For the past decade, I've been studying non-state armed groups: armed organizations like terrorists, insurgents or militias. I document what these groups do when they're not shooting. My goal is to better understand these violent actors and to study ways to encourage transition from violent engagement to nonviolent confrontation. I work in the field, in the policy world and in the library.
在過去的十年裡, 我一直在研究非政府武裝組織。 例如恐怖組織、叛亂者,或是民兵組織。 我記錄他們在非戰爭情況中都在做些什麼, 我的目的是為了更好的理解這些暴力者 並且研究如何促使暴力行為 轉變為非暴力對抗。 我在現場、政策層面及圖書館內開展研究。
Understanding non-state armed groups is key to solving most ongoing conflict, because war has changed. It used to be a contest between states. No longer. It is now a conflict between states and non-state actors. For example, of the 216 peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011, 196 of them were between a state and a non-state actor. So we need to understand these groups; we need to either engage them or defeat them in any conflict resolution process that has to be successful.
因為戰爭的改變, 解決很多現有衝突的關鍵 是理解非國家武裝組織 曾經,戰爭是國家之間的比賽。 然而現在不是了。 如今,戰爭演變成了國家 和非國家組織之間的鬥爭。 比如,在1975年到2011年之間簽署的 216項和平條約中, 有196項是有關於 國家與非國家組織之間的矛盾。 因此我們需要了解這些組織 通過在衝突解決過程中與他們的溝通 甚至是有效的打敗他們
So how do we do that? We need to know what makes these organizations tick. We know a lot about how they fight, why they fight, but no one looks at what they're doing when they're not fighting. Yet, armed struggle and unarmed politics are related. It is all part of the same organization. We cannot understand these groups, let alone defeat them, if we don't have the full picture.
那麼,我們要如何做到呢? 我們需要知道這些組織為什麼會採取武裝行動 我們可以了解到他們為何戰鬥、如何戰鬥 但是沒有人注意到當他們不再戰鬥時, 他們在做些什麼, 然而,武裝鬥爭和非武裝政治是相互關聯的。 它們存在於同一個組織中 如果我們不了解全局, 我們將不會了解這些組織 無法擊敗他們。
And armed groups today are complex organizations. Take the Lebanese Hezbollah, known for its violent confrontation against Israel. But since its creation in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has also set up a political party, a social-service network, and a military apparatus. Similarly, the Palestinian Hamas, known for its suicide attacks against Israel, also runs the Gaza Strip since 2007. So these groups do way more than just shoot. They multi-task. They set up complex communication machines -- radio stations, TV channels, Internet websites and social media strategies. And up here, you have the ISIS magazine, printed in English and published to recruit. Armed groups also invest in complex fund-raising -- not looting, but setting up profitable businesses; for example, construction companies. Now, these activities are keys. They allow these groups to increase their strength, increase their funds, to better recruit and to build their brand.
在如今,武裝組織是非常複雜的組織 以黎巴嫩真主黨為例, 它以對以色列的暴力抗爭而被大家熟知 但是,從真主黨在十九世紀八十年代成立以來 它也組建了政治集團、 社工服務機構和軍事組織。 再例如,巴勒斯坦的伊斯蘭抵抗運動 以自殺式行為對抗以色列而出名, 同樣從2007年就開始控制加薩地帶。 因此,這些組織不僅僅進行暴力襲擊, 他們完成多個任務。 他們建立複雜的媒體設備, 比如電臺廣播、電視台、 網站和社交媒體策略。 在那裏,你可以讀到ISIS雜誌 甚至是紙質英文版本,有利於招募新成員。 武裝組織同樣可以投資於 複雜的資金籌集專案, 不再需要以打劫的方式獲取資源, 而是通過創立盈利性質的公司來籌錢, 比如,建築公司。 目前,這些活動纔是這些武裝組織的關鍵 他們使得武裝組織增強他們的力量 籌集到更多的資金 以便於更好的招募新成員, 並且建立自己的品牌
Armed groups also do something else: they build stronger bonds with the population by investing in social services. They build schools, they run hospitals, they set up vocational-training programs or micro-loan programs. Hezbollah offers all of these services and more. Armed groups also seek to win the population over by offering something that the state is not providing: safety and security. The initial rise of the Taliban in war-torn Afghanistan, or even the beginning of the ascent of ISIS, can be understood also by looking at these groups' efforts to provide security. Now, unfortunately, in these cases, the provision of security came at an unbearably high price for the population. But in general, providing social services fills a gap, a governance gap left by the government, and allows these groups to increase their strength and their power. For example, the 2006 electoral victory of the Palestinian Hamas cannot be understood without acknowledging the group's social work.
同時,他們還做其他的事情, 他們通過積极參與社會活動 促進與大眾的感情, 他們開辦學校、建立醫院、 開展職業培訓計劃,和小額貸款計劃。 真主黨提供的服務比以上所提到的還要多。 武裝組織同樣通過 提供通常政府無法提供的服務 來贏取大眾支持, 比如安全和保障 阿富汗塔利班的最初萌芽 和ISIS的起源 可以基於對這些組織 為了提供安保而做出的努力而理解 然而,在這些例子中 對於人民而言, 為了安全而投靠這些組織的代價 是非常昂貴 但是總體而言, 這些組織提供的社會服務彌補 政府遺留下的治理缺口, 從而使得這些非武裝組織更加強壯, 並且不斷的增強他們的實力。 比如, 對於2006年 伊斯蘭抵抗運動的勝利的理解 必須基於該組織所做出的社會服務
Now, this is a really complex picture, yet in the West, when we look at armed groups, we only think of the violent side. But that's not enough to understand these groups' strength, strategy or long-term vision. These groups are hybrid. They rise because they fill a gap left by the government, and they emerge to be both armed and political, engage in violent struggle and provide governance.
現在,情況變得複雜, 然而在西方,當我們提到武裝組織 我們只考慮到了暴力的一面。 但是若要更好理解這些組織的優勢, 只考慮暴力方面遠遠不夠。 這些組織是綜合體, 他們之所以立足 是因為他們彌補了政府職能缺失, 他們兼併成為武裝政治力量, 在暴力鬥爭和治理中起很大作用。
And the more these organizations are complex and sophisticated, the less we can think of them as the opposite of a state. Now, what do you call a group like Hezbollah? They run part of a territory, they administer all their functions, they pick up the garbage, they run the sewage system. Is this a state? Is it a rebel group? Or maybe something else, something different and new? And what about ISIS? The lines are blurred. We live in a world of states, non-states, and in-between, and the more states are weak, like in the Middle East today, the more non-state actors step in and fill that gap. This matters for governments, because to counter these groups, they will have to invest more in non-military tools. Filling that governance gap has to be at the center of any sustainable approach. This also matters very much for peacemaking and peacebuilding. If we better understand armed groups, we will better know what incentives to offer to encourage the transition from violence to nonviolence.
這些組織變得越複雜精密 我們越無法關注到他們與國家的不同, 那麼,你將會如何稱呼真主黨這類組織呢? 他們運營自己的基地, 並且管理所有的職能部門, 他們清理垃圾,也經營排水管道。 這是一個國家?還是一個反叛組織? 或者是另外的東西,是一個完全新的東西? 現在我們來聊聊ISIS, 界限變得模糊, 我們生活在由國家,非國家 和介於二者間的世界中, 隨著越來越多的國家變得軟弱, 例如當今的中東, 越來越多的非國家組織就介入 並填充職能缺失。 對於政府而言,在面對這些組織中 政府需要在非軍事職能方面投入更多 填充治理的空白 是任何永續發展方式的重心。 如果我們更好的理解武裝組織 對於和平調節和構建也有深遠意義, 我們會更了解如何給出更優的動機 促進暴力到非暴力的轉變。
So in this new contest between states and non-states, military power can win some battles, but it will not give us peace nor stability. To achieve these objectives, what we need is a long-term investment in filling that security gap, in filling that governance gap that allowed these groups to thrive in the first place.
所以在國家與非國家之間的競爭中, 軍事力量可以贏得一些戰爭 但是不會使社會和平穩定 為了實現這個目標 我們需要長期對安保缺失進行彌補 彌補治理缺失 使得這些組織得到成長。
Thank you.
謝謝。
(Applause)
(掌聲)