For the past decade, I've been studying non-state armed groups: armed organizations like terrorists, insurgents or militias. I document what these groups do when they're not shooting. My goal is to better understand these violent actors and to study ways to encourage transition from violent engagement to nonviolent confrontation. I work in the field, in the policy world and in the library.
在过去的十年里, 我一直在研究非政府武装集团: 像恐怖分子、造反派或民兵等武装组织。 我记录他们在非战斗状态下都做些什么。 我的目标是更好地了解这些暴力分子 并研究促进从暴力途径到非暴力对抗的 过渡方式。 我做过实地考察, 研究过政策层面, 在图书馆翻阅过资料.
Understanding non-state armed groups is key to solving most ongoing conflict, because war has changed. It used to be a contest between states. No longer. It is now a conflict between states and non-state actors. For example, of the 216 peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011, 196 of them were between a state and a non-state actor. So we need to understand these groups; we need to either engage them or defeat them in any conflict resolution process that has to be successful.
理解非政府武装组织是解决当今大多数冲突的关键, 因为战争形态已经跟以前不一样了。 它曾经是国家间的竞赛, 但现在不是了。 现在它是政府与非政府组织间的冲突。 例如,在1975年到2011间签署的216项 和平协议中, 其中196项是政府与非政府组织之间签订的。 因此我们需要了解这些集团;我们需要要么参与他们 要么在任何非成功不可的冲突解决过程中打败他们。
So how do we do that? We need to know what makes these organizations tick. We know a lot about how they fight, why they fight, but no one looks at what they're doing when they're not fighting. Yet, armed struggle and unarmed politics are related. It is all part of the same organization. We cannot understand these groups, let alone defeat them, if we don't have the full picture.
那么我们怎么做? 我们要知道是什么让这些组织采取武装行动 关于他们如何战斗、为何战斗我们了解很多, 但是没人关注当他们不战斗时都在干什么。 然而,武装斗争与非武装政治是相关联的。 它们都是相同组织的一部分。 我们甚至不能理解这些集团,遑论打败他们, 如果我们不能了解全貌的话。
And armed groups today are complex organizations. Take the Lebanese Hezbollah, known for its violent confrontation against Israel. But since its creation in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has also set up a political party, a social-service network, and a military apparatus. Similarly, the Palestinian Hamas, known for its suicide attacks against Israel, also runs the Gaza Strip since 2007. So these groups do way more than just shoot. They multi-task. They set up complex communication machines -- radio stations, TV channels, Internet websites and social media strategies. And up here, you have the ISIS magazine, printed in English and published to recruit. Armed groups also invest in complex fund-raising -- not looting, but setting up profitable businesses; for example, construction companies. Now, these activities are keys. They allow these groups to increase their strength, increase their funds, to better recruit and to build their brand.
当今的武装集团是复杂的组织。 以黎巴嫩真主党为例, 它因暴力对抗以色列而出名。 但自从上世纪80年代初创建以来, 真主党也建立了政党, 社会服务网络和军事机构。 类似地,因其对抗以色列的自杀式袭击而出名的 巴勒斯坦哈马斯, 自从2007年来也控制加沙走廊。 因而这些集团所做的不仅仅是战斗。 他们进行多项任务。 他们建立复杂的宣传系统—— 包括无线电台、电视频道、 网站和社交媒体宣传。 这里还有伊斯兰国杂志, 用英文打印,发表文章来招募新兵。 武装组织也投资复杂的基金筹备工作—— 不是通过掠夺的方式,而是通过建立可盈利的公司; 例如建筑公司。 现在,这些活动是关键。 它们使得这些集团能够增强自己的力量, 增加基金, 更好地招募,建立自己的品牌。
Armed groups also do something else: they build stronger bonds with the population by investing in social services. They build schools, they run hospitals, they set up vocational-training programs or micro-loan programs. Hezbollah offers all of these services and more. Armed groups also seek to win the population over by offering something that the state is not providing: safety and security. The initial rise of the Taliban in war-torn Afghanistan, or even the beginning of the ascent of ISIS, can be understood also by looking at these groups' efforts to provide security. Now, unfortunately, in these cases, the provision of security came at an unbearably high price for the population. But in general, providing social services fills a gap, a governance gap left by the government, and allows these groups to increase their strength and their power. For example, the 2006 electoral victory of the Palestinian Hamas cannot be understood without acknowledging the group's social work.
武装组织也做其他的一些事情: 它们通过投资社会服务 与大众建立更牢固的联系。 他们建立学校,他们经营医院, 他们建立职业培训项目或小额贷款项目。 真主党提供所有这些服务,并且不止这些。 武装组织也寻求通过提供政府未提供的东西 来赢得大众的支持: 安全和稳定。 塔利班在战乱重创的阿富汗的崛起, 或者甚至是伊斯兰国的崛起, 可以通过看这些团体提供安保的努力 来理解。 现在,不幸的是,在这些案例中, 提供安保对大众来说是个 难以承受的高代价。 但是通常情况下,提供社会服务填充了一个缺口, 由政府留下的管理缺口, 使得这些集团能够增强自身实力 和权利。 例如,要理解2006年巴勒斯坦哈马斯的选举胜利 就不能不承认集团的社会工作扮演的重要角色。
Now, this is a really complex picture, yet in the West, when we look at armed groups, we only think of the violent side. But that's not enough to understand these groups' strength, strategy or long-term vision. These groups are hybrid. They rise because they fill a gap left by the government, and they emerge to be both armed and political, engage in violent struggle and provide governance.
现在,情况变得复杂起来, 然而在西方,当我们提起武装集团, 我们仅仅想到它暴力的一面。 但这不足以理解这些集团的力量, 策略或长远目标。 这些集团是混合体。 他们的崛起是因为他们填补了政府留下的空白, 他们以武装与政治集团的身份出现, 参与暴力斗争、提供管理。
And the more these organizations are complex and sophisticated, the less we can think of them as the opposite of a state. Now, what do you call a group like Hezbollah? They run part of a territory, they administer all their functions, they pick up the garbage, they run the sewage system. Is this a state? Is it a rebel group? Or maybe something else, something different and new? And what about ISIS? The lines are blurred. We live in a world of states, non-states, and in-between, and the more states are weak, like in the Middle East today, the more non-state actors step in and fill that gap. This matters for governments, because to counter these groups, they will have to invest more in non-military tools. Filling that governance gap has to be at the center of any sustainable approach. This also matters very much for peacemaking and peacebuilding. If we better understand armed groups, we will better know what incentives to offer to encourage the transition from violence to nonviolence.
这些组织越复杂、精密, 他们越不会将自身视为国家的对立面。 现在,你怎么称呼想真主党这样的集团? 他们管理部分领土,有政府所有的功能, 他们回收垃圾,他们维护排水系统。 这是政府吗?这是叛乱集团吗? 或是其他一些东西,一些不同的新东西? 那么伊斯兰国呢? 界限模糊了。 我们生活在政府、非政府以及二者之间, 政府越无力,像今天的中东那样, 非政府武装组织就会更多地介入,填补那个空白。 这对政府来说很重要,因为为了对抗这些集团, 他们将不得不在非军事领域投入更多。 填补这项政府空白, 必须居于任何可持续方式的中心。 这对于调解和创建和平也很重要。 如果我们更好地理解武装集团, 我们将更好地了解该采取何种途径来 实现从暴力到非暴力形式的过渡。
So in this new contest between states and non-states, military power can win some battles, but it will not give us peace nor stability. To achieve these objectives, what we need is a long-term investment in filling that security gap, in filling that governance gap that allowed these groups to thrive in the first place.
因此在这项政府与非政府间的竞赛中, 军事力量可以赢得一些战斗, 但是它不会给我们带来和平与稳定。 为了实现这些目标, 我们需要的是填补这项安保空白 填补上政府管理的缺位 这才是阻止非政府武装组织繁荣的关键.
Thank you.
谢谢。
(Applause)
(鼓掌)