My story is a little bit about war. It's about disillusionment. It's about death. And it's about rediscovering idealism in all of that wreckage. And perhaps also, there's a lesson about how to deal with our screwed-up, fragmenting and dangerous world of the 21st century. I don't believe in straightforward narratives. I don't believe in a life or history written as decision "A" led to consequence "B" led to consequence "C" -- these neat narratives that we're presented with, and that perhaps we encourage in each other. I believe in randomness, and one of the reasons I believe that is because me becoming a diplomat was random. I'm colorblind. I was born unable to see most colors. This is why I wear gray and black most of the time, and I have to take my wife with me to chose clothes.
Historia ime eshte pak rreth luftes. Ka te beje me zhgenjimin. Ka te beje me vdekjen. Dhe rreth rizbulimit idealizmit ne te tere ate mbeturine. Dhe ndoshta , eshte nje mesim se si te manovrosh me mosmarrveshjet tona , apo coptimet e nje bote te rrezikshme te shekullit te 21-te. Une nuk besoj ne tregime te ndershme. Une nuk besoj ne nje jete apo histori e shkruajtur me qellimin "A" te con ne konseguencen "B" me pas ne konseguencen "C" -- keto tregime modeste qe ne prezantohemi me, dhe ndoshta ne inkurajojme njeri-tjetrin . Une besoj tek rastesia, dhe nje nga arsyet qe une besoj ate eshte sepse une qe u bera diplomat ishte e rastesishme. Une nuk i dalloj dot ngjyrat . Une linda me mundesi te kufizuar per te pare shumicen e ngjyrave. Kjo tregon qe une vishem me ngjyre gri dhe te zeze gjate gjithe kohes, dhe me duhet te marre dhe gruan me vehte per te me zgjedhur rrobat.
And I'd always wanted to be a fighter pilot when I was a boy. I loved watching planes barrel over our holiday home in the countryside. And it was my boyhood dream to be a fighter pilot. And I did the tests in the Royal Air Force to become a pilot, and sure enough, I failed. I couldn't see all the blinking different lights, and I can't distinguish color. So I had to choose another career, and this was in fact relatively easy for me, because I had an abiding passion all the way through my childhood, which was international relations. As a child, I read the newspaper thoroughly. I was fascinated by the Cold War, by the INF negotiations over intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the proxy war between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in Angola or Afghanistan. These things really interested me. And so I decided quite at an early age I wanted to be a diplomat. And I, one day, I announced this to my parents -- and my father denies this story to this day -- I said, "Daddy, I want to be a diplomat." And he turned to me, and he said, "Carne, you have to be very clever to be a diplomat." (Laughter) And my ambition was sealed.
Dhe une gjithmone kam dashur te behem pilot luftarak kur kam qene i ri . Mbaroja per te pare fucite e avionit gjate pushimeve rreth gjithe qytetit. Dhe ajo ishte enderra ime te behesha pilot luftarak. Dhe dhashe provimet ne Forcat Ajrore Mbreterore per tu bere pilot, dhe sigurisht , qe deshtova. Sepse nuk mund te shikoja pulsimin e dritave te ndryshme , dhe nuk mund te dalloja ngjyrat. Keshtu qe mu desh te zgjedh nje karriere tjeter, dhe ishte ne fakt relativisht e lehte per mua, sepse une kisha nje pasion te qendrueshem gjate gjithe kohes se femijrise time, qe ishin marrdheniet nderkombetare. Si femije qe isha , e lexoja gazeten te gjithe. U mrekullova nga Lufta e Ftohte, me negocimet e INF rreth nje rreze te ndermjetme predhash berthamore, ne luften e prokuruar nga Bashkimi Sovjetik dhe U.S. ne Angola dhe Afganistan. Keto gjera vertet me interesonin mua. Keshtu qe une vendosa qe kur isha i ri qe do behesha diplomat . Dhe Une, nje dite, ja shpalla kete gje prinderve te mi -- dhe babai ma mohoi kete histori deri me sot -- I thashe, " Babi une dua te behem Diplomat. " Ai u kthue nga une, dhe tha, "Carne, duhet te jesh shume i zgjuar per tu bere nje diplomat." ( Te qeshura ) Dhe ambicja ime u vulos.
In 1989, I entered the British Foreign Service. That year, 5,000 people applied to become a diplomat, and 20 of us succeeded. And as those numbers suggest, I was inducted into an elite and fascinating and exhilarating world. Being a diplomat, then and now, is an incredible job, and I loved every minute of it -- I enjoyed the status of it. I bought myself a nice suit and wore leather-soled shoes and reveled in this amazing access I had to world events. I traveled to the Gaza Strip. I headed the Middle East Peace Process section in the British Foreign Ministry. I became a speechwriter for the British Foreign Secretary. I met Yasser Arafat. I negotiated with Saddam's diplomats at the U.N. Later, I traveled to Kabul and served in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. And I would travel in a C-130 transport and go and visit warlords in mountain hideaways and negotiate with them about how we were going to eradicate Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, surrounded by my Special Forces escort, who, themselves, had to have an escort of a platoon of Royal Marines, because it was so dangerous. And that was exciting -- that was fun. It was really interesting. And it's a great cadre of people, incredibly close-knit community of people.
Ne 1989, Une hyra ne Sherbimet Britanike te Huaja. Ate vit, 5,000 njerez aplikuan per tu bere diplomat, dhe 20 nga ne dolen me sukses. Dhe sic ato numura premtonin , Une u rekrutova ne brendesi te nje elite te nje bote te magjepsur dhe gazmore. Duke qene nje diplomat, atehere dhe tani , eshte nje pune e pabesueshme, dhe e admiroja cdo minute te saj -- Une e gezoja ate status. Bleva nje kostum per vehte dhe vishja kepuce lekure dhe isha entuziast per kete qe qasje qe une kisha ne evente boterore Une kam udhetuar ne Ripin e Gazes. Une drejtoja Procesin e Paces ne Lindjen e Mesme pjese kjo e Ministrise se Jashteme Britanike. Une u bera nje perpilues fjalimesh per Sekretaren e Jashtme Britanike Une takova me Yasser Arafat. Une negociova me diplomatet e Saddamit ne Kombet e Bashkuara. Me vone, une udhetova per ne Kabul kam punuar ne Afganistan mbas renies se Talebaneve. Dhe udhetoja me nje mjet tranposrti C-130 per te takuar udheheqesit ushtarake te fshehur ne male dhe te negocioja me ta sesi do te shfarosnim Al Qaeda nga Afganistani, i rrethuar nga eskortat e Forcave Speciale, te cilet, per vehten e tyre, i duhej eskorte e Marines Mbreterore, nga qe ishte shume e rrezikshme. Dhe kjo ishte emocionusese -- ishte argetuese. Ishte me te vertete interesante. Dhe eshte nje grup kuadrosh njerzish, shume te lidhur me njeri-tjetrin.
And the pinnacle of my career, as it turned out, was when I was posted to New York. I'd already served in Germany, Norway, various other places, but I was posted to New York to serve on the U.N. Security Council for the British delegation. And my responsibility was the Middle East, which was my specialty. And there, I dealt with things like the Middle East peace process, the Lockerbie issue -- we can talk about that later, if you wish -- but above all, my responsibility was Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and the sanctions we placed on Iraq to oblige it to disarm itself of these weapons. I was the chief British negotiator on the subject, and I was steeped in the issue. And anyway, my tour -- it was kind of a very exciting time. I mean it was very dramatic diplomacy. We went through several wars during my time in New York. I negotiated for my country the resolution in the Security Council of the 12th of September 2001 condemning the attacks of the day before, which were, of course, deeply present to us actually living in New York at the time. So it was kind of the best of time, worst of times kind of experience. I lived the high-life. Although I worked very long hours, I lived in a penthouse in Union Square. I was a single British diplomat in New York City; you can imagine what that might have meant. (Laughter) I had a good time.
Pastaj, kulmi i karrieres time, sic doli me vone, kur me derguan ne New York. Une do te desha te punoja ne Gjermani, Norvegji, ne vende te ndryshme, por me derguan ne New York ne sherbim te Keshillit te Kombeve te Bashkuara per delegacionin Britanik. Dhe pergjegjesia ime ishte Lindja e Mesme, qe ishte e preferuara ime. Dhe atje, une u mora me gjera si procesi i paqes ne Lindjen e Mesme, ceshtja Lockerbie --- ne mund te flasim per kete me vone, nqse doni -- por mbi te gjitha, pergjegjesia ime ishte Iraku dhe armet e shkaterrimit ne mase dhe sanksionet qe ne vume ne Irak per te detyruar per c'armatimin e keyre armeve. Une isha Shefi i negociatorit Britanik per kete teme, dhe une u ndala ne kete ceshtje. Dhe gjithsesi , udhetimi im -- ishte shume intensiv per mua. Dua te them ishte nje diplomaci dramatike. Ne shkuam ne shume luftra gjate kohes time ne New York. Une negociova per vendin tim per zgjidhjen ne Keshillin e Sigurimit te 12-te shtatorit te 2001 duke denuar ashper sulmet e nje dite me pare, qe ishin, pa dyshim, shume te renda per ne qe jetonim aktualisht ne New York ate kohe. Pra ishte nje kohe e mire por edhe e keqe per te tilla eksperienca. Une jetova nje jete jashte mase aktive. Megjithse, punoja me ore te zgjatura, Une jetoja ne nje papafingo ne Union Square. Isha i vetmi diplomat Britanik ne New York... ... mund ta imagjinoni cfare do te thoshte kjo. ( Te qeshura ) Une ja kalova mire.
But in 2002, when my tour came to an end, I decided I wasn't going to go back to the job that was waiting for me in London. I decided to take a sabbatical, in fact, at the New School, Bruce. In some inchoate, inarticulate way I realized that there was something wrong with my work, with me. I was exhausted, and I was also disillusioned in a way I couldn't quite put my finger on. And I decided to take some time out from work. The Foreign Office was very generous. You could take these special unpaid leave, as they called them, and yet remain part of the diplomatic service, but not actually do any work. It was nice. And eventually, I decided to take a secondment to join the U.N. in Kosovo, which was then under U.N. administration.
Por ne 2002, kur udhetimit tim po i vinte fundi, vendosa qe nuk do te kthehesha prape tek puna qe po me priste ne Londer. Une vendosa te bej pak pushim , ne te vertete, tek Shkolla e Re, Bruce. Ne menyre provizore, apo pa e ditur mire kuptova qe dicka nuk shkonte ne punen time, me mua. Isha i rraskapitur, dhe isha gjithashtu i diziluzionuar ne nje menyre qe s'mund as ta mendoja. Dhe vendosa te marre sisa dite pushimi nga puna. Zyra e puneve te jashteme u tregua shume zemer-gjere. Une mund ti merrja keto pushime speciale qe nuk paguhen, sic i quajne ata, dhe ende jane pjese e sherbimit diplomatic, por jo per te bere ndonje pune. Ishte e lezetshme. Dhe perfundimisht, une vendosa per nje pune te dyte prane Kombeve te Bashkuara ne Kosove, qe ishte atehere nen administrimin e Kombeve te Bashkuara.
And two things happened in Kosovo, which kind of, again, shows the randomness of life, because these things turned out to be two of the pivots of my life and helped to deliver me to the next stage. But they were random things. One was that, in the summer of 2004, the British government, somewhat reluctantly, decided to have an official inquiry into the use of intelligence on WMD in the run up to the Iraq War, a very limited subject. And I testified to that inquiry in secret. I had been steeped in the intelligence on Iraq and its WMD, and my testimony to the inquiry said three things: that the government exaggerated the intelligence, which was very clear in all the years I'd read it. And indeed, our own internal assessment was very clear that Iraq's WMD did not pose a threat to its neighbors, let alone to us. Secondly, the government had ignored all available alternatives to war, which in some ways was a more discreditable thing still. The third reason, I won't go into. But anyway, I gave that testimony, and that presented me with a crisis. What was I going to do? This testimony was deeply critical of my colleagues, of my ministers, who had, in my view had perpetrated a war on a falsehood.
Dhe dy gjera ndodhen ne Kosove, te ciles , perseri tregojne rastesite e jetes, sepse keto gjera u bene dy gjera qe do te me kthenin mbrapa ne jeten time dhe me ndihmuan per te me cuar ne fazen tjeter. Por ishin gjera te rastesishme. Njera ishte, ne veren e 2004-es, qeveria Britanike, disi pa deshire, vendosi per te bere nje hetim zyrtar ne perdorimin e inteligjences mbi WMD gjate luftes ne Irak, nje teme e limituar. Une deshmova per ate hetim ne menyre sekrete. Une u ndala ne sherbimin inteligjent mbi Irakun dhe Armet e Demtimit ne mase te tij, dhe ne ate deshmi permenda tre gjera: qe qeveria e kishte ekzagjeruar me inteligjencen, qe ishte me se i dukshem ne te gjithe vitet qe kam lexuar une. Dhe ne te vertet, vleresimi jone i brendshem ishte shume transparent qe WMDm e Irakut nuk perbente kercenim per komshinjte tane, por na ishte lene neve. Se dyti , qeveria kishte injoruar cdo lloj alternative per lufte, qe ne disa menyra ishte akoma dicka e turpshme . Arsyeja e trete, Une nuk desha te hyja . Por gjithsesi, une e dhashe ate deshmi, dhe ajo me beri te ndihem ne siklet. Cfare do te beja une ? Kjo deshmi ishte thellesisht kritike per koleget e mi, e ministrive te mia, qe kishin, per mendimin time kishim penetruar nje lufte e gabuar .
And so I was in crisis. And this wasn't a pretty thing. I moaned about it, I hesitated, I went on and on and on to my long-suffering wife, and eventually I decided to resign from the British Foreign Service. I felt -- there's a scene in the Al Pacino movie "The Insider," which you may know, where he goes back to CBS after they've let him down over the tobacco guy, and he goes, "You know, I just can't do this anymore. Something's broken." And it was like that for me. I love that movie. I felt just something's broken. I can't actually sit with my foreign minister or my prime minister again with a smile on my face and do what I used to do gladly for them. So took a running leap and jumped over the edge of a cliff.
Dhe keshtu qe une isha ne krize. Dhe kjo nuk ishte gje e mire. Une renkoja per te, hezitoja, Une vazhdova te torturoj gruan time te pervuajtur, dhe perfundimisht une vendosa ta le Sherbimin e Huaj Britanik. Une u ndieva si -- eshte nje fragment tek filmi me Al Pacino"The Insider",nese ju kujtohet ku ai kthehet tek CBS mbasi e kishin abandonuar ndaj djalit te cigareve, dhe shkon, " A e di , Une nuk mund ta beje me kete. Dicka eshte thyer." Dhe keshtu ishte per mua. Une e pelqej ate film. Une u ndieva qe dicka eshte thyer. Une nuk mund me te ulem me ministrin e jashtem ose kryeministin perseri me ate buzeqeshjen ne fytyren time dhe te bej ate qe beja me gjithe qef per ta. Keshtu qe bera nje kapercim dhe kerceva pertej kufirit te shkembit.
And it was a very, very uncomfortable, unpleasant feeling. And I started to fall. And today, that fall hasn't stopped; I'm still falling. But, in a way, I've got used to the sensation of it. And in a way, I kind of like the sensation of it a lot better than I like actually standing on top of the cliff, wondering what to do. A second thing happened in Kosovo, which kind of -- I need a quick gulp of water, forgive me. A second thing happened in Kosovo, which kind of delivered the answer, which I couldn't really answer, which is, "What do I do with my life?" I love diplomacy -- I have no career -- I expected my entire life to be a diplomat, to be serving my country. I wanted to be an ambassador, and my mentors, my heroes, people who got to the top of my profession, and here I was throwing it all away. A lot of my friends were still in it. My pension was in it. And I gave it up. And what was I going to do?
Dhe ishte shume, shume e pa kendeshme, nje ndjesi e pa kendeshme. Dhe une fillova te bie, Dhe sot, kjo renie nuk ka ndaluar; Une jam ende duke rene. Por, nje menyre, qe une jam mesuar me ndjesine e saj. Dhe ne nje menyre, me pelqen kjo ndjesi shume me teper sesa te jem ne maje te shkembit, duke menduar cfare te bej. Nje tjeter gje ndodhi ne Kosove, e tipit -- me duhet te gllenjke uje, me falni . Nje tjeter gje ndodhi ne Kosove, nje lloj pergjigje percjellse, te ciles s'mund to pergjigjesha, qe eshte, "Cfare do te bej me jeten time?" Une e admiroj diplomacine -- Une s'kam kariere -- Une prisja tere jeten time per tu bere nje diplomat, ti sherbeja vendit tim. Desha te behesh nje ambasador, dhe keshilltaret e mi, heronjte e mi, njerez qe kane hipur ne majen e professionit, dhe ketu une po i hidhja te gjitha poshte. Shume nga miqte e mi ishin akoma ne pune. Pensioni im ishte ne te. Dhe une hoqa dore. Dhe cfare do te beja ?
And that year, in Kosovo, this terrible, terrible thing happened, which I saw. In March 2004, there were terrible riots all over the province -- as it then was -- of Kosovo. 18 people were killed. It was anarchy. And it's a very horrible thing to see anarchy, to know that the police and the military -- there were lots of military troops there -- actually can't stop that rampaging mob who's coming down the street. And the only way that rampaging mob coming down the street will stop is when they decide to stop and when they've had enough burning and killing. And that is not a very nice feeling to see, and I saw it. And I went through it. I went through those mobs. And with my Albanian friends, we tried to stop it, but we failed. And that riot taught me something, which isn't immediately obvious and it's kind of a complicated story.
Dhe po ate vit ne Kosove, gjera te tmerrshme ndodhen, qe i pashe . Ne Mars te 2004, aty ishin trazira te temerrshme gjate gjithe provinces --sec ishte me pas -- ne Kosove. 18 njerez u vrane. Aty ishte nje konfuzion. Eshte nje gje e tmerrshme te shohesh kete konfuzion, duke ditur qe policia dhe ushtria -- aty kishte shume trupa ushtarake -- s'mund ta ndalonin dot kete turme te inatosur qe po vinte nga fundi rruges. Dhe e vetmja menyre per te ndaluar kete tumre te inatosur ishte vetem kur donin ata te ndalonin kur te mjaftoheshin me djegjet dhe vrasjet. Dhe kjo eshte nje ndjesi e tmerrshme per ta pare, dhe une e pashe ate. Dhe une shkova permes tyre.Une u futa ne turme. Dhe me miqte e mi Shqiptare, u munduam ti ndalojme, por deshtuam. Dhe ajo trazi me mesoi mua dicka, qe nuk ishte menjehere e dukshme dhe eshte nje histori e komplikuar.
But one of the reasons that riot took place -- those riots, which went on for several days, took place -- was because the Kosovo people were disenfranchised from their own future. There were diplomatic negotiations about the future of Kosovo going on then, and the Kosovo government, let alone the Kosovo people, were not actually participating in those talks. There was this whole fancy diplomatic system, this negotiation process about the future of Kosovo, and the Kosovars weren't part of it. And funnily enough, they were frustrated about that. Those riots were part of the manifestation of that frustration. It wasn't the only reason, and life is not simple, one reason narratives. It was a complicated thing, and I'm not pretending it was more simple than it was. But that was one of the reasons.
Por nje nga arsyet qe ajo revolte mori shkas -- ato trazira, qe vazhduan per dite me radhe, u zhvilluan -- sepse Kosovareve ju ishte hequr e drejta e votes per te ardhmen e tyre. Kishte disa negocime per te ardhem e Kosoves qe po vazhdonin, dhe qeveria e Kosoves, i la vetem Kosovaret, aktualisht mos marre pjese ne keto bisedime. Ishte nje trillim i tere ne sistemin diplomatic, ke proces negocimi rreth te ardhmes se Kosoves, dhe qe Kosovaret nuk ishin pjese e saj . Dhe me e forta ishte, qe ata ishin te irrituar per kete. Keto trazira ishin pjese e manifestimit te ketij deshtimi. Nuk ishte arsyeja e vetme, dhe jeta nuk eshte e lehte me nje argument te vetem. Ishte dicka e komplikuar, dhe une nuk pretendoj qe ishte me e lehte se c'ishte. Por ajo ishte nje nga arsyet.
And that kind of gave me the inspiration -- or rather to be precise, it gave my wife the inspiration. She said, "Why don't you advise the Kosovars? Why don't you advise their government on their diplomacy?" And the Kosovars were not allowed a diplomatic service. They were not allowed diplomats. They were not allowed a foreign office to help them deal with this immensely complicated process, which became known as the Final Status Process of Kosovo. And so that was the idea. That was the origin of the thing that became Independent Diplomat, the world's first diplomatic advisory group and a non-profit to boot. And it began when I flew back from London after my time at the U.N. in Kosovo. I flew back and had dinner with the Kosovo prime minister and said to him, "Look, I'm proposing that I come and advise you on the diplomacy. I know this stuff. It's what I do. Why don't I come and help you?" And he raised his glass of raki to me and said, "Yes, Carne. Come."
Dhe ajo gje mua me frymezoi -- ose per te qene me i sakte, i dha gruas time frymezimin . Ajo tha, " Pse nuk i keshillon Kosovaret ? Pse nuk e keshillon qeverine e tyre rreth diplomacise?" Kosovareve nuk i ishin lejuar sherbimi diplomatik. Nuk lejohej te kishte dipllomate. Nuk ju ishte lejuar zyra e puneve te jashtme dhe per ti ndihmuar ata ishte nje proces shume i komplikuar , qe u be me vone si Statusi Final i Kosoves. Dhe keshtu me erdhi ideja. Kjo ishte origjina e kesaj gjeje qe me vone u krijua Diplomati Pavarur, grupi i pare ne bote me keshillime diplomatike qe eshte jo-fitim-prurese ne zhvillim. Dhe filloi kur une u ktheva ne Londer mbas kohes time tek U.N ne Kosove. Une u ktheva dhe pata nje darke pune me Kryeministrin e Kosoves dhe i thashe atij, Shiko, po ju propozoj qe te vij per t'ju keshilluar mbi dipllomacine. Une marr vesh. Kjo eshte ajo qe bej une.Pse mos te vij the t'ju ndihmoj juve? Dhe ai ngriti goten e rakise dhe me tha, "Po, Carne. Hajde. "
And I came to Kosovo and advised the Kosovo government. Independent Diplomat ended up advising three successive Kosovo prime ministers and the multi-party negotiation team of Kosovo. And Kosovo became independent. Independent Diplomat is now established in five diplomatic centers around the world, and we're advising seven or eight different countries, or political groups, depending on how you wish to define them -- and I'm not big on definitions. We're advising the Northern Cypriots on how to reunify their island. We're advising the Burmese opposition, the government of Southern Sudan, which -- you heard it here first -- is going to be a new country within the next few years. We're advising the Polisario Front of the Western Sahara, who are fighting to get their country back from Moroccan occupation after 34 years of dispossession. We're advising various island states in the climate change negotiations, which is suppose to culminate in Copenhagen.
Dhe une erdha ne Kosove dhe keshillova qeverine Kosovare. Diplomati Pavarur perfundoi me suksess me keshillimin e tre Kryeministrave te ardhshem te Kosoves dhe grupin e shume partive te Kosoves. Dhe Kosova u be e pavarur. Diplomati Pavarur tashme eshte themeluar ne pese qendra diplomatike neper bote, dhe ne ofrojme asistencen tone ne shtate ose tete, vende te ndryshme, ose grupe politike, varet se si desheron ti ti percaktosh ato -- une nuk jam per percaktime te medha. Ne po keshillojme Qipron Veriore se si te ri-unifikojne ishujt e tyre. Ne jemi duke keshilluar opoziten e Burmes, qeverine e Sudanit te Jugut, qe -- e degjuat per te paren -- qe do te behen nje shtet i ri brenda disa viteve. Ne jemi duke keshilluar Frontin Polisario te Saharase Perendimore, ne po luftojme per ti kthyer mbrapsh vendin e tyre nga uzurpimi Moroken mbas 34 vjeteve shpronesim. Ne jemi duke keshilluar shtetet ishuj ne negocimet rreth ndryshimit te klimes, qe supozohet te arrije kulmin ne Kopenhagen.
There's a bit of randomness here too because, when I was beginning Independent Diplomat, I went to a party in the House of Lords, which is a ridiculous place, but I was holding my drink like this, and I bumped into this guy who was standing behind me. And we started talking, and he said -- I told him what I was doing, and I told him rather grandly I was going to establish Independent Diplomat in New York. At that time there was just me -- and me and my wife were moving back to New York. And he said, "Why don't you see my colleagues in New York?" And it turned out he worked for an innovation company called ?What If!, which some of you have probably heard of. And one thing led to another, and I ended up having a desk in ?What If! in New York, when I started Independent Diplomat. And watching ?What If! develop new flavors of chewing gum for Wrigley or new flavors for Coke actually helped me innovate new strategies for the Kosovars and for the Saharawis of the Western Sahara. And I began to realize that there are different ways of doing diplomacy -- that diplomacy, like business, is a business of solving problems, and yet the word innovation doesn't exist in diplomacy; it's all zero sum games and realpolitik and ancient institutions that have been there for generations and do things the same way they've always done things.
Ka dicka te zakonshme gjithashtu edhe ketu sepse , kur isha ne fillimet e Diplomatit te Pavarur, Shkova ne nje feste me disa pjestare te larte te parlamentit, qe ishte dhe vend qesharak , por e mbaja ne dore goten kshu , dhe u perplasa tek ky djale qe po qendronte mbrapa meje. Dhe ne filluam te flasim, dhe ai tha -- Une i thashe atij se cfare po beja, dhe i thashe atij mjaft gjeresisht Qe une do te themeloja Diplomatin e Pavarur ne New York. Ne ate kohe isha vetem une -- dhe une dhe gruaja ime do te shkonim ne New York . Dhe ai the, " Pse nuk i takon koleget e mi ne New York ?" Dhe ja ku doli ai punonte per nje kompani zhvillimi e quajtur? Cfare nese!, qe ndoshta disa nga ju mbase e kane degjuar. Dhe punet moren drejtim duke perfunduar ne nje tavoline pune ne? Cfare nese! ne New York , kur une fillova Diplomatin e Pavarur. Duke pare? Cfare nese! te gjeja nje shije te re cemcakizi per Wrigley ose shije te re per Coca Cola actualisht me ndihmoje mua te sillja dicka te re strategji te reja per Kosovaret dhe per ata te Saharas te Saharase Perendimore. Dhe une fillova te kuptoje qe keto jane menyra te ndryshme per te bere diplomacy -- qe dipllomacia, si busnesi , eshte nje bisnes qe zgjidh problemet , dhe ende fjala risi nuk ekziston ne diplomaci; eshte nje shumezim me zero ne politiken reale dhe institucionet e lashta qe kane qene aty perpara shume brezave kane bere te njejten gje brez pas brezi.
And Independent Diplomat, today, tries to incorporate some of the things I learned at ?What If!. We all sit in one office and shout at each other across the office. We all work on little laptops and try to move desks to change the way we think. And we use naive experts who may know nothing about the countries we're dealing with, but may know something about something else to try to inject new thinking into the problems that we try to address for our clients. It's not easy, because our clients, by definition, are having a difficult time, diplomatically.
Dhe Diplomati Pavarur, sot, perpiqet te fuse disa nga gjerat qe une mesova tek? Cfare nese!.. Ne te gjithe ulemi ne zyre dhe i bertasim njeri-tjetrit matane zyres. Ne te gjithe punojme me laptopa te vegjel dhe perpiqemi te zhvendosim tavolinat dhe te ndryshojme menyren e te menduarit. Dhe ne perdorim eksperta naive qe ndoshta nuk dime asgje rreth shteteve qe ne meremi, por mund te dine dicka rreth dickaje tjeter per ty perpjekur per te injektuar menyra te reja te menduari ne probleme qe ne perpiqemi ti adresojme per klientet tane. Dhe nuk eshte e lehte, sepse klientet tane, sipas percaktimit, jane duke kaluar kohe te veshtira, ne dipllomaci.
There are, I don't know, some lessons from all of this, personal and political -- and in a way, they're the same thing. The personal one is falling off a cliff is actually a good thing, and I recommend it. And it's a good thing to do at least once in your life just to tear everything up and jump. The second thing is a bigger lesson about the world today. Independent Diplomat is part of a trend which is emerging and evident across the world, which is that the world is fragmenting. States mean less than they used to, and the power of the state is declining. That means the power of others things is rising. Those other things are called non-state actors. They may be corporations, they may be mafiosi, they may be nice NGOs, they may anything, any number of things. We are living in a more complicated and fragmented world. If governments are less able to affect the problems that affect us in the world, then that means, who is left to deal with them, who has to take greater responsibility to deal with them? Us. If they can't do it, who's left to deal with it? We have no choice but to embrace that reality.
Ka disa, Nuk e di , disa leksione nga e gjitha kjo , personale dhe politike -- ne nje menyre, qe ato jane te njejtat gjera. Ajo personale eshte duke rene nga shkembi eshte aktualisht nje gje e mire, dhe une e rekomandoj ate. Dhe eshte gje e mire pe te bere te pakten ne jeten tende vetem sa te shkepus cdo gje dhe te kercej. Gjeja e dyte eshte nje mesim me i madh rreth botes sot. Indipendent Diplomat eshte pjese e nje tendence qe po zhvillohet dhe evidente pertej botes, qe eshte ajo e coptimit te saj. Shtetet nuk jane me ato qe kane qene, dhe fuqia e shtetit eshte ne renie. Kjo do te thote qe fuqia e gjerave te tjera eshte duke u ngritur. Keto gjera te tjera quhen aktore jo-shteterore. Ato mund te jene korporata, ato mund te jene mafioze, mund te jene NGOs, mund te jene cfaredo, cdo numer gjerash. Ne po jetojme ne nje bote me shume te komplikuar dhe te coptuar. Ne qoftese qeverite jane me pak te afta per te zgjidhur probelmet qe na prekin neve ne bote, kjo do te thote, qe kush do me merret me me to , kush duhet te marri pergjegjesine per tu marre me to ? Neve. Nqs nuk mund ta besh , kush ka ngelur per ta bere ate? Ne nuk kemi zgjedhje per te perqafuar kete realitet.
What this means is it's no longer good enough to say that international relations, or global affairs, or chaos in Somalia, or what's going on in Burma is none of your business, and that you can leave it to governments to get on with. I can connect any one of you by six degrees of separation to the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia. Ask me how later, particularly if you eat fish, interestingly enough, but that connection is there. We are all intimately connected. And this isn't just Tom Friedman, it's actually provable in case after case after case. What that means is, instead of asking your politicians to do things, you have to look to yourself to do things. And Independent Diplomat is a kind of example of this in a sort of loose way.
Cfare do te thote kjo qe nuk eshte me e mjatueshme per te thene qe marrdheniet nderkombetare, ose punet globale, ose kaosi ne Somali, apo cfare po ndosh ne Burma nuk eshte puna jote, dhe ti mund ta lesh ate ne dore te qeverive per tu marre. Une mund te lidhe cdo njerin nga ju me gjashte marrdhenie ndarjeje tek milicia Al-Shabbab ne Somali. Me pyesni mua me vone, vecanerisht kur ha peshk, vertet majft por lidhja qendron aty. Ne te gjithe jemi te lidhur ngushte. Dhe kjo nuk eshte vetem Tom Fridman, eshte e vertetueshem rast mbas rasti. Ajo qe do te thote eshte, ne vend qe te pyesesh politikanet te bejne dicka duhet te shikosh vehten se si ben gjerat. Dhe Diplomati Pavarur eshte nje lloj shembulli e kesaj ne nje lloj menyre te humbur.
There aren't neat examples, but one example is this: the way the world is changing is embodied in what's going on at the place I used to work -- the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. was established in 1945. Its charter is basically designed to stop conflicts between states -- interstate conflict. Today, 80 percent of the agenda of the U.N. Security Council is about conflicts within states, involving non-state parties -- guerillas, separatists, terrorists, if you want to call them that, people who are not normal governments, who are not normal states. That is the state of the world today. When I realized this, and when I look back on my time at the Security Council and what happened with the Kosovars, and I realize that often the people who were most directly affected by what we were doing in the Security Council weren't actually there, weren't actually invited to give their views to the Security Council, I thought, this is wrong. Something's got to be done about this.
Nuk ka shembuj te qarte, por nje shembull eshte i tille: menyra se si bota eshte duke ndyshuar eshte misheruar se cfare eshte duke ndodhur ne vendin ku une punoja me pare -- tek Keshilli Kombeve te Bashkuara. Kombet e Bashkuara jane themeluar ne 1945. Akti themelues ne themel eshte i ndertuar per te ndaluar konfliktet mes shteteve -- ato ndershteterore. Sot, 80 perqind e aktivitetit te keshillit te sigurimit te U.N eshte rreth konflikteve brenda shteteve, duke perfshire partite jo legjitime -- guerrilasit, separatistiet, terroristet, n.q.s doni ti thoni kshu , njerez qe nuk jane qeveri normale, qe nuk jane shtete normale,. Ky eshte shteti i botes sot. Kur une e kuptova kete, dhe kur kthehem pas ne kohen kur isha une tek Keshilli i Sigurimit dhe se cfare ndoshi me Kosovaret, dhe e ate shpesh njerizit qe ishin prekur me shume nga kjo nga cfare bente aty Keshilli i Sigurimit nuk ishte aktualisht aty, nuk ishin ftuar per te dhene mendimet e tyre tek Keshilli Sigurimit, Une menova kjo eshte gabim. Dicka duhet te bere per kete.
So I started off in a traditional mode. Me and my colleagues at Independent Diplomat went around the U.N. Security Council. We went around 70 U.N. member states -- the Kazaks, the Ethiopians, the Israelis -- you name them, we went to see them -- the secretary general, all of them, and said, "This is all wrong. This is terrible that you don't consult these people who are actually affected. You've got to institutionalize a system where you actually invite the Kosovars to come and tell you what they think. This will allow you to tell me -- you can tell them what you think. It'll be great. You can have an exchange. You can actually incorporate these people's views into your decisions, which means your decisions will be more effective and durable." Super-logical, you would think. I mean, incredibly logical. So obvious, anybody could get it. And of course, everybody got it. Everybody went, "Yes, of course, you're absolutely right. Come back to us in maybe six months." And of course, nothing happened -- nobody did anything. The Security Council does its business in exactly the same way today that it did X number of years ago, when I was there 10 years ago.
Keshtu qe u vura ne levizje ne sipas menyres tradicionale. Une dhe koleget e mi tek Diplomati Pavarur u sollen rreth U.N Keshillit te Sigurimit. Ne ishim rreth 70 anetare te U.N Kazaket, Etiopianet, Izraelitet -- mund ti dini ato , ne vajtem per ti pare ato -- sekretari pergjithshem, te gjithe ata, dhe tha . " Kjo eshte e tera e gabuar. Kjo eshte e temershme qe ti nuk i keshillon keta njerez qe jane aktualishte te prekur. Ti duhet ti institucionalizosh nje sistem ku ti ftosh Kosovaret per te ardhur dhe per te treguar vfare mendojne ata. Kjo do te lente ty per te me thene mua --mund ti thush atyre cfare mendon ti. Do te ishte gje e madhe. Mund te kishe nje shkembim . Aktualisht mund te nderfusesh mendimet e ketyre njerzve ne vendimet e tua, qe do te thote vendimet e tua do te jene me efektive dhe te besueshme." Super-logjike, do te mendoje. Dua te them, teper elogjike. kaq dukshem, cdo njeri mud ta kuptoje ate. Dhe patjeter, cdonjeri e mori vesh ate. Te gjithe iken duke thene," Po Patjeter, ti ke te drejte. Kthehuni mbrapa tek ne ne ndoshta 6 muaj . Dhe sigurisht, asgje nuk ndoshi -- asnjeri s'beri gje. Keshilli Sigurimit ben punet e veta ekzaktesisht sic i ben edhe sot qe beri x numer vitesh me perpara, kur une isha 10 vjet me perpara.
So we looked at that observation of basically failure and thought, what can we do about it. And I thought, I'm buggered if I'm going to spend the rest of my life lobbying for these crummy governments to do what needs to be done. So what we're going to do is we're actually going to set up these meetings ourselves. So now, Independent Diplomat is in the process of setting up meetings between the U.N. Security Council and the parties to the disputes that are on the agenda of the Security Council. So we will be bringing Darfuri rebel groups, the Northern Cypriots and the Southern Cypriots, rebels from Aceh, and awful long laundry list of chaotic conflicts around the world. And we will be trying to bring the parties to New York to sit down in a quiet room in a private setting with no press and actually explain what they want to the members of the U. N. Security Council, and for the members of the U.N. Security Council to explain to them what they want. So there's actually a conversation, which has never before happened. And of course, describing all this, any of you who know politics will think this is incredibly difficult, and I entirely agree with you. The chances of failure are very high, but it certainly won't happen if we don't try to make it happen.
Keshtu qe ne pame kete mbikqyrrje ne themel te deshtuar dhe menduam, cfare mund te bejme per te. Dhe une mendova, Une jam nje hajvan nqs do kaloja pjesen tjeter te jetes time duke ndikuar tek keto qeveri te pa vlera per te bere ate qe duhej bere. Pra ajo cfare ne do te bejme eshte qe ti bejme keto takime me vehten tone. Keshtu qe sot, Diplomati Pavarur eshte ne procesin e organizimit te takimeve mes U.N Keshillit te Sigurimit dhe partive dhe konflikteve qe jane ne axhenden e Keshillit te Sigurimit. Keshtu qe ne do te sjellim grupin rebel Darfuri, Qipriotet Veriore dhe ata Jugore, rebelet nga Aceh, dhe nje liste e tmerrshme e konflikteve rreth gjithe botes. Dhe do te perpiqemi te sjellin ata ne New York per tu ulur ne nje dhome te qene ne nje bisede private pa media dhe te na shpjegojne aktualisht cfare ata kerkojne nga pjestaret e Keshillit te Sigurimit, dhe nga anetaret e keshillit te U.N ti shpjegojme cfare kerkojne ata. Aktualisht kemi pasur nje bisedim , qe nuk ka ndoshur ndonjehere. Dhe sigurisht, duke pershkruar te gjithe kete, cdonjeri nga ju qe merret me politike do te mendoje qe eshte shume e veshtirte, dhe une jam ploteshisht dakord me ju. Keto shanse apo deshtime jane shume te larta, por nuk do te ndodhe nqs nuk do te perpiqemi qe te ndoshin .
And my politics has changed fundamentally from when I was a diplomat to what I am today, and I think that outputs is what matters, not process, not technology, frankly, so much either. Preach technology to all the Twittering members of all the Iranian demonstrations who are now in political prison in Tehran, where Ahmadinejad remains in power. Technology has not delivered political change in Iran. You've got to look at the outputs, and you got to say to yourself, "What can I do to produce that particular output?" That is the politics of the 21st century, and in a way, Independent Diplomat embodies that fragmentation, that change, that is happening to all of us.
Dhe politika ime ka ndryshuar renjesisht qe kur une isha nje diplomat e deri me sot, dhe une mendoj qe rezultater kane rendesi , jo procesi , jo teknologjia, sinqerisht, kaq shumer per kedo . Bej moral per teknologjine per te gjithe anetaret eTwitter-it te te gjithe demonstrueseve Iraniane qejane tani ne burgim politik ne Terhan, ku Ahmadinexhad qendron ne fuqi. Technologjia nuk ka shkaktuar ndonje ndryshim politik ne Iran. Duhet te shikoni rezultatet, dhe duhet ta thoni vete, " Cfare mund te bej per te pasur nje rezultat te vecante?" Kjo eshte politika e shekullit te 21-te, dhe ne nje menyre , Diplomati Pavarur misheron kete coptim , kete ndryshim , qe po na ndodh te gjithe neve.
That's my story. Thanks.
Kjo eshte historia ime. Falemderit