What I'm going to try to do is explain to you quickly how to predict, and illustrate it with some predictions about what Iran is going to do in the next couple of years.
我將向各位說明 如何預測, 並用一些實例說明, 關於伊朗在未來一兩年將會怎麼做,
In order to predict effectively, we need to use science. And the reason that we need to use science is because then we can reproduce what we're doing; it's not just wisdom or guesswork. And if we can predict, then we can engineer the future. So if you are concerned to influence energy policy, or you are concerned to influence national security policy, or health policy, or education, science -- and a particular branch of science -- is a way to do it, not the way we've been doing it, which is seat-of-the-pants wisdom.
為了預測正確 我們需要運用科學 需要運用科學的原因, 是因為這樣才可以重複驗證我們做的, 不只是靠智慧或是猜測。 如果我們可以預測, 那麼我們就可以掌握未來, 所以如果你想影響能源政策, 或你想影響國家安全政策, 或是健保,或教育, 科學,與科學中特別的一支,是正確的方法, 與我們從前的方法不同, 從前用的是憑感覺經驗這種智慧,
Now before I get into how to do it let me give you a little truth in advertising, because I'm not engaged in the business of magic. There are lots of thing that the approach I take can predict, and there are some that it can't. It can predict complex negotiations or situations involving coercion -- that is in essence everything that has to do with politics, much of what has to do with business, but sorry, if you're looking to speculate in the stock market, I don't predict stock markets -- OK, it's not going up any time really soon. But I'm not engaged in doing that. I'm not engaged in predicting random number generators. I actually get phone calls from people who want to know what lottery numbers are going to win. I don't have a clue.
現在,在我說明如何做它之前, 先告訴你們一些事實, 因為我做的不是魔術, 我用的方法可以預測許多事情, 但有些事沒有辦法, 它可以預測複雜的談判, 或有用到威脅手段的情形, 幾乎可以應用於任何與政治有關的事情, 也可以用在多數與商業有關的事上, 但很抱歉,如果你想在股票市場投機, 我不預測股票市場--嗯, 它不會在短期內上漲, 我不從事這種預測, 我不預測會出現什麼隨機數目, 真的有人打電話問我, 想知道什麼樂透數字會中獎? 我毫無線索,
I engage in the use of game theory, game theory is a branch of mathematics and that means, sorry, that even in the study of politics, math has come into the picture. We can no longer pretend that we just speculate about politics, we need to look at this in a rigorous way. Now, what is game theory about? It assumes that people are looking out for what's good for them. That doesn't seem terribly shocking -- although it's controversial for a lot of people -- that we are self-interested. In order to look out for what's best for them or what they think is best for them, people have values -- they identify what they want, and what they don't want. And they have beliefs about what other people want, and what other people don't want, how much power other people have, how much those people could get in the way of whatever it is that you want. And they face limitations, constraints, they may be weak, they may be located in the wrong part of the world, they may be Einstein, stuck away farming someplace in a rural village in India not being noticed, as was the case for Ramanujan for a long time, a great mathematician but nobody noticed.
我採用的是博弈理論,它是數學的一支, 就是說,就是在政治研究當中, 數學也來軋一腳, 我們對政治不能再只靠猜測, 我們該用嚴肅的方法看待它, 那麼什麼是博弈理論? 它假設人是追尋他們的利益, 這看來並不很離譜-- 雖然對不少人這是有得爭議的-- 就是我們是追求自利的, 為了追求他們最大的利益, 或者他們認為什麼是對他們最好的, 人們有價值觀--他們認清自己想要的是什麼,不想要的是什麼, 也相信別人想要的是什麼, 還有別人不想要什麼,他們有多大的權力, 還有你算計的他們最多可以得到多少 以及他們面對的限制, 他們可能柔弱,可能處於這世界不對的地方, 他們也可能像愛因斯坦那樣有本事,但困在農村, 住在印度一個鄉下,沒人注意到, 就像Ramanujan那樣很長一段時間, 一位了不起的數學家,但沒人注意到,
Now who is rational? A lot of people are worried about what is rationality about? You know, what if people are rational? Mother Theresa, she was rational. Terrorists, they're rational. Pretty much everybody is rational. I think there are only two exceptions that I'm aware of -- two-year-olds, they are not rational, they have very fickle preferences, they switch what they think all the time, and schizophrenics are probably not rational, but pretty much everybody else is rational. That is, they are just trying to do what they think is in their own best interest.
那麼誰是理性的呢? 許多人擔心理性是什麼? 人們都是理性的, 德瑞沙修女,她是理性的, 恐怖分子,他們也是理性的, 一般來說每個人都是理性的, 我所知的例外只有兩種情形-- 兩歲的小孩,他們不是理性的, 他們想要的變來變去, 他們的想法不時的改變, 還有精神分裂病患者大概也不理性, 但其他多數人都是理性的, 就是說,他們只想做 他們認為對他們最有利的事。
Now in order to work out what people are going to do to pursue their interests, we have to think about who has influence in the world. If you're trying to influence corporations to change their behavior, with regard to producing pollutants, one approach, the common approach, is to exhort them to be better, to explain to them what damage they're doing to the planet. And many of you may have noticed that doesn't have as big an effect, as perhaps you would like it to have. But if you show them that it's in their interest, then they're responsive.
為了推算出人們下一步會怎麼做 以追求他們的利益, 我們必須考慮這世界上誰有影響力, 如果你想影響公司改變它們的行為, 關於產生污染的問題, 一個做法,較通常的做法, 是勸告他們改善, 讓他們知道他們 對地球造成怎樣的傷害,, 你們可能知道這效果有限, 不如你們期望的那麼有用, 但如果你能顯示這樣對他們有利, 他們就會有反應。
So, we have to work out who influences problems. If we're looking at Iran, the president of the United States we would like to think, may have some influence -- certainly the president in Iran has some influence -- but we make a mistake if we just pay attention to the person at the top of the power ladder because that person doesn't know much about Iran, or about energy policy, or about health care, or about any particular policy. That person surrounds himself or herself with advisers. If we're talking about national security problems, maybe it's the Secretary of State, maybe it's the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, maybe the ambassador to the United Nations, or somebody else who they think is going to know more about the particular problem. But let's face it, the Secretary of State doesn't know much about Iran. The secretary of defense doesn't know much about Iran. Each of those people in turn has advisers who advise them, so they can advise the president. There are lots of people shaping decisions and so if we want to predict correctly we have to pay attention to everybody who is trying to shape the outcome, not just the people at the pinnacle of the decision-making pyramid.
所以,我們必須找出誰有影響力, 例如看伊朗問題,美國總統 我們認為,可能有些影響力-- 自然,伊朗總統有些影響力-- 但我們可能犯錯,如果只注意 在權力階梯頂端的人, 因為那個人對伊朗所知不多, 或關於能源政策, 或關於健康保險, 或任何特定的政策, 決策者周圍有許多顧問。 如果我們談的是國家安全問題, 那麼可能 是國務卿 也許是國防部長, 或情報局長, 或駐聯合國大使,或其他的 他們認為對某個問題知道較多的人, 讓我們想想看,國務卿對伊朗所知不多, 國防部長也不是伊朗問題專家。 他們每個人 都各有自己的顧問, 因此他們可以對總統提意見。 這是許多人共同影響決策的, 所以如果我們想正確的預測, 就需注意到每一個人, 每個對結果有影響的人, 而不是只在尖端的人, 決策金字塔的,
Unfortunately, a lot of times we don't do that. There's a good reason that we don't do that, and there's a good reason that using game theory and computers, we can overcome the limitation of just looking at a few people. Imagine a problem with just five decision-makers. Imagine for example that Sally over here, wants to know what Harry, and Jane, and George and Frank are thinking, and sends messages to those people. Sally's giving her opinion to them, and they're giving their opinion to Sally. But Sally also wants to know what Harry is saying to these three, and what they're saying to Harry. And Harry wants to know what each of those people are saying to each other, and so on, and Sally would like to know what Harry thinks those people are saying. That's a complicated problem; that's a lot to know. With five decision-makers there are a lot of linkages -- 120, as a matter of fact, if you remember your factorials. Five factorial is 120. Now you may be surprised to know that smart people can keep 120 things straight in their head. Suppose we double the number of influencers from five to 10. Does that mean we've doubled the number of pieces of information we need to know, from 120 to 240? No. How about 10 times? To 1,200? No. We've increased it to 3.6 million. Nobody can keep that straight in their head. But computers, they can. They don't need coffee breaks, they don't need vacations, they don't need to go to sleep at night, they don't ask for raises either. They can keep this information straight and that means that we can process the information.
不幸的是,常常我們不是這樣做。 不這樣做是有原因的, 使用博弈理論與電腦是有很好的理由, 我們可以超越限制, 不是只看少數幾個人。 假設一個問題只涉及五名決策人士, 想像一下, 這裡是Sally, 她想知道Harry,Jane George,Frank怎麼想, 並把意見傳達給他們, Sally把她的看法傳給他們, 他們也把自己的意見傳給Sally。 但Sally也想知道 Harry對其他三人說了什麼, 以及他們對Harry說了什麼, 而Harry又想知道 其他每個人間互相說了什麼, Sally想知道Harry對其他人說法的感覺如何。 這是個複雜的問題,需要知道的很多。 當有五名決策人士時 就有許多的關係聯繫-- 實際上是120條連線, 如果你記得代數裡的階乘關係, 5的階乘是120, 現在你可能驚異的發現 聰明人可以清楚記得120件事 在他們的腦中, 假如我們把有影響的人數加倍, 從5變成10, 是資訊的數目也加倍嗎? 我們需要知道的,從120 變成240嗎 ? 不是,那是10倍嗎? 成為1200?不是, 我們需要增加到360萬, 沒有人的腦袋可以記得這麼多, 但是電腦, 它們可以,他們不需要休息喝咖啡, 它們不需要休假, 它們不需要在晚上睡覺, 它們也不要求加薪, 它們能夠保持資訊正確, 這表示我們可以處理這些資訊,
So I'm going to talk to you about how to process it, and I'm going to give you some examples out of Iran, and you're going to be wondering, "Why should we listen to this guy? Why should we believe what he's saying?" So I'm going to show you a factoid. This is an assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency of the percentage of time that the model I'm talking about is right in predicting things whose outcome is not yet known, when the experts who provided the data inputs got it wrong. That's not my claim, that's a CIA claim -- you can read it, it was declassified a while ago. You can read it in a volume edited by H. Bradford Westerfield, Yale University Press.
我將談談如何處理它, 我將以伊朗為例, 你們也許會奇怪, “為什麼要聽這個人的? 我們為什麼要相信他所說的?” 我給你們看這證詞, 這是一個中央情報局的評估報告, 是正確的百分比 我將談的這個模型 在預測還未發生的事情時, 在提供數據的專家 預測錯誤時, 這不是我說的,是中情局說的--你們可以讀它, 不久前它才解密,你們可以在 威斯特菲編輯,耶魯大學出版這書上看到,
So, what do we need to know in order to predict? You may be surprised to find out we don't need to know very much. We do need to know who has a stake in trying to shape the outcome of a decision. We need to know what they say they want, not what they want in their heart of hearts, not what they think they can get, but what they say they want, because that is a strategically chosen position, and we can work backwards from that to draw inferences about important features of their decision-making. We need to know how focused they are on the problem at hand. That is, how willing are they to drop what they're doing when the issue comes up, and attend to it instead of something else that's on their plate -- how big a deal is it to them? And how much clout could they bring to bear if they chose to engage on the issue?
我們需要知道什麼, 才可以預測? 你也許會因發現我們不需要知道很多而嚇一跳, 我們需要知道誰有利害關係, 要試圖影響一個決定的結果。 我們需要知道他們說他們想要什麼, 而不是他們心中想要什麼, 不是他們認為他們可以得到什麼, 而是他們說他們想要的是什麼,因為這是策略性選擇的位置, 我們可以從這倒退推算, 由他們決策時的重要特質去推理。 我們需要知道他們有多關注, 在手上的問題。 就是在問題發生時,他們有多願意放下手上正在做的事, 會關注這件事而不是身邊其他的事-- 這事對他們有多重要? 他們有多大的能耐可以影響決策, 如果他們選擇關注這問題,
If we know those things we can predict their behavior by assuming that everybody cares about two things on any decision. They care about the outcome. They'd like an outcome as close to what they are interested in as possible. They're careerists, they also care about getting credit -- there's ego involvement, they want to be seen as important in shaping the outcome, or as important, if it's their druthers, to block an outcome. And so we have to figure out how they balance those two things. Different people trade off between standing by their outcome, faithfully holding to it, going down in a blaze of glory, or giving it up, putting their finger in the wind, and doing whatever they think is going to be a winning position. Most people fall in between, and if we can work out where they fall we can work out how to negotiate with them to change their behavior.
如果我們有這些資訊, 我們就可以預測他們的行為, 假設每個人在任何決定上關心兩件事, 他們關心結果,他們希望結果與他們 的利益盡量的接近, 他們有自己的職志,關心信譽的建立, 這裡有個人自我 他們希望被認為在形成結果上有重要性, 或者也很重要的,是他們的反對而阻止了某些結果的發生, 所以我們需要辨認清楚他們是如何平衡那兩件事的, 這因人而異, 人們有不同的立場不同的追求, 有的人堅持,追求榮耀, 或者放棄,見風使舵, 而做任何他們認為最有利的, 多數人介於兩者之間,如果我們能夠認清他們處於那裡, 我們就可以認清如何與他們談判, 以改變他們的行為。
So with just that little bit of input we can work out what the choices are that people have, what the chances are that they're willing to take, what they're after, what they value, what they want, and what they believe about other people. You might notice what we don't need to know: there's no history in here. How they got to where they are may be important in shaping the input information, but once we know where they are we're worried about where they're going to be headed in the future. How they got there turns out not to be terribly critical in predicting. I remind you of that 90 percent accuracy rate.
所以只要這麼一點輸入的資訊, 我們就能知道別的人有些什麼可能的選擇, 他們願意接受的機會有多大, 他們追求的是什麼,他們的價值觀如何,他們期望什麼, 他們眼中的別人是如何, 你也許也注意到一些我們不需要知道的, 這裡不需要歷史記錄, 關於他們是如何成為現在這樣的, 對如何形成所輸入的資訊可能有重要性, 但一旦我們知道他們現狀是如何後, 我們就會想知道他們未來會朝那個方向發展, 他們如何變成現狀的,在預測上就不是這麼重要, 提醒你們這是90%的準確性,
So where are we going to get this information? We can get this information from the Internet, from The Economist, The Financial Times, The New York Times, U.S. News and World Report, lots of sources like that, or we can get it from asking experts who spend their lives studying places and problems, because those experts know this information. If they don't know, who are the people trying to influence the decision, how much clout do they have, how much they care about this issue, and what do they say they want, are they experts? That's what it means to be an expert, that's the basic stuff an expert needs to know.
所以我們要從那裡獲得這些資訊? 我們可以獲得這些資訊, 從互聯網,從《經濟學人》雜誌、 從《金融時報》、《紐約時報》, 《美國新聞》與《世界報導》,還有很多類似的來源, 或者可以從請教專家而得到, 這些專家長期研究各地方的問題, 因為這些專家知道這些資訊, 如果他們不知道,那麼是誰會能影響決策, 他們有多大的影響力, 他們對這問題有多關心,他們對所希望的怎麼說, 他們是專家嗎?專家應該知道這些, 那是一個專家需要知道的基本資料,
Alright, lets turn to Iran. Let me make three important predictions -- you can check this out, time will tell. What is Iran going to do about its nuclear weapons program? How secure is the theocratic regime in Iran? What's its future? And everybody's best friend, Ahmadinejad. How are things going for him? How are things going to be working out for him in the next year or two? You take a look at this, this is not based on statistics. I want to be very clear here. I'm not projecting some past data into the future. I've taken inputs on positions and so forth, run it through a computer model that had simulated the dynamics of interaction, and these are the simulated dynamics, the predictions about the path of policy.
好,讓我們看伊朗問題, 我在這做三個重要的預測-- 你可以檢驗這些預測的正確性,時間會證明, 伊朗的核武計劃將來會如何? 伊朗的神權政府是多穩定? 未來如何? 還有大家的好朋友, 艾瑪迪-內賈德,他將來會如何? 在未來一兩年他的地位會怎樣演變? 你看這裡,這不是依據統計, 在這裡我要說清楚,我不是以過去的數據延伸來推測未來, 我是以各個人的立場為輸入資料, 經電腦模型運算, 模擬動態的相互作用, 這些經過模擬的動態, 就是政策變化過程的預測,
So you can see here on the vertical axis, I haven't shown it all the way down to zero, there are lots of other options, but here I'm just showing you the prediction, so I've narrowed the scale. Up at the top of the axis, "Build the Bomb." At 130, we start somewhere above 130, between building a bomb, and making enough weapons-grade fuel so that you could build a bomb. That's where, according to my analyses, the Iranians were at the beginning of this year. And then the model makes predictions down the road. At 115 they would only produce enough weapons grade fuel to show that they know how, but they wouldn't build a weapon: they would build a research quantity. It would achieve some national pride, but not go ahead and build a weapon. And down at 100 they would build civilian nuclear energy, which is what they say is their objective.
所以你可以在縱軸上看到, 我沒有顯示它一直向下走到零 有很多可能的選項,但這裡我只向各位展示預測, 我將比例縮窄, 在軸線的頂端,是要建造核彈, 那是130,我們從高於130開始, 在建造核彈與製造足夠的核武等級燃料之間, 這樣就可以建造核彈, 這是依據我的分析, 伊朗今年初的位置, 然後這模型預測後來的變化, 在115表示伊朗能生產足夠的核彈等級的燃料, 展現他們有此能力,但不去建造武器, 他們只建立了足夠研究的數量, 達到國家榮譽的程度, 但不再往前建造武器, 到100表示他們建立民生用的核能發電, 這是他們所宣稱的目標,
The yellow line shows us the most likely path. The yellow line includes an analysis of 87 decision makers in Iran, and a vast number of outside influencers trying to pressure Iran into changing its behavior, various players in the United States, and Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and Russia, European Union, Japan, so on and so forth. The white line reproduces the analysis if the international environment just left Iran to make its own internal decisions, under its own domestic political pressures. That's not going to be happening, but you can see that the line comes down faster if they're not put under international pressure, if they're allowed to pursue their own devices.
這黃線代表最可能的發展路徑, 這黃線包含了分析 87名伊朗的決策人士, 以及大量的外部有力人士 他們對伊朗施壓 要改變它的行為, 許多在美國以及埃及的人士, 還有沙烏地阿拉伯、蘇俄、歐盟、 日本,等等 這白線是再一次的分析, 假如國際環境 讓伊朗自己內部做決定, 在它自己國內的政治壓力下-- 那是不會發生的-- 但你能看到這條線下降得快一些, 如果沒有國際壓力, 如果他們能夠以自己的方式追求,
But in any event, by the end of this year, beginning of next year, we get to a stable equilibrium outcome. And that equilibrium is not what the United States would like, but it's probably an equilibrium that the United States can live with, and that a lot of others can live with. And that is that Iran will achieve that nationalist pride by making enough weapons-grade fuel, through research, so that they could show that they know how to make weapons-grade fuel, but not enough to actually build a bomb. How is this happening? Over here you can see this is the distribution of power in favor of civilian nuclear energy today, this is what that power block is predicted to be like by the late parts of 2010, early parts of 2011. Just about nobody supports research on weapons-grade fuel today, but by 2011 that gets to be a big block, and you put these two together, that's the controlling influence in Iran.
但任何情況下,到今年底, 從明年開始,我們會達到平衡穩定的結果, 這平衡點不是美國所盼望的, 但可能是美國能夠接受的平衡狀態, 還有很多其他國家也可以接受, 那是伊朗能夠達成國家榮譽的程度, 並經由研究而製作出足夠的武器等級燃料, 這樣他們可以炫耀他們知道如何製造武器等級的燃料, 但不足以實際製造核彈, 這怎麼發生的? 這裡你可以看到這是權利的分配 它有利於今天民生用途的核能發電, 這是依據權利分配而預測出來的, 在2010年底2011年初, 還沒有人支持武器等級核燃料的研究, 但到2011年,那成為很大的力量, 你把這兩個加在一起,對伊朗有控制性的影響力,
Out here today, there are a bunch of people -- Ahmadinejad for example -- who would like not only to build a bomb, but test a bomb. That power disappears completely; nobody supports that by 2011. These guys are all shrinking, the power is all drifting out here, so the outcome is going to be the weapons-grade fuel.
今天,有許多人-- 像艾瑪迪內賈德-- 他不僅希望建造核彈, 還測試這炸彈, 這個力量完全消失了, 到2011年已經沒人支持這觀點。 這群人數在萎縮, 權力流到這邊, 所以結果是武器等級的燃料,
Who are the winners and who are the losers in Iran? Take a look at these guys, they're growing in power, and by the way, this was done a while ago before the current economic crisis, and that's probably going to get steeper. These folks are the moneyed interests in Iran, the bankers, the oil people, the bazaaries. They are growing in political clout, as the mullahs are isolating themselves -- with the exception of one group of mullahs, who are not well known to Americans. That's this line here, growing in power, these are what the Iranians call the quietists. These are the Ayatollahs, mostly based in Qom, who have great clout in the religious community, have been quiet on politics and are going to be getting louder, because they see Iran going in an unhealthy direction, a direction contrary to what Khomeini had in mind. Here is Mr. Ahmadinejad. Two things to notice: he's getting weaker, and while he gets a lot of attention in the United States, he is not a major player in Iran. He is on the way down.
誰是伊朗的贏家與輸家呢? 看這些人,他們的權力在增加, 順便說一下,這是不久前做的, 是在現在這經濟危機之前, 現在可能會更為傾斜, 這些人是伊朗有權勢的人, 銀行家,油人,商家, 他們的政治影響力都在成長, 在穆斯林神職人員自我隔絕時-- 除了有一群教士外, 美國人一般不知道他們, 只有他們的權力在擴張, 伊朗人稱他們為Quietists教派, 他們被稱為阿亞圖拉,主要存在於庫姆這地區, 他們在宗教圈裡很有影響力, 以往對政治沉默,現在聲音愈來愈大, 因為他們覺得伊朗走向不健康的方向, 一個反方向 與柯梅尼心中希望的。 這位是艾馬迪內賈德總統, 兩件事值得注意,他變弱了, 當他在美國受到許多注意時, 他在伊朗卻不是很重要的人, 他在走下坡,
OK, so I'd like you to take a little away from this. Everything is not predictable: the stock market is, at least for me, not predictable, but most complicated negotiations are predictable. Again, whether we're talking health policy, education, environment, energy, litigation, mergers, all of these are complicated problems that are predictable, that this sort of technology can be applied to. And the reason that being able to predict those things is important, is not just because you might run a hedge fund and make money off of it, but because if you can predict what people will do, you can engineer what they will do. And if you engineer what they do you can change the world, you can get a better result. I would like to leave you with one thought, which is for me, the dominant theme of this gathering, and is the dominant theme of this way of thinking about the world. When people say to you, "That's impossible," you say back to them, "When you say 'That's impossible,' you're confused with, 'I don't know how to do it.'" Thank you.
好的,我要你們注意力從這移開一下, 不是所有事情都能預測,股票市場 至少對我是不能預測的, 但多數複雜的談判是可以預測的, 不管是談健保政策、教育、 環境、能源、 訴訟、併購, 這些都是複雜的問題, 它們是可以預測的, 可以應用這類的技術, 而能夠預測這些事情的原因是重要的, 不是因為你可能經營一個避險基金,要從它賺錢, 而是因為假如你能夠預測人們將怎麼做, 你就能夠控制他們將做什麼, 如果你能控制他們要做什麼,你就能改變這世界, 你可能得到較好的結果, 我想留個問題給你們思考, 對我,這聚會的重要議題, 也是這樣思考世界問題的主要論點就是, 當人們對你說, “那個不可能,” 你回應說, “當你說‘那個不可能,’ 你真的意思是, ”我不知道怎麼做“ 謝謝
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Chris Anderson: One question for you. That was fascinating. I love that you put it out there. I got very nervous halfway through the talk though, just panicking whether you'd included in your model, the possibility that putting this prediction out there might change the result. We've got 800 people in Tehran who watch TEDTalks.
安德森:請教個問題, 這個很棒, 很高興你提出來, 但聽講到一半時,我變得緊張, 不知在你的模型中,會包含可能性 做這些預測可能改變結果, 我們在德黑蘭有800人觀看這演講,
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: I've thought about that, and since I've done a lot of work for the intelligence community, they've also pondered that. It would be a good thing if people paid more attention, took seriously, and engaged in the same sorts of calculations, because it would change things. But it would change things in two beneficial ways. It would hasten how quickly people arrive at an agreement, and so it would save everybody a lot of grief and time. And, it would arrive at an agreement that everybody was happy with, without having to manipulate them so much -- which is basically what I do, I manipulate them. So it would be a good thing.
我想到這個, 我們為精英社群做了許多工作, 他們也考慮 那將是好事如果 人們更加注意,嚴肅對待, 也進行相似的算計, 因為這會改變事情,它會在兩個有利的方面改變事情, 他們提高 人們達成協議的速度, 所以它會節省每個人許多痛苦與時間。 它也會達成每個人都喜歡的協議, 而不需要非常操控他們-- 這也就是我現在做的,我操控他們, 這將是個好事,
CA: So you're kind of trying to say, "People of Iran, this is your destiny, lets go there."
安德森:所以你是在客氣的說 ,“伊朗人,這是你們命定的,我們往這前進。”
BBM: Well, people of Iran, this is what many of you are going to evolve to want, and we could get there a lot sooner, and you would suffer a lot less trouble from economic sanctions, and we would suffer a lot less fear of the use of military force on our end, and the world would be a better place.
BBM:伊朗人,這是你們許多人將會轉變而期望的, 我們可以快一點達到那裡, 這樣你也少受一些經濟制裁帶來的困難, 我們也會少受點軍事威脅的恐懼, 世界也變得更可愛些,
CA: Here's hoping they hear it that way. Thank you very much Bruce.
安德森:這是期望他們所聽到的,謝謝你。
BBM: Thank you.
BBM:謝謝。
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