Em fa molt feliç compartir amb vosaltres
I'm really excited to share with you
uns descobriments insòlits sobre què fa que les empreses emergents tinguin èxit, quines són realment les claus per a que tiromfin.
some findings that really surprise me about what makes companies succeed the most, what factors actually matter the most for startup success.
Em sembla que una startup és una gran manera de fer del món un lloc millor. Si tens un grup de persones amb els incentius correctes i els organitzes en una empresa, pots treure el màxim de tots ells com mai abans s'havia fet. Pots fer que aconsegueixin coses increïbles.
I believe that the startup organization is one of the greatest forms to make the world a better place. If you take a group of people with the right equity incentives and organize them in a startup, you can unlock human potential in a way never before possible. You get them to achieve unbelievable things.
Però si les startups són tan increïbles, per què en fracassen tantes? Això és el que volia descobrir. Volia descobrir que és el més important per a assolir l’èxit.
But if the startup organization is so great, why do so many fail? That's what I wanted to find out. I wanted to find out what actually matters most for startup success.
I volia intentar ser sistemàtic, evitar les idees preconcebudes i sovint errònies que tinc degut a les múltiples empreses que he vist durant tants anys.
And I wanted to try to be systematic about it, avoid some of my instincts and maybe misperceptions I have from so many companies I've seen over the years.
Volia saber això perquè he creat empreses des de que tenia 12 anys quan venia caramels a la parada de bus de l'escola, a l' institut, on feia aparells d'energia solar, i a la universitat, on fabricava altaveus. I quan vaig acabar els estudis, vaig crear empreses de software. Fa vint anys, vaig crear Idealab, i en els últims 20 anys, hem creat mes de 100 empreses. Moltes han tingut èxit, d'altres, no. Hem après molt dels fracassos.
I wanted to know this because I've been starting businesses since I was 12 years old when I sold candy at the bus stop in junior high school, to high school, when I made solar energy devices, to college, when I made loudspeakers. And when I graduated from college, I started software companies. And 20 years ago, I started Idealab, and in the last 20 years, we started more than 100 companies, many successes, and many big failures. We learned a lot from those failures.
I, per aquest motiu, he intentat esbrinar quins factors tenen més pes en l’èxit i el fracàs d'una empresa. He considerat aquests cinc. Primer, la idea. Solia pensar que la idea ho és tot. La meva empresa es diu Idealab per la devoció que tenia sobre el precís moment en el que tens una idea. Però amb el temps, vaig començar a pensar que potser l'equip, l’execució, l'adaptabilitat, eren més importants que la idea.
So I tried to look across what factors accounted the most for company success and failure. So I looked at these five. First, the idea. I used to think that the idea was everything. I named my company Idealab for how much I worship the "aha!" moment when you first come up with the idea. But then over time, I came to think that maybe the team, the execution, adaptability, that mattered even more than the idea.
Mai hauria pensat que citaria a Mike Tyson en aquest escenari, però ell va dir, "Tothom té un pla, fins que et colpegen la cara" (Riure) I crec que això és cert en el món de les empreses també. Una part important de l’execució de l'equip és l'habilitat d'acostumar-te a que el client et colpegi la cara. El client és la veritable realitat. Per això vaig pensar que potser l'equip era la part més important.
I never thought I'd be quoting boxer Mike Tyson on the TED stage, but he once said, "Everybody has a plan, until they get punched in the face." (Laughter) And I think that's so true about business as well. So much about a team's execution is its ability to adapt to getting punched in the face by the customer. The customer is the true reality. And that's why I came to think that the team maybe was the most important thing.
Desprès vaig estudiar el model de negoci. És cert que l'empresa té una visió clara de com generar beneficis? Vaig començar a pensar més i més que aquest podia ser el factor més important.
Then I started looking at the business model. Does the company have a very clear path generating customer revenues? That started rising to the top in my thinking about maybe what mattered most for success.
També vaig estudiar el finançament. Moltes empreses reben grans quantitats de diners. És això el més important?
Then I looked at the funding. Sometimes companies received intense amounts of funding. Maybe that's the most important thing?
I finalment, vaig estudiar l'època. Pot ser que les ideees siguin massa innovadores pel món? Has arribat massa d'hora, i has com d´educar el món? És el moment adequat? O has arribat massa tard i ja tens massa competidors?
And then of course, the timing. Is the idea way too early and the world's not ready for it? Is it early, as in, you're in advance and you have to educate the world? Is it just right? Or is it too late, and there's already too many competitors?
Vaig estudiar meticulosament aquests cinc factors en moltes empreses. Vaig analitzar les empreses creades a Idealab, i altres empreses del mercat per a trobar una resposta científica al meu estudi.
So I tried to look very carefully at these five factors across many companies. And I looked across all 100 Idealab companies, and 100 non-Idealab companies to try and come up with something scientific about it.
Primer, en les empreses creades a Idealab, les cinc primeres empreses: Citysearch, CarsDirect, GoTo, NetZero i Tickets.com, van ser totes grans èxits. De les cinc últimes empreses: Z.com, Insider Pages, MyLife, Desktop Factory i Peoplelink, tots esperàvem molt, però no van tenir èxit.
So first, on these Idealab companies, the top five companies -- Citysearch, CarsDirect, GoTo, NetZero, Tickets.com -- those all became billion-dollar successes. And the five companies on the bottom -- Z.com, Insider Pages, MyLife, Desktop Factory, Peoplelink -- we all had high hopes for, but didn't succeed.
Vaig intentar ordenar les empreses segons la puntuació que jo creia que tenien en cada apartat. Després, vaig estudiar grans èxits fora d'Idealab, com Airbnb, Instagram, Uber, Youtube i Linkedin.
So I tried to rank across all of those attributes how I felt those companies scored on each of those dimensions. And then for non-Idealab companies, I looked at wild successes, like Airbnb and Instagram and Uber and Youtube and LinkedIn.
I alguns fracassos: Webvan, Kozmo, Pets.com, Flooz i Friendster. Aquestes empreses tenien finançament, també tenien models de negoci, però no van tenir èxit. Vaig estudiar els factors que van pesar més en l’èxit i el fracàs de totes aquestes empreses, i els resultats em van sorprendre molt.
And some failures: Webvan, Kozmo, Pets.com Flooz and Friendster. The bottom companies had intense funding, they even had business models in some cases, but they didn't succeed. I tried to look at what factors actually accounted the most for success and failure across all of these companies, and the results really surprised me.
El primer factor va ser l'època. El timing era el 42 % de la diferència entre l’èxit i el fracàs. L'equip i l’execució eren els segons, i la idea, la diferenciació de la idea, la unicitat de la idea, era el tercer factor.
The number one thing was timing. Timing accounted for 42 percent of the difference between success and failure. Team and execution came in second, and the idea, the differentiability of the idea, the uniqueness of the idea, that actually came in third.
Això no és definitiu, no podem dir que la idea no és important, però em va sorprendre molt que la idea no fos el més important. A vegades importava més el "quan".
Now, this isn't absolutely definitive, it's not to say that the idea isn't important, but it very much surprised me that the idea wasn't the most important thing. Sometimes it mattered more when it was actually timed.
Els dos últims punts: el model de negoci i el finançament, tenen sentit. És lògic que el model de negoci estigui tan baix perquè pots començar sense un model de negoci i crear-lo desprès si els clients volen el que estàs fent. El mateix amb el finançament, si al principi no tens diners però les coses funcionen, especialment avui en dia, és molt fàcil obtenir finançament.
The last two, business model and funding, made sense to me actually. I think business model makes sense to be that low because you can start out without a business model and add one later if your customers are demanding what you're creating. And funding, I think as well, if you're underfunded at first but you're gaining traction, especially in today's age, it's very, very easy to get intense funding.
Ara parlaré d'exemples específics de cada un d'aquests factors. Per exemple, l’èxit d' Airbnb, del qual tothom parla. Molts inversors van rebutjar aquesta empresa, perquè pensaven: "Ningú llogarà un espai a casa seva a algú que no coneixen." Evidentment, no tenien raó. Però un dels motius del seu èxit, a part d'un bon model de negoci, una bona idea i una gran execució, és el timing.
So now let me give you some specific examples about each of these. So take a wild success like Airbnb that everybody knows about. Well, that company was famously passed on by many smart investors because people thought, "No one's going to rent out a space in their home to a stranger." Of course, people proved that wrong. But one of the reasons it succeeded, aside from a good business model, a good idea, great execution, is the timing.
L'empresa va aparèixer en un moment de crisi econòmica, quan la gent necessitava diners extra, i això potser va fer que la gent superés la por de llogar casa seva a un desconegut.
That company came out right during the height of the recession when people really needed extra money, and that maybe helped people overcome their objection to renting out their own home to a stranger.
Uber és un cas similar. Quan va aparèixer era una empresa increïble, amb un bon model de negoci, gran execució, també. I el timing va ser perfecte per a incorporar conductors al sistema. Els conductors volien diners extra, això va ser el punt clau.
Same thing with Uber. Uber came out, incredible company, incredible business model, great execution, too. But the timing was so perfect for their need to get drivers into the system. Drivers were looking for extra money; it was very, very important.
Un dels nostres èxits, Citysearch, va arribar quan la gent volia webs. GoTo.com, el qual vam anunciar a TED l'any 1998, va aparèixer quan les empreses buscaven formes de tenir més tràfic. Vam pensar que la idea era genial, però la veritat és que el timing va ser més important. Pel que fa als fracassos, vam crear Z.com, una empresa d'entreteniment online. Teníem grans expectatives, un bon finançament, un gran model de negoci, fins i tot vam contractar un gran talent de Hollywood. Però al 99-2000 no hi havia bona cobertura de banda ampla. Era molt difícil veure vídeos online Calia instal•lar còdecs i el procés era complicat. L'empresa va haver de tancar l'any 2003.
Some of our early successes, Citysearch, came out when people needed web pages. GoTo.com, which we announced actually at TED in 1998, was when companies were looking for cost-effective ways to get traffic. We thought the idea was so great, but actually, the timing was probably maybe more important. And then some of our failures. We started a company called Z.com, it was an online entertainment company. We were so excited about it -- we raised enough money, we had a great business model, we even signed incredibly great Hollywood talent to join the company. But broadband penetration was too low in 1999-2000. It was too hard to watch video content online, you had to put codecs in your browser and do all this stuff, and the company eventually went out of business in 2003.
Dos anys més tard, quan Adobe Flash va resoldre el problema dels còdecs i la penetració de banda ampla va superar el 50% a Amèrica, YouTube va aparèixer en el moment oportú. Gran idea, però millor timing. De fet, YouTube no tenia model de negoci quan va començar. Ningú estava segur que funcionés, però va aparèixer en el moment perfecte.
Just two years later, when the codec problem was solved by Adobe Flash and when broadband penetration crossed 50 percent in America, YouTube was perfectly timed. Great idea, but unbelievable timing. In fact, YouTube didn't even have a business model when it first started. It wasn't even certain that that would work out. But that was beautifully, beautifully timed.
Per tant, en resum, l’execució és molt important. La idea és molt important. Però el timing pot ser més important. I, la millor manera d’encertar el moment oportú és estudiar si els consumidors estan preparats per a rebre el que vols oferir. Cal ser molt honest amb això, i no intentar negar els resultats, perquè si estimes el que crees, sempre vols continuar. Però s'ha de ser molt honest amb el timing.
So what I would say, in summary, is execution definitely matters a lot. The idea matters a lot. But timing might matter even more. And the best way to really assess timing is to really look at whether consumers are really ready for what you have to offer them. And to be really, really honest about it, not be in denial about any results that you see, because if you have something you love, you want to push it forward, but you have to be very, very honest about that factor on timing.
Com ja he dit, les empreses emergents poden convertir el món en un lloc millor. Espero que alguns d'aquests descobriments puguin ajudar-vos a tenir èxit, i a crear coses genials que d'una altra manera potser no hauríeu creat.
As I said earlier, I think startups can change the world and make the world a better place. I hope some of these insights can maybe help you have a slightly higher success ratio, and thus make something great come to the world that wouldn't have happened otherwise.
Moltes gràcies, sou un gran públic.
Thank you very much, you've been a great audience.
(Aplaudiments)
(Applause)