What I'm going to do, in the spirit of collaborative creativity, is simply repeat many of the points that the three people before me have already made, but do them -- this is called "creative collaboration;" it's actually called "borrowing" -- but do it through a particular perspective, and that is to ask about the role of users and consumers in this emerging world of collaborative creativity that Jimmy and others have talked about.
Apa yg akan saya lakukan, dalam semangat kolaboratif yg kreatif adalah cukup mengulang topik yang telah disampaikan ketiga pembicara sebelum saya. Tapi dalam pelaksanaannya -- ini disebut kolaborasi kreatif; adalah yg biasa disebut 'meminjam'. Hanya saja, lakukan ini dalam perspektif khusus yaitu dari sudut peranan pengguna dan pelanggan di zaman modern yang penuh kreativitas kolaboratif seperti yg disinggung Jimmy dan lain-lain.
Let me just ask you, to start with, this simple question: who invented the mountain bike? Because traditional economic theory would say, well, the mountain bike was probably invented by some big bike corporation that had a big R&D lab where they were thinking up new projects, and it came out of there. It didn't come from there. Another answer might be, well, it came from a sort of lone genius working in his garage, who, working away on different kinds of bikes, comes up with a bike out of thin air.
Coba saya tanya, untuk memulai, pertanyaan sederhana ini : Siapa pencipta sepeda gunung ? Karena teori ekonomi kuno akan menunjukkan, sepeda gunung itu mungkin diciptakan oleh sebuah perusahaan sepeda besar, yg punya lab litbang besar dimana ide-ide baru digodok dan menghasilkan sepeda itu. Itu tidak datang dari sana. Jawaban lain mungkin, ide itu datang dr seorang jenius penyendiri yg biasa mengoprek digarasinya, mengerjakan berbagai jenis sepeda, dan akhirnya mendapatkan ide itu dr langit.
It didn't come from there. The mountain bike came from users, came from young users, particularly a group in Northern California, who were frustrated with traditional racing bikes, which were those sort of bikes that Eddy Merckx rode, or your big brother, and they're very glamorous. But also frustrated with the bikes that your dad rode, which sort of had big handlebars like that, and they were too heavy. So, they got the frames from these big bikes, put them together with the gears from the racing bikes, got the brakes from motorcycles, and sort of mixed and matched various ingredients. And for the first, I don't know, three to five years of their life, mountain bikes were known as "clunkers." And they were just made in a community of bikers, mainly in Northern California.
Ide itu bukan dr sana. Ide sepeda gunung datang dari pengguna, datang dari pengguna muda, tepatnya dr sebuah kelompok di California Utara, yg frutrasi dengan sepeda balap tradisional, yg biasanya mirip sepeda yg dipakai Eddy Merckx, atau kakak anda, yang luar biasa mewah. Tapi juga tidak suka dengan sepeda yang ayah anda tunggangi, yang setangnya besar dan kaku, belum lagi beratnya. Jadi, mereka ambil rangka sepeda besar ini, memadukannya dgn roda gigi sepeda balap, rem dari sepeda motor, dan berkreasi dengan berbagai komponen. Dan untuk, saya tidak tahu, tiga sampai lima tahun pertama, sepeda gunung dikenal dgn sebutan "clunkers" (rombengan) dan hanya dibuat didalam komunitas pengendara sepeda, terutama di California Utara.
And then one of these companies that was importing parts for the clunkers decided to set up in business, start selling them to other people, and gradually another company emerged out of that, Marin, and it probably was, I don't know, 10, maybe even 15, years, before the big bike companies realized there was a market. Thirty years later, mountain bike sales and mountain bike equipment account for 65 percent of bike sales in America. That's 58 billion dollars.
Lalu sebuah perusahaan yg biasa mengimpor suku cadang untuk clunkers yang memutuskan berbisnis, dan mulai menjualnya ke orang lain, lalu muncul perusahaan lain, Marin, dan itu mungkin, saya tidak tahu, 10 atau bahkan 15 tahun sebelum perusahaan besar sepeda menyadari potensi pasarnya. 30 tahun kemudian penjualan sepeda gunung, dan kelengkapan sepeda gunung, mencakup 65 persen pasar sepeda di Amerika. Itu sekitar 58 juta dolar.
This is a category entirely created by consumers that would not have been created by the mainstream bike market because they couldn't see the need, the opportunity; they didn't have the incentive to innovate. The one thing I think I disagree with about Yochai's presentation is when he said the Internet causes this distributive capacity for innovation to come alive. It's when the Internet combines with these kinds of passionate pro-am consumers -- who are knowledgeable; they've got the incentive to innovate; they've got the tools; they want to -- that you get this kind of explosion of creative collaboration. And out of that, you get the need for the kind of things that Jimmy was talking about, which is our new kinds of organization, or a better way to put it: how do we organize ourselves without organizations? That's now possible; you don't need an organization to be organized, to achieve large and complex tasks, like innovating new software programs.
Ini segmen pasar yg seutuhnya diciptakan pelanggan, yang tidak mungkin lahir dr pasar sepeda populer karena pasar tidak melihat kebutuhannya kesempatannya, Tidak ada insentif untuk berinovasi Satu-satunya hal yg tidak saya setujui dr presentasi Yochai adalah ketika dia bilang internet mewujudkan pendistribusian kemampuan berinovasi. Adalah ketika internet memadukan semangat pro ke-amatir-an dikalangan pelanggan -- yang memahami produknya, akan terdorong untuk berinovasi Mereka punya alatnya, mereka ingin -- Dan akhirnya anda merasakan ledakan kolaborasi kreatif ini. Sebagai hasilnya, muncul kebutuhan untuk hal-hal seperti yg disinggung Jimmy, yg merupakan jenis organisasi terbaru kita, atau lebih tepatnya bagaimana cara kita mengatur diri senidri tanpa organisasi ? Sekarang itu jadi mungkin, anda tidak butuh organisasi untuk jadi teratur untuk mengerjakan hal yg besar dan rumit, seperti menginovasi program perangkat lunak.
So this is a huge challenge to the way we think creativity comes about. The traditional view, still enshrined in much of the way that we think about creativity -- in organizations, in government -- is that creativity is about special people: wear baseball caps the wrong way round, come to conferences like this, in special places, elite universities, R&D labs in the forests, water, maybe special rooms in companies painted funny colors, you know, bean bags, maybe the odd table-football table. Special people, special places, think up special ideas, then you have a pipeline that takes the ideas down to the waiting consumers, who are passive. They can say "yes" or "no" to the invention. That's the idea of creativity. What's the policy recommendation out of that if you're in government, or you're running a large company? More special people, more special places. Build creative clusters in cities; create more R&D parks, so on and so forth. Expand the pipeline down to the consumers.
Ini memang sebuah tantangan besar Bagi cara kita berpikir tentang munculnya kreativitas. Pandangan tradisional, yg masih mendominasi pola pikir kita berkenaan dgn kreativitas -- di organisasi, di pemerintahanan -- adalah bahwa kreativitas datang dari orang-orang spesial: yang memakai topi dgn serampangan, menghadiri seminar seperti ini, di tempat-tempat spesial, universitas elit, lab litbang di tengah hutan, danau, mungkin di perusahaan dgn ruangan yang dicat warna warni anda tahu, dgn bean bags, mungkin dilengkapi dengan meja futbol yang aneh. Orang-orang spesial, di tempat yg spesial, melahirkan ide yg spesial jadilah sebuah alur proses yg mengolah ide menjadi produk akhir untuk pelanggan yang menunggu dengan pasif. Yang cuma bisa bilang "ya" atau "tidak" pada hasil penemuan itu; Itulah ide ttg kreativitas. Bagaimana rekomendasi kebijakan ttg hal itu di instansi pemerintah, atau perusahaan besar? lebih banyak lagi orang spesial dan tempat spesial. Bangun kluster kreatif di kota-kota; bangun lebih banyak lagi taman litbang, dst. Perluas alur prosesnya sampai ke pelanggan
Well this view, I think, is increasingly wrong. I think it's always been wrong, because I think always creativity has been highly collaborative, and it's probably been largely interactive. But it's increasingly wrong, and one of the reasons it's wrong is that the ideas are flowing back up the pipeline. The ideas are coming back from the consumers, and they're often ahead of the producers. Why is that? Well, one issue is that radical innovation, when you've got ideas that affect a large number of technologies or people, have a great deal of uncertainty attached to them. The payoffs to innovation are greatest where the uncertainty is highest. And when you get a radical innovation, it's often very uncertain how it can be applied.
Cara pandang ini, Menurut saya, semakin lama semakin salah. Menurut saya dari dulu sudah salah. Karena saya selalu meyakini kreativitas itu hasil kolaborasi. dan mungkin juga sifatnya sangat interaktif. Tapi ini semakin salah, dan salah satu penyebabnya adalah idenya mengalir berlawanan arah dgn alur prosesnya. banyak sekali ide datang dr pelanggan, dan seringkali mendahului produsennya. Mengapa demikian? Salah satu faktornya adalah inovasi yg radikal, ketika anda punya ide yang mempengaruhi teknologi dan orang banyak, biasanya akan disertai ketidakpastian yg tinggi. Keuntungan sebuah inovasi akan maksimal ketika ketidakpastiannya tertinggi. Pada inovasi yang radikal, seringkali tidak jelas bagaimana aplikasinya.
The whole history of telephony is a story of dealing with that uncertainty. The very first landline telephones, the inventors thought that they would be used for people to listen in to live performances from West End theaters. When the mobile telephone companies invented SMS, they had no idea what it was for; it was only when that technology got into the hands of teenage users that they invented the use.
Sejarah perteleponan adalah cerita ttg bagaimana menghadapi ketidakpastian. Telpon kabel pertama, dimaksudkan penciptanya agar orang-orang bisa mendengarkan pertunjukan langsung dr teater-teater di West End. Ketika perusahan selular menciptakan SMS, mereka tidak tahu apa gunanaya fitur itu, hanya ketika teknologi itu sampai ke tangan para remaja kegunannya jadi jelas.
So the more radical the innovation, the more the uncertainty, the more you need innovation in use to work out what a technology is for. All of our patents, our entire approach to patents and invention, is based on the idea that the inventor knows what the invention is for; we can say what it's for. More and more, the inventors of things will not be able to say that in advance. It will be worked out in use, in collaboration with users. We like to think that invention is a sort of moment of creation: there is a moment of birth when someone comes up with an idea. The truth is that most creativity is cumulative and collaborative; like Wikipedia, it develops over a long period of time.
Jadi makin radikal sebuah inovasi, makin tinggi ketidakpastiannya; makin tinggi kebutuhan inovasi penggunaannya untuk menentukan kegunaan sebuah teknologi. Semua paten kita, pendekatan kita ttg paten dan temuan, didasarkan pada asumsi bahwa si pencipta tahu pasti kegunaan temuannya Fungsinya jelas. Tapi makin banyak penemu-penemu yang tidak bisa menentukan ini di tahap awal. kegunaannya dipikirkan kemudian, bersama-sama pengguna. Sebuah penemuan hanyalah satu momen dalam proses penciptaan: ada momen kelahiran ketika seseorang memikirkan sebuah ide. Kenyataannya adalah kebanyakan kreativitas bersifat kumulatif dan kolaboratif, seperti Wikipedia, ia dikembangkan dlm waktu yg panjang
The second reason why users are more and more important is that they are the source of big, disruptive innovations. If you want to find the big new ideas, it's often difficult to find them in mainstream markets, in big organizations. And just look inside large organizations and you'll see why that is so. So, you're in a big corporation. You're obviously keen to go up the corporate ladder. Do you go into your board and say, "Look, I've got a fantastic idea for an embryonic product in a marginal market, with consumers we've never dealt with before, and I'm not sure it's going to have a big payoff, but it could be really, really big in the future?" No, what you do, is you go in and you say, "I've got a fantastic idea for an incremental innovation to an existing product we sell through existing channels to existing users, and I can guarantee you get this much return out of it over the next three years."
Alasan kedua mengapa pengguna makin lama makin penting adalah karena mereka sumber innovasi yang radikal dan dahsyat. Kalau anda ingin mencari ide yg luar biasa, biasanya sukar sekali didapat di pasaran, atau di perusahaan besar. Kalau perusahaan besar itu dicermati anda akan tahu mengapa bisa begitu. Kalau anda kerja buat perusahaan besar; anda tentu akan berusaha keras untuk naik pangkat. Jadi apa mungkin anda datang ke atasan, dan bilang, dengarlah, saya punya ide hebat tentang produk yg tidak jelas bagi pasar yg belum berkembang dengan pelanggan yg belum pernah kita bidik, dan buat sekarang saya tidak yakin akan menghasilkan, tapi kedepannya bisa jadi spektakuler. Tidak mungkin. Yang biasa terjadi adalah anda bilang, saya punya ide hebat buat inovasi lanjutan dari produk yang sudah ada yang kita jual lewat distributor yang sudah ada dengan pelanggan saat ini, dan saya jamin ini kan menghasilkan sekian besar dalam tiga tahun.
Big corporations have an in-built tendency to reinforce past success. They've got so much sunk in it that it's very difficult for them to spot emerging new markets. Emerging new markets, then, are the breeding grounds for passionate users. Best example: who in the music industry, 30 years ago, would have said, "Yes, let's invent a musical form which is all about dispossessed black men in ghettos expressing their frustration with the world through a form of music that many people find initially quite difficult to listen to. That sounds like a winner; we'll go with it." (Laughter). So what happens? Rap music is created by the users. They do it on their own tapes, with their own recording equipment; they distribute it themselves. 30 years later, rap music is the dominant musical form of popular culture -- would never have come from the big companies. Had to start -- this is the third point -- with these pro-ams.
Perusahaan besar secara internal cenderung berusaha mengulang sukses masa lalu Mereka mencurahkan semua perhatian ke arah itu, sulit sekali bagi mereka utk menemukan pasar baru yg potensial. pasar baru yg potensial, selanjutnya, adalah jadi lahan subur bagi pengguna yg berdedikasi. Contoh paling bagus : Siapa di dalam industri musik, "30 tahun yg lalu, yg berani bilang, "Yuk, kita ciptakan bentuk musikal ttg ke-frustasi-an warga keturunan afrika di tempat kumuh, mengekspresikan rasa frustrasi mereka pada dunia melalui sejenis musik yg mungkin akan kedengaran tidak enak pada awalnya. Wah sepertinya ide bagus, mari kita wujudkan." (tertawa) Apa yg terjadi ? Musik rap diciptakan penggunanya. Mereka melakukannya di kaset sendiri, dengan peralatan rekaman mereka sendiri; dan mendistribusikan sendiri hasilnya. 30 tahun kemudian, musik rap jadi bentuk musikal dominan dalam budaya modern -- sesuatu yg mustahil datang dr perusahaan besar. Harus segera memulai -- ini point ketiga -- dengan pro-ams (pro amatir).
This is the phrase that I've used in some stuff which I've done with a think tank in London called Demos, where we've been looking at these people who are amateurs -- i.e., they do it for the love of it -- but they want to do it to very high standards. And across a whole range of fields -- from software, astronomy, natural sciences, vast areas of leisure and culture like kite-surfing, so on and so forth -- you find people who want to do things because they love it, but they want to do these things to very high standards. They work at their leisure, if you like. They take their leisure very seriously: they acquire skills; they invest time; they use technology that's getting cheaper -- it's not just the Internet: cameras, design technology, leisure technology, surfboards, so on and so forth. Largely through globalization, a lot of this equipment has got a lot cheaper. More knowledgeable consumers, more educated, more able to connect with one another, more able to do things together. Consumption, in that sense, is an expression of their productive potential. Why, we found, people were interested in this, is that at work they don't feel very expressed. They don't feel as if they're doing something that really matters to them, so they pick up these kinds of activities. This has huge organizational implications for very large areas of life.
Itu sebutan yang saya gunakan dalam beberapa pekerjaan yg saya kerjakan bersama think tank di London bernama Demos, dimana kami mempelajari orang-orang yg amatir dibidangnya -- mereka lakukan karena kecintaan mereka -- tapi mereka punya standar kerja yg tinggi. dan meluas ke berbagai bidang -- dari perangkat lunak, astronomi, ilmu alam, serta bidang luas di rekreasi dan budaya seperti kite-surfing, dan lain lain -- kami temukan orang yg melakukan sesuatu karena kecintaannya, tapi mereka mengerjakannya dgn sungguh-sungguh. Mereka kerjakan di waktu luang mereka. tapi mereka menggunakannya dgn sangat serius: mereka mendapatkan keahlian, mereka menginvestasikan waktu mereka, mereka menggunakan teknologi yg semakin murah, tidak hanya internet; kamera, teknologi desain, teknologi rekreasi, papan selancar, dan lain-lain. yg didapat lewat globalisasi, sehingga banyak dr hal itu jadi sangat murah. Pelanggannya makin canggih, makin pandai, makin terhubung satu dengan yg lain makin banyak yg bisa dikerjakan bersama. Berbelanja, dlm konteks itu, adalah ekspresi potensi produktif mereka. Alasan, yg kami temukan, mengapa orang menyukai ini, adalah karena di tempat kerja mereka tdk leluasa berekspresi. Mereka tidak merasa melakukan sesuatu yg berarti untuk mereka, jadi mereka melakukan berbagai kegiatan ini. Ini berpengaruh besar secara organisasi terhadap banyak area kehidupan.
Take astronomy as an example, which Yochai has already mentioned. Twenty years ago, 30 years ago, only big professional astronomers with very big telescopes could see far into space. And there's a big telescope in Northern England called Jodrell Bank, and when I was a kid, it was amazing, because the moon shots would take off, and this thing would move on rails. And it was huge -- it was absolutely enormous. Now, six amateur astronomers, working with the Internet, with Dobsonian digital telescopes -- which are pretty much open source -- with some light sensors developed over the last 10 years, the Internet -- they can do what Jodrell Bank could only do 30 years ago. So here in astronomy, you have this vast explosion of new productive resources. The users can be producers.
Astronomi contohnya, seperti yg telah disinggung Yochai 20, yg lalu, 30 tahun yg lalu hanya astronomer profesional dengan teleskop megah yang bisa mengintip angkasa raya. seperti teleskop di inggris utara yg disebut Jodrell Bank, Dulu waktu saya masih kecil, kelihatannya hebat, karena ketika citra bulan muncul, teleskop itu bergerak di relnya. Padahal ukurannya luar biasa besar. Tapi sekarang, enam orang astronomer amatir, bekerja lewat internet dgn teleskop digital Dobsonian yg praktis berbasis open source -- dgn sejumlah sensor cahaya dikembangkan 10 tahun terakhir, sekarang internet -- mereka bisa melakukan apa yg Jodrell Bank bisa lakukan 30 thn yg lalu Jadi dlm bidang astronomi, ada ledakan besar tersebut tentang sumberdaya yg produktif yang baru. Pengguna jadi produser
What does this mean, then, for our organizational landscape? Well, just imagine a world, for the moment, divided into two camps. Over here, you've got the old, traditional corporate model: special people, special places; patent it, push it down the pipeline to largely waiting, passive consumers. Over here, let's imagine we've got Wikipedia, Linux, and beyond -- open source. This is open; this is closed. This is new; this is traditional. Well, the first thing you can say, I think with certainty, is what Yochai has said already -- is there is a great big struggle between those two organizational forms. These people over there will do everything they can to stop these kinds of organizations succeeding, because they're threatened by them. And so the debates about copyright, digital rights, so on and so forth -- these are all about trying to stifle, in my view, these kinds of organizations. What we're seeing is a complete corruption of the idea of patents and copyright. Meant to be a way to incentivize invention, meant to be a way to orchestrate the dissemination of knowledge, they are increasingly being used by large companies to create thickets of patents to prevent innovation taking place.
Apa maknanya, kemudian, bagi landasan organisasi kami? Ya, bayangkan saja sebuah dunia, yg anggap saja, terbagi atas dua kelompok/ Sebelah sini, para senior, dgn model perusahaan tradisional. orang-orang spesial, tempat-tempat spesial; patenkan semuanya, masukkan ke jalur proses ke konsumen yg menunggu dgn pasif. Sebelah sini, mari bayangkan, kita memiliki Wikipedia, Linux, dan masih banyak lagi -- open source. Yang satu terbuka, yang satu tertutup. Yang satu baru, yang satu kuno. Hal pertama yang terpikir, tentunya, adalah seperti apa yg Yochai telah katakan -- bahwa ada satu pergulatan hebat antara kedua bentuk organisasi itu Orang-orang sebelah sini akan melakukan apa saja untuk menghalangi keberhasilan orang-orang sebelah sana karena mereka merasa terancam jadi semua perdebatan tentang hak cipta, kewenangan digital, dan lain-lain -- semua itu upaya untuk menjatuhkan, menurut saya, orang-orang di sebelah sana. Yang kita saksikan adalah kerusakan total dari konsep-konsep paten dan hak cipta. Yg semula dimaksudkan untuk memotivasi penemuan, untuk mengendalikan penyebaran pengetahuan, mereka lebih sering digunakan perusahaan-perusahaan besar untuk menciptakan dinding-dinding paten yang menghalangi terjadinya inovasi.
Let me just give you two examples. The first is: imagine yourself going to a venture capitalist and saying, "I've got a fantastic idea. I've invented this brilliant new program that is much, much better than Microsoft Outlook." Which venture capitalist in their right mind is going to give you any money to set up a venture competing with Microsoft, with Microsoft Outlook? No one. That is why the competition with Microsoft is bound to come -- will only come -- from an open-source kind of project.
Saya akan tunjukan dua contoh saja. pertama, bayangkan anda mengunjungi seorang venture capitalist. dan bilang, "Saya punya ide hebat. Saya telah menciptakan sebuah program baru yang jauh jauh lebih baik dr MS Oultook." Kira-kira investor mana yang mau mendanai anda untuk memulai sebuah usaha yg berkompetisi dgn Microsoft, dgn MS Outlook ? Tidak ada. Karena itulah, yg sanggup bersaing dengan Microsoft hanya bisa datang dari projek-projek seperti open-source.
So, there is a huge competitive argument about sustaining the capacity for open-source and consumer-driven innovation, because it's one of the greatest competitive levers against monopoly. There'll be huge professional arguments as well. Because the professionals, over here in these closed organizations -- they might be academics; they might be programmers; they might be doctors; they might be journalists -- my former profession -- say, "No, no -- you can't trust these people over here."
Ada banyak argumentasi ttg persaingan ttg mempertahankan kapasitas dr inovasi-inovasi berbasis open source dan konsumen, karena merupakan salah satu pesaing terbesar monopoli. Dari sisi profesionalisme juga akan banyak sanggahan. Karena para profesional, di sebalah sini di bagian yg tertutup yg terdiri dr cendekiawan, pemrogram, dokter atau wartawan -- profesi saya sebelumnya -- yg akan bilang, " tidak tidak -- orang-orang itu tidak bisa dipercaya"
When I started in journalism -- Financial Times, 20 years ago -- it was very, very exciting to see someone reading the newspaper. And you'd kind of look over their shoulder on the Tube to see if they were reading your article. Usually they were reading the share prices, and the bit of the paper with your article on was on the floor, or something like that, and you know, "For heaven's sake, what are they doing! They're not reading my brilliant article!" And we allowed users, readers, two places where they could contribute to the paper: the letters page, where they could write a letter in, and we would condescend to them, cut it in half, and print it three days later. Or the op-ed page, where if they knew the editor -- had been to school with him, slept with his wife -- they could write an article for the op-ed page. Those were the two places.
Ketika saya memulai karir jadi jurnalis -- Financial Times, 20 thn yg lalu -- adalah sangat sangat menyenangkan melihat orang membaca koran anda berusaha megintip dr belakang untuk melihat apa yg dibaca itu -- artikel yg dibaca itu milik anda. Biasanya mereka membaca info harga saham, sedangkan bagian yg memuat artikel anda tergeletak di lantai, atau dlm posisi serupa, dan anda akan, "demi Tuhan, apa yang mereka lakukan! masak artikel begitu hebat tidak dibaca!" Kita juga hanya mengizinkan pengguna maupun pembaca, dua tempat untuk berinteraksi: Kolom surat pembaca, kemana mereka bisa melayangkan surat, yg akan kita pilih-pilih, di proses hanya separonya, yg akan dicetak 2 hari kemudian. atau tajuk rencana, dimana mereka harus kenal baik dgn editor -- pernah sekolah bareng, atau berselingkuh dgn istrinya -- mereka dibolehkan menulis tajuk rencana Hanya dua cara itu.
Shock, horror: now, the readers want to be writers and publishers. That's not their role; they're supposed to read what we write. But they don't want to be journalists. The journalists think that the bloggers want to be journalists; they don't want to be journalists; they just want to have a voice. They want to, as Jimmy said, they want to have a dialogue, a conversation. They want to be part of that flow of information. What's happening there is that the whole domain of creativity is expanding. So, there's going to be a tremendous struggle. But, also, there's going to be tremendous movement from the open to the closed.
Dengan mengejutkan, sekarang, para pembaca mau jadi penulis dan penerbit. itu kan bukan tugas mereka, mestinya mereka hanya membaca saja. Padahal mereka tidak berniat menjadi jurnalis. Para jurnalis pikir bahwa para -- para blogger mau menjadi jurnalis; mereka tidak ingin menjadi jurnalis, mereka hanya mau didengar. mereka, seperti kata Jimmy, mereka mau berdialog, bercakap-cakap. Mereka mau jadi bagian dr arus informasi. Apa yg terjadi adalah keseluruhan ranah kreativitas itu meluas. Jadi pasti akan timbul pergulatan luar biasa. Tapi juga akan ada satu gerakan masif dari yg terbuka ke yg tertutup.
What you'll see, I think, is two things that are critical, and these, I think, are two challenges for the open movement. The first is: can we really survive on volunteers? If this is so critical, do we not need it funded, organized, supported in much more structured ways? I think the idea of creating the Red Cross for information and knowledge is a fantastic idea, but can we really organize that, just on volunteers? What kind of changes do we need in public policy and funding to make that possible? What's the role of the BBC, for instance, in that world? What should be the role of public policy? And finally, what I think you will see is the intelligent, closed organizations moving increasingly in the open direction. So it's not going to be a contest between two camps, but, in between them, you'll find all sorts of interesting places that people will occupy. New organizational models coming about, mixing closed and open in tricky ways. It won't be so clear-cut; it won't be Microsoft versus Linux -- there'll be all sorts of things in between. And those organizational models, it turns out, are incredibly powerful, and the people who can understand them will be very, very successful.
Yang akan terjadi, menurut saya, adalah dua hal penting, dan ini merupakan tantangan bagi gerakan open souce. Yg pertama adalah : apa kita benar-benar bisa mengandalkan relawan? Kalau ini sangat penting, apa tidak sebaiknya didanai, diatur dan didukung dalam cara-cara yang lebih terstruktur? menurut saya, ide menciptakan Palang Merah bagi informasi dan pengetahuan adalah ide yg fantastis, tapi apa benar kita bisa mengandalkan hanya para relawan? Penyesuaian apa yg dibutuhkan pada kebijakan publik? dan pendanaannya untuk mewujudkannya? Apa peranan BBC, misalnya, di dunia? Mestinya apa peranan kebijakan publik? Dan akhirnya, apa yg akan anda saksikan adalah organisasi yg tertutup tapi berkualitas lambat laun akan bergerak ke arah yg terbuka. Jadi tidak akan seperti pertandingan antara dua kubu, tapi yg akan terjadi diantara mereka adalah upaya-upaya baru yang menarik. model organisasi baru akan muncul, memadukan gaya tertutup dan terbuka dgn cerdik. Hasilnya tidak akan lugas; tidak akan jadi Microsoft vs Linux -- akan banyak hal-hal menarik dimana-mana. Model-model organisasi baru itu, ternyata, luar biasa dahsyat, dan mereka yg memahami cara kerjanya akan menjadi sangat, sangat sukses.
Let me just give you one final example of what that means. I was in Shanghai, in an office block built on what was a rice paddy five years ago -- one of the 2,500 skyscrapers they've built in Shanghai in the last 10 years. And I was having dinner with this guy called Timothy Chan. Timothy Chan set up an Internet business in 2000. Didn't go into the Internet, kept his money, decided to go into computer games. He runs a company called Shanda, which is the largest computer games company in China. Nine thousand servers all over China, has 250 million subscribers. At any one time, there are four million people playing one of his games. How many people does he employ to service that population? 500 people. Well, how can he service 250 million people from 500 employees? Because basically, he doesn't service them. He gives them a platform; he gives them some rules; he gives them the tools and then he kind of orchestrates the conversation; he orchestrates the action. But actually, a lot of the content is created by the users themselves. And it creates a kind of stickiness between the community and the company which is really, really powerful.
Saya akan berikan satu contoh terakhir ttg apa yg saya maksud. Saya pernah ke Shanghai, kerja di sebuah perkantoran yg dibangun di atas tanah yg 5 tahun yg lalu adalah sawah -- Yang jadi salah satu dr 2500 pencakar langit yg dibangun di Shanghai 10 tahun terakhir. Waktu itu saya makan malam dgn orang bernama Timothy Chen. Timothy Chen mendirikan bisnis internet pada tahun 2000. Tapi dia tidak buka usaha di internet, dia simpan uangnya, dan memutuskan masuk bisnis game komputer. Dia mengelola perusahan bernama Shanda, yg merupakan salah satu perusahaan permainan komputer terbesar di Cina. dgn 9000 server di seluruh Cina dan punya 250 juta pelanggan. Dalam satu waktu, 4 juta orang memainkan permainan yg dia jual. Kira-kira berapa banyak orang yg dipekerjakannya untuk melayani populasi itu? 500 orang. Lho, bagaimana mungkin dia melayani dua setengah 250 juta orang dgn 500 karyawan? Dia memang tidak melayani mereka. Dia menyediakan platform, dia menentukan aturannya, dia sediakan alatnya dan dia tinggal mendalangi komunikasi yg terjadi; dia mendalangi kegiatan yg diperlukan. Yang sebenarnya, sebagian besar isinya dikerjakan oleh penggunanya sendiri. dan ini menciptakan semacam ketergantungan antara komunitas dan perusahaan. yg adalah sangat sangat dahsyat.
The best measure of that: so you go into one of his games, you create a character that you develop in the course of the game. If, for some reason, your credit card bounces, or there's some other problem, you lose your character. You've got two options. One option: you can create a new character, right from scratch, but with none of the history of your player. That costs about 100 dollars. Or you can get on a plane, fly to Shanghai, queue up outside Shanda's offices -- cost probably 600, 700 dollars -- and reclaim your character, get your history back. Every morning, there are 600 people queuing outside their offices to reclaim these characters. (Laughter) So this is about companies built on communities, that provide communities with tools, resources, platforms in which they can share. He's not open source, but it's very, very powerful.
Ini buktinya : Kalau anda mainkan permainannya, anda ciptakan sebuah karakter yg akan tumbuh sejalan dgn apa yg anda mainkan Kalau, karena suatu sebab, kartu kredit anda ditolak, atau karena masalah lainnya anda akan kehilangan karakter anda. pilihannya tinggal dua Pertama : anda bikin karakter baru dari nol, tanpa "pengalaman" yg anda dapat selama bermain. yang biayanya sekitar 100 dolar. atau anda naik pesawat dan terbang ke Shanghai mengantri di salah-satu kantor Shanda -- dgn biaya sekitar 600, 700 dolar -- dan menghidupkan kembali karakter anda lengkap dgn pengalamannya Setiap pagi ada sekitar 600 orang yg mengantri diluar kantor mereka untuk menghidupkan kembali karakter mereka. Jadi ini tentang perusahaan yg dibangun diatas komunitas, yg menyediakan alat bagi komunitas, sumberdaya, platform yg bisa mereka pakai bersama. Usahanya tidak open source tapi jadi sangat menghasilkan
So here is one of the challenges, I think, for people like me, who do a lot of work with government. If you're a games company, and you've got a million players in your game, you only need one percent of them to be co-developers, contributing ideas, and you've got a development workforce of 10,000 people. Imagine you could take all the children in education in Britain, and one percent of them were co-developers of education. What would that do to the resources available to the education system? Or if you got one percent of the patients in the NHS to, in some sense, be co-producers of health.
Jadi itulah tantangannya, menurut saya, bagi orang-orang seperti saya yang sering bekerja untuk pemerintah. Kalau anda menjalankan perusahaan game, yg punya sejuta pelanggan, hanya perlu 1 persen saja dr mereka untuk ikutan membangun, memberikan ide, dan menghasilkan tenaga kerja kreatif sebanyak 10.000 orang. Bayangkan jika anda melibatkan semua anak di inggris dalam kegiatan pendidikan, dan 1 persen dr mereka ikut membangun sistem pendidikannya. Kira-kira apa yg akan terjadi dgn sumber daya pendidikan yang ada? Atau kalau satu persen dr semua pasien di NHS (National Health Service) bisa terlibat dlm membentuk sistem kesehatan.
The reason why -- despite all the efforts to cut it down, to constrain it, to hold it back -- why these open models will still start emerging with tremendous force, is that they multiply our productive resources. And one of the reasons they do that is that they turn users into producers, consumers into designers.
Alasan utama mengapa -- meski dengan berbagai upaya menjatuhkannya, membatasinya, menahannya -- mengapa model terbuka ini tetap saja bersemi dgn dorongan begitu kuat, adalah karena model itu melipat gandakan sumberdaya. Dan alasan kenapa itu bisa terjadi adalah karena model itu mengubah pelanggan menjadi produser; pengguna menjadi perancang.
Thank you very much.
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