So a friend of mine who's a political scientist, he told me several months ago exactly what this month would be like. He said, you know, there's this fiscal cliff coming, it's going to come at the beginning of 2013. Both parties absolutely need to resolve it, but neither party wants to be seen as the first to resolve it. Neither party has any incentive to solve it a second before it's due, so he said, December, you're just going to see lots of angry negotiations, negotiations breaking apart, reports of phone calls that aren't going well, people saying nothing's happening at all, and then sometime around Christmas or New Year's, we're going to hear, "Okay, they resolved everything." He told me that a few months ago. He said he's 98 percent positive they're going to resolve it, and I got an email from him today saying, all right, we're basically on track, but now I'm 80 percent positive that they're going to resolve it.
我有個朋友是政治學家 幾個月前 他告訴我 這個月大概是什麼光景 他說:「財政懸崖快來了。」 估計在 2013 年初到來 兩黨都必須解決這問題 但沒有一方願意先採取行動 也沒有一方想要在危機到來以前解決 所以他說,在十二月時你會看到一堆 激烈爭執、協商破局 一些在電話上相談不歡的報導 有人說什麼結果都沒有 到了聖誕節或是新年的時候 我們會聽說:「他們解決所有問題了。」 他幾個月前告訴我 他有98%的把握 他們會解決問題 今天我收到他的電子郵件說 「好吧,大致上猜的沒錯 但現在我只有80%的把握 他們會解決這件事情。」
And it made me think. I love studying these moments in American history when there was this frenzy of partisan anger, that the economy was on the verge of total collapse.
所以我開始思考,我喜歡研究 美國歷史上這種分歧的時期 不同黨派彼此爭論不休 經濟正值崩盤的邊緣
The most famous early battle was Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson over what the dollar would be and how it would be backed up, with Alexander Hamilton saying, "We need a central bank, the First Bank of the United States, or else the dollar will have no value. This economy won't work," and Thomas Jefferson saying, "The people won't trust that. They just fought off a king. They're not going to accept some central authority." This battle defined the first 150 years of the U.S. economy, and at every moment, different partisans saying, "Oh my God, the economy's about to collapse," and the rest of us just going about, spending our bucks on whatever it is we wanted to buy.
早期最有名的爭論是 亞歷山大•漢彌爾頓 和湯瑪斯•傑弗遜對於美元會如何 以及 該用什麼方式儲存而爭論 亞歷山大•漢彌爾頓說 「我們需要一個中央銀行,美國第一銀行 不然美元就毫無價值了」 湯瑪斯•傑弗遜則說 「這經濟體系行不通,人民不信這一套」 「他們才剛推翻一個王朝 才不會接受一個中央集權組織。」 這個爭論奠定了美國前期 一百五十年的經濟 每一次,當不同黨派說 「老天,經濟要崩盤了。」 有些人就開始盡情揮霍 把錢花在所有想買的東西上
To give you a quick primer on where we are, a quick refresher on where we are. So the fiscal cliff, I was told that that's too partisan a thing to say, although I can't remember which party it's supporting or attacking. People say we should call it the fiscal slope, or we should call it an austerity crisis, but then other people say, no, that's even more partisan. So I just call it the self-imposed, self-destructive arbitrary deadline about resolving an inevitable problem. And this is what the inevitable problem looks like. So this is a projection of U.S. debt as a percentage of our overall economy, of GDP. The light blue dotted line represents the Congressional Budget Office's best guess of what will happen if Congress really doesn't do anything, and as you can see, sometime around 2027, we reach Greek levels of debt, somewhere around 130 percent of GDP, which tells you that some time in the next 20 years, if Congress does absolutely nothing, we're going to hit a moment where the world's investors, the world's bond buyers, are going to say, "We don't trust America anymore. We're not going to lend them any money, except at really high interest rates." And at that moment our economy collapses. But remember, Greece is there today. We're there in 20 years. We have lots and lots of time to avoid that crisis, and the fiscal cliff was just one more attempt at trying to force the two sides to resolve the crisis.
先來了解一下我們現在的處境 快速地回顧一下 有人叫我別叫它財政懸崖 因為黨派色彩太重 我記不得 到底誰贊成誰反對 有人說 應該叫財政斜坡才對 或稱為緊縮危機 但就有人反對 說這樣反而更不中立 所以我乾脆叫它設立自我導致 自我毀滅 沒有明確期限的方案 來解決不可避免的問題 這就是一個不可避免的問題的真實模樣 這是美國國債百分比圖 佔整體經濟 國內生產毛額(GDP)的比例高低 藍色虛線代表 國會預算局最樂觀的估計 如果國會什麼都沒做的情形 可以看到 大概在2027年 我們的債務會跟希臘有得拚 債務約佔GDP的130% 顯示出未來20年內 如果國會什麼事都沒做 我們在國際上的地位會動搖 全球的投資人 債券買家 將會說 「我們再也不信任美國人了 也不會借他們錢」 「除非利率真的夠高」 到時我們的經濟就崩盤了 但記得 這是希臘現在的狀況 我們要過20年才會到那 我們有十分充裕的時間 來避免危機 而財政懸崖 再次 逼迫兩黨一起解決危機
Here's another way to look at exactly the same problem. The dark blue line is how much the government spends. The light blue line is how much the government gets in. And as you can see, for most of recent history, except for a brief period, we have consistently spent more than we take in. Thus the national debt. But as you can also see, projected going forward, the gap widens a bit and raises a bit, and this graph is only through 2021. It gets really, really ugly out towards 2030.
其實可以換個角度來看同樣的問題 藍色實線是政府的開銷 淺藍色線是政府收入 由此可見 近幾年來 除了短暫的時期 我們一直 入不敷出 所以國債才會這麼高 但可以看出 隨著時間的增長 收支的落差也越來越大 這張圖只統計到2021年 到了2030年 數據會變得很難看
And this graph sort of sums up what the problem is. The Democrats, they say, well, this isn't a big deal. We can just raise taxes a bit and close that gap, especially if we raise taxes on the rich. The Republicans say, hey, no, no, we've got a better idea. Why don't we lower both lines? Why don't we lower government spending and lower government taxes, and then we'll be on an even more favorable long-term deficit trajectory? And behind this powerful disagreement between how to close that gap, there's the worst kind of cynical party politics, the worst kind of insider baseball, lobbying, all of that stuff, but there's also this powerfully interesting, respectful disagreement between two fundamentally different economic philosophies.
從圖表中可以總結出問題所在 民主黨認為 這沒啥大不了 只要稍微提高稅率 縮短收支差就好 提高有錢人的賦稅尤其有效 共和黨則說:「不 我們有更好的方法」 「為何不要讓兩種數據都降低?」 「何不降低政府支出和賦稅?」 如此一來 就有更完善的 長期赤字規劃 而在彼此爭論不休 該如何縮小收支差距的背後 有種最糟 最憤世嫉俗的政黨政治 最醜陋的內幕 遊說政治 等黑暗面 但這場爭論也有非常有趣 正大光明的一面 因為這包含兩種截然不同 的經濟理念
And I like to think, when I picture how Republicans see the economy, what I picture is just some amazingly well-engineered machine, some perfect machine. Unfortunately, I picture it made in Germany or Japan, but this amazing machine that's constantly scouring every bit of human endeavor and taking resources, money, labor, capital, machinery, away from the least productive parts and towards the more productive parts, and while this might cause temporary dislocation, what it does is it builds up the more productive areas and lets the less productive areas fade away and die, and as a result the whole system is so much more efficient, so much richer for everybody. And this view generally believes that there is a role for government, a small role, to set the rules so people aren't lying and cheating and hurting each other, maybe, you know, have a police force and a fire department and an army, but to have a very limited reach into the mechanisms of this machinery.
而我希望 在我描繪出共和黨 對經濟的看法時 所描出的只是 一台構造完整的機器 一台傑作 不幸的是 這是德國或曰本製 但這完美的機器不斷地侵蝕 人類的每分努力並拿走資源 錢財 勞工 資本和機械等 把它們從最沒生產力的部份 移到生產力最高的地方 雖然會造成短暫的混亂 卻能增強生產力較高的區塊 讓低生產力的區塊 慢慢地淘汰 如此一來 整個系統就更有效率 所以大家就更富有了 此觀點也認為政府佔有一席之地 一個訂定規則的小角色 以免人們 說謊 欺騙及傷害彼此 政府機關像是警察 消防隊 或軍隊等 但這些機關影響很有限 難以深入此機器內部
And when I picture how Democrats and Democratic-leaning economists picture this economy, most Democratic economists are, you know, they're capitalists, they believe, yes, that's a good system a lot of the time. It's good to let markets move resources to their more productive use. But that system has tons of problems. Wealth piles up in the wrong places. Wealth is ripped away from people who shouldn't be called unproductive. That's not going to create an equitable, fair society. That machine doesn't care about the environment, about racism, about all these issues that make this life worse for all of us, and so the government does have a role to take resources from more productive uses, or from richer sources, and give them to other sources. And when you think about the economy through these two different lenses, you understand why this crisis is so hard to solve, because the worse the crisis gets, the higher the stakes are, the more each side thinks they know the answer and the other side is just going to ruin everything.
而當我描繪民主黨或偏民主黨 經濟學家對此種經濟的看法時 大部份的民主黨派經濟學家是資本主義者 他們深信:「對 以目前情況來說 這是理想的體制」 讓市場自動把資源做有效的利用是很好 但這體制有一大堆的問題 財富都聚集在不對的地方 那些被不當稱為沒有生產力的人們被剝奪了財富 這樣沒法創造一個合理公平的社會 這種運作模式沒考慮到周遭環境 例如種族歧視等負面議題 這些讓我們的生活更糟的問題 所以政府有義務從 較高生產力或擁有較多資源的地方 將其資源分配給其它地方 如果你用這兩種不同的觀點 來探討經濟的話 你就懂為何危機這麼難解決 因為情況如果越嚴重 風險就越高 兩方都認為自己有解決之道 並對彼此嗤之以鼻
And I can get really despairing. I've spent a lot of the last few years really depressed about this, until this year, I learned something that I felt really excited about. I feel like it's really good news, and it's so shocking, I don't like saying it, because I think people won't believe me. But here's what I learned. The American people, taken as a whole, when it comes to these issues, to fiscal issues, are moderate, pragmatic centrists. And I know that's hard to believe, that the American people are moderate, pragmatic centrists. But let me explain what I'm thinking.
我感到絕望 過去幾年 我對此感到沮喪 直到今年 我發現了一些使我非常興奮的事 我認為這是很好的消息 而且非常震撼 我不常談論它 因為我覺得沒人會相信我的話 我所發現的是 整體來說 當美國人 遇到跟財政有關的問題時 就變成溫和 務實的中立派 沒錯 很不可思議 美國人 竟會是溫和 務實的中立派 但讓我解釋一下我的看法
When you look at how the federal government spends money, so this is the battle right here, 55 percent, more than half, is on Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, a few other health programs, 20 percent defense, 19 percent discretionary, and six percent interest. So when we're talking about cutting government spending, this is the pie we're talking about, and Americans overwhelmingly, and it doesn't matter what party they're in, overwhelmingly like that big 55 percent chunk. They like Social Security. They like Medicare. They even like Medicaid, even though that goes to the poor and indigent, which you might think would have less support. And they do not want it fundamentally touched, although the American people are remarkably comfortable, and Democrats roughly equal to Republicans, with some minor tweaks to make the system more stable.
當你看看聯邦政府的支出比例 這裡是問題所在 55% 超過一半用在社會福利 醫療保險 醫療補助 及其他的健保 20%國防 19%自由支配支出 利息則是6% 所以我們在討論如何 減少政府支出時 就是看這統計圖 絕大多數的美國人 無論 支持哪一黨 大都喜歡 55%這一塊 他們喜歡社會福利 醫療健保 甚至喜歡醫療補助 (低收入戶用) 即使這些支出只補助貧困的人 你本來可能以為 醫療補助的支持度較低 他們都不希望以上支出比例變動 雖然美國人民對此非常滿意 兩黨選民基本上意見一致 只要稍做調整 系統會更穩定
Social Security is fairly easy to fix. The rumors of its demise are always greatly exaggerated. So gradually raise Social Security retirement age, maybe only on people not yet born. Americans are about 50/50, whether they're Democrats or Republicans.
社會福利很好調整 社會福利會倒的謠言 往往都是誇大的說法 所以對於把逐漸提高退休福利年齡的政策 加諸到未出世的下一代人的這個方法 不管是支持民主黨還是共和黨 贊成和反對人數都差不多
Reduce Medicare for very wealthy seniors, seniors who make a lot of money. Don't even eliminate it. Just reduce it. People generally are comfortable with it, Democrats and Republicans.
減少高收入老人健保支出 就是給老富翁的福利金 根本不用廢除 減少即可 人們大都接受這個政策 不管哪一黨的都如此認為
Raise medical health care contributions? Everyone hates that equally, but Republicans and Democrats hate that together.
提高健保費呢? 大家都恨死了此方法 可是共和黨 和民主黨支持者都一致反對
And so what this tells me is, when you look at the discussion of how to resolve our fiscal problems, we are not a nation that's powerfully divided on the major, major issue. We're comfortable with it needing some tweaks, but we want to keep it. We're not open to a discussion of eliminating it.
所以這個事實告訴我 當我們仔細探討 如何解決財政問題 我們的國民在主要議題方面並沒有意見分歧 做點改變的話我們能接受 但卻不想廢除整個系統 不太可能去討論是否要廢除整個系統
Now there is one issue that is hyper-partisan, and where there is one party that is just spend, spend, spend, we don't care, spend some more, and that of course is Republicans when it comes to military defense spending. They way outweigh Democrats. The vast majority want to protect military defense spending. That's 20 percent of the budget, and that presents a more difficult issue. I should also note that the [discretionary] spending, which is about 19 percent of the budget, that is Democratic and Republican issues, so you do have welfare, food stamps, other programs that tend to be popular among Democrats, but you also have the farm bill and all sorts of Department of Interior inducements for oil drilling and other things, which tend to be popular among Republicans.
針對一個議題 政黨的意見分歧非常嚴重 有一黨說花錢消災就好 多花點錢無傷大雅 這當然是共和黨對於 減少國防預算的看法 他們的反對聲浪就比民主黨還強勢 多數共和黨支持者贊成不改變國防支出 國防支出佔了國家預算的20% 而它代表一個更複雜的議題 我也要提一下自由性支出的部份 佔了預算的19% 這是兩黨共同的議題 福利 食物券等種種福利制度 在民主黨眼裡較受重視 但農田法案等以及 內政部的福利制度 例如石油鑽探之類的 就比較受共和黨青睞
Now when it comes to taxes, there is more disagreement. That's a more partisan area. You have Democrats overwhelmingly supportive of raising the income tax on people who make 250,000 dollars a year, Republicans sort of against it, although if you break it out by income, Republicans who make less than 75,000 dollars a year like this idea. So basically Republicans who make more than 250,000 dollars a year don't want to be taxed. Raising taxes on investment income, you also see about two thirds of Democrats but only one third of Republicans are comfortable with that idea.
至於納稅方面 分歧就比較嚴重 這方面黨派色彩比較嚴重 民主黨民眾大力支持 提高年收入25萬元以上 高收入族群的所得稅 共和黨支持者基本上是反對的 但如果用收入分開來看的話 年收入在7萬5以下的支持者 還滿喜歡這提議的 也就是說 年收入高於25萬的 共和黨民眾不想多繳稅 提高投資所得稅 你也看得出 贊成的人數 民主黨大約2/3 共和黨只有1/3 接受這個主意
This brings up a really important point, which is that we tend in this country to talk about Democrats and Republicans and think there's this little group over there called independents that's, what, two percent? If you add Democrats, you add Republicans, you've got the American people. But that is not the case at all. And it has not been the case for most of modern American history. Roughly a third of Americans say that they are Democrats. Around a quarter say that they are Republicans. A tiny little sliver call themselves libertarians, or socialists, or some other small third party, and the largest block, 40 percent, say they're independents. So most Americans are not partisan, and most of the people in the independent camp fall somewhere in between, so even though we have tremendous overlap between the views on these fiscal issues of Democrats and Republicans, we have even more overlap when you add in the independents. Now we get to fight about all sorts of other issues. We get to hate each other on gun control and abortion and the environment, but on these fiscal issues, these important fiscal issues, we just are not anywhere nearly as divided as people say.
這反映出非常重要的迷思 就是 在美國 我們往往只討論民主黨和共和黨 剩下有一小部分的人 也就是獨立派所組成 獨立派大概只有2%吧 只要你把共和黨與民主黨支持者加起來 就等於全美國人民了 但事實並非如此 美國近代歷史裡也沒這樣的情況 大約有1/3的美國人說 他們支持民主黨 大概1/4的人則說他們是共和黨的 另有一小區塊的人則傾向 是自由或社會主義黨 或是支持其他小黨派 而最大的區塊占了40% 這裡的人 認為自己是獨立派 所以大多美國人都不特別支持哪一黨 大多屬於獨立陣營的人 都沒有偏向某一黨 即使我們 在這些財政議題上 從支持民主及共和黨的民眾來看 大家有很多一致的想法 一旦你把獨立派的人加進來 就會有更多共同的想法 我們常常為其他問題起爭執 我們因為槍枝管制 而厭惡彼此 墮胎還有環境議題也是 但講到財政問題時 重要的財政議題 我們並沒有像其他人說的那樣 彼此意見不合
And in fact, there's this other group of people who are not as divided as people might think, and that group is economists. I talk to a lot of economists, and back in the '70s and '80s it was ugly being an economist. You were in what they called the saltwater camp, meaning Harvard, Princeton, MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, or you were in the freshwater camp, University of Chicago, University of Rochester. You were a free market capitalist economist or you were a Keynesian liberal economist, and these people didn't go to each other's weddings, they snubbed each other at conferences. It's still ugly to this day, but in my experience, it is really, really hard to find an economist under 40 who still has that kind of way of seeing the world. The vast majority of economists -- it is so uncool to call yourself an ideologue of either camp. The phrase that you want, if you're a graduate student or a postdoc or you're a professor, a 38-year-old economics professor, is, "I'm an empiricist. I go by the data." And the data is very clear. None of these major theories have been completely successful. The 20th century, the last hundred years, is riddled with disastrous examples of times that one school or the other tried to explain the past or predict the future and just did an awful, awful job, so the economics profession has acquired some degree of modesty. They still are an awfully arrogant group of people, I will assure you, but they're now arrogant about their impartiality, and they, too, see a tremendous range of potential outcomes.
事實上 有另外一群人 並沒有我們想像中 內部分裂的那麼嚴重 那群人就是經濟學家 我跟很多經濟學家談過 在70年代 到80年代時 當經濟學家非常不好過 當時你會被貼上一個「鹹水學派」的標籤 指的是哈佛 普林斯頓 麻省 史丹佛 柏克萊等學派 或者你被標為「淡水學派」 例如芝加哥大學 羅徹斯特大學等派 你可能是個支持市場資本主義的經濟學家 或是支持凱恩斯自由派主義的經濟學家 這些人仇視到不去對方的婚禮 在會議上也互不理睬 現在還有這種醜陋面 但就我的經驗 真的 真的很難找到一個 不到40歲的經濟學家 有這種過時的世界觀 大多的經濟學家 如果稱自己是 某學派的擁護者 就遜掉了 什麼樣的稱謂才是你想要的 如果你是研究生 博士 或是教授 一個38歲的經濟學教授會說: 「我是經驗主義者」 「我只相信數據資料。」 而數據顯示非常清楚 沒有任何的理論真正成功過 20世紀或過去一百年來 有數不清的慘痛案例 過去有學派或其他人試圖分析 過去或預估未來經濟 結果慘不忍睹 所以經濟學界變得比較謙虛了 我敢保證 他們的人還是 臭屁到不行 但現在令他們自豪的是公正的態度 而他們也看到未來 一片光明的極大潛能
And this nonpartisanship is something that exists, that has existed in secret in America for years and years and years. I've spent a lot of the fall talking to the three major organizations that survey American political attitudes: Pew Research, the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center, and the most important but the least known is the American National Election Studies group that is the world's longest, most respected poll of political attitudes. They've been doing it since 1948, and what they show consistently throughout is that it's almost impossible to find Americans who are consistent ideologically, who consistently support, "No we mustn't tax, and we must limit the size of government," or, "No, we must encourage government to play a larger role in redistribution and correcting the ills of capitalism." Those groups are very, very small. The vast majority of people, they pick and choose, they see compromise and they change over time when they hear a better argument or a worse argument. And that part of it has not changed. What has changed is how people respond to vague questions. If you ask people vague questions, like, "Do you think there should be more government or less government?" "Do you think government should" — especially if you use loaded language -- "Do you think the government should provide handouts?" Or, "Do you think the government should redistribute?" Then you can see radical partisan change. But when you get specific, when you actually ask about the actual taxing and spending issues under consideration, people are remarkably centrist, they're remarkably open to compromise.
這樣無黨派立場的存在 必須是不為人知的 在美國好幾年來都是如此 我大概整個秋天 都在跟美國三大 政治態度民調機構討論 其中包括皮尤研究中心 芝加哥大學全國意見研究中心 還有最舉足輕重卻鮮為人知的 美國選舉研究中心 它是全世界歷史最悠久 最具公信力的 政治態度民調中心 從1948年就開始做調查 調查中顯出一個共通點 就是美國幾乎找不到 完全忠於某種主義的人 始終認為:「不能課稅 我們要限制政府的權力範圍。」 或是「不 我們堅持政府 扮演要角 政府要重新分配資源並改掉 資本主義的壞毛病。」 這種群體少之又少 大多數人都東挑西揀 找到折衷方案並在發現 更好或更糟的論點時 改變立場 這種現象一如往昔 改變的是人們回答 籠統問題的方式 如果你問別人籠統的問題 例如 「你認為政府要多干涉還少干涉經濟?」 「你認為政府應該...」尤其是 你用有偏見的方式去問時 「你認為政府應該提供救濟金嗎?」 或是「你認為政府應該重組嗎?」 如此你就會發現極端的政治立場 但若你再更具體一點 如果你問 關於實際稅制與開銷等 值得注意的議題 人們很明顯地變中立 他們很樂意妥協
So what we have, then, when you think about the fiscal cliff, don't think of it as the American people fundamentally can't stand each other on these issues and that we must be ripped apart into two separate warring nations. Think of it as a tiny, tiny number of ancient economists and misrepresentative ideologues have captured the process. And they've captured the process through familiar ways, through a primary system which encourages that small group of people's voices, because that small group of people, the people who answer all yeses or all noes on those ideological questions, they might be small but every one of them has a blog, every one of them has been on Fox or MSNBC in the last week. Every one of them becomes a louder and louder voice, but they don't represent us. They don't represent what our views are.
所以以後談到政治懸崖的時候 別想說這是美國人民完全 不能達成共識的議題 而我們一定得選邊站 把國家一分為二 應該想說這只是一小群 老不修的經濟學家 和不誠實的理論家利用了這個議題 他們用似曾相似的方法 來利用這個爭議 用主要體系來慫恿 某一小群人發聲 因為那一小群人 那群對於思想面的問題 全部答是或否的激進份子 他們可能是少數 但是每個人 都有一個部落格 每個人上禮拜至少都上過 Fox或MSNBC的節目 每個人說話的份量也越來越大 但他們不能代表我們 他們的想法不代表就是我們的
And that gets me back to the dollar, and it gets me back to reminding myself that we know this experience. We know what it's like to have these people on TV, in Congress, yelling about how the end of the world is coming if we don't adopt their view completely, because it's happened about the dollar ever since there's been a dollar. We had the battle between Jefferson and Hamilton. In 1913, we had this ugly battle over the Federal Reserve, when it was created, with vicious, angry arguments over how it would be constituted, and a general agreement that the way it was constituted was the worst possible compromise, a compromise guaranteed to destroy this valuable thing, this dollar, but then everyone agreeing, okay, so long as we're on the gold standard, it should be okay. The Fed can't mess it up so badly. But then we got off the gold standard for individuals during the Depression and we got off the gold standard as a source of international currency coordination during Richard Nixon's presidency. Each of those times, we were on the verge of complete collapse. And nothing happened at all. Throughout it all, the dollar has been one of the most long-standing, stable, reasonable currencies, and we all use it every single day, no matter what the people screaming about tell us, no matter how scared we're supposed to be.
這讓我回想到美元的問題 我不禁回想 提醒自己說 我們有過類似經驗 我們了解實際情況 那些在電視上 國會上的人 威脅說如果我們 不全盤採納他們的意見 世界末日就會到來 因為從我們開始有美元以來 他們一直是如此 傑佛遜和漢密爾頓的爭論也是如此 也就是1913年關於聯準會的那場惡鬥 成立聯準會時 掀起一股 惡毒憤怒的爭論 吵著聯準會要如何組成 而多數人同意的組成方式 其實是最糟的妥協辦法 這個辦法絕對會瓦解一個寶貴的東西 也就是美元 但大家又互相附和說 只要有金本位制度即可 聯準會不可能會搞砸的那麼嚴重 但接下來我們脫離金本位 因為 經濟大蕭條的引響 我們脫離金本位 認為這是國際貨幣一致性的開端 尼克森總統任職期間廢除了金本位制 每次危機時我們都如履薄冰 但其實什麼事也沒發生 整體來說 美元一直是 最長效 最穩定 最理性的貨幣 而我們每天都會用到美元 無論別人怎麼激動的對我們說 無論我們有多害怕
And this long-term fiscal picture that we're in right now, I think what is most maddening about it is, if Congress were simply able to show not that they agree with each other, not that they're able to come up with the best possible compromise, but that they are able to just begin the process towards compromise, we all instantly are better off. The fear is that the world is watching. The fear is that the longer we delay any solution, the more the world will look to the U.S. not as the bedrock of stability in the global economy, but as a place that can't resolve its own fights, and the longer we put that off, the more we make the world nervous, the higher interest rates are going to be, the quicker we're going to have to face a day of horrible calamity. And so just the act of compromise itself, and sustained, real compromise, would give us even more time, would allow both sides even longer to spread out the pain and reach even more compromise down the road.
我們目前的長期財政規劃 我認為最令人生氣的是 如果國會能夠 不要一味的爭論到底誰贊同誰反對 也不是告訴我們如何 達成最好的協議 而是他們能夠實際開始 妥協的過程 情況馬上就改善了 真正恐怖的是 全世界都在看 恐怖的是 越慢找到解決方法 美國留給別人的印象 再也不是全球經濟的穩定基石 而是一個連自家內鬨也解決不了的笑話 我們把問題拖得越久 就會讓全世界更緊張 利率會節節攀升 我們得更早被迫面對 危機爆發的一天 只有真正去執行妥協的動作 執行真正能永續的協議 才能爭取更多時間 也能讓兩黨有更多時間 分散疼痛 在未來才能繼續達成更多協議
So I'm in the media. I feel like my job to make this happen is to help foster the things that seem to lead to compromise, to not talk about this in those vague and scary terms that do polarize us, but to just talk about it like what it is, not an existential crisis, not some battle between two fundamentally different religious views, but a math problem, a really solvable math problem, one where we're not all going to get what we want and one where, you know, there's going to be a little pain to spread around. But the more we address it as a practical concern, the sooner we can resolve it, and the more time we have to resolve it, paradoxically. Thank you. (Applause)
而我在媒體界工作 我想我有義務實現理想 就是促成可能的解決之道 不是用含糊半帶威脅的態度去討論 那樣只會加劇分裂 我們應該單純就當前情況去討論 不是把赤字懸崖看成已發生的樣子 也不是把危機看成 兩種信仰之間的鬥爭 而是看成一道可以解決的數學題目 一個我們無法解決的面面俱到的問題 而這個解決辦法需要大家一起分擔一點痛苦 但用越實際的眼光去看待這個問題 就越快可以解決 相對的 我們如此以來會有更多時間可以解決問題 謝謝 (掌聲)