないからです 意味のある仕事をしている実感がないから 何か別の活動をやりたくなる 人の人生に大きな影響を与える 組織的にも大きな課題です
Take astronomy as an example, which Yochai has already mentioned. Twenty years ago, 30 years ago, only big professional astronomers with very big telescopes could see far into space. And there's a big telescope in Northern England called Jodrell Bank, and when I was a kid, it was amazing, because the moon shots would take off, and this thing would move on rails. And it was huge -- it was absolutely enormous. Now, six amateur astronomers, working with the Internet, with Dobsonian digital telescopes -- which are pretty much open source -- with some light sensors developed over the last 10 years, the Internet -- they can do what Jodrell Bank could only do 30 years ago. So here in astronomy, you have this vast explosion of new productive resources. The users can be producers.
天文学を例に考えてみましょう ヨーカイ氏が言ったとおり 20年前か30年前には 専門的な天文学者しか 大きな望遠鏡で宇宙を見れなかった 英国北部のジョドレルバンク望遠鏡は 子供の時に驚いたのですが 月ロケットが発射される時に鉄道で運ぶほど とても巨大なものだった 今では6人の素人天文家が インターネットを利用して ドブソニアン望遠鏡で それは無料で誰でも利用できるのですが この10年で開発された 簡単なセンサーを使い 30年前のジョドレルバンクと同じことができる 天文学ではユーザーという創造的な担い手が 急速に増えています 消費者が製作者にもなれるのです
What does this mean, then, for our organizational landscape? Well, just imagine a world, for the moment, divided into two camps. Over here, you've got the old, traditional corporate model: special people, special places; patent it, push it down the pipeline to largely waiting, passive consumers. Over here, let's imagine we've got Wikipedia, Linux, and beyond -- open source. This is open; this is closed. This is new; this is traditional. Well, the first thing you can say, I think with certainty, is what Yochai has said already -- is there is a great big struggle between those two organizational forms. These people over there will do everything they can to stop these kinds of organizations succeeding, because they're threatened by them. And so the debates about copyright, digital rights, so on and so forth -- these are all about trying to stifle, in my view, these kinds of organizations. What we're seeing is a complete corruption of the idea of patents and copyright. Meant to be a way to incentivize invention, meant to be a way to orchestrate the dissemination of knowledge, they are increasingly being used by large companies to create thickets of patents to prevent innovation taking place.
これは組織的な視点に どんな意味をもたらすでしょう? それでは世界を2つのグループに 分けて考えて見ましょう 一つは古い伝統的な組織モデル 特別な人々 特別な場所 特許をとって 受身の消費者に 商品を一方的に流す もう一方はウィキペディアや リナックスなどのオープンソースをイメージして下さい こちらはオープンでこちらは閉じている 新しいのと旧来のもの 確かに言えることの一つは ヨーカイ氏が言ったように この2つの組織形態の間で 抗争が起こっている こちらは存在が脅かされていますから そっちのグループが成功しないよう 出来る事は何でもやる 著作権やデジタル著作権の議論は こうした新しいグループを鎮圧するための 悪戦苦闘だと 私は見ています 特許とか著作権というのは 全く腐敗しています 発明を促すのではなく 知識の普及を組織化するのでもなく 大企業はこうした制度で 特許という障壁を巡らし 発明を邪魔しています
Let me just give you two examples. The first is: imagine yourself going to a venture capitalist and saying, "I've got a fantastic idea. I've invented this brilliant new program that is much, much better than Microsoft Outlook." Which venture capitalist in their right mind is going to give you any money to set up a venture competing with Microsoft, with Microsoft Outlook? No one. That is why the competition with Microsoft is bound to come -- will only come -- from an open-source kind of project.
二つの例をお見せしよう 貴方がベンチャーを立ち上げたとします ”素晴らしいアイデアがあるんだ- 全くすごいプログラムを発明した- Microsoft Outlookよりずっといいものだ” 一体誰が Microsoft Outlookと競争するような 貴方の事業に資金を出すでしょうか。 これがマイクロソフトと競争できるのは オープンソース型の事業 だけである理由です
So, there is a huge competitive argument about sustaining the capacity for open-source and consumer-driven innovation, because it's one of the greatest competitive levers against monopoly. There'll be huge professional arguments as well. Because the professionals, over here in these closed organizations -- they might be academics; they might be programmers; they might be doctors; they might be journalists -- my former profession -- say, "No, no -- you can't trust these people over here."
実際、大きな論争になっているのは オープンソースや消費者主導の発明が 維持発展できるかどうかです これらが独占を打ち負かす 唯一の競争相手だからです 専門家からの反撃も強くなるでしょう こちらの閉じた世界の専門家には 学者であれプログラマーであれ 医者であれジャーナリストであれ 私も以前はジャーナリストでしたが ”そっちの素人の意見を信用するな” と言うのです
When I started in journalism -- Financial Times, 20 years ago -- it was very, very exciting to see someone reading the newspaper. And you'd kind of look over their shoulder on the Tube to see if they were reading your article. Usually they were reading the share prices, and the bit of the paper with your article on was on the floor, or something like that, and you know, "For heaven's sake, what are they doing! They're not reading my brilliant article!" And we allowed users, readers, two places where they could contribute to the paper: the letters page, where they could write a letter in, and we would condescend to them, cut it in half, and print it three days later. Or the op-ed page, where if they knew the editor -- had been to school with him, slept with his wife -- they could write an article for the op-ed page. Those were the two places.
私が20年前に ファイナンシャルタイムスの記者になった頃 誰かが記事を読んでいると とてもドキドキしたものです 地下鉄で肩越しに 自分の記事を読んでいないか覗いて見る たいていは株価しか読まないし 私の記事の載った新聞紙が 床の上に落ちていたりすると ”一体なんて馬鹿な奴らだ- 俺のすばらしい記事を読まずに”と叫んでしまう 読者の参画を認めるのは 2箇所だけ 一つは投稿の読者ページだけど 原稿を半分に縮めて 3日後に掲載する もう一つが論説欄 編集者の奥さんと寝た事があれば 原稿を載せてもらえるかもしれない この二箇所しかなかった
Shock, horror: now, the readers want to be writers and publishers. That's not their role; they're supposed to read what we write. But they don't want to be journalists. The journalists think that the bloggers want to be journalists; they don't want to be journalists; they just want to have a voice. They want to, as Jimmy said, they want to have a dialogue, a conversation. They want to be part of that flow of information. What's happening there is that the whole domain of creativity is expanding. So, there's going to be a tremendous struggle. But, also, there's going to be tremendous movement from the open to the closed.
恐ろしい事に今では読者が記者や出版者になりたがる 俺たちの記事だけ読んでればよいのに でも別にジャーナリストになりたいわけではない ジャーナリスト自身はよく分かっていないようだが ブロガーはただ発信したいのです ジミーが言ったようにただ議論や会話がしたい 情報のやりとりに加わりたいのです つまり創造の担い手が 増えているのです これは大きな抗争なのです しかし別のオープン側から 閉じた側への大きな動きもあります
What you'll see, I think, is two things that are critical, and these, I think, are two challenges for the open movement. The first is: can we really survive on volunteers? If this is so critical, do we not need it funded, organized, supported in much more structured ways? I think the idea of creating the Red Cross for information and knowledge is a fantastic idea, but can we really organize that, just on volunteers? What kind of changes do we need in public policy and funding to make that possible? What's the role of the BBC, for instance, in that world? What should be the role of public policy? And finally, what I think you will see is the intelligent, closed organizations moving increasingly in the open direction. So it's not going to be a contest between two camps, but, in between them, you'll find all sorts of interesting places that people will occupy. New organizational models coming about, mixing closed and open in tricky ways. It won't be so clear-cut; it won't be Microsoft versus Linux -- there'll be all sorts of things in between. And those organizational models, it turns out, are incredibly powerful, and the people who can understand them will be very, very successful.
オープン側の将来にとって 二つの決定的な 課題があります 一つは ボランティアに依存していけるかという課題 もしこの動きが重要ならば 資金を流し組織化する仕組みをきっちりと 支援する必要があるのではないですか? 赤十字社を設立するのは 素晴らしいアイデアですが ボランティアだけで組織できるでしょうか 公共政策や資金の流れを どうすればよいのか? 例えばBBCは どんな役割を担えるか? 公共政策の役割は何か? 最後に知って欲しい事は こっちの閉じた側もオープンな側に 動きつつある事です つまり単に二つのグループの争いではなく この二つのグループの間に我々の将来が あるのかもしれないのです 新しい組織モデルがこの2つを混在させて 生まれてくるでしょう マイクロソフトとリナックスのように白か黒かではない その中間の灰色の世界 この灰色の組織モデルは とてもパワフルなのです これを理解した人が 大成功するでしょう
Let me just give you one final example of what that means. I was in Shanghai, in an office block built on what was a rice paddy five years ago -- one of the 2,500 skyscrapers they've built in Shanghai in the last 10 years. And I was having dinner with this guy called Timothy Chan. Timothy Chan set up an Internet business in 2000. Didn't go into the Internet, kept his money, decided to go into computer games. He runs a company called Shanda, which is the largest computer games company in China. Nine thousand servers all over China, has 250 million subscribers. At any one time, there are four million people playing one of his games. How many people does he employ to service that population? 500 people. Well, how can he service 250 million people from 500 employees? Because basically, he doesn't service them. He gives them a platform; he gives them some rules; he gives them the tools and then he kind of orchestrates the conversation; he orchestrates the action. But actually, a lot of the content is created by the users themselves. And it creates a kind of stickiness between the community and the company which is really, really powerful.
最後に具体例を一つ 紹介しましょう 上海に行っていました 5年前は水田だったオフィス街で この10年の間に建てられた 2500の高層ビルの一つで ティモシー チェンという青年と 食事をして来ました ティモシーは2000年に インターネットビジネスを始めました コンピュータゲームに専念することを決め ネットから離れることにしました 彼は"盛大"という名の中国最大の コンピュータゲーム企業を経営しています 9000のサーバーを中国全土に備え 加入者は2億5千万人いて 常時4百万人がゲームで遊んでいます このサービスを提供する スタッフはわずか500人です 一体どうやって 2.5億人に対して 500人で対応できるのか? サービスは提供しないのです 規則や道具といった プラットフォームを用意し ユーザーとの対話を組織化し アクションを組織化します ゲーム自体はユーザーが 自分たちで作るのです それがある種の一体感を 会社との間に生みだすのです この効果は絶大です
The best measure of that: so you go into one of his games, you create a character that you develop in the course of the game. If, for some reason, your credit card bounces, or there's some other problem, you lose your character. You've got two options. One option: you can create a new character, right from scratch, but with none of the history of your player. That costs about 100 dollars. Or you can get on a plane, fly to Shanghai, queue up outside Shanda's offices -- cost probably 600, 700 dollars -- and reclaim your character, get your history back. Every morning, there are 600 people queuing outside their offices to reclaim these characters. (Laughter) So this is about companies built on communities, that provide communities with tools, resources, platforms in which they can share. He's not open source, but it's very, very powerful.
こういうことです ゲームを始めると 自分で登場人物を作り ゲームを通して成長させます クレジットカードが不渡りになるとか 何か問題があると 登場人物は消えます 二つの選択肢があります 一つは登場人物を一から創り直す でもこれまでの歴史は消えてします これは100ドルです もう一つは飛行機で上海に飛んで 盛大の事務所に並び再登録する 600-700ドルかかるが登場人物の 歴史をとり戻すことが出来る 毎朝この事務所の外には 登場人物の再登録のために 600人も並んでいます ユーザーが共有できる 道具や場所を提供することで 成り立つ会社の例です オープンソースではないですが とても強力です
So here is one of the challenges, I think, for people like me, who do a lot of work with government. If you're a games company, and you've got a million players in your game, you only need one percent of them to be co-developers, contributing ideas, and you've got a development workforce of 10,000 people. Imagine you could take all the children in education in Britain, and one percent of them were co-developers of education. What would that do to the resources available to the education system? Or if you got one percent of the patients in the NHS to, in some sense, be co-producers of health.
政府の仕事に関わる者は 大きな課題を 抱えています ゲームの会社の場合 百万人がゲームで遊ぶとして その内の1%がアイデアを提供する 開発者になれば 1万人の人手が 確保できるわけです 同様に英国の教育の場合 生徒の1%が教育の提供側に 協力するなら 教育を支える人材が 十分に確保できます 国民保険を利用する患者の1%が 保健サービスに関われるかもしれません
The reason why -- despite all the efforts to cut it down, to constrain it, to hold it back -- why these open models will still start emerging with tremendous force, is that they multiply our productive resources. And one of the reasons they do that is that they turn users into producers, consumers into designers.
経費の削減圧力の中で こうした利用者を巻き込んだモデルが 力強く立ち上がりつつあるのは このモデルがサービスを 提供する側の人材を 何倍にも増やすからです それができるのは 利用者が製造し 消費者が計画するからです
Thank you very much.
以上です ありがとう