My story is a little bit about war. It's about disillusionment. It's about death. And it's about rediscovering idealism in all of that wreckage. And perhaps also, there's a lesson about how to deal with our screwed-up, fragmenting and dangerous world of the 21st century. I don't believe in straightforward narratives. I don't believe in a life or history written as decision "A" led to consequence "B" led to consequence "C" -- these neat narratives that we're presented with, and that perhaps we encourage in each other. I believe in randomness, and one of the reasons I believe that is because me becoming a diplomat was random. I'm colorblind. I was born unable to see most colors. This is why I wear gray and black most of the time, and I have to take my wife with me to chose clothes.
Moja oriče je pomalo o ratu. O razočaranju. O smrti. I o ponovnom otkrivanju idealizma u svom tom uništenju. Možda u mojoj priči bude i pouka kako se nositi s našim zeznutim, raspadajućim i opasnim svijetom u 21. stoljeću. Ne vjerujem u obično pripovijedanje. Ne vjerujem u život ili priču koji je zapisan kao odluka A koja je dovela do posljedice B koja je dovela do posljedice C -- kao u urednim pričama koje obično čujemo, i koje možda tražimo jedni od drugih. Vjerujem u slučajne događaje, a jedan od razloga zašto to vjerujem jest taj što sam ja slučajno postao diplomat. Daltonist sam. Rođen sam s manom neraspoznavanja većine boja. Zato uglavnom nosim sivo i crno i moram sa sobom voditi suprugu kada biram odjeću.
And I'd always wanted to be a fighter pilot when I was a boy. I loved watching planes barrel over our holiday home in the countryside. And it was my boyhood dream to be a fighter pilot. And I did the tests in the Royal Air Force to become a pilot, and sure enough, I failed. I couldn't see all the blinking different lights, and I can't distinguish color. So I had to choose another career, and this was in fact relatively easy for me, because I had an abiding passion all the way through my childhood, which was international relations. As a child, I read the newspaper thoroughly. I was fascinated by the Cold War, by the INF negotiations over intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the proxy war between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in Angola or Afghanistan. These things really interested me. And so I decided quite at an early age I wanted to be a diplomat. And I, one day, I announced this to my parents -- and my father denies this story to this day -- I said, "Daddy, I want to be a diplomat." And he turned to me, and he said, "Carne, you have to be very clever to be a diplomat." (Laughter) And my ambition was sealed.
Dok sam bio malen, uvijek sam želio biti vojni pilot. Obožavao sam gledati avione kako prelijeću našu vikendicu na selu. I dječački mi je san bio da postanem vojni pilot. Išao sam na testiranja za pilota u Kraljevskim zračnim snagama, i, naravno, pao sam. Nisam vidio bljeskanje različitih svjetala i nisam razlikovao boje. Zato sam morao odabrati drugo zanimanje, što mi je zapravo bilo relativno lako, jer sam imao veliku strast kroz cijelo djetinjstvo, a to su bili međunarodni odnosi. Kao dijete, pažljivo sam čitao novine. Fascinirao me Hladni rat, pregovori oko naoružanja nuklearnim projektilima srednjeg dometa, posrednički rat između Sovjetskog Saveza i SAD-a u Angoli i Afganistanu. Te su me stvarno zaista zanimale. I tako sam vrlo mlad odlučio da želim biti diplomat. I jednog sam dana to rekao svojim roditeljima -- a moj otac do danas poriče ovu priču -- rekao sam: "Tata, ja želim biti diplomat." A on se okrenuo prema meni i rekao: "Carne, moraš biti vrlo pametan da bi bio diplomat." (Smijeh) Time je moja ambicija bila zapečaćena.
In 1989, I entered the British Foreign Service. That year, 5,000 people applied to become a diplomat, and 20 of us succeeded. And as those numbers suggest, I was inducted into an elite and fascinating and exhilarating world. Being a diplomat, then and now, is an incredible job, and I loved every minute of it -- I enjoyed the status of it. I bought myself a nice suit and wore leather-soled shoes and reveled in this amazing access I had to world events. I traveled to the Gaza Strip. I headed the Middle East Peace Process section in the British Foreign Ministry. I became a speechwriter for the British Foreign Secretary. I met Yasser Arafat. I negotiated with Saddam's diplomats at the U.N. Later, I traveled to Kabul and served in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. And I would travel in a C-130 transport and go and visit warlords in mountain hideaways and negotiate with them about how we were going to eradicate Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, surrounded by my Special Forces escort, who, themselves, had to have an escort of a platoon of Royal Marines, because it was so dangerous. And that was exciting -- that was fun. It was really interesting. And it's a great cadre of people, incredibly close-knit community of people.
1989. godine zaposlio sam se u britanskom Ministarstvu vanjskih poslova. Te se godine 5.000 ljudi prijavilo da postanu diplomati, a uspjelo nas je 20. Kako možete zaključiti iz tih brojeva, uveden sam u elitni, fascinantan i uzbudljiv svijet. Zanimanje diplomata, i tada i danas, nevjerojatan je posao i uživao sam u svakom trenutku. Uživao sam u statusu koji on nosi. Kupio sam si fino odijelo i nosio cipele s kožnim potplatima i uživao sam u nevjerojatnom pristupu događanjima u svijetu. Putovao sam u pojas Gaze. Bio sam na čelu Odjela za mirovni proces na Bliskom istoku u britanskom Ministarstvu vanjskih poslova. Pisao sam govore za britanskog ministra vanjskih poslova. Upoznao sam Yassera Arafata. Pregovarao sam sa Saddamovim diplomatima u UN-u. Kasnije sam putovao u Kabul i služio u Afganistanu nakon pada talibana. Putovao sam vojnim teretnim avionom C-130 i posjećivao gerilske vojne zapovjednike u planinskim skloništima i s njima pregovarao kako ćemo iskorijeniti Al-Qa'idu iz Afganistana. Bio sam okružen svojom pratnjom iz posebnih postrojbi koji su pak morali biti u pratnji odreda kraljevskih marinaca jer to je bilo tako opasno. I bilo je uzbudljivo. Bilo je zabavno. Bilo je stvarno zanimljivo. To je odličan kadar, nevjerojatno povezana zajednica ljudi.
And the pinnacle of my career, as it turned out, was when I was posted to New York. I'd already served in Germany, Norway, various other places, but I was posted to New York to serve on the U.N. Security Council for the British delegation. And my responsibility was the Middle East, which was my specialty. And there, I dealt with things like the Middle East peace process, the Lockerbie issue -- we can talk about that later, if you wish -- but above all, my responsibility was Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and the sanctions we placed on Iraq to oblige it to disarm itself of these weapons. I was the chief British negotiator on the subject, and I was steeped in the issue. And anyway, my tour -- it was kind of a very exciting time. I mean it was very dramatic diplomacy. We went through several wars during my time in New York. I negotiated for my country the resolution in the Security Council of the 12th of September 2001 condemning the attacks of the day before, which were, of course, deeply present to us actually living in New York at the time. So it was kind of the best of time, worst of times kind of experience. I lived the high-life. Although I worked very long hours, I lived in a penthouse in Union Square. I was a single British diplomat in New York City; you can imagine what that might have meant. (Laughter) I had a good time.
To je bio i vrhunac moje karijere, što sam shvatio kasnije, kad sam raspoređen na službu u New Yorku. Prije toga radio sam u Njemačkoj, Norveškoj, i raznim drugim mjestima, ali poslan sam u New York kako bih radio u britanskoj delegaciji u Vijeću sigurnosti u UN-u. Bio sam odgovoran za Bliski istok, koji je bio moja specijalnost. Na tom sam se položaju bavio stvarima kao što je mirovni proces na Bliskom istoku, ili slučaj Lockerbie -- o tome možemo razgovarati ako želite -- ali najviše od svega, moja odgovornost bio je Irak i oružja za masovno uništenje koja ondje postoje i sankcije koje smo nametnuli Iraku kako bismo ga prisilili na uklanjanje tog oružja. Bio sam glavni britanski pregovarač za to pitanje i bio sam potpuno posvećem tom problemu. Uglavnom, moj put -- bilo je to na neki način vrlo uzbudljivo. Mislim, radilo se o vrlo dramatičnoj diplomaciji. Prošli smo kroz nekoliko ratova za vrijeme dok sam radio u New Yorku. Zastupao sam svoju zemlju u rezoluciji u Vijeću sigurnosti donesenoj 12. rujna 2001. godine kojom su se osudili napadi prethodnog dana, koji su, naravno, bili bolno stvarni nama koji smo u to vrijeme živjeli u New Yorku. Tako da je to na neki način bilo i slatko i gorko iskustvo. Živio sam ugodnim životom. Iako sam mnogo radio, živio sam u luksuznom stanu na Union Squareu. Bio sam britanski diplomat, bez partnerice, u New Yorku; možete misliti što je to značilo. (Smijeh) Uživao sam.
But in 2002, when my tour came to an end, I decided I wasn't going to go back to the job that was waiting for me in London. I decided to take a sabbatical, in fact, at the New School, Bruce. In some inchoate, inarticulate way I realized that there was something wrong with my work, with me. I was exhausted, and I was also disillusioned in a way I couldn't quite put my finger on. And I decided to take some time out from work. The Foreign Office was very generous. You could take these special unpaid leave, as they called them, and yet remain part of the diplomatic service, but not actually do any work. It was nice. And eventually, I decided to take a secondment to join the U.N. in Kosovo, which was then under U.N. administration.
Ali 2002. godine, kad je mojem mandatu došao kraj, odučio sam da se neću vratiti poslu koji me čekao u Londonu. Odlučio sam da odem na dopust u New School, Bruce. Na neki nedefiniran, nejasan način, shvatio sam da nešto nije u redu s mojim poslom, sa mnom. Bio sam iscrpljen, i bio sam također i razočaran na način koji nisam točno znao objasniti. Zato sam odlučio otići na odmor od posla. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova bilo je vrlo velikodušno. Mogao sam uzeti poseban neplaćen dopust, kako su oni to zvali, a ipak ostati dio diplomatskog zbora, a da ne radim nikakav posao. To je bilo lijepo. Na kraju sam odlučio uzeti premještaj kako bih se priključio UN-u na Kosovu, koje je bilo pod upravom UN-a.
And two things happened in Kosovo, which kind of, again, shows the randomness of life, because these things turned out to be two of the pivots of my life and helped to deliver me to the next stage. But they were random things. One was that, in the summer of 2004, the British government, somewhat reluctantly, decided to have an official inquiry into the use of intelligence on WMD in the run up to the Iraq War, a very limited subject. And I testified to that inquiry in secret. I had been steeped in the intelligence on Iraq and its WMD, and my testimony to the inquiry said three things: that the government exaggerated the intelligence, which was very clear in all the years I'd read it. And indeed, our own internal assessment was very clear that Iraq's WMD did not pose a threat to its neighbors, let alone to us. Secondly, the government had ignored all available alternatives to war, which in some ways was a more discreditable thing still. The third reason, I won't go into. But anyway, I gave that testimony, and that presented me with a crisis. What was I going to do? This testimony was deeply critical of my colleagues, of my ministers, who had, in my view had perpetrated a war on a falsehood.
Dvije su se stvari dogodile na Kosovu, koje na neki način, i opet, ilustriraju slučajnosti u životu, jer te su se stvari pokazale ključnim točkama u mojem životu i pomogle mi da dođem do iduće faze. Ali to su bile slučajne stvari. Prva je bila to što je, u ljeto 2004. godine, britanska vlada, pomalo nerado, odlučila provesti službeno ispitivanje korištenja informacija o oružju za masovno uništenje u vrijeme prije iračkog rata -- vrlo uska tema. I ja sam u tajnosti dao iskaz za to ispitivanje. Bio sam dobro informiran o Iraku i njihovom oružju za masovno uništenje i moja je izjava sadržavala tri točke: da je vlada pretjerivala u izvještajima, što je bilo vrlo jasno svih godina dok sam ih čitao. I stvarno, naše unutarnje procjene jasno su otkrile da oružje za masovno uništenje u Iraku nije predstavljalo prijetnju njihovim susjedima, a kamoli nama. Drugo, vlada je ignorirala moguće alternative ratu, što je, na neki način, još više smanjivalo njezin kredibilitet. U treću stavku neću ulaziti. Ali u svakom slučaju, dao sam iskaz i to me dovelo do krize. Što da radim? U iskazu sam ozbiljno kritizirao svoje kolege, svoje ministre, koji su, po meni, krenuli u rat na temelju lažnih pretpostavki.
And so I was in crisis. And this wasn't a pretty thing. I moaned about it, I hesitated, I went on and on and on to my long-suffering wife, and eventually I decided to resign from the British Foreign Service. I felt -- there's a scene in the Al Pacino movie "The Insider," which you may know, where he goes back to CBS after they've let him down over the tobacco guy, and he goes, "You know, I just can't do this anymore. Something's broken." And it was like that for me. I love that movie. I felt just something's broken. I can't actually sit with my foreign minister or my prime minister again with a smile on my face and do what I used to do gladly for them. So took a running leap and jumped over the edge of a cliff.
I tako sam bio u krizi. A to nije bilo ugodno. Žalio sam se na to, oklijevao sam, neprestano sam jadikovao svojoj sirotoj supruzi, i na kraju sam odlučio da dam otkaz u britanskom Ministarstvu vanjskih poslova. Osjećao sam se -- kao u sceni iz filma Al Pacina "The Insider", možda ga znate, gdje on odlazi na televiziju CBS nakon što su mu uskratili potporu u slučaju s proizvođačem cigareta i on kaže "Znate, ja ne mogu više. Nešto nije kako treba." Tako je bilo i meni. Obožavam taj film. Samo sam osjetio da nešto nije kako treba. Ne mogu više samo sjediti s ministrom vanjskih poslova ili premijerom, s osmjehom na licu i raditi što sam prije rado radio za njih. Zato sam se zatrčao i skočio s ruba litice.
And it was a very, very uncomfortable, unpleasant feeling. And I started to fall. And today, that fall hasn't stopped; I'm still falling. But, in a way, I've got used to the sensation of it. And in a way, I kind of like the sensation of it a lot better than I like actually standing on top of the cliff, wondering what to do. A second thing happened in Kosovo, which kind of -- I need a quick gulp of water, forgive me. A second thing happened in Kosovo, which kind of delivered the answer, which I couldn't really answer, which is, "What do I do with my life?" I love diplomacy -- I have no career -- I expected my entire life to be a diplomat, to be serving my country. I wanted to be an ambassador, and my mentors, my heroes, people who got to the top of my profession, and here I was throwing it all away. A lot of my friends were still in it. My pension was in it. And I gave it up. And what was I going to do?
Bio je to vrlo, vrlo neugodan osjećaj. I počeo sam padati. I taj pad do danas nije prestao; još uvijek padam. Ali na neki sam se način privikao na taj osjećaj. I na neki način, taj mi se osjećaj mnogo više sviđa nego stajanje na vrhu litice i smišljanje što da radim. Druga se stvar dogodila na Kosovo. I ona je -- trebam popiti malo vode, ispričavam se. Druga se stvar dogodila na Kosovu, i donijela je odgovor na pitanje, do kojeg ja nisam mogao doći, a to je: "Što da radim sa svojim životom?" Volim diplomaciju. Nemam karijere. Očekivao sam da ću cijeli život biti diplomat, da ću služiti svojoj zemlji. Htio sam biti veleposlanik. a svoje mentore, svoje heroje, ljude koji su bili najbolji u mojem zanimanju, sve sam to sada odbacivao. Mnogi moji prijatelji još uvijek su bili u tom poslu. Moja mirovina je ovisila o tom poslu. A ja sam odustao od njega. I što da radim?
And that year, in Kosovo, this terrible, terrible thing happened, which I saw. In March 2004, there were terrible riots all over the province -- as it then was -- of Kosovo. 18 people were killed. It was anarchy. And it's a very horrible thing to see anarchy, to know that the police and the military -- there were lots of military troops there -- actually can't stop that rampaging mob who's coming down the street. And the only way that rampaging mob coming down the street will stop is when they decide to stop and when they've had enough burning and killing. And that is not a very nice feeling to see, and I saw it. And I went through it. I went through those mobs. And with my Albanian friends, we tried to stop it, but we failed. And that riot taught me something, which isn't immediately obvious and it's kind of a complicated story.
Te godine, na Kosovu, dogodila se strašna, strašna stvar, a ja sam je vidio. U ožujku 2004. godine došlo je do strašnih pobuna u cijeloj pokrajini -- što je ono tada i bilo -- Kosovo. Ubijeno je 18 ljudi. Bila je to anarhija. Bilo je zastrašujuće vidjeti anarhiju, znati da policija i vojska -- bilo je prisutno mnogo vojske -- zapravo ne mogu zaustaviti podivljalu svjetinu koja dolazi ulicom. Jedini način da se ta podivljala svjetina koja dolazi niz ulicu zaustavi jest da sami odluče prestati kad im bude dovoljno paljenja i ubijanja. To nije naročito lijepo za vidjeti, a ja sam to vidio. I prošao sam to. Probijao sam se kroz rulju. Sa svojim albanskim prijateljima, pokušali smo ih zaustaviti, ali nismo uspjeli. Ta me pobuna naučila nešto, što nije odmah vidljivo i radi se o pomalo kompliciranoj priči.
But one of the reasons that riot took place -- those riots, which went on for several days, took place -- was because the Kosovo people were disenfranchised from their own future. There were diplomatic negotiations about the future of Kosovo going on then, and the Kosovo government, let alone the Kosovo people, were not actually participating in those talks. There was this whole fancy diplomatic system, this negotiation process about the future of Kosovo, and the Kosovars weren't part of it. And funnily enough, they were frustrated about that. Those riots were part of the manifestation of that frustration. It wasn't the only reason, and life is not simple, one reason narratives. It was a complicated thing, and I'm not pretending it was more simple than it was. But that was one of the reasons.
Ali jedan od razloga te pobune -- tih pobuna, koje su trajale nekoliko dana -- bio je taj što Kosovari nisu imali utjecaja na vlastitu budućnost. U to su se vrijeme odvijali diplomatski pregovori o budućnosti Kosova, a ni vlada Kosova, a kamoli kosovski narod, nisu zapravo sudjelovali u tim pregovorima. Postojao je cijeli fini diplomatski sustav, taj proces pregovora o budućnosti Kosova, a Kosovari nisu sudjelovali u tome. I, tko bi rekao, to ih je frustriralo. Pobune su bile način ispoljavanja te frustracije. To nije bio jedini razlog, jer život nije jednostavna, jednosmjerna priča. Bilo je komplicirano, i ne činim to jednostavnijim nego što je bilo. Ali to je bio jedan od razloga.
And that kind of gave me the inspiration -- or rather to be precise, it gave my wife the inspiration. She said, "Why don't you advise the Kosovars? Why don't you advise their government on their diplomacy?" And the Kosovars were not allowed a diplomatic service. They were not allowed diplomats. They were not allowed a foreign office to help them deal with this immensely complicated process, which became known as the Final Status Process of Kosovo. And so that was the idea. That was the origin of the thing that became Independent Diplomat, the world's first diplomatic advisory group and a non-profit to boot. And it began when I flew back from London after my time at the U.N. in Kosovo. I flew back and had dinner with the Kosovo prime minister and said to him, "Look, I'm proposing that I come and advise you on the diplomacy. I know this stuff. It's what I do. Why don't I come and help you?" And he raised his glass of raki to me and said, "Yes, Carne. Come."
A to me, recimo, inspiriralo -- ili, da budem precizniji, inspiriralo je moju suprugu. Rekla je: "Zašto ti ne bi bio savjetnik Kosovarima? Zašto ne bi savjetovao njihovu vladu ili njihove diplomate?" A Kosovari nisu smjeli imati diplomatsku službu. Nisu smjeli imati diplomate. Nisu smjeli imati ministarstvo vanjskih poslova koje bi im pomoglo u tom vrlo kompliciranom procesu, koji je kasnije bio poznat kao Proces za konačni status Kosova. To je, dakle, bila ideja. Tako je nastao Nezavisni diplomat, prva diplomatska savjetnička grupa na svijetu, i to neprofitna. Sve je počelo kad sam se vratio iz Londona nakon što sam boravio s UN-om na Kosovu. Vratio sam se i otišao na večeru s kosovskim premijerom i rekao sam mu: "Predlažem da vas dođem savjetovati o diplomaciji. Razumijem se u te stvari. Time se bavim. Zašto vam ne bih pomogao?" Podigao je svoju čašu rakije i rekao: "Da, Carne. Dođi."
And I came to Kosovo and advised the Kosovo government. Independent Diplomat ended up advising three successive Kosovo prime ministers and the multi-party negotiation team of Kosovo. And Kosovo became independent. Independent Diplomat is now established in five diplomatic centers around the world, and we're advising seven or eight different countries, or political groups, depending on how you wish to define them -- and I'm not big on definitions. We're advising the Northern Cypriots on how to reunify their island. We're advising the Burmese opposition, the government of Southern Sudan, which -- you heard it here first -- is going to be a new country within the next few years. We're advising the Polisario Front of the Western Sahara, who are fighting to get their country back from Moroccan occupation after 34 years of dispossession. We're advising various island states in the climate change negotiations, which is suppose to culminate in Copenhagen.
I tako sam došao na Kosovo i savjetovao kosovsku vladu. Nezavisni diplomat na kraju je savjetovao tri kosovska premijera za redom i višestranački kosovski pregovarački tim. I tako je Kosovo postalo nezavisno. Nezavisni diplomat sada je osnovan u pet diplomatskih centara u svijetu, a savjetujemo sedam ili osam različitih zemalja ili političkih skupina, ovisi kako ih želite definirati -- ali meni definicije nisu naročito bitne. Savjetujemo Sjeverne Ciprane kako da ujedine svoj otok. Savjetujemo burmansku opoziciju, vladu Južnog Sudana, koja će -- ovdje to čujete prvi put -- postati nova zemlja u sljedećih nekoliko godina. Savjetujemo Front Polisario u zapadnoj Sahari, koji se bore da oslobode svoju zemlju od marokanske okupacije nakon 34 godine otuđenja. Savjetujemo razne otočke zemlje u pregovorima o promjeni klime, koji bi trebali kulminirati u Kopenhagenu.
There's a bit of randomness here too because, when I was beginning Independent Diplomat, I went to a party in the House of Lords, which is a ridiculous place, but I was holding my drink like this, and I bumped into this guy who was standing behind me. And we started talking, and he said -- I told him what I was doing, and I told him rather grandly I was going to establish Independent Diplomat in New York. At that time there was just me -- and me and my wife were moving back to New York. And he said, "Why don't you see my colleagues in New York?" And it turned out he worked for an innovation company called ?What If!, which some of you have probably heard of. And one thing led to another, and I ended up having a desk in ?What If! in New York, when I started Independent Diplomat. And watching ?What If! develop new flavors of chewing gum for Wrigley or new flavors for Coke actually helped me innovate new strategies for the Kosovars and for the Saharawis of the Western Sahara. And I began to realize that there are different ways of doing diplomacy -- that diplomacy, like business, is a business of solving problems, and yet the word innovation doesn't exist in diplomacy; it's all zero sum games and realpolitik and ancient institutions that have been there for generations and do things the same way they've always done things.
I ovdje postoji doza slučajnosti jer, kad sam tek počinjao s Nezavisnim diplomatom, otišao sam na zabavu u Domu lordova, što je presmiješno, ali držao sam svoje piće ovako, i zaletio sam se u tipa koji je stajao iza mene. Tako smo počeli razgovarati i on je rekao -- ispričao sam mu čime se bavim, i rekao sam mu prilično pompozno da namjeravam osnovati Nezavisnog diplomata u New Yorku. U to vrijeme samo sam ja bio u tome, i selio sam se sa suprugom natrag u New York. A on je rekao: "Zašto ne odete do mojih kolega u New Yorku?" Ispalo je da on radi za tvrtku za inovacije koja se zove ?What If! (?Što Ako!), za koju su neki od vas možda čuli. I tako, spletom okolnosti, dobio sam stol u tvrtki ?What If! u New Yorku, kad sam započinjao s Nezavisnim diplomatom. A gledanje kako ?What If! stvara nove okuse žvakaćih guma Wrigley ili nove okuse Coca-Cole zapravo mi je pomoglo u smišljanju novih inovativnih strategija za Kosovare i Saharavije iz Zapadne Sahare. Počeo sam shvaćati da postoje drugačiji načini bavljenja diplomacijom, da je diplomacija, kao bilo koji posao, posao rješavanja problema, a riječ inovacija ipak ne postoji u diplomaciji; to je sve igra nulte sume i realpolitike i starih institucija koje postoje već generacijama i sve rade na isti način kao što su to oduvijek radili.
And Independent Diplomat, today, tries to incorporate some of the things I learned at ?What If!. We all sit in one office and shout at each other across the office. We all work on little laptops and try to move desks to change the way we think. And we use naive experts who may know nothing about the countries we're dealing with, but may know something about something else to try to inject new thinking into the problems that we try to address for our clients. It's not easy, because our clients, by definition, are having a difficult time, diplomatically.
A Nezavisni diplomat danas pokušava ukopiti neke od stvari koje sam naučio u ?What If!. Svi sjedimo u uredu i dovikujemo se jedni s drugima. Svi radimo na malim laptopima i nastojimo pomicati stolove da bismo promijenili način razmišljanja. Angažiramo naivne stručnjake koji možda ne znaju ništa o zemljama kojima se bavimo, ali možda znaju nešto o nečem drugom, što bi moglo ubaciti novi način razmišljanja o problemima koje se trudimo riješiti za naše klijente. To nije lako jer naši su klijenti, po prirodi stvari, u teškoj situaciji, diplomatski gledano.
There are, I don't know, some lessons from all of this, personal and political -- and in a way, they're the same thing. The personal one is falling off a cliff is actually a good thing, and I recommend it. And it's a good thing to do at least once in your life just to tear everything up and jump. The second thing is a bigger lesson about the world today. Independent Diplomat is part of a trend which is emerging and evident across the world, which is that the world is fragmenting. States mean less than they used to, and the power of the state is declining. That means the power of others things is rising. Those other things are called non-state actors. They may be corporations, they may be mafiosi, they may be nice NGOs, they may anything, any number of things. We are living in a more complicated and fragmented world. If governments are less able to affect the problems that affect us in the world, then that means, who is left to deal with them, who has to take greater responsibility to deal with them? Us. If they can't do it, who's left to deal with it? We have no choice but to embrace that reality.
Postoji, ne znam, nekoliko pouka u svemu ovome, osobnih i političkih -- i, na neki način, one su sve ista stvar. Osobna je pouka to da je padanje s litice zapravo dobra stvar, i preporučam je. I dobro je barem jednom u životu jednostavno raskinuti sa svime i skočiti. Druga stvar je veća pouka o današnjem svijetu. Nezavisni diplomat dio je trenda koji se tek pojavljuje i primjetan je u cijelom svijetu, a to je da se svijet cijepa. Države imaju manje značenje nego prije, a moć države sve je manja. To znači da se povećava moć drugih stvari. Te se stvari zovu nedržavni faktori. To mogu biti korporacije, mogu biti mafijaši, mogu biti fine nevladine organizacije, to može biti bilo tko, bilo kakva organizacija. Živimo u sve kompliciranijem i rascjepanijem svijetu. Ako vlade su vlade manje sposobne utjecati na probleme u svijetu koji utječu na nas, onda to znači - tko je ostao da ih rješava. tko mora preuzeti veliku odgovornost da ih rješava? Mi. Ako oni to ne mogu, tko je preostao da ih riješi? Nemamo drugog izbora osim da prihvatimo tu stvarnost.
What this means is it's no longer good enough to say that international relations, or global affairs, or chaos in Somalia, or what's going on in Burma is none of your business, and that you can leave it to governments to get on with. I can connect any one of you by six degrees of separation to the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia. Ask me how later, particularly if you eat fish, interestingly enough, but that connection is there. We are all intimately connected. And this isn't just Tom Friedman, it's actually provable in case after case after case. What that means is, instead of asking your politicians to do things, you have to look to yourself to do things. And Independent Diplomat is a kind of example of this in a sort of loose way.
A to znači da više nije dovoljno da kažemo da međunarodni odnosi, ili svjetski problemi, ili kaos u Somaliji, ili ono što se događa u Burmi nije naš problem. i da možete ostaviti vladama da se time bave. Svakoga od vas mogu preko šest stupnjeva udaljenosti povezati s paravojskom Al-Shabaab u Somaliji. Pitajte me poslije kako, ako jedete ribu, zanimljivo, ali ta veza postoji. Blisko smo povezani. I ne radi se tu samo o Tomu Friedmanu, to je zapravo dokazivo u svakom novom slučaju. A to znači da, umjesto da tražite političare da obavljaju stvari, morate sami odlučiti obavljati stvari. Nezavisni diplomat je primjer toga, na neki širok način.
There aren't neat examples, but one example is this: the way the world is changing is embodied in what's going on at the place I used to work -- the U.N. Security Council. The U.N. was established in 1945. Its charter is basically designed to stop conflicts between states -- interstate conflict. Today, 80 percent of the agenda of the U.N. Security Council is about conflicts within states, involving non-state parties -- guerillas, separatists, terrorists, if you want to call them that, people who are not normal governments, who are not normal states. That is the state of the world today. When I realized this, and when I look back on my time at the Security Council and what happened with the Kosovars, and I realize that often the people who were most directly affected by what we were doing in the Security Council weren't actually there, weren't actually invited to give their views to the Security Council, I thought, this is wrong. Something's got to be done about this.
Ne postoje savršeni primjeri, ali evo jednog: način na koji se svijet mijenja utjelovljen je u situaciji na mjestu gdje sam nekad radio, u Vijeću sigurnosti UN-a. UN je osnovan 1945. godine. UN je izvorno zamišljen kako bi zaustavio sukobe između zemalja -- međudržavne sukobe. Danas se 80% predmeta na dnevnom redu Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a odnosi na sukobe unutar država, koji uključuju nedržavne aktere -- gerilce, separatiste, teroriste, ako ih hoćete tako nazvati, ljude koji nisu dio uobičajenih vlada, uobičajenih država. Takvo je danas stanje svijeta. Kad sam to shvatio, i kad razmišljam o vremenu provedenom u Vijeću sigurnosti i o onome što se dogodilo Kosovarima, shvaćam da često ljudi na koje je najizravnije utjecalo ono što smo radili mi u Vijeću sigurnosti nisu uopće bili prisutni, nisu bili pozvani da iznesu svoja stajališta pred Vijećem sigurnosti. Mislio sam da to nije u redu. Nešto se mora učiniti u vezi toga.
So I started off in a traditional mode. Me and my colleagues at Independent Diplomat went around the U.N. Security Council. We went around 70 U.N. member states -- the Kazaks, the Ethiopians, the Israelis -- you name them, we went to see them -- the secretary general, all of them, and said, "This is all wrong. This is terrible that you don't consult these people who are actually affected. You've got to institutionalize a system where you actually invite the Kosovars to come and tell you what they think. This will allow you to tell me -- you can tell them what you think. It'll be great. You can have an exchange. You can actually incorporate these people's views into your decisions, which means your decisions will be more effective and durable." Super-logical, you would think. I mean, incredibly logical. So obvious, anybody could get it. And of course, everybody got it. Everybody went, "Yes, of course, you're absolutely right. Come back to us in maybe six months." And of course, nothing happened -- nobody did anything. The Security Council does its business in exactly the same way today that it did X number of years ago, when I was there 10 years ago.
Zato sam počeo tradicionalnim putem. Ja i moji kolege u Nezavisnom diplomatu išli smo po cijelom Vijeću sigurnosti. Obišli smo 70 zemalja članica UN-a -- Kazahstance, Etiopljanje, Izraelce -- sve smo ih posjetili -- glavnog tajnika, sve. I rekao sam: "Sve je ovo pogrešno. Strašno je da ne konzultirate ljude na koje sve ovo utječe. Morate institucionalizirati sustav u kojem ćete pozvati Kosovare da dođu i kažu vam što misle. Tako ćete mi moći reći -- moći ćete njima reći što vi mislite. Bit će sjajno. Možete imati razmjenu. Možete uključiti stajališta tih ljudi u svoje odluke, što znači da će vaše odluke biti učinkovitije i trajnije." Super-logično, pomislili biste. Mislim, nevjerojatno logično. Tako očito, svi to mogu. Naravno, svi su shvatili što želim. Rekli su: "Da, naravno, u potpunosti si u pravu. Dođi ponovno možda za nekih šest mjeseci." Naravno, ništa se nije dogodilo. Nitko ništa nije učinio. Vijeće sigurnosti danas djeluje na potpuno isti način kao i prije X godina, kad sam ondje bio prije 10 godina.
So we looked at that observation of basically failure and thought, what can we do about it. And I thought, I'm buggered if I'm going to spend the rest of my life lobbying for these crummy governments to do what needs to be done. So what we're going to do is we're actually going to set up these meetings ourselves. So now, Independent Diplomat is in the process of setting up meetings between the U.N. Security Council and the parties to the disputes that are on the agenda of the Security Council. So we will be bringing Darfuri rebel groups, the Northern Cypriots and the Southern Cypriots, rebels from Aceh, and awful long laundry list of chaotic conflicts around the world. And we will be trying to bring the parties to New York to sit down in a quiet room in a private setting with no press and actually explain what they want to the members of the U. N. Security Council, and for the members of the U.N. Security Council to explain to them what they want. So there's actually a conversation, which has never before happened. And of course, describing all this, any of you who know politics will think this is incredibly difficult, and I entirely agree with you. The chances of failure are very high, but it certainly won't happen if we don't try to make it happen.
Zato smo analizirali taj naš, u biti, neuspjeh i razmislili što tu možemo učiniti. Pomislio sam da sam nadrapao ako namjeravam provesti ostatak života lobirajući da te beskorisne vlade naprave što se treba napraviti. Dakle, ono što ćemo učiniti jest da sami dogovorimo te sastanke. Sada je Nezavisni diplomat u procesu dogovaranja sastanaka između Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a i sudionika sukoba koji su na dnevnom redu Vijeća sigurnosti. Tako ćemo dovesti pobunjeničke skupine iz Darfura, Sjeverne Ciprane i Južne Ciprane, pobunjenike iz Aceha, i užasno dug popis kaotičnih sukoba u cijelom svijetu. Pokušat ćemo dovesti sve njih u New York da sjednu u tihu prostoriju u intimnom okruženju, bez novinara te da objasne što žele pred članovima Vijeća sigurnosti, a da članovi Vijeća sigurnosti njima objasne što oni žele. To će, dakle, biti razgovor kakvog još nikad nije bilo. I, naravno, dok ovo opisujem, svi vi koji se razumijete u politiku mislit ćete kako je to vrlo teško i ja se u potpunosti slažem s vama. Vrlo su velike šanse za neuspjeh, ali svakako se ništa neće dogoditi ako se za to ne potrudimo.
And my politics has changed fundamentally from when I was a diplomat to what I am today, and I think that outputs is what matters, not process, not technology, frankly, so much either. Preach technology to all the Twittering members of all the Iranian demonstrations who are now in political prison in Tehran, where Ahmadinejad remains in power. Technology has not delivered political change in Iran. You've got to look at the outputs, and you got to say to yourself, "What can I do to produce that particular output?" That is the politics of the 21st century, and in a way, Independent Diplomat embodies that fragmentation, that change, that is happening to all of us.
Moja se politika iz temelja promijenila otkad sam bio diplomat do ovoga što sam danas i mislim da su bitni rezultati, a ne proces, niti, iskreno, tehnologija. Propovjedajte o tehnologiji svim sudionicama prosvjeda u Iranu koji su na Twitteru, i koji su sad u političkom zatvoru u Teheranu, gdje je Ahmadinedžad i dalje na vlasti. Tehnologija nije donijela političke promjene u Iranu. Morate gledati rezultate, i morate reći sami sebi: "Što mogu učiniti da dobijem takav i takav rezultat?" To je politika 21. stoljeća. Nezavisni diplomat, na neki način, utjelovljuje to cijepanje, tu promjenu koja se događa svima nama.
That's my story. Thanks.
To je moja priča. Hvala.