Bruno Giussani: Commissioner, thank you for coming to TED.
Bruno Giussani: Comisionado, grazas por vir ao TED.
António Guterres: Pleasure.
António Guterres: Un pracer.
BG: Let's start with a figure. During 2015, almost one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe from many different countries, of course, from Syria and Iraq, but also from Afghanistan and Bangladesh and Eritrea and elsewhere. And there have been reactions of two different kinds: welcoming parties and border fences. But I want to look at it a little bit from the short-term and the long-term perspective. And the first question is very simple: Why has the movement of refugees spiked so fast in the last six months?
BG: Imos comezar cuns datos. Durante 2015, case un millón de refuxiados e migrantes chegaron a Europa desde diferentes países, desde Siria e Iraq, claro, pero tamén desde Afganistán e Bangladesh e Eritrea e doutros sitios. E houbo reaccións de dous tipos: festas de benvida e muros fronteirizos. Pero eu quero prestarlle atención a isto desde un enfoque a curto e a longo prazo. E a primeira pregunta é moi sinxela: Por que o movemento de refuxiados aumentou tanto nos últimos seis meses?
AG: Well, I think, basically, what triggered this huge increase was the Syrian refugee group. There has been an increased movement into Europe from Africa, from Asia, but slowly growing, and all of a sudden we had this massive increase in the first months of this year. Why? I think there are three reasons, two long-term ones and the trigger. The long-term ones, in relation to Syrians, is that hope is less and less clear for people. I mean, they look at their own country and they don't see much hope to go back home, because there is no political solution, so there is no light at the end of the tunnel. Second, the living conditions of the Syrians in the neighboring countries have been deteriorating. We just had research with the World Bank, and 87 percent of the Syrians in Jordan and 93 percent of the Syrians in Lebanon live below the national poverty lines. Only half of the children go to school, which means that people are living very badly. Not only are they refugees, out of home, not only have they suffered what they have suffered, but they are living in very, very dramatic conditions.
AG: Penso, basicamente, que o que provocou este enorme incremento foi o grupo de refuxiados de Siria. Houbo un movemento cara a Europa de África, de Asia, pero medrando pouco a pouco e, de súpeto, tivemos este incremento masivo nos primeiros meses deste ano. Por que? Penso que hai tres razóns, dúas a longo prazo e o desencadeante. As de longo prazo, en relación cos sirios, son, primeiro, que cada vez a xente ten menos esperanza. É dicir, eles miran o seu propio país e non teñen moita esperanza de volver á casa porque non hai solución política, non hai luz á fin do túnel. Segundo, as condicións de vida dos sirios nos países veciños fóronse deteriorando. Acabamos de facer unha investigación co Banco Mundial e o 87 % dos sirios en Xordania e o 93 % dos sirios no Líbano viven por baixo do limiar nacional de pobreza. Só a metade dos nenos van á escola, o que quere dicir que a xente está vivindo moi mal. Non só son refuxiados, fóra da súa casa, non só sufriron o que sufriron senón que están vivindo en condicións moi, moi dramáticas.
And then the trigger was when all of a sudden, international aid decreased. The World Food Programme was forced, for lack of resources, to cut by 30 percent food support to the Syrian refugees. They're not allowed to work, so they are totally dependent on international support, and they felt, "The world is abandoning us." And that, in my opinion, was the trigger. All of a sudden, there was a rush, and people started to move in large numbers and, to be absolutely honest, if I had been in the same situation and I would have been brave enough to do it, I think I would have done the same.
E o desencadeante foi cando, de súpeto, a axuda internacional diminuíu. O Programa Mundial de Alimentos viuse obrigado, por falta de recursos, a cortar o 30 % do apoio alimentario para os refuxiados sirios. Como non lles deixan traballar dependen totalmente do apoio internacional e eles sentiron "O mundo estanos abandonando." E iso, na miña opinión, foi o desencadeante. De repente, houbo présa e a xente comezou a moverse en gran cantidade e, para ser totalmente sincero, se eu estivese na mesma situación e fose valente dabondo para facelo, penso que faría o mesmo.
BG: But I think what surprised many people is it's not only sudden, but it wasn't supposed to be sudden. The war in Syria has been happening for five years. Millions of refugees are in camps and villages and towns around Syria. You have yourself warned about the situation and about the consequences of a breakdown of Libya, for example, and yet Europe looked totally unprepared.
BG: Pero penso que o que sorprendeu a moita xente é non só que fose súbito senón que se supoñía que non debía ser súbito. A guerra en Siria duraba cinco anos. Millóns de refuxiados están en campos e aldeas e cidades ao redor de Siria. Vostede mesmo alertou da situación e das consecuencias dun colapso en Libia, por exemplo, e aínda así Europa parecía totalmente desprevida.
AG: Well, unprepared because divided, and when you are divided, you don't want to recognize the reality. You prefer to postpone decisions, because you do not have the capacity to make them. And the proof is that even when the spike occurred, Europe remained divided and was unable to put in place a mechanism to manage the situation. You talk about one million people. It looks enormous, but the population of the European Union is 550 million people, which means we are talking about one per every [550] Europeans. Now, in Lebanon, we have one refugee per three Lebanese. And Lebanon? Struggling, of course, but it's managing. So, the question is: is this something that could have been managed if -- not mentioning the most important thing, which would have been addressing the root causes, but forgetting about root causes for now, looking at the phenomenon as it is -- if Europe were able to come together in solidarity to create an adequate reception capacity of entry points? But for that, the countries at entry points need to be massively supported, and then screening the people with security checks and all the other mechanisms, distributing those that are coming into all European countries, according to the possibilities of each country. I mean, if you look at the relocation program that was approved by the Commission, always too little too late, or by the Council, too little too late --
AG: Ben, desprevida a causa da división e cando estás dividida non queres recoñecer a realidade. Prefires pospoñer as decisións porque non tes capacidade para tomalas. E a proba é que, incluso cando o o aumento ocorreu, Europa permaneceu dividida e foi incapaz de poñer en marcha un mecanismo para xestionar a situación. Fala de preto dun millón de persoas. Parece unha enormidade, pero a poboación da Unión Europea é de 550 millóns de persoas, o que significa que estamos falando dun por cada 2000 europeos. Agora, no Líbano, temos un refuxiado por cada tres libaneses. E o Líbano? Loitando, por suposto, pero estao xestionando. Así que a cuestión é: isto é algo que podería ser xestionado se --sen mencionar o máis importante, que sería dirixírmonos ás causas profundas, pero esquecendo as causas por agora, mirando o fenómeno como é-- se Europa fose quen de unirse na solidariedade para crear unha adecuada capacidade de recepción nos puntos de entrada? Pero, para iso, os países polos que entran teñen que ter un enorme apoio e despois a avaliación da xente con comprobacións de seguridade e todos os outros mecanismos, distribuíndo os que están chegando en todos os países de Europa de acordo coas posibilidades de cada país. É dicir, se miras o programa de recolocación que foi aprobado pola Comisión, sempre moi pouco e moi tarde ou polo Consello, moi pequeno e moi tarde...
BG: It's already breaking down.
BG: Xa está colapsando.
AG: My country is supposed to receive four thousand. Four thousand in Portugal means nothing. So this is perfectly manageable if it is managed, but in the present circumstances, the pressure is at the point of entry, and then, as people move in this chaotic way through the Balkans, then they come to Germany, Sweden, basically, and Austria. They are the three countries that are, in the end, receiving the refugees. The rest of Europe is looking without doing much.
AG: O meu país suponse que ten que recibir catro mil. Catro mil en Portugal non significa nada. Así que é perfectamente manexable se se manexa, pero nas actuais circunstancias a presión está no punto de entrada, e despois, cando a xente se move no caótico camiño a través dos Balcáns, van a Alemaña, Suecia, basicamente, e Austria. Son os tres países que están, ao final, recibindo os refuxiados. O resto de Europa está mirando sen facer moito.
BG: Let me try to bring up three questions, playing a bit devil's advocate. I'll try to ask them, make them blunt. But I think the questions are very present in the minds of many people in Europe right now, The first, of course, is about numbers. You say 550 million versus one million is not much, but realistically, how many people can Europe take?
BG: Déixeme traer aquí tres cuestións, facendo de avogado do diaño. Intentarei preguntalas sen rodeos. Pero creo que son preguntas moi presentes na mente de moita xente en Europa neste momento. A primeira, claro, ten que ver cos números. Di que 550 millóns comparados cun millón, non é moito, pero sendo realistas, cantas persoas pode acoller Europa?
AG: Well, that is a question that has no answer, because refugees have the right to be protected. And there is such a thing as international law, so there is no way you can say, "I take 10,000 and that's finished." I remind you of one thing: in Turkey, at the beginning of the crisis, I remember one minister saying, "Turkey will be able to receive up to 100,000 people." Turkey has now two million three-hundred thousand or something of the sort, if you count all refugees.
AG: Ben, esa é unha cuestión que non ten resposta porque os refuxiados teñen o dereito a seren protexidos. E hai unha cousa que é o dereito internacional así que non hai maneira de poder dicir "Eu collo 10.000 e acabouse." Lémbrolle unha cousa: en Turquía, ao comezo da crise, lembro un ministro dicindo "Turquía poderá recibir máis de 100.000 persoas." Turquía ten agora dous millóns trescentas mil ou algo así se se contan todos os refuxiados.
So I don't think it's fair to say how many we can take. What it is fair to say is: how we can we organize ourselves to assume our international responsibilities? And Europe has not been able to do so, because basically, Europe is divided because there is no solidarity in the European project. And it's not only about refugees; there are many other areas. And let's be honest, this is the moment in which we need more Europe instead of less Europe. But as the public less and less believes in European institutions, it is also each time more difficult to convince the public that we need more Europe to solve these problems.
Así que non creo que sexa xusto dicir cantas persoas podemos acoller. O que é xusto é dicir: como podemos organizarnos para asumir as nosas responsabilidades internacionais? E Europa non foi capaz de facelo porque, basicamente, Europa está dividida porque non hai solidariedade no proxecto europeo. E non só ten que ver con refuxiados; hai outras moitas áreas. E sexamos honestos, este é o momento no que necesitamos máis Europa en lugar de menos Europa. Pero como o público cre cada vez menos nas institucións europeas é tamén cada vez máis difícil convencelo de que precisamos máis Europa para resolver estes problemas.
BG: We seem to be at the point where the numbers turn into political shifts, particularly domestically. We saw it again this weekend in France, but we have seen it over and over in many countries: in Poland and in Denmark and in Switzerland and elsewhere, where the mood changes radically because of the numbers, although they are not very significant in absolute numbers. The Prime Minister of --
BG: Parece que estamos no punto en que os números levan a cambios políticos, sobre todo nacionais. Vímolo esta fin de semana en Francia, pero xa o vimos unha e outra vez en moitos países: en Polonia e en Dinamarca e en Suíza e noutros lugares, onde o estado de ánimo cambia radicalmente por causa dos números aínda que non son moi significativos en valores absolutos. O Primeiro Ministro de...
AG: But, if I may, on these: I mean, what does a European see at home in a village where there are no migrants? What a European sees is, on television, every single day, a few months ago, opening the news every single day, a crowd coming, uncontrolled, moving from border to border, and the images on television were of hundreds or thousands of people moving. And the idea is that nobody is taking care of it -- this is happening without any kind of management. And so their idea was, "They are coming to my village." So there was this completely false idea that Europe was being invaded and our way of life is going to change, and everything will -- And the problem is that if this had been properly managed, if people had been properly received, welcomed, sheltered at point of entry, screened at point of entry, and the moved by plane to different European countries, this would not have scared people. But, unfortunately, we have a lot of people scared, just because Europe was not able to do the job properly.
AG: Pero se se me permite, nisto: Quero dicir, que ve un europeo na súa casa nunha aldea onde non hai migrantes? O que ve un europeo, na televisión, cada día, desde hai meses, abrindo os telexornais cada día, unha multitude que vén, descontrolada, movéndose de fronteira a fronteira, e as imaxes na televisión eran de centos ou miles de persoas desprazándose. E a idea é que ninguén está tendo conta disto... isto é o que ocorre sen ningún tipo de xestión. E así a súa idea sería "Van chegar á miña aldea." Así xurdiu esta idea completamente falsa de que Europa estaba sendo invadida e o noso estilo de vida ía cambiar, e todo será... E o problema é que se isto se xestionase ben, se a xente, de forma axeitada, fose recibida, benvida, acollida e avaliada no punto de entrada, e trasladada en avión a diferentes países europeos isto non asustaría a poboación. Pero, por desgraza, temos un montón de xente asustada só porque Europa non foi quen de facer o traballo con xeito.
BG: But there are villages in Germany with 300 inhabitants and 1,000 refugees. So, what's your position? How do you imagine these people reacting?
BG: Pero hai aldeas en Alemaña con 300 habitantes e 1000 refuxiados. Así que, cal é a súa posición? Como imaxina a reacción destas persoas?
AG: If there would be a proper management of the situation and the proper distribution of people all over Europe, you would always have the percentage that I mentioned: one per each 2,000. It is because things are not properly managed that in the end we have situations that are totally impossible to live with, and of course if you have a village -- in Lebanon, there are many villages that have more Syrians than Lebanese; Lebanon has been living with that. I'm not asking for the same to happen in Europe, for all European villages to have more refugees than inhabitants. What I am asking is for Europe to do the job properly, and to be able to organize itself to receive people as other countries in the world were forced to do in the past.
AG: Se houbese unha xestión adecuada da situación e unha distribución adecuada da xente por toda Europa teríamos sempre a porcentaxe que xa mencionei: un por cada 2000. Como as cousas non se xestionaron ben acabamos tendo situacións coas que é totalmente imposible vivir e por suposto se Vde. ten unha aldea... no Líbano, hai moitas aldeas que teñen máis sirios que libaneses; o Líbano está vivindo con iso. Non estou pedindo que pase o mesmo en Europa, que todas as aldeas europeas teñan máis refuxiados que habitantes. O que pido é que Europa faga ben o seu traballo e que sexa capaz de organizarse para recibir xente como outros países no mundo se viron obrigados a facelo antes.
BG: So, if you look at the global situation not only at Europe --
BG: Así, se observamos a situación global, non só Europa...
(Applause)
(Aplauso)
BG: Yes!
BG: Si!
(Applause)
(Aplauso)
BG: If you look at the global situation, so, not only at Europe, I know you can make a long list of countries that are not really stepping up, but I'm more interested in the other part -- is there somebody who's doing the right thing?
BG: Se observamos a situación global, non só Europa, eu sei que se pode facer unha lista longa de países que realmente non se están ofrecendo para axudar, pero estou máis interesado na outra parte... hai alguén que estea facendo o correcto?
AG: Well, 86 percent of the refugees in the world are in the developing world. And if you look at countries like Ethiopia -- Ethiopia has received more than 600,000 refugees. All the borders in Ethiopia are open. And they have, as a policy, they call the "people to people" policy that every refugee should be received. And they have South Sudanese, they have Sudanese, they have Somalis. They have all the neighbors. They have Eritreans. And, in general, African countries are extremely welcoming of refugees coming, and I would say that in the Middle East and in Asia, we have seen a tendency for borders to be open.
AG: Ben, o 86 % dos refuxiados no mundo están nos países en desenvolvemento. E se miramos os países como Etiopía... Etiopía recibiu máis de 600.000 refuxiados. Todas as súas fronteiras están abertas. E teñen, como política, o que chaman a política de "pobo a pobo", que cada refuxiado debería ser recibido. E teñen xente de Sudán do Sur, teñen sudaneses, somalís. Teñen todos os veciños. Teñen eritreos. E, en xeral, os países africanos son moi acolledores cos refuxiados, e eu diría o mesmo para o Oriente Medio e Asia, vimos unha tendencia a abrir as fronteiras.
Now we see some problems with the Syrian situation, as the Syrian situation evolved into also a major security crisis, but the truth is that for a large period, all borders in the Middle East were open. The truth is that for Afghans, the borders of Pakistan and Iran were open for, at the time, six million Afghans that came. So I would say that even today, the trend in the developing world has been for borders to be open. The trend in the developed world is for these questions to become more and more complex, especially when there is, in the public opinion, a mixture of discussions between refugee protections on one side and security questions -- in my opinion, misinterpreted -- on the other side.
Agora vemos algúns problemas coa situación siria ao evolucionar esta cara a unha grave crise de seguridade, pero é certo que, durante un longo período todas as fronteiras en Oriente Medio estaban abertas. Certo é que, para os afgáns, as fronteiras de Paquistán e Irán estaban abertas para os seis millóns de afgáns que chegaron. Así que eu diría que, mesmo hoxe, a tendencia no mundo en desenvolvemento foi a de abrir as fronteiras. A tendencia no mundo desenvolvido é a de que estas cuestións se volvan cada vez máis complexas, especialmente cando hai, na opinión pública, unha mestura de discusións entre a protección de refuxiados por unha banda e as cuestións de seguridade --para min mal interpretadas-- pola outra banda.
BG: We'll come back to that too, but you mentioned the cutting of funding and the vouchers from the World Food Programme. That reflects the general underfunding of the organizations working on these issues. Now that the world seems to have woken up, are you getting more funding and more support, or it's still the same?
BG: Volveremos a iso, pero mencionou os recortes no financiamento e nos vales do Programa Mundial de Alimentos. Iso amosa que en xeral as organizacións que traballan nestes temas están infrafinanciadas. Agora que o mundo parece que espertou, están conseguindo máis orzamento e máis apoio ou é aínda o mesmo?
AG: We are getting more support. I would say that we are coming close to the levels of last year. We were much worse during the summer. But that is clearly insufficient to address the needs of the people and address the needs of the countries that are supporting the people. And here we have a basic review of the criteria, the objectives, the priorities of development cooperation that is required.
AG: Estamos conseguindo máis apoio. Eu diría que estamos chegando preto dos niveis do último ano. Estivemos moito peor durante o verán. Pero é claramente insuficiente para abordar as necesidades da xente e abordar as necesidades dos países que están apoiando a xente. E aquí temos unha revisión básica dos criterios, dos obxectivos, das prioridades da cooperación para o desenvolvemento.
For instance, Lebanon and Jordan are middle-income countries. Because they are middle-income countries, they cannot receive soft loans or grants from the World Bank. Now, today this doesn't make any sense, because they are providing a global public good. They have millions of refugees there, and to be honest, they are pillars of stability in the region, with all the difficulties they face, and the first line of defense of our collective security. So it doesn't make sense that these countries are not a first priority in development cooperation policies. And they are not. And not only do the refugees live in very dramatic circumstances inside those countries, but the local communities themselves are suffering, because salaries went down, because there are more unemployed, because prices and rents went up. And, of course, if you look at today's situation of the indicators in these countries, it is clear that, especially their poor groups of the population, are living worse and worse because of the crisis they are facing.
Por exemplo, o Líbano e Xordania son países de renda media. Como son países de renda media non poden recibir créditos brandos ou axudas do Banco Mundial. Agora, isto non ten ningún sentido porque están provendo un ben público global. Teñen millóns de refuxiados alí e, para ser honesto, son piares de estabilidade na rexión, con todas as dificultades que afrontan, e a primeira liña de defensa da nosa seguridade colectiva. Así que non ten sentido que eses países non sexan prioritarios nas políticas de cooperación ao desenvolvemento. E non o son. E non só os refuxiados viven en circunstancias moi dramáticas nestes países senón que as comunidades locais tamén están sufrindo porque os salarios baixaron, porque hai máis desempregados, porque os prezos e os alugamentos subiron. E, por suposto, se mira a situación actual dos indicadores nestes países. está claro que, especialmente os grupos pobres de poboación, están vivindo cada vez peor pola crise á que se enfrontan.
BG: Who should be providing this support? Country by country, international organizations, the European Union? Who should be coming up with this support?
BG: Quen debería estar dando este apoio? País a país, organizacións internacionais, a Unión Europea? Quen debería dar este apoio?
AG: We need to join all efforts. It's clear that bilateral cooperation is essential. It's clear that multilateral cooperation is essential. It's clear that international financial institutions should have flexibility in order to be able to invest more massively in support to these countries. We need to combine all the instruments and to understand that today, in protracted situations, at a certain moment, that it doesn't make sense anymore to make a distinction between humanitarian aid and development aid or development processes. Because you are talking about children in school, you are talking about health, you are talking about infrastructure that is overcrowded. You are talking about things that require a long-term perspective, a development perspective and not only an emergency humanitarian aid perspective.
AG: Debemos unir todos os esforzos. Está claro que a cooperación bilateral é esencial. Que a cooperación multilateral é esencial. Que as institucións financeiras internacionais deben ser flexibles para poderen investir a grande escala no apoio destes países. Necesitamos combinar todos os instrumentos e entender que hoxe, en situacións prolongadas, en certos momentos, xa non ten sentido facer unha distinción entre axuda humanitaria e axuda para o desenvolvemento ou procesos de desenvolvemento. Porque estamos falando de nenos na escola, estamos falando de saúde, estamos falando de infraestruturas que están masificadas. Estamos falando de cousas que requiren enfques a longo prazo, un enfoque de desenvolvemento e non só un de axuda humanitaria de emerxencia.
BG: I would like your comment on something that was in newspapers this morning. It is a statement made by the current front-runner for the Republican nomination for US President, Donald Trump. Yesterday, he said this.
BG: Gustaríame que comentase algo que apareceu nos xornais esta mañá. É unha declaración feita polo actual candidato principal para a candidatura republicana á presidencia de EE.UU., Donald Trump. Onte dixo isto:
(Laughter)
(Risos)
No, listen to this. It's interesting. I quote: "I am calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the US, until our country's representatives can figure out what's going on." How do you react to that?
Non, escoiten isto. É interesante. Cito: "Apelo a unha total e completa cancelación da entrada de musulmáns nos EE.UU. ata que os representantes do noso país poidan determinar que está pasando." Como reacciona a isto?
AG: Well, it's not only Donald Trump. We have seen several people around the world with political responsibility saying, for instance, that Muslims refugees should not be received. And the reason why they say this is because they think that by doing or saying this, they are protecting the security of their countries. Now, I've been in government. I am very keen on the need for governments to protect the security of their countries and their people. But if you say, like that, in the US or in any European country, "We are going to close our doors to Muslim refugees," what you are saying is the best possible help for the propaganda of terrorist organizations. Because what you are saying --
AG: Ben, non é só Donald Trump. Vimos moitas persoas ao redor do mundo con responsabilidade política dicindo, por exemplo, que non se deberían recibir refuxiados musulmáns. E a razón pola que o din é porque cren que ao dicir ou facer isto, están protexendo a seguridade dos seus países. Eu estiven no goberno. Son moi partidario da necesidade dos gobernos de protexer a seguridade dos seus países e da súa xente. Pero se se di, algo así, nos EE.UU. ou en calquera país europeo, "Imos pecharlles as portas aos refuxiados musulmáns" o que se está dicindo é a mellor axuda posible para a propaganda de organizacións terroristas. Porque o que se di...
(Applause)
(Aplauso)
What you are saying will be heard by all the Muslims in your own country, and it will pave the way for the recruitment and the mechanisms that, through technology, Daesh and al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, and all those other groups are today penetrating in our societies. And it's just telling them, "You are right, we are against you." So obviously, this is creating in societies that are all multiethnic, multi-religious, multicultural, this is creating a situation in which, really, it is much easier for the propaganda of these terrorist organizations to be effective in recruiting people for terror acts within the countries where these kinds of sentences are expressed.
O que se di será escoitado por todos os musulmáns no noso propio país, e preparará o camiño para o recrutamento e os mecanismos que, a través da tecnoloxía, Daesh e al-Nusra, al-Qaeda e todos os outros grupos introducen nas nosas sociedades. E estamos dicíndolles: "Tedes razón, estamos na vosa contra." Así que, obviamente, isto crea, en sociedades que son multiétnicas, multirrelixiosas, multiculturais, isto crea unha situación na que, realmente, é moito máis fácil que a propaganda destas organizacións terroristas sexa eficaz ao recrutaren persoas para actos de terror nos países onde se fan este tipo de declaracións.
BG: Have the recent attacks in Paris and the reactions to them made your job more difficult?
BG: Os recentes ataques en París e as reaccións que provocaron, fixeron máis difícil o seu traballo?
AG: Undoubtedly.
AG: Sen dúbida.
BG: In what sense?
BG: En que sentido?
AG: In the sense that, I mean, for many people the first reaction in relation to these kinds of terrorist attacks is: close all borders -- not understanding that the terrorist problem in Europe is largely homegrown. We have thousands and thousands of European fighters in Syria and in Iraq, so this is not something that you solve by just not allowing Syrians to come in. And I must say, I am convinced that the passport that appeared, I believe, was put by the person who has blown --
AG: No sentido de que, para moita xente, a primeira reacción en relación a estes ataques terroristas é pechar todas as fronteiras, sen entender que o terrorismo en Europa é totalmente autóctono. Temos miles e miles de combatentes europeos en Siria e en Iraq, así que isto non se pode resolver simplemente impedindo que o sirios veñan. E teño que dicir, estou convencido, de que o pasaporte que apareceu, eu penso, foi posto pola persoa que se detonou...
BG: -- himself up, yeah.
BG: A si mesmo, si.
AG: [I believe] it was on purpose, because part of the strategies of Daesh is against refugees, because they see refugees as people that should be with the caliphate and are fleeing to the crusaders. And I think that is part of Daesh's strategy to make Europe react, closing its doors to Muslim refugees and having an hostility towards Muslims inside Europe, exactly to facilitate Daesh's work.
AG: (Eu penso) que foi á mantenta, porque parte da estratexia de Daesh é ir contra os refuxiados, porque os ven como persoas que deberían estar co califato e están fuxindo desas cruzadas. E eu penso que é parte da estratexia de Daesh para facer que Europa reaccione, pechándolles as portas aos refuxiados musulmáns e mantendo unha hostilidade cara aos musulmáns en Europa, exactamente para facilitarlle o traballo a Daesh.
And my deep belief is that it was not the refugee movement that triggered terrorism. I think, as I said, essentially terrorism in Europe is today a homegrown movement in relation to the global situation that we are facing, and what we need is exactly to prove these groups wrong, by welcoming and integrating effectively those that are coming from that part of the world.
E creo profundamente que non foi o movemento refuxiado o que desencadeou o terrorismo. Penso, como dixen, que, esencialmente, o terrorismo en Europa é hoxe un movemento autóctono en relación coa situación global á que nos estamos enfrontando e o que necesitamos é exactamente probar que eses grupos se equivocan, dándolles a benvida e integrando eficazmente aos que están chegando desa parte do mundo.
And another thing that I believe is that to a large extent, what we are today paying for in Europe is the failures of integration models that didn't work in the '60s, in the '70s, in the '80s, in relation to big migration flows that took place at that time and generated what is today in many of the people, for instance, of the second generation of communities, a situation of feeling marginalized, having no jobs, having improper education, living in some of the neighborhoods that are not adequately provided by public infrastructure. And this kind of uneasiness, sometimes even anger, that exists in this second generation is largely due to the failure of integration policies, to the failure of what should have been a much stronger investment in creating the conditions for people to live together and respect each other. For me it is clear.
E outra cousa que eu creo é que, ata certo punto, o que estamos pagando agora en Europa é o fracaso de modelos de integración que non funcionaron nos anos 60 nin nos 70 nin nos 80 en relación cos grandes fluxos migratorios daquel tempo e xeraron o que hoxe é, para moitas persoas, por exemplo, das segundas xeracións das comunidades un sentimento de marxinalización, sen traballo, sen unha boa educación, vivindo en barrios que non están ben dotados de infraestruturas públicas. E este tipo de malestar, ás veces, incluso de xenreira que existe nesta segunda xeración débese, en boa parte, ao fracaso das políticas de integración, ao fracaso do que debería ser un investimento moito máis forte en crear as condicións para que as persoas vivan xuntas e se respecten. Para min, está claro.
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For me it is clear that all societies will be multiethnic, multicultural, multi-religious in the future. To try to avoid it is, in my opinion, impossible. And for me it's a good thing that they will be like that, but I also recognize that, for that to work properly, you need a huge investment in the social cohesion of your own societies. And Europe, to a large extent, failed in that investment in the past few decades.
Teño claro que todas as sociedades deben ser multiétnicas, multiculturais, multirrelixiosas no futuro. Intentar evitar isto, na miña opinión, é imposible. E para min, é bo que sexa así, pero eu tamén recoñezo que, para que funcione ben, cómpre un enorme investimento na cohesión social das nosas sociedades. E Europa, ata certo punto, fracasou nese investimento nas pasadas décadas.
BG: Question: You are stepping down from your job at the end of the year, after 10 years. If you look back at 2005, when you entered that office for the first time, what do you see?
BG: Vai deixar o seu cargo ao final do ano, despois de dez anos. Se mira atrás ata o 2005, cando vostede entrou nese despacho a primeira vez, que ve?
AG: Well, look: In 2005, we were helping one million people go back home in safety and dignity, because conflicts had ended. Last year, we helped 124,000. In 2005, we had about 38 million people displaced by conflict in the world. Today, we have more than 60 million. At that time, we had had, recently, some conflicts that were solved. Now, we see a multiplication of new conflicts and the old conflicts never died: Afghanistan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo. It is clear that the world today is much more dangerous than it was. It is clear that the capacity of the international community to prevent conflicts and to timely solve them, is, unfortunately, much worse than what it was 10 years ago. There are no clear power relations in the world, no global governance mechanisms that work, which means that we live in a situation where impunity and unpredictability tend to prevail, and that means that more and more people suffer, namely those that are displaced by conflicts.
AG: Ben, mire: En 2005, estabamos axudando un millón de persoas a volver á casa con seguridade e dignidade, porque os conflitos acabaran. O último ano, axudamos 124.000. En 2005, tiñamos uns 38 millóns de persoas desprazadas por conflitos no mundo. Hoxe, temos máis de 60 millóns. Nese momento, tiñamos, desde había pouco, algúns conflitos resoltos. Agora, vemos unha multiplicación de novos conflitos e os vellos conflitos que nunca morreron: Afganistán, Somalia, República Democrática do Congo. Está claro que o mundo hoxe é moito máis perigoso do que era. Está claro que a capacidade da comunidade internacional para previr conflitos e resolvelos a tempo é, por desgraza, moito peor que hai dez anos. Non hai relacións de poder claras no mundo, non hai mecanismos de goberno global que funcionen, o que significa que vivimos nunha situación onde a impunidade e a imprevisibilidade tenden a prevalecer, e iso significa que cada vez máis xente sofre, especialmente os desprazados polos conflitos.
BG: It's a tradition in American politics that when a President leaves the Oval Office for the last time, he leaves a handwritten note on the desk for his successor that walks in a couple of hours later. If you had to write such a note to your successor, Filippo Grandi, what would you write?
BG: Hai unha tradición na política americana de que cando un presidente deixa o despacho oval por última vez, deixa no escritorio unha nota manuscrita para o seu sucesor que entrará dúas horas despois. Se tivese que escribir unha para o seu sucesor, Filippo Grandi, que escribiría?
AG: Well, I don't think I would write any message. You know, one of the terrible things when one leaves an office is to try to become the backseat driver, always telling the new one what to do. So that, I will not do. If I had to say something to him, it would be, "Be yourself, and do your best."
AG: Ben, non creo que escribise ningunha mensaxe. Sabes, unhas das cousas terribles cando un deixa o despacho é intentar converterse en condutor desde o asento de atrás, sempre dicíndolle ao novo o que ten que facer. Así que eu non o farei. Se tivese que dicirlle algo, sería: "Sé ti mesmo, e faino o mellor que poidas."
BG: Commissioner, thank you for the job you do. Thank you for coming to TED.
BG: Comisionado, grazas polo traballo que fai. Grazas por vir ao TED.
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